It is He who has sent this Scripture down to you [O Prophet]. Some of its verses are definite (muhkam) in meaningâthese are the cornerstone of the Scriptureâand others are ambiguous [or allegorical or symbolic] (muta-shabih)⌠only God knows the true meaning and those firmly grounded in knowledge. They say: âWe believe in it: it is all from our Lord.â
(Q. 3:7)
Throughout the centuries, Sunni scholars have made a systematic effort to project an image that the early Muslims had little or no dispute over the succession to Muhammad until the assassination of âUthman ibn âAffan, who succumbed to nepotism and failed to provide astute and disciplined leadership.1 This may be referred to as the Sunnis' harmonizing tendency to minimize the disparity between them and the Shiâis. Further, some have argued that this rift began only after Ali's caliphate (661), suggesting thereby that it was no more than a minor political struggle with little, if any, religious motivation.2 In addition, it is asserted that the proclivity or tendency toward the Shiâi world-view and the definitive schism became crystallized only after the massacre of Husayn, the Prophet's grandson, and his small group of devoted followers at Karbala, Iraq, in 680, an event that served as a catalyst in the formulation of a unique Shiâi identity.
Such a view, derived from tendentious Sunni historiographies, has recently been challenged by Henri Lammens, Leone Caetani, Maria Dakake, Wilferd Madelung, amongst others. Madelung reaches a tentative conclusion, based on evidence gathered from the Qur'an and by extrapolating from historical accounts, that there were acute disagreements over the succession and that Ali's followers had some justification, found both in the Qur'an and the prophetic hadith literature, to promote his candidacy. For instance, he cites several examples in which the Qur'an stresses the importance of blood ties (dhu al-qurba) and its superiority and priority over all other types of affiliations and bonds. In addition, he provides instances of previous prophets' authority and charisma being transmitted to their immediate family members, who had already been accorded an eminent position in the Qur'an and were considered to be their heirs. Thus, it would not be far-fetched to expect that Muhammad would have envisioned his succession in a similar light, for âInsofar as the Qur'an expresses the thoughts of Muhammad, it is evident that he could not have considered Abu Bakr his natural successor or have been pleased by his succession.â3 The Shiâis cite the incident that took place while Muhammad was on his deathbed as a self-evident proof that he wanted to appoint Ali as his successor. And yet âUmar rejected his request to have a letter of guidance âafter which you will not go astrayâ recorded on the grounds that the Prophet was delirious and because: âYou have the Qur'an, the Book of God is sufficient for us.â The Shiâis view both of these with misgiving and apprehension, for they hold that âUmar suspected that the Prophet might designate Ali as his successor.4
Asma Afsaruddin argues that the basis of support for the selection of Abu Bakr and the ensuing pro-Alid opposition was based on âthe Qur'anic paradigm of sabiqa and fadl/fadila to establish the legitimacy of the claims of their respective candidates to leadership of the polity and kinship had little role to play in this enterprise at this stage, but would acquire growing importance in the subsequent period.â5 However, the Arab society of that time was deeply anchored in tribal values according to which the kinship and ancient nobility ascribed to a certain clan or family were the primary marks of identity and source of authority. Moreover, even the Quraysh invoked kinship at the Saqifa gathering. During âUthman's reign one observes the large-scale reas-sertion of the pre-Islamic concept of authority. Afsaruddin, although aware of the tentativeness of her findings, is nevertheless confident that the validity of her thesis can be sustained via the collective weight of the evidence: âAdmittedly, the evidence garnered from these diverse sources is to a degree circumstantial; cumulatively, however, the weight of this evidence is significant and cannot be easily discounted.â6 Moshe Sharon, who posits a similar theory, asserts that the kinship factor only became prominent in the middle of the seventh century, about 80 years before the timing suggested by Afsaruddin.7 Wilferd Madelung and Amir-Moezzi have contested and challenged these claims.
In this chapter, I intend to underline the centrality of wilaya/walaya in the formulation of the Shiâi religious ethos and in defining their worldview. This concept, which has been part of their nomenclature from the outset, especially after the Battle of Siffin in 657, continues to dominate the Shiâi ethos. Its expansive and broad meaning includes both the political and spiritual domains and âdenotes an all-encompassing bond of spiritual loyalty that describes, simultaneously, a Shiâite believer's allegiance to God, the Prophet, the Imam and the community of Shiâite believers, collectively.â8
Two diametrically opposite conceptions of post-Muhammadan authority existed at this time. Those who supported Abu Bakr, the school of khilafa (caliph), assumed that the Prophet's strictly religious role ended with the Qur'an's completion and Islam's perfection. Thus, there was no more need for prophethood and revelation: âToday, I have perfected your religion for you, completed My blessing upon you, and chosen as your religion islam: total devotion to Godâ (Q. 5:3). In contrast, the school of the Imamate held that (a) the role of his successor comprised both a religious and a political aspect, for this individual would be the authoritative expositor and elucidator of the Qur'anic teachings and (b) be entrusted with continuing the Prophet's mission of radically transforming those tribal values and norms that conflicted with the Qur'anic worldview. Given that the Prophet only had a few years to initiate major reform in a deeply anchored tribal society with age-old traditions, such people stated that continued sound leadership was needed to prevent any backsliding. As such, the candidate could only be appointed by the Prophet based upon divine directive.
Interestingly, Dr. Ali Shariati writes that although both modes of succession are appropriate and have textual support, the Sunni option would be suitable only after the community has attained a degree of maturity that would allow each member to make an independent evaluation of the candidate(s) and to overcome their traditional obedience to tribal leaders. In other words, the ten years allotted to the Prophet to reform society after his migration to Madina was grossly insufficient to uproot the pre-Islamic and tribal practices that severely curtailed personal autonomy. He writes that âthe elections which were held immediately after the death of the Prophet in Saqifeh, should have taken place 250 years later.â9
Origin of the Term Shiâa
The word shiâa (pl. shiyaâ or ashyaâ) and other derivative forms from the root word sh-y-â appear in the Qur'an and the hadith literature with varied meanings and significations. Over time, it acquired a technical meaning in historical and sectarian works: those who supported Ali and believed that the Prophet had explicitly designated him as h...