Islam in Perspective

A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law

Patrick Bannerman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415830775
• eBook ISBN: 9781134608935
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Regional Studies

There has been a significant upsurge of western interest in the political manifestations and significance of Islam in the last decade, fuelled by the notion of Islamic 'revival', the Iranian revolution and by events in countries as diverse as Egypt, Pakistan and Sudan.

Oil power and its effect on the international economic order, the relationship of Muslim countries with the superpowers and the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict have also served to focus attention on Islamic politics and, in particular, on the notion of Islamic reassertion.

As the author of this book argues, one result of this interest has been the development of a view of Islam as monolithic and implacable. He takes a broad view of the intellectual and cultural history of Islam, emphasising the extraordinary diversity of Islamic societies and the ways in which the ideal is often pragmatically adapted to reality. In this wider social and historical context, the nature of Islamic revival is then reassessed.

First published in 1988.

1

Ways of Looking at Islam

Introduction

Five main reasons were cited in the Introduction for the fact that ‘misunderstandings of Islam and its theories and practices are rife, fundamental errors concerning the history of Islam are continually repeated, and a very confusing picture of the historical and political perspectives which influence the views of Muslims is presented’.¹ Of these, the most glaring is that non-Muslim commentators too often address the subject on the simplistic assumption that Islam is monolithic, thus ignoring the remarkable diversity to be found in reality. Admittedly, some Muslim writers also perpetuate the myth,² but it is a fundamental misconception which has been neatly summed up by one commentator, who asks:

Why should Islam be any more one-dimensional than say Christianity or Marxism, to mention just two of its ideological counterparts? … But in their overwhelming preoccupation to explain the current Islamic revival, the modern Islamicists rarely ask themselves why Islamic praxis should be any less varied, any less multidimensional, any less divergent from its doctrinal ideal than other ideologically inspired and defined social behaviour.³

One answer is that many of the non-Muslim commentators perceive Islam — and in particular, the Islamic revival — as both alien and hostile, and that such a flawed interpretation is characteristic of those who perceive a particular ideological group as alien and hostile. Thus, American Russophobes attribute to Soviet leaders a devotion to Marxist ideology and principles far more rigorous than the devotion to capitalist and Christian principles which they require in their own leaders, while Soviet leaders attribute to the West generally and to the United States in particular a doctrinaire capitalist orthodoxy which is both false and unrealistic.

It is certainly the case that the exceptions to the general rule tend to a more sympathetic and perceptive view of Islam and stress the diversity. Thus, one leading authority comments that ‘while there is a unity in Islamic belief, there is also a variety of understandings both as to its implications and its implementation’, and refers to ‘the divergence (ikhtilaf) of thought and action which has existed and continues to exist in the Muslim world’. Similarly, another notes that

the only definite thing one can say about the term ‘Islam’ is that it is Protean and imprecise. Every Muslim can agree that the profession of faith, ‘there is no God but God and Muhammad is his Prophet’, is an article of faith and not susceptible to differing interpretations, but there is little agreement that many other principles and ideas mean the same to everyone and are beyond question and change.⁴

As for Muslim commentators, the answer may be that an unwillingness to address the state plurality to be found in the Muslim world and to reconcile it with the concept of the universal umma has caused them to concentrate upon the unity of Islam and upon theory and doctrine. A subsidiary reason might be an unconscious belief that only in this way will it be possible for the Muslim world to hold its own against competing ideologies. Again, however, there are exceptions. One scholar, for example, has pointed out that

Muslims do not have a unified and monolithic perception of their faith any more than the followers of other great religions. However much the orthodox dislike it, different groups of Muslims interpret the various Quranic injunctions and Prophetic sayings differently — each according to its historical background, and the realities encircling it — and not always in terms conducive to a dictatorial conduct of individual and social affairs.⁵

These quotations serve to illustrate a number of problems about the approach of some commentators. There are widely divergent interpretations of even the most fundamental issues. Compare, for example, the different views on the nature, qualifications, and attributes of the imam as between Sunnis, Shi'a, Zaidis, and the Ibadhis; or differing views on the doctrine of taqiyya (prudential caution, often mistranslated as ‘dissimulation’).⁶ Moreover, since differing interpretations and attitudes depend in part on the historical, geographical, cultural, and political context, it is unwise to attribute to the entire Muslim community the views and attitudes of one particular national group. It is even more misleading, if not positively dangerous, to extrapolate to the entire Muslim community the experiences, interpretations, and professed attitudes of that relatively small, though influential, group, the intellectuals, on the rare occasions when they exhibit some degree of unanimity: for the great majority of Muslims do not normally concern themselves overmuch with doctrine and theory, preferring to devote their energies to more mundane but necessary occupations such as making a living. This is not to suggest that they are not devout and sincere Muslims, that they neither think or care about Islam, or that they will be indifferent to the exhortations of the activists and theoreticians. Nor does it mean that they are uncultured, since

a recent analysis of the contemporary Arab experience applies to the Muslim world in general. ‘Whether one wishes it or not, the Arab masses, while sometimes illiterate or, more generally, under-educated, are, to repeat, profoundly cultivated. This subconscious heritage in which village civilization and desert civilization, Koranic heritage and poetic heritage are intermingled is not unimportant.’⁷

In addition, as has been seen particularly in Iran, the populace can be profoundly stirred by an appeal to particular elements in that heritage to lend active and enthusiastic support to the activist or ideologue without necessarily fully understanding or being fully committed to the message. Finally, observers are prone to a too ready acceptance of the idea that the interpretation of ‘the Quranic injunctions and the Prophetic sayings’ is as much a part of the divine revelation as the revelation itself.

Conventional ways of looking at Islam

More fundamentally, there is an essentially flawed perception of Islam. Commentators, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, are generally agreed that Islam is more than just a religion in the narrow Western sense of faith, ritual, and dogma, that ‘it is a complete way of life, catering for all fields of human existence. Islam provides guidance for all walks of life — individual and social, material and moral, economic and political, legal and cultural, national and international’. A variant formula is that ‘it comprehends and fulfils all the requirements of life past and future until the end of human existence on the earth whether these requirements are spiritual, material, political, economic, social, moral, intellectual or aesthetic’.⁸ Although terminology may differ somewhat there is general agreement on the bases of these formulations in both traditional and more recent speculative literature on Islam. There is, however, an all too common tendency to pay lip-service to the concept and then to revert to usage which clearly indicates that Islam is seen primarily as a religion in the narrow sense of the word, albeit one which is deemed either to have overriding authority in political, cultural, social, economic, and legal matters, or to have at least considerable significance in those areas. Analysis, therefore, tends to identify Islam as a factor in politics, and so on, and in so doing to define it, by implication at least, as an extrinsic and holistic influence upon normal activity. However, this does not reflect reality and it is more accurate to talk of Muslim political, legal, and economic systems, in the particular sense that there are political, legal, and economic structures which are consistent with the basic principles and precepts of Islam and a manner of conducting activity within these structures which is held to be equally consistent. However, this should not be taken to suggest that there is a single and distinctive structural model applicable throughout the Muslim world, since this would be to deny the effects of practice, a matter which will be treated in more detail later. Nor does it imply that Muslim political, legal, and economic systems are radically different from those of other ideologies, for the differences, such as they are, are primarily in inspiration, focus, and articulation, as will be demonstrated.

How, then, should Islam be defined or perceived? It has been suggested that ‘in the last analysis, it does not matter what non-Muslims say about Islam, whether in interpreting its meaning or its political import’⁹ — a view which has been echoed by many Muslims, some of whom go further and deny to the non-Muslim any locus standi to engage in debate about or examination of the proper definition of Islam and how it should be perceived. There is something in this argument, since in the last analysis Islam must be what Muslims believe it to be: but that is a partial answer only. Thus, for example, the standard, if somewhat ritual, definition of Islam is ‘the complete submission of man before God’, ‘submission to the will of God’, or ‘total submission to the divine will’.¹⁰ However, this is a remarkably passive and negative description of what is an essentially active and positive action.¹¹ A more acceptable general definition would be ‘a willing and active commitment to compliance with the will of God’, or, as one eminent Muslim put it, ‘Islam invites man to commit himself exclusively to his Creator, to harmonise his will with the will of God and to recreate the world with this noble commitment.’ He indicated how this might be achieved and placed his definition in a contemporary context by continuing that ‘the mission towards which Islam invites man is to harness all material and human resources for the promotion of virtue, justice and peace’.¹²

However, although it is reasonable to argue that Islam is what Muslims believe it to be, it is not reasonable to restrict the expression of that belief to what they say: what they show by their actions is, in their view, incorporated into, or accepted as part of, the totality of Islam, is often rather different to what they say, but is certainly important. The relationship between theory and practice implied in this is therefore an important factor, although it has been largely ignored in the modern literature by both Muslim and non-Muslim authors. Inevitably, there are exceptions, and some do clearly perceive the relationship. One scholar has commented, for example, that religion provides ‘a basic plan into which are integrated all the activities of the society, economic, social, intellectual’. Having defined what he chooses to call the ‘Islamic vision’, he points out that it

informs the whole life of society and of individuals in the Islamic world. This does not mean that the vision or religious belief absolutely determines the whole way of life, for there are various aspects which have a relative autonomy, but it exercises a certain control or pressure on the whole.¹³

Modern schools of thought

There have been attempts to categorize schools of thought and trends, particularly those of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although terminology varies considerably, there appears to be general agreement that there were four main trends, which might be broadly defined as:

(a) orthodox convervatives;

(b) quasi-orthodox conservatives;

(c) modernizing reformers;

(d) conservative reformers.¹⁴

The ‘orthodox conservatives’ argue that Islam is a comprehensive, complete, and perfect system which neither needs nor is susceptible to change. The proper application of Muslim principles and Muslim law is sufficient to deal with all problems and difficulties facing humankind at all times. They are not necessarily against modernization and economic development, but are suspicious of both as possibly alien influences and possibly corrupting factors, because of their identification with the non-Muslim world. Ideas, however, are another matter, and they will have no truck with imported (usually Western) ideas and intellectualism. They are, in effect, dedicated to the principle of taqlid (imitation) or ‘the unquestioning acceptance of established schools and authorities’.¹⁵ The ‘quasi-orthodox conservatives’, normally associated with the establishment and the ruling elite, hold similar views; but they are under pressure and, in practice, find it necessary to deal pragmatically with intrusions of Western influence, both material and intellectual, and with the imposition of Western practices on Muslim countries. In so doing, they have recourse to the time-honoured Muslim practice of hiyal (legal casuistry), though they would not necessarily admit to it. Hiyal have been neatly summed up, incidentally, as

‘legal devices’, which were often legal fictions. They can be described in short as the use of legal means for achieving extralegal ends, ends that could not be achieved directly with the means provided by the shari'a whether such ends might or might not be in themselves illegal.¹⁶

The ‘modernizing reformers’ seek to reinterpret the fundamentals of Islam in the light of existing and constantly changing circumstances. Taqlid is opposed root and branch and the use of ijtihad is seen not only as permissible but as obligatory. They favour a process of synthesis between the essentials of Islam and the ‘best of the West’, and argue that adaptation and assimilation into a genuinely Muslim format is possible. Their attitude might be best characterized as ‘accommodationist’ and pragmatic, and they would approve wholeheartedly of President Boumedienne's comment to the Lahore summit meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference that

human experience in many regions of the world has shown that spiritual bonds, be they Islamic or Christian, have not been able to resist the violent blows of poverty and ignorance, for the simple reason that men do not care to go to heaven with an empty belly.¹⁷

The ‘conservative reformers’ insist that bida (innovation and corrupt practice) must be ruthlessly extirpated, that taqlid is wrong, and that ijtihad is essential. However, they tend to set limits to the use of ijtihad and argue that the solution is not synthesis but a return to their concept of the ideals, practices, and principles of the ‘Golden Age’ of Islam.

However, this scheme clearly requires a fifth category to cover those (for example, Hassan al Banna, Qadhdhafl, Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, and Khomeini) who originally followed one of the trends outlined in the previous paragraph but whose thinking has developed to the point where they no longer fit comfortably into the mainstream: those sometimes described as ‘non-conformist’.¹⁸ All except Qadhdhafi have had a significant impact on attitudes in the Muslim world, while Qadhdhafl is significant because he has faced up to a number of difficult questions which others have either failed to perceive or have not wished to perceive. In so doing he has taken the argument to its logical conclusion, though that conclusion — that the bulk of the corpus of doctrine, dogma, and law is man-made and therefore can be ignored — is hardly palatable to more orthodox thinkers.¹⁹

The literature also identifies, at a less sophisticated and intellectual level, four broad strands in the way in which...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. Ways of Looking at Islam
• 2. The Law
• 3. Concepts of State Government and Authority
• 4. International Relations and International Law
• 5. The Islamic Economic System
• 6. Intellectual Influences, Part I — The Indian Subcontinent
• 7. Intellectual Influences, Part II — Egypt
• 8. The Islamic Revival
• 9. The Extremists
• 10. Envoi
• Notes
• Glossary of Technical Terms
• Biographical Notes on Major Historical Figures
• Suggestions for Further Reading
• Index