Implicit and Explicit Mental Processes

Kim Kirsner, Craig Speelman, Murray Maybery, Angela O'Brien-Malone, Mike Anderson

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781134778614
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Cognitive Psychology & Cognition
• Index: Psychology

The need for synthesis in the domain of implicit processes was the motivation behind this book. Two major questions sparked its development: Is there one implicit process or processing principle, or are there many? Are implicit memory, learning, and expertise; skill acquisition; and automatic detection simply different facets of one general principle or process, or are they distinct processes performing very different functions? This book has been designed to cast light on this issue.

Because it is impossible to make sense of implicit processes without taking into account their explicit counterparts, consideration is also given to explicit memory, learning, and expertise; and controlled processing. The chapter authors consider principles, processes, and models which stand above a wealth of data collected to evaluate models designed specifically to account for data from a specific paradigm, or even more narrowly, from a specific experimental task. The motivation behind this approach is the proposition that modeling is possible for a much broader data domain, even though there may be some cost where specific tasks are concerned. The aim of this book is to treat synthesis as the objective, and to approach this objective by collecting and discussing phenomena which--although they are drawn from diverse areas of psychological science--touch a single issue concerning the distinction between explicit and implicit processes.

I

INTRODUCTION

1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Kim Kirsner

University of Western Australia

Craig Speelman

Edith Cowan University

The motivation behind this book was the need for synthesis in the domain of implicit processes. The main questions that sparked the development of this book are as follows: Is there one implicit process or processing principle, or are there many such principles and processes? Are implicit memory, implicit learning, implicit expertise, skill acquisition, and automatic detection simply different facets of one general principle or process, or are they distinct processes performing very different functions? This book has been designed to cast light on this issue.

Because it is impossible to make sense of implicit processes without taking into account their explicit counterparts, consideration also is given to explicit memory, explicit learning, explicit expertise, and controlled processing.

This book is concerned with synthesis. The chapter authors were encouraged to consider principles, processes, and models that stand above a wealth of data collected to evaluate models designed specifically to account for data from a specific paradigm, or even more narrowly, from a specific experimental task (e.g., for lexical decision, fragment completion, and naming in the repetition-priming paradigm). The motivation behind this approach is the proposition that modeling is possible for a much broader data domain, even though there may be some cost where specific tasks are concerned.

By implication, it is our contention that the discipline of psychological science, and cognitive psychology in particular, has been dominated by analysis at the expense of synthesis. Where implicit memory is concerned, for example, this move has produced clear dissociations from explicit memory, but little consideration of the possibility that implicit memory data may reflect the same principle or even the same process as data from the skill acquisition and implicit learning paradigms, and that it could be merged at some abstract information-processing level with other implicit processes. John Anderson’s (1982, 1983, 1987, 1993) ACT* model of skill acquisition, for instance, can be generalized to account for many implicit memory effects as well as practice effects (Kirsner & Speelman, 1996).

This first chapter has been designed to provide a foretaste of the breadth of the book. In it we document a series of short sketches, each of which has been included to illustrate some point about implicit processes, or the contrast between explicit and implicit processes. The underlying point that this chapter has been designed to communicate is that implicit processes are not a mere artifact of laboratory research in experimental psychology, but a general property of mind, a universal cognitive feature. The aim of the introduction is to provide an idea of the number and diversity of phenomena that are touched by the contrast between implicit and explicit processes. The chapter is not exhaustive, but it touches nearly every part of the discipline.

SPONTANEOUS TRANSLATION

Consider the case of a 55-year-old patient, B.B. (K. Hird, personal communication, June, 1996). B.B. and his wife were Polish and fluent in that language as well as three others, English, French, and German. B.B. had a deep stroke involving arterial distribution to the left cerebral hemisphere and subcortical regions. The stroke had different effects on his comprehension and production skills. His comprehension of spoken English was unimpaired by the stroke, but his production was severely impaired, and it reflected both word-finding and grammatical difficulties. When asked questions in English, for example, he gave part of his answer in English but occasional words and even phrases were in French, even when he was asked to restrict his responses to English. When asked why he was using French, he denied that he had used French. But, more important for the current argument, when he was specifically asked to translate words and sentences into French, he was unable to do so. Thus, in B.B. we were able to observe spontaneous translation, from English to French, and the inability to translate from English to French under conscious control. B.B. was able to understand instructions given in English directing him to perform specific tasks, including the selective use of English and French, and he could perform many language comprehension tasks. However, when some tasks required an answer in English, he provided part of his answer in French, without awareness and in the absence of any instructions or intention to that effect. Thus, voluntary translation from English to French was impaired by his injury, but involuntary translation from French to English was at least partially intact. Here, then, is a person who has lost control over voluntary translation although his discourse demonstrates that he has retained residual translation skills.

AMNESIA AND MEMORY

B.B. provides an interesting parallel to studies of amnesic patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. When faced with a direct request to recall information about a specific event, Korsakoff patients are usually unable to recall information about that event. That is, they have a failure of “explicit memory.” But when they are invited to perform tasks the performance of which will be facilitated by an event, it is evident that the event has influenced performance in some way, for their response is faster or more accurate because of it. That is, their “implicit memory” is intact (see in this volume Dunn, chap. 6; Kirsner, chap. 2). The case of B.B. is slightly different, however. Although he could not translate on request, the underlying ability to translate between languages has been spared to some extent. The difference is that the demonstration of implicit memory and explicit memory requires qualitatively different responses, involving the use of information on the one hand, and knowledge about the original event on the other. The demonstration of spontaneous translation (Perecman, 1984) involves essentially the same response under explicit and implicit conditions, and the only distinction concerns the success or failure of the process that provokes that response. The task can be accomplished under routine or automatic language production conditions, but it fails under deliberate or willful conditions.

Another example of implicit processes involves the Tower of Hanoi (N.J. Cohen, Eichenbaum, Deacedo, & Corkin, 1985). The players in this game are given three small towers or poles, one of which has a set of rings of increasing size placed on it before the start of the game. The task for each player is to move all of the rings from the first tower to the third tower, using all three towers, and ending up with the rings in the same order, but without ever placing a big ring on a small ring. The game can be completed by an expert in a given number of steps, but beginners start with many more steps and gradually approach the optimum sequence used by the expert.

People suffering from amnesia behave in an interesting way when they are invited to play this game. They appear to learn the game just as quickly as people who are not suffering from amnesia. They not only behave as if they understand the rules, but also improve from session to session so that their performance pattern approaches and eventually attains the expert level, when they can complete the task in the smallest possible number of moves. But despite the appearance of normality, when they approach the task each day they talk as if it is a new task that they have not seen before. In other words, by the standards of verbal report they have learned nothing, even when their performance indicates that they are experts. This task falls between implicit memory and implicit learning. Amnesic patients cannot describe their experience with the task, and they cannot identify the features or rules that they used to solve the problem, indicants that are consistent with both implicit learning and implicit memory.

In some respects, then, B.B. and other cases of patients involving a dissociation between conscious and spontaneous translation provide a cleaner example of the distinction between explicit and implicit processes. Where memory is concerned, explicit and implicit retrieval conditions involve distinct tasks and therefore responses. But where translation is concerned the tasks and responses are identical, and the only difference involves the mechanism that triggers or provokes the translation process. The contrast between B.B. and a typical Korsakoff patient provides a useful starting point for this book because it identifies two situations for which the label implicit is appropriate, while hinting at the variety of phenomena that may be included under this umbrella. This book is rich in such contrasts.

CONTRASTS

Another obvious example of the variety of phenomena that have been labeled implicit involves the distinction between implicit learning and implicit memory. We already have provided an illustration of the contrast between explicit and implicit memory, involving amnesia. Implicit learning, however, is used to describe a situation where people gradually master new and complex perceptual or conceptual problems despite the fact that they cannot identify the feature or principle on which their new expertise is based (see in this volume O’Brien-Malone & Maybery, chap. 3; Roberts, chap. 7). Implicit learning appears to be different in several other ways from explicit learning. Not only does it occur without conscious awareness, but it is also indifferent to limitations in information-processing capacity and other variables. The contrast between explicit and implicit learning is used, therefore, to refer to the extent to that the student is aware of the stimulus features or qualities that he or she is using to master a particular problem.

Another and closely related contrast is that between implicit learning and the concept of implicit expertise. Whereas the notion of implicit learning is concerned with the extent to which a subject is ever aware of critical stimulus features (O’Brien-Malone & Maybery, chap. 3 of this volume), skilled performance or “implicit expertise” often involves a completely different transformation. As Speelman (chap. 8 of this volume) describes, implicit expertise refers to the situation where people are fully aware of the basis of their expertise during the early stages of skill acquisition, but as fluent performance is approached they become less and less aware of this information until, finally, as a polished performer, they have lost contact with the basis of their expertise entirely. In implicit learning, then, the subject is never aware of the basis of their skill. In expert performance, however, it is often assumed that people start out with a clear idea of the problem, but that, with practice, they may lose contact with the basis of their expertise (see also Speelman & Maybery, chap. 5 of this volume).

The proposition that implicit and explicit processes involve qualitatively different processes also has shaped much recent memory research. Evidence that amnesia reduces performance on explicit tasks such as recall and recognition memory without impairing performance on implicit memory tasks has been used to support inferences about the structure of memory including, for example, the hypothesis that performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks reflects the operation of distinct memory systems. However, an alternative perspective involves the use of processes rather than systems, and rests on the assumption that amnesia reflects damage to a specific type of retrieval process. As Dunn (chap. 6 of this volume) emphasizes, much debate in this area stems from conflict over the notion of a system, where this could be used with reference to either structural or functional criteria.

PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES

A distinction between explicit and implicit processes also has been made at an even earlier stage of processing, involving perceptual analysis (see MacLeod, chap. 4 of this volume). An experiment described by Marcel (1983a) suggests that semantic information can be extracted from words during brief presentation under conditions where the identity of the word is not known. In one study, he found that response times to test words were influenced by the meaning of a priming word that immediately preceded it, despite the fact that the prime word itself was not recognized. The experimental sequence involved presentation of three stimuli in rapid succession, a prime, a mask (which prevented identification of the prime), and a test word for lexical decision or naming. The implication of this finding is that semantic information about a word may be available, automatically, in the absence of conscious awareness. Thus, the semantic content of a word may become available before the viewer can identify the word, and before conscious processes are involved. A similar observation has been made with respect to processes involved with discourse comprehension (see Speelman, chap. 11 of this volume). The underlying assumption from these observations is that implicit or automatic processes activate all of the representations that might be relevant, after which explicit or conscious processes shape selection of the critical representation.

LEARNING

Whereas explicit and implicit memory concern different ways in which information is retrieved, the terms explicit learning and implicit learning are used to distinguish two ways in which new information is acquired. Explicit learning is used to refer to learning that occurs when people invoke active strategies to discover the rules or principles that underlie some task. Implicit learning, on the other hand, is used to refer to knowledge acquisition that occurs without a deliberate attempt to learn. These learning modes may be distinguished in several ways. Implicit learning, for example, operates outside consciousness, without intent, and with indifference to task demands or work load. Explicit learning, by comparison, depends on intent and conscious processing, and it is assumed to be sensitive to work load. The contrast also involves questions about cognitive development (see Maybery & O’Brien-Malone, chap. 9 of this volume) and neurological insult, the assumption being that implicit learning is relatively indifferent to each of these variables. Maybery and O’Brien-Malone give detailed consideration to the proposition that implicit processes are age-invariant. Their review indicates that there is widespread support for this assumption, in regard to implicit memory, implicit learning, and the application and use of automatic processes. According to O’Brien-Malone and Maybery (chap. 3 of this volume), however, there is no compelling evidence for the conclusion that implicit learning occurs outside of consciousness.

EVOLUTIONARY COGNITION

The proposition that implicit processes are age-invariant has an interesting parallel in evolutionary cognition. Are explicit processes restricted to humans, for example, or, given sufficient care over definitional issues, can explicit learning and memory processes be observed in nonhumans? Wynne (chap. 15 of this volume) demonstrates that, when explicit memory and learning are defined in ways that enable nonhumans to be considered, explicit processes can be inferred from their behavior. According to Wynne, therefore, questions about the relative position of implicit and explicit processes in cognitive evolution must remain open.

Another issue with evolutionary undertones concerns the possible contribution of individual differences to intelligence. According to Anderson (chap. 10 of this volume), traditional psychometric theories of intelligence generally are predicated on the assumption that intelligence is dominated by explicit knowledge and deliberate problem-solving strategies. According to Anderson, intelligence is not synonymous with knowledge, although it is dominated directly or indirectly by higher order strategies. However, Anderson concedes that it is the capability of being conscious that is crucial rather than the role of consciousness or awareness at a particular point in time. Thus, according to this point of view, evidence that a particular component process operates with or without awareness may not be the issue. The central issue concerns the extent to which that process is open to conscious control. Fletcher and Roberts (chap. 20 of this volume) evaluate this view with respect to intellectual disabilities. They explore the possibility that, although intellectual disabilities may be associated with a lack of conscious control in some forms of mental processing, implicit learning could be utilized to build up a repertoire of useful behaviors.

COMMUNICATION

Recent interest in the relationship between explicit and implicit processes has neglected communication to some extent, although this ultimately may provide one of the richest arenas for this issue. The study of reading processes has been an exception, however. Tunmer and Chapman (chap. 21 of this volume), for example, compare two views about the acquisition of reading, one of which focuses on implicit processes throughout skill acquisition, the other of which advocates a two-stage process in which implicit processes are eventually replaced by explicit processes. Speelman (chap. 11 of this volume) is more directly concerned with comprehension skills in the skilled reader. According to Speelman, comprehension is dominated by automatic processes, where these account for our limited awareness of the component processes involved in this skill, and for the importance of data-driven processes. Speelman includes provision for the roles of context and strategic control, however, and the question therefore involves the conditions under which automatic processes provide a sufficient explanation of performance.

The chapter by Hird and Kirsner (chap. 12 of this volume) is concerned with prosody, the term used to refer to the suprasegmental aspects of verbal communication. According to Hird and Kirsner, the control of prosody usually involves a mixture of controlled processes driven by communicative intent and “lower” or automatic processes, recruited by specific communicative intentions. Hird and Kirsner acknowledge, however, that the control of prosody may fluctuate from moment to moment as attention is dominated by the propositional as distinct from the pragmatic aspects of communication. Thus, when a propositional challenge is encountered, prosodic control may be restricted to implicit mechanisms, for reception and production. But, when the propositional challenge is reduced, for whatever reason, conscious control may be achieved. Another factor concerns the way in which conscious control processes influence prosody. This could involve direct processes, but the authors favor an alternative approach that emphasizes the role of perceptual targets rather than the detailed control of complex production mechanisms.

The role of prosody in the conveyance of emotions in speech can be illustrated with respect to two famous orators. Although few people would deny that Adolph Hitler exerted what is often referred to as “magnetic control” over his audiences at the Nuremberg rallies and elsewhere, this control usually is explained in generalities that focus on the content of the message rather than the quality with which it was delivered. However, almost any non-German speake...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Part I Introduction
• Part II Theory
• Part III Application
• Part IV Synthesis
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index