Images Of Japanese Society Hb

Ross Mouer, Yoshio Sugimoto

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781136189975
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Anthropology
• Index: Social Sciences

The popular image of Japanese society is a steroetypical one - that of a people characterised by a coherent set of thought and behaviour patterns, applying to all Japanese and transcending time. Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto found this image quite incongruous during their research for this book in Japan. They ask whether this steroetype of the Japanese is not only generated by foreigners but by the Japanese themselves.

This is likely to be a controversial book as it does not contribute to the continuing mythologising of Japan and the Japanese. The book examines contemporary images of Japanese society by surveying an extensive sample of popular and academic literature on Japan. After tracing the development of "holistic" theories about the Japanese, commonly referred to as the "group model", attention is focused on the evaluation of that image. Empirical evidence contrary to this model is discussed and methodological lacunae are cited. A "sociology of Japanology" is also presented.

In pursuit of other visions of Japanese society, the authors argue that certain aspects of Japanese behaviour can be explained by considering Japanese society as the exact inverse of the portayal provided by the group model. The authors also present a multi-dimensional model of social stratification, arguing that much of the variation in Japanese behaviour can be understood within the framework as having universal equivalence.

Chapter 1

Japanese Society: Stereotypes and Realities

I The Recent Interest in Understanding Japanese Society

Over the last two decades interest in Japanese society has grown remarkably, both within Japan and overseas. This development has resulted in part from Japan’s emergence as an economic power. The apparent suddenness with which Japan appeared on the world stage stimulated many to ask how Japan’s ‘economic miracle’ was achieved. During the seventies a large number of books on Japan were published. Many of these sought to make Japan’s success story seem plausible by emphasizing the ways in which Japanese national character or Japanese culture had contributed to the process of modernization. The boom in literature emphasizing one unique facet of the Japanese character or another is evident not only in Japan itself but in other countries as well. Today there are not many disciplines in the social sciences in which the uniqueness of the Japanese is not stressed by at least some.

Significance has been attached to the study of Japanese society for a number of reasons. There are the mundane concerns of business firms competing against or negotiating with Japanese economic organizations. On the national level, there are the larger problems of dealing with certain domestic dislocations often blamed on Japan’s aggressive marketing and social dumping, and with obtaining specific technologies being developed in Japan. In addition to these immediate concerns, the Japanese experience is also seen as significant in the study of some larger problems associated with industrialization.
1. Interest in the Sources of Industrialization. For many in the developing economies, Japan is seen as a model to emulate. The Karachi plan which emerged in the early sixties, for example, was based on the notion that the high levels of education attained in Japan were crucial to the nation’s successful economic development (Duke: 1966; Nakayama: 1975, pp. 93–7; Toyota: 1970). China also has shown an interest in Japan’s system of management (NKSC, 5 March 1980, p. 3) and in learning from Japan à la Vogel (ASC, 20 November 1980, p. 1). This interest is apparent in the images of Japan presented in the People’s Daily (Zhang: 1982) and in the problem consciousness which Chinese scholars have in regard to Japan (Liu and Jiang: 1982).

Traditional societies facing the onslaught of the industrialized world have experienced the various tremendous psychological traumas described by Fanon (1965 and 1967a). Elsewhere Goulet (1971) has written about the ‘cruel choice’. On the one hand, many in the ‘less developed countries’ feel that they must industrialize in order to prevent or at least limit the inroads made on their cultures by multinational enterprises and others from the ‘developed countries’. At the same time, to absorb the required industrial technology and to achieve economic independence, many of these societies will have to sacrifice the very cultural heritage they seek to maintain. The belief that Japan developed successfully while maintaining its cultural integrity has shifted attention from narrow considerations of economic efficiency, competitiveness in international markets and protectionism at home to a whole range of sociological issues concerning the role of political organization and cultural continuity in industrialization.

In an effort to ferret out the main ingredients accounting for Japan’s successes, scholars have compared Japan with various other countries (Beckman: 1962a; Ward and Rustow: 1964; and Black et al.: 1975). The literature on Japanese society now emphasizes the role of the governmental complex built around a highly developed bureaucracy, a strong sense of national identity, respect for education, paternalistic orientations behind the notion of labor-management cooperation and consensus in decision-making, enthusiastic acceptance of benevolent guidance, the work ethic and an inclination to save. Regardless of which aspect is emphasized, it is common for considerable attention to be given to the Japanese value system, and the Japanese are commonly seen as having economic values similar to those associated with Weber’s Protestant ethic in the West (such as hard work and thrift). Yet the apparent absence of other values commonly associated with the West (such as individualism, rationalism and universalism) has also been frequently noted. Accordingly, many began to ponder whether there is in Japanese society a certain cultural predisposition which has promoted economic growth. This is true not only of the rather superficial discussion in Kahn (1970), but also of more sophisticated depictions of Japanese society. Although Vogel (1979a), for example, explains that his interest is in structures and not in values (p. ix), there is a tendency in the body of his argument to accept ‘structured consensus’ as a ‘pre-programmed’ or given cultural value.
2. The Interest in Competing with the Japanese. In recent years, many in the developed world also became interested in Japan. Confronted by the ‘Japanese challenge’, many realized in the late sixties and the early seventies that Japan was a force to be reckoned with not only in world markets overseas but increasingly at home in their own domestic economy (Kahn: 1970; Guillain: 1970; Hedberg: 1970: and von Krookow: 1970). The initial concern of policy-makers was the development of defensive strategies to deal with Japanese competition in the international economy, with domestic unemployment caused by Japanese imports, and with the prospects of Japanese involvement in economic decision-making resulting from growing levels of Japanese investment. The policies adopted to deal with these types of problem obviously emerged from some perception of how such a competitive advantage had been generated. In this regard, as a kind of solace for those suffering from economic woes in their own country, it was easy for authors to conclude that Japan’s advantage resulted from social dumping, social orchestration and various other unacceptable practices.
3. Japanese Lessons for the Industrialized World. A more creative response to the Japanese challenge can be found in the suggestion that Japan’s competitive advantage resulted from a better system of education, a well-designed program of tax incentives or from some other structural innovation. The solution lay not so much in defensive withdrawal but in learning from the Japanese. Some–including Dore (1973), the OECD (1973a and 1977), Clifford (1976), Vogel (1979a), Cummings (1980), Gibney (1982), Ōuchi (1981a) and Pascale and Athos (1981a)–have gone so far as to suggest that Japan has not only industrialized successfully, but also solved many of the social problems associated with becoming a post-industrial society: alienation, crime, social disintegration and a certain loss of self-discipline. Dore even argues that as a ‘late developer’ Japan was able to adopt industrial technology and then create a post-industrial situation at the same time that an industrial society emerged. In other words, it developed initially with a ‘culture lag’ and was then already ‘post-industrial’ by the time that social changes began to occur. The Japanese economy progressed from being agrarian/feudalistic to being industrial/capitalistic to being post-industrial/welfare-coporate. However, the economy passed through the second stage so quickly that Japanese society did not really have time to develop social institutions commensurate with the intermediate type of economy. Moreover, some authors began to believe that many of the Japanese social structures found in the feudalistic stage are quite suited to the needs of post-industrial society, meaning that minimal amounts of social change and concomitant social dislocation have occurred in Japan.
4. Assessing the Pluses and Minuses of Japanese-style Development. In this fashion, then, the focus of attention has been shifted from considering the requisites for industrialization to considering how certain desirable features of Japanese society might be emulated in moving beyond industrialization. Despite these changes in focus, however, the major ingredients associated with Japan’s success have remained unchanged: national independence, high levels of literacy and the ability to process information, a uniquely Japanese form of industrial relations, the central role of the bureaucracy and, behind all this, Japanese values, which emphasize group loyalties, consensus and service to society. From this perspective, the Japanese experience is seen as a forceful lesson in how to do it.

At the same time, attention has also been given to some of the demerits of the Japanese experience (Ui: 1968 and 1971–4; Woronoff: 1979 and 1980; Halliday: 1975; Bennett and Levine: 1976; and Halliday and McCormack: 1973). The demerits include

(i) pollution and the stand-offish attitude taken by bureaucratic and corporate organizations toward the victims of pollution;

(ii) the artificially high population densities and the loss of privacy resulting from excessive concentration of the population in a few urban areas;

(iii) the psychological pressures and pathological effects arising from the excessive weight attached to the merit-oriented, rationalistic, universalistic norms commonly associated with examinations in Japan’s production-oriented system of education;

(iv) various forms of alienation common not only among factory and office workers alike, but also among senior citizens forced to retire prematurely without an adequate livelihood or sufficient opportunity to contribute to the larger community, and among students concerned about the scope and quality of their education;

(v) the utter imperviousness of bureaucrats to the aspirations and creative potential of local citizens who were seen as standing in the way of important national or regional development projects;

(vi) various types of invidious inequalities, not least of which is one concerning the status of women in Japanese society;

(vii) the extraordinary amount of social control which seems to characterize Japanese society–control that often dulls the rough diamonds which might otherwise inject into the postwar society that precious glitter associated with the idealism of youth culture in other societies around the world.

Putting aside for the moment questions concerning the accuracy of these images, it is clear that there are also those who view the Japanese experience critically, claiming that it also provides lessons in how not to do it.
5. The Debates on Convergence and Divergence. On a more theoretical level, the concerns discussed here have been central to the ongoing debate on convergence and divergence.[1] Condensed to its most common denominators, the debate originally revolved around the proposition of the convergence theorists, who suggested that there are two ways in which societies become increasingly alike as industrialization occurs. First, social structures become increasingly congruent. Second, the values of individuals in different industrializing societies become increasingly similar. Those emphasizing convergence argue that, despite dissimilar cultural origins and social traditions, societies with similar industrial technology will tend to produce common patterns in terms of the distribution of income and status within society. Those emphasizing divergence stress the importance of cultural continuity and argue that individuals in different societies will be likely to perceive and evaluate the same physical environment (including the same machines, etc.) in very different ways.

Although both views can be found in the literature on Japanese society, it is our impression that the divergence theorists have prevailed in the English-language literature on Japanese society. Moreover, it is largely from this perspective that the mysteriously strange and quaint aspects of Japanese society seem to have received an inordinate amount of attention in the overseas media whenever Japan is featured. In recent years a small minority has voiced dissatisfaction with the predominant view of Japanese society, but thus far it has had little success in dislodging the divergence theorists from their accepted position as the true interpreters of Japanese social realities for those in the mass media and for those in policy-making positions.
6. Internationalization and Japanese Society. Finally, in recent years attention has been given to the cultural and social aspects of Japan’s expanding presence around the world. The riots accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka on his visit to Southeast Asia in January 1974 seemed to jolt the nation’s consciousness. Since then, Japanese intellectuals have increasingly sought to address the social problems caused by the economic inroads Japan was making overseas. In this context, increased foreign aid, cultural and academic exchange and a better grasp of the host nation’s language were seen as solutions by some. In the meantime, others such as Nakane (1972a) and Kunihiro (1980) began to question whether some of these difficulties were the result of the Japanese having a unique set of social values and social structures. These scholars maintained that this uniqueness served to isolate Japanese abroad from the host society and to produce rather self-contained Japanese enclaves unable to interact with the local community. Others have begun to pay attention to the way in which the people of one nation come to form national stereotypes of the people in other countries (Iwao, Hagiwara and Mouer: 1980; Manabe: 1981; Broinowski: 1980; Chalmers and Mitchie: 1982; AJ, 26 March 1982).

Although observers have come up with different answers, there seems to have been considerable agreement as to what the central questions are. Obviously, the most pressing issues have changed over the years as the objective circumstances defining Japan’s relations with the outside world have changed. During the occupation there was great interest in how to learn or absorb Western or democratic habits of thinking from abroad. Later, the focus shifted to ways of importing technologies and management techniques which had their origins largely in the West. The two Nixon shocks, the oil crisis and the normalization of relations with China, produced yet other concerns. At about the same time, the sudden increase in direct Japanese foreign investment and the continued drive to export Japanese goods drew attention to the problems of Japanese people having to live and work in other societies. This is turn created an interest in the cultural shock and dislocations experienced when Japanese re-enter their own society after a prolonged absence abroad (Hoshino: 1981; Nagata and Nagata: 1980; Kobayashi: 1981).

While Japan’s overseas presence has been seen by many in the host countries as an economic challenge, some have been concerned with the social dimensions of the Japanese interface. In some countries, the Japanese are now taking their turn at carrying the ‘ugly man’s burden’. While the frequent and perhaps irksome clicking of cameras at tourist spots around the world may in fact be quite innocuous, the blatant commandeering of those visiting Korea, Taiwan and various Southeast Asian countries on ‘sex tours’ has aroused considerable anger. So too has the tendency of Japanese to establish enclave communities–behavior which is often interpreted as symbolizing total disregard of the local population, its traditions, its needs and its interests. One might also mention the changes which Japanese products and the accompanying commercialism have brought to lifestyles and ways of thinking in other societies. The Japanese presence is not yet as large or as conspicuous as that of American troops in various countries immediately after the Second World War. Nevertheless, the Japanese impact on specific societies has been considerable. Aware of these aspects of Australia’s new economic relationship with Japan, both public and private parties in Australia have begun to give this dimension and the area of mutual perceptions more attention (Stirling: 1981; Broinowski: 1980; and Chalmers: 1981).

II Competing Images of Japanese Society

The reasons for studying Japanese society are numerous. Many are interrelated. Some involve complex psychological and ideological needs. The way in which such factors have shaped the perceptions of the Japanese provide interesting subject-matter for those interested in the sociology of knowledge. Although the significance of the Japanese experience for those in both the developing and the developed countries is clear, commonly held images of Japanese society continue to be dominated by a maze of apparent paradoxes which defy understanding. Some of these are captured by the imagery in the title of Benedict’s classic, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946). The development of this imagery in the English-language literature on Japanese society has been documented by Glazer (1975), Minear (1980b) and others. On the one hand, the Japanese are seen as being militaristic and ruthless. On the other, they are characterized as being mild-mannered, polite and peace-loving. Economic organizations are described as being both the most competitive and the best orchestrated in the world. Closeness to nature is contrasted with the world’s worst examples of pollution. Some of the world’s greatest eccentrics are produced by the world’s most group-oriented society, where a supreme value is placed on conformity. One of the world’s most conservative societies somehow also produces some of its most radical student groups. The contemplative self associated with the Zen heritage and many Japanese traditions somehow coexists with the materialistic and hedonistic self in one of the world’s most consumption-oriented societies. While the list can be expanded ad infinitum, it is sufficient here simply to note that all these apparent contradictions are associated with one of the most stable societies in the world.

In the case of Japan, the paradoxical seems to be more pronounced by the ambivalence with which Japan’s economic successes are evaluated by many in the West. As the title of one book on Japan, The Fragile Blossom, suggests, there is something ethereal about Japanese realities (Brzezinski: 1972). Although Japan’s accomplishments are clearly perceived, many seem unwilling to acknowledge them publicly; accordingly, it is not uncommon for authors to suggest that the accomplishments may be fleeting. This equivocal view of Japan no doubt reflects the difficulty many Westerners have had in coming to grips with the Orient. Minear (1980a), for example, argues in his discussion of Said (1979) that scholarship on Japan has been colored by a notion of Western superiority which is commonly present in scholarly writing on other Asian societies. Those who admire Japan’s success emphasize the accomplishments–the remarkable improvement in the standard of living, high standards of education, social equality, cleanliness, freedom of speech, high social mobility, low levels of deviant behavior and organizational loyalty. Those skeptical of Japanese success emphasize the failures–crowded housing, inflation, ‘examination hell’, the poor and forgotten minority groups, industrial pollution, various situational constraints limiting behavioral choices, the rigidities of a society structured around hierarchical bureaucracies, high levels of alienation, political corruption and closed labor markets. Although observers are not agreed as to whether the lessons from Japan concern that which is to be learned or that which is to be avoided, there is little doubt that something can be learned from the Japanese experience. As Johnson (1982: p. 24) writes, ‘the impact of things Japanese on American society has never been more powerful, and the impact is spreading rapidly across American campuses’....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Copytitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• List of Tables
• List of Figures
• Dedication
• Preface
• 1 Japanese Society: Stereotypes and Realities
• Part One: Two Views: Competing Images of Japanese Society
• Part Two: Skepticism: Three Reasons for Doubting the Validity of Nihonjinron
• Part Three: The Obverse: Tales of Another Japan
• Part Four: Multiple Dimensions: Toward a Comparative Framework for the Study of Japanese Society
• Part Five: Relevance and New Directions: The Future of Japanese Studies
• Appendix: Methodology for the Survey of Job Situations
• Notes
• References
• Index