The Seven Years' War

Daniel Marston

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781135975173
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

The closest thing to total war before the First World War, the Seven Years' War was fought in North America, Europe, the Caribbean and India with major consequences for all parties involved. This fascinating book is the first to truly review the grand strategies of the combatants and examine the differing styles of warfare used in the many campaigns. These methods ranged from the large-scale battles and sieges of the European front to the ambush and skirmish tactics used in the forests of North America. Daniel Marston's engaging narrative is supported by personal diaries, memoirs, and official reports.

The fighting

World war

Overview of the war

Theaters of operation

The fighting during the war can be divided into distinct theaters of operation. The naval conflict was chiefly between the British and the French, as were the conflicts in North America and the Caribbean. On the North American frontier, the British suffered early defeats because the army was not properly trained or equipped to fight in wooded terrain. By 1758 these deficits had been remedied and the tide had turned in favor of the British. In 1760 the British launched a three-pronged attack against the last remnants of the French in North America, and by the end of the year they had achieved their aim of destroying the French presence in North America.

The western European theater of operations was in western Germany, between the French and the British-allied German armies. After initial defeats, the British-allied army rallied to protect the western flank of Prussia and secure Hanover against French occupation.

The central European theater of operations was the scene of the battles and campaigns of the Prussians, Austrians, and Russians. Most of the fighting occurred in Saxony, Silesia, Bohemia, and the Oder River region. Frederick began the war with the intent of striking against and occupying the wealthy province of Saxony. His strategy of 1757 was to deliver a knockout blow against the main Austrian army before the Russians had fully entered the war, and that year was marked by a series of major battles that nevertheless failed to deliver the vital victory that Frederick had wished for. His revised strategy in 1758 was to deliver attacks upon the Austrians and Russians that would prevent them from forming a united front, but his losses mounted and in 1759 his strategy changed radically, to one of strategic defense. His plan was to allow his enemies both to come against him and then to exploit the advantage of interior lines to defeat first one and then the other. He had selected this plan when he recognized that the Austrians and Russians were proving difficult to defeat when fighting on the defensive. The rest of the war was spent attempting to stop the Austrians and Russians uniting and destroying the main Prussian corps in the field.

The last theater of operations to be considered was on the Indian subcontinent. Chiefly, this was a war between two commercial enterprises, the French and English East India Companies. The war was on a small scale compared to the battles of Europe and North America, but the prize of dominance in India was nevertheless an important one. Both companies deployed locally raised troops, both native and European, reinforced by a sprinkling of regular troops provided by their respective governments. The campaigns began in Bengal in 1756 and were concluded in Britain's favor in 1757 after the Battle of Plassey. The conflict then switched to a southern region, the Carnatic, where the war took on a more European flavor. The French were first on the offensive in 1758, but were unable to hold the advantage for long due to reverses in the naval situation. British success in blockading the French navy meant that the French were effectively cut off from any hope of reinforcements by sea.

The naval war

The naval war was chiefly fought between Britain and France. The Royal Navy had a tonnage of 277,000 tons in 1755 and 375,000 tons in 1760. The French navy had 162,000 tons in 1755 and 156,000 tons in 1760. The British had feared that the French and Spanish would join in an alliance, because the combined force of the two nations would have exceeded that of the Royal Navy. In the event, Spain did not join the war until 1762, after the French had been swept from the seas, leaving Britain free to concentrate on this new naval opponent.

The Royal Navy engaged in three different forms of strategy during the war. The first was the seizure and destruction of the French trading fleet across the world's oceans, which denied the French government a large percentage of the revenue raised from the colonies and had the added benefit of increasing British revenue for the war effort. The second was the tying up and emasculating of the French fleet by blockade in its home waters. The third and final strategy was the combined operations role of the fleet in carrying the war to the colonies and France. This last role is dealt with later in the book. During the war, the Royal Navy was able to increase its numbers of ships both by construction and by seizure of French (and later Spanish) fighting ships. The Royal Navy

HMS George (right, first rate) alongside the launching of HMS Cambridge (third rate) in 1757. (National Maritime Museum)

built or captured 69 ships, whereas the combined French and Spanish navies only added a total of six ships to their fleets. The French navy's biggest problem was a lack of unified strategy at the government level, since opinion at the French court was divided between those who favored concentrating on naval and colonial warfare, and those who favored a war in Europe and felt that a naval war was secondary to the seizure of Hanover.

The naval term ‘ship of the line’ refers to three-masted, square-rigged vessels with 60 or more cannon on board (i.e. the minimum firepower to be able to stand in the line of

battle against an enemy). Ships with fewer than 60 cannon were referred to as cruisers and frigates. First rate ships carried 90–100 or more guns; second rate usually fielded 80–90 guns; third rate ships had 64–74 guns. Fourth rate ships (frigates) usually carried 50 guns. Fifth and sixth rate ships (cruisers) carried 24–40 guns. Each navy attempted to standardize its own ratings, but captured foreign ships and changes in design made this difficult. The Royal Navy return for 10 April 1759 lists the following: two ships of the first rating, 10 of the second rating, 40 of the third, 47 of the fourth, 32 of the fifth, and 60 of the sixth (Hardwicke Papers 35898).

Naval tactics in use at this time had been developed during the previous century. The most commonly used tactic was called line-ahead, which was similar to the linear formations of the land armies. The idea was for a squadron to form in line and attack the enemy fleet with a broadside fire along a continuous line. The ships would give covering fire to each other as they progressed down the line of the enemy. However, some admirals hoped for a melee or penetration of the enemy's line of ships, because otherwise battles could easily descend into ship-versus-ship engagements. Another advantage of the melee was that the line-ahead formation could be broken at a critical moment in battle to destroy fleeing enemy ships or penetrating ships. Royal Navy commanders had been given ‘Fighting Instructions’ that tied them rigidly to the line-ahead tactics. However, at various times commanders changed tactics and employed the melee. In the early part of the war, superior French shipbuilding gave them more maneuverability and thus a strategic advantage. By 1756 the British had recognized this and had begun to improve their own designs. They also examined and impressed any captured French ships into British service as soon as they were taken.

The Royal Navy deployed the majority of its fleet in the North American theater and in home waters, intending to disrupt the lucrative trade between France and her colonies as well as to protect Great Britain from a possible French invasion. The French

Admiral Edward Boscawen, victor of Louisbourg in 1758 and Lagos Bay in 1759. (National Maritime Museum)

navy was initially successful at the outbreak of war; it seized Minorca and reinforced New France. In 1757 the Royal Navy began to intercept French shipping in the Gulf of Mexico and seized a large quantity of prizes. They also began to blockade the major French ports in an attempt to seize or destroy French naval units, and seized neutral shipping, using the claim that the cargo was intended for the French market. The British government also hired privateers to search and seize French and neutral shipping. This policy upset many neutral states, but they were powerless to oppose it. British commercial shipping by 1758 had a naval protection force (convoy) to offset any French naval attacks, although French privateering efforts eventually accounted for about 10 percent of British commercial shipping.

The Royal Navy suffered reverses in 1757 and 1758 in the coastal expeditions against Rochefort and St Malo, and in the Louisbourg campaign of 1757. However, in 1758 the British Admiral Henry Osborne defeated a French force in Spanish waters attempting to relieve pressure on the Toulon fleet. The British Admiral Sir Edward Hawke defeated a French force near Basque Roads, which was preparing to sail to New France. The French inability to unite their Toulon, Brest, and Le Havre fleets to overwhelm the Royal Navy blockade was to be a decisive factor in these victories; the Royal Navy had the advantage in 1758 of bases such as Gibraltar close at hand, which enabled it to mask the Toulon base and develop new resupply methods for the fleet off Brest. The British also improved the port of Halifax in Nova Scotia, and this proved decisive in the campaigns against Louisbourg and Quebec. After the fall of the French naval base at Louisbourg in 1758, the Royal Navy could sail into the St Lawrence region at least a month earlier from Halifax and Louisbourg than if it had sailed from Great Britain. Only the break-up of the ice floes impeded its progress.

The year 1759 was marked by two decisive engagements that ended French naval attempts to gain a decisive advantage. The French Commodore, the Marquis de la Clue, sailed with 12 ships of the line from Toulon for Brest. The British Admiral Edward Boscawen, commander at Gibraltar, with 14 ships of the line, sailed to intercept the French. On 18 August the two fleets met off the Portuguese coast at Lagos. The British captured three ships and destroyed two others. The French withdrew and sailed for Lisbon, where the British blockaded them.

Even after the loss at Lagos, the French continued to prepare for an invasion of Britain to offset pressure on New France. In November 1759, a major part of the Royal Navy blockading force off Brest returned to port at Torbay due to a storm. The French decided to seize this moment and launch a naval attack. The French Admiral Hubert de Conflans sailed with 21 ships of the line and supporting frigates, and encountered some of the remaining Royal Navy ships. The British Admiral Edward Hawke shortly caught up with the French force, leading 25 ships of the line, plus various supporting cruisers and frigates. The French withdrew towards Quiberon Bay, hoping its natural defense of reefs would prevent the Royal Navy squadron from pursuing. The Royal Navy followed despite the dangers of rocks and reefs and on 20 November battle ensued. Hawke destroyed or captured seven ships while losing only two of his own, and the French withdrew further after being scattered. This was the last major French attempt to invade the British Isles; most of the French fleet remained in port for the rest of the war.

The Royal Navy continued to patrol off the various French bases. It also increased pressure on the French commercial fleets throughout the world. In 1760 France, due to the losses in New France and to her commercial fleet, had problems funding her war effort in Germany and paying the annual subsidy to Austria. The Royal Navy, with other areas secure, sought a more aggressive combined operations policy in the Caribbean against the French and, by 1762, the Spanish colonies.

1757

North America

Lord Loudon waited through the first months of 1757 for specific instructions for the campaign in North America. In April he was directed to attack the French naval port of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island. Louisbourg was a well-garrisoned and important base for the French navy. It also protected the entry to the St Lawrence River basin, which was the central route of trade for New France. Loudon was forced to withdraw many of his regular troops from the New York frontier to gather sufficient strength for the attack. By early July the British had assembled seven battalions of regulars in Halifax, where they awaited the naval squadron that would carry the force and engage any French naval units at Louisbourg. However, while they were wait...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• Chronology
• Background to war: Old enemies, new friends
• Warring sides: Linear and irregular warfare
• Outbreak: The gathering storm
• The fighting: World war
• Portrait of a soldier: A soldier of the British 68th Regiment of Foot
• The world around war: The civilian and economic cost
• Portrait of a civilian: The nun's story
• Conclusion and consequences: Ramifications for the future
• Further reading
• Index