Military Organization and Society

Stanislaw Andrzejewski

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781136253195
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Scienze sociali
• Subtopic: Sociologia

First published in 1998. This is Volume Vi of the eighteen in the Sociology of Work and Organization series. The author of the present book belongs to the sociological tradition that, starting from Montesquieu, includes such thinkers as Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. The idea formulated by Montesquieu is that there are important relations of interdependence amongst the various features of social life that characterize different societies, and he applied this idea in an attempt to discover the relations between the laws of society and other features of social life, the form of government, the religion, the economic institutions, usages of various kinds and geographical environment.

II

Stratification

A. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

How to estimate social inequalities

BEFORE proceeding to investigate the influence of military organization on social stratification, it is necessary, in view of the unsettled state of sociological terminology, to say a few words about the meaning of the terms used. A social stratum may be defined as an aggregate of individuals having more or less the same status in a given society. By status is meant the prestige enjoyed not because of individual peculiarities but in virtue of position occupied, i.e. the social role performed. I use the term ‘aggregate’ instead of the more obvious word ‘group’ because the latter implies that the relations between individuals constituting it are fairly close. This need not be so; as, for instance, in the case of medieval barons or Polynesian chiefs in sparsely populated areas. The only relation between its members which is indispensable for the existence of a social stratum is the mutual recognition of equal status. The consciousness of solidarity or antagonism towards other strata may or may not be present.

In spite of the simplicity of the definition, and of the fact that we all seem to know what stratum is, there is no dependable yardstick by which we could measure status. The forms of address and other visible forms of deference are obviously our sole indicators. But how can we tell when these are genuine and when spurious? An all-powerful dictator may be surrounded by a semi-divine halo, but those approaching him will call him ‘comrade’ in spite of their trembling knees. Or one may have to endure a waiter's impertinence in a British restaurant while being called ‘Sir’. And ‘Your obedient servant’ of the official document may not perhaps be approached without gestures of propitiation. Did women have higher status fifty years ago than they have today, as one would expect judging from the readiness of men to bow and show other signs of deference?

Moreover, while in some societies, as in Russia in the eighteenth century, a definite system of ranks may exist, in others there may be no clear delimitation between the strata, as in the contemporary West. The presence or absence of such delimitations does not depend on inter-stratic mobility, which can be extremely intensive and general in societies and groups where ranks are rigidly demarcated, as for instance in the Ottoman Empire. For the benefit of those not acquainted with sociological terminology I must add that the term ‘interstratic mobility’ designates ascending and descending movements of individuals on the ladder of social stratification. Generally speaking, the greater the differences in status the stronger is the tendency for the corresponding patterns of behaviour to become institutionalized, which involves a clear demarcation of groups to which they apply. This is particularly likely to happen in societies not undergoing rapid changes.

I have been speaking so far about differences in prestige which various groups enjoy. The next step is to consider how are they connected with the distribution of wealth. If we classify groups or individuals according to their wealth we may find that this classification does not coincide with the one based on status. This problem was exemplified in a question over which one of my South African students pondered in his essay: ‘is the status of a rich butcher higher or lower than that of a poverty-stricken professor?’ Or one can think of the very common phenomenon of impoverished noblemen scorning the newly rich, who acknowledge themselves the superiority of blue blood. In spite of such exceptions, however, we can say that in the long run an impoverished group will also lose prestige, while that of the enriched group will be enhanced. But we should remember that we are dealing with an extremely abstract phenomenon; we may ask—prestige among whom? There may be conflicting claims which have not yet been settled by general acceptance. Every group tries to foster its material interests and if it does not succeed it means it has no influence, no power. Lack of wealth, then, proves powerlessness; and prestige is essentially determined by power. The discrepancies between prestige and wealth must, therefore, be considered as transitional phenomena, except in the case of groups whose claim to superior status is based on religious capacity requiring ascetism.

Since we are studying here the influence of military organization on social structure, it would be tautological to define political stratification as the grouping of individuals according to their political power. In order to be precise I must add that by political I mean the aspect of social organization which is concerned with the regulation of the use of violence. The term political stratification’ will be used to designate the grouping of individuals according to their political rights. Political power may be exercised (i.e. the government may be influenced) in many ways: by passive resistance, unwillingness to fight, sabotage, bribery, moral reprimands, etc. Political rights differ from those channels of political influence in that they are claims to exert influence on the actions of the government, recognized by laws or customs. Generally speaking, the distribution of actual power tends to be reflected in the distribution of nominal rights, which, however, is also shaped by political ideas—perhaps a legacy of the past.

For the purpose of the present investigation I shall use the term 'social stratification’ to describe the combined result of the evaluation of status, distribution of wealth and of political rights. In other words, inequalities in respect of wealth, status and political rights will be lumped together for the sake of the economy of words, and called social inequalities.

Contrary to the common preconception, social inequalities may be extremely sharp in a society where interstratic mobility is very great. Thus, for instance, in the Ottoman Empire at its apogee all the highest officials began their careers as slaves; the Delhi Sultanate in India even had a slave dynasty; Mamluks, the military group ruling medieval Egypt, were on principle recruited from foreign slaves. The Maori, on the other hand, provide an example of a society where, though everybody's ‘station’ was determined by birth, social inequalities were not very great.

Basic Causes of Stratification and Basic Forms of Power

There is a tendency nowadays, due to the influence of Marx, to think of the causes of social stratification as being mainly of economic nature. It is true that differences in wealth can arise even in societies devoid of political hierarchy, provided that there is something that can be appropriated. Among the Kazaks, for example, whose political structure is very rudimentary, the primary basis of distinctions is wealth in herds. Those who lose their cattle may be reduced to servitude. Even more striking is the case of the Goajiro Indians, living on the Carribean coast of Colombia. This tribe abandoned hunting, and went over to pastoralism after receiving cattle from Europeans. This was followed by the rise of inequalities based on differences in the number of cattle possessed. The neighbouring tribes, which did not adopt cattle breeding, show no traces of stratification. Here, then, we have the clearest possible case of a change in economy producing social inequalities. It should be noted, however, that these inequalities are rather small. I have not been able to discover a tribe where great differences in wealth would not be accompanied by a political machine of coercion, enabling the wealthy minority to protect their wealth, except where it is already protected by magico-religious beliefs.

Any large group needs co-ordinating organs. Very often co-ordination cannot be done through consultation, but only through subordination. In a large community, therefore, some hierarchic organization is unavoidable; particularly when it comes to fighting. Peoples who could not evolve or adopt such organization were inevitably destroyed. Now, certain privileges must be given to those placed in positions of command. A plentiful supply of able aspirants can be secured only if such posts carry some privileges of at least honorary nature. Honorary distinctions are in a way psychological correlatives of attitudes of obedience and command, and are inseparable from any hierarchic organization. Also, wealth always inspires awe. A hierarchic organization, the higher rungs of which were worse paid than their underlings, could not work. The common bent of the poorer to court the favours of the richer would undermine discipline. Moreover, in all groups performing tasks not in themselves enjoyable supervisors must be privileged. Otherwise, they would make common cause with those they are supposed to force to work. The following account well illustrates the point. The Polish army, which was reconstituted in Britain in 1940 with men who managed to get there by various ways after the occupation of Poland and France, contained far more officers then required. As according to Polish military law a rank could be taken away only as a punishment, the superfluous officers were incorporated into all-officer units where they performed the duties of ordinary soldiers. It was interesting to watch how the conduct of individuals changed when they were transferred from such units to formations where they had functions corresponding to their rank, or vice versa. When they were in positions of responsibility and honours they were far more severe with themselves, more eager to do their duties. ‘La noblesse oblige.’

In every large society, then, there must be some sort of stratification, and, other things being equal, the larger the society the higher the stratification. But it must not be forgotten that the size of a society is only one of the factors determining its stratification. The American society must be more highly stratified than a band of Semang, numbering a few dozens of individuals; but social inequalities in the kingdom of Dahomey are more pronounced than in America. The Buinese society, pervaded by differences of status and wealth, was not larger than the egalitarian League of Iroquois. The size of the society sets only upper and lower limits to the height of stratification.

In nearly all societies social inequalities go far beyond what is necessary for the smooth working of administration. Once the habits of obedience become established, it is easy for those in positions of command to use their authority to extend their privi- leges. How far they will be able to extend them depends on the balance of power between the rulers and the ruled. We can imagine a sort of a tug-of-war between the two groups. But we should beware of taking this schema for reality, where there is no clear cut frontier between the rulers and the ruled. Our imaginary tug-of-war symbolizes the result of countless human actions and attitudes; attempts to increase one's share of wealth or enforce more accentuated forms of deference; resistance to such attempts on the part of others, alliances and counter-alliances etc; all effected through countless forms of pressure and counter-pressure which human beings can exert on one another, ranging from physical violence to gentle disapproval. The result of these interactions depends on many circumstances: the number of contending groups, their relative power and cohesion, their constellation, the technique of supervision and possibilities of sabotage, ease of maintaining secrecy, etc. Nor should we forget the influence of ideologies. To a certain extent the beliefs about what are the proper privileges of any group are shaped by actual practice. Generally, we are inclined to consider as just—we ‘expect’—what normally happens. This is what Ihering calls ‘the normative tendency of the actual’. Nevertheless, as I have tried to show in the article contained in the December 1949 issue of the American Sociological Review, the ideas must be considered as forces possessing considerable measure of independence.

The possession of wealth gives power. But as soon as we enquire into the meaning of the word ‘possession’, we see that the economic power is derivative. The terms: possession, property, ownership, designate the right to control, to use and dispose of objects, the access to which is prohibited to all except the owner. The norms, legal or customary, which support this control constitute, therefore, the foundations of economic power.

The basic rules of honesty are common to all peoples and form a part of the ethics of neighbourliness, indispensable to any kind of social life. Nevertheless, in highly stratified societies, consisting of a multitude of groups, frequently with divergent ethical norms, the poor often consider encroachments on the property rights of the rich not only as permissible, but even as meritorious. This popular opinion has found expression in tales, to be found all over the world, about good robbers who despoiled the rich and distributed their booty to the poor. Generally speaking, in societies where inequalities of wealth are extreme, the property of the rich is respected mainly because of the fear of punishment. Through early conditioning of generations, it is true, ‘habits of honesty’ can be inculcated, which are observed almost automatically. Nevertheless as the experience of revolutions shows, once the notion spreads that one can help oneself to the goods of one's richer neighbours with impunity, these habits disappear quickly.

We see then that economic power is not self-sufficient but derivative. On the other hand, the ability to compel through the use or the threat of violence is an irreducible form of power, which can exist without being supported by anything else. Spoliation is the usual fate of wealthy groups which do not wield political power. Plutocrats of Greek cities, Italian and German bankers in the epoch of the Renaissance, Chinese and Japanese merchants throughout history, provide examples to the point. The situation in the countries of Islam is well brought out in the following passage taken from the work of the greatest social philosopher of the Middle Ages—Ibn Khaldun (Prolegomenes Historiques, t. 2, Paris 1936, p. 293): ‘A burgess who possesses enough money and goods to be regarded as the richest man of the town draws upon himself envious looks, and the more he displays his wealth the more he exposes himself to be harassed by emirs and princes…. And when by some chicanery they manage to convict him of some offence … they take away his riches…. Everybody, then, who possesses great wealth … should have a protector who can shelter him … a member of the royal family, or one of the favourites of the ruler … or a leader of a party, strong enough to make the sultan respect him.’ The proverb ‘who pays the piper calls the tune’ does not hold if the piper is stronger and can rob the payer, as is shown by the outcome of the dealings of various financial magnates with Hitler. It is true that sometimes businessmen exercised considerable influence, even though they did not control the government, because they were indispensable. Thus the medieval lord obtained a share of the wealth produced by his burghers but he could produce none himself; he had, therefore, to give them various liberties.

In view of these facts it is not surprising that it is almost always those who wield the military power who form the supreme stratum of society. The pure plutocracy, that is to say, the rule of the rich who do not control the military power, can only be a temporary phenomenon. Purely economic factors produce, no doubt, fluctuations in the height of stratification, but, as the following evidence will show, the long-term trends are determined by the shifts of the locus of military power.

In all social conflicts violence is the argument of the last resort. Even where it is never used it stands in the background as the enforcement of the ‘rules of the game’. In a strike or a lock-out, business competition or electioneering, no violence may be used, but it is so because the police threaten with violence anybody who would use violence against other contestants. There are, of course, limits to what compulsion can do: it can enforce the grudging acquiescence and the execution of assigned tasks, if this can be effectively supervised; it cannot produce willingness to put out maximum effort or readiness to make sacrifices, and it stifles initiative. These consequences of a social order based on compulsion may have a very unfavourable influence on the quantity and the quality of production, thus leading to general impoverishment, which, however, need not affect the ruling group if it can alter the distribution of wealth even more in its favour. The passive resistance of the masses is most dangerous to the ruling group when the state is fighting for survival. At such times, if the willing co-operation of the masses is militarily essential, an effort must be made to win them over, to convince them that they are fighting for themselves. And the rulers who have to convince the masses to this effect may end by convincing themselves that their task is to serve and defend the People. For these reasons, the technical and military circumstances, which make the willing co-operation of the masses in the war effort more or less essential, are the most powerful among the factors which determine the extent of social inequalities.

Economic power is derivative, but the same cannot be said about power based on magico-religious beliefs. As a matter of fact, this power seems to be the earliest foundation of social inequalities. Many extremely simple societies, such as, for example, various Siberian tribes, with no traces of chieftainship, have shamans enjoying high status, unusual wealth and other privileges. Among the Trobriand islanders the power of the chief has a magical basis. He possesses, it is true, considerable wealth, acquired through polygynous matrimonial arrangements, which enables him to display generosity indispensable for maintaining his influence. The ultimate weapon, however, against disobedience and encroachment on his prerogatives is his sorcery, which is believed by the commoners to be of deadly efficiency. The power of the Church in medieval Europe was based on the firmly rooted belief that it was the intermediary between God and mankind. The wealth, which the Church accumulated in consequence of its power, far from being an element of strength, was a root of weakness. Its accumulation led to laxity among the clergy which undermined the people's devotion, and then the riches of the Church became an easy booty for princes and nobles. Perhaps the most striking example of the efficacy of magico-religious beliefs as a foundation of power is the supremacy which the Brahmins maintained in India for two thousand years. It is particularly remarkable that they, unlike the Egyptian or Catholic priesthoods, were never organized.

These few examples are sufficient to show that the magico-religious power, unlike the economic, is irreducible to any other form. For this reason we must make allowances for this factor, when ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK AND ORGANIZATION
• Full Title
• Copyright
• FOREWORD
• PREFACE
• Contents
• INTRODUCTION
• I OMNIPRESENCE OF STRUGGLE
• II STRATIFICATION
• III. THE SIZE OF POLITICAL UNITS AND THEIR COHESION
• IV. SUBORDINATION AND HIERARCHY
• V. THE EXTENT OF GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
• VI. M.P.R. AND FEROCITY OF WARFARE
• VII. CLASSIFICATION OF FORMS OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION
• VIII. BIATAXY AND POLEMITY
• IX. INTERSTRATIC MOBILITY
• X. TYPES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND TYPES OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE
• XI. REVOLUTIONS
• XII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
• XIII. A GUESS ABOUT THE FUTURE
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• GLOSSARY OF NEOLOGISMS
• INDEX