Pacifism

David A. Martin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415175500
• eBook ISBN: 9781136232367
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Ciencias sociales
• Subtopic: Sociología

First published in 1998. This book is divided into two parts. The first part is concerned with expounding a broad framework and with illustrating it from a wide variety of historical examples. The second part narrows the focus to modern Britain, largely in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and has particular reference to the years covered by the world wars, 1914–1945. The aim of the second part is to exemplify the framework in detail within the specific context of British history. However, it would have been quite as feasible to select American history for this purpose.

PART ONE

The Framework

CHAPTER ONE

BASIC CATEGORIES: TROELTSCH AND WEBER

THE basic categories required for the study of pacifism derive in the first place from the work of Troeltsch and Weber: the former with respect to the distinction between Church and sect and the latter with respect to his characterization of the world religions. Two analytical tasks present themselves: an expansion of Troeltsch's original distinction and an attempt to see how this expansion can be combined with the work of Weber.

Troeltsch proposed a basic distinction in Christian history between Church and sect, to which he added the concept of the mystical group. As regards the distinction between Church and sect he regarded the Church as a socially inclusive institution which adapted the absolute law of God to the relativities and necessities of politics as well as tempering its demands to average possibilities. The sect, however, regarded itself as an elect minority, proclaiming, or embodying the imminence of a new society and a judgement on the world. Troeltsch also noted, but did not develop, a contradiction within the category of sect between intense activity and passivity, between aggression and withdrawal. This contradiction is central to the present argument, which also aims to show that it is related to other contradictions, as for example between omnipotence and impotence, amorality and perfectionism, complete authoritarianism and total lack of authority. This means that the sect is a type of organization which polarizes at extremes. These extremes are not always associated in an entirely regular way: perfectionism for example may occur in conjunction with pacifism or with violence.

However, not all religious groups fall neatly into the division between Church and sect. Richard Niebuhr also focused attention on the denomination as constituting a developed stage of the sect when perfectionist demands have been ameliorated, the adventist hope dimmed and compromises made with the world. This process certainly occurs, although it can be argued that in the case of the historically most significant examples of the denomination (the Congregationalists, the Baptists and the Methodists) it begins as a type sui generis with characteristics which are only marginally sectarian. In general the denomination may be distinguished from the sect because it is a reformist body which only rejects the wider society within the more embracing terms of an overall agreement. It is not revolutionary, either in espousing revolutionary violence or engaging in pacifist withdrawal. However, although the denomination does not withdraw as a body from the enveloping society it does lay a stress on individual conscience which is important for the discussion of pacifism. Hence the importance of the concept for the analysis which follows.

There remain two further categories: the order and the ‘cult’. The former can be viewed as an analogue, within the inclusive Church, of the spiritual élitism which finds expression in the sect. The order embodies only those polar extremes which are compatible with the wider society: a limited communism can can be admitted whereas revolutionary aggression cannot. Moreover, the acute eschatological expectations of the sect are felt to be already realized here and now in the communitarian enclave of those who have a vocation. The concept of a vocation open only to a minority is the kind of tacit acceptance of double standards which distinguishes bodies which remain within the Church from organizations like the sect and the denomination.

However, there is a certain type of sect which resembles the order in that it also adopts the principle of the communitarian enclave. Perhaps the best-known examples are provided by the various Russian and American experiments in communistic living. The resemblance to the monastic order is the more marked since such communities generally regard the eschatological event as already realized in their own organization rather than as remaining in the future. Since such groups are usually pacifistic they are briefly discussed under the heading of ‘the order’ in Chapter Eight.

The term ‘cult’ indicates the most radically individualistic forms of religious experience. To that extent the word is unfortunate since cultus implies the reverse of individualism. Troeltsch himself came close to the concept when he characterized mystical groups as being based merely on parallel spontaneities. Such groups lack the fellowship principle required to secure historical continuity. Naturally, some mystics remain within the social fellowship, moral disciplines and historical concerns of the Church. Others are possessed by an absorption in the absolute or in nature, enveloping them in a passivity which obliterates time and the knowledge of good and evil.

Radical individualism is not only to be found among mystics. The individualistic principle in Protestantism can undergo continuous extension to the point where it hardly requires a religious organization. It begins in the denomination but is there vigorously checked by an intimate sense of fellowship. While it is true that the denomination may progressively subjectivize worship in terms of what it does for the participant the element of divine service is still present. But in an organization like Christian Science, for example, worship is much more severely attenuated and subjectivity becomes a concern about personal ills. Thus the social psychology of the denomination develops into a religiously based psycho-therapy. The somewhat paradoxical result may be an interest in techniques of adjustment which is very unlikely to produce an ethos at odds with the wider society in any sort of major issue, including that of war.

So far then Troeltsch's original categories of Church, sect and mystical group have been expanded. The sect has been subdivided into activist and pacifist varieties, and the order has been viewed as a muted analogue of the sect within the bounds of the wider Church. Morover, certain connections between the order and the kind of religious organization which sets up a separatist communitarian enclave have been pointed out. Finally, the cult has been subdivided into its mystical form and a form of self-adjustment to society and to personal difficulties based on psychological techniques.

These categories are variously understood by different sociologists but they represent a fair consensus of work done in this field over the past half-century or so. The most complete and coherent exposition of them is to be found in the work of Bryan Wilson. Differences are largely over terminology rather than over criteria, although of course the criteria which one emphasizes vary with analytic purpose. In this case the purpose is to take different sociological types and examine their logical relationship to the quite crucial issues raised by political participation as it is focused in the question of war.

We now turn to a rather different intellectual task and one which, so far as I know, has not been seriously attempted. It has often been queried whether the categories of Troeltsch apply outside Christianity and it is this query which requires an attempt to link his categories with Weber's characterization of the world religions. Without this attempt it is impossible to set the issue of pacifism in a context wider than that of Christianity itself. Obviously, one wants to ask whether the pacifist variety of sect, and the denomination, with its emphasis on conscience, occur outside the ambit of Christian influence.

Two questions are involved here, each linked with the other. One is the range of categories implied by the basic logic of religions apart from Christianity: whether for example the logic of a particular religion implies only the Church, or only the pacifist sect. The other is the way in which this logic may alter to some extent the content of a category. For example the category of Church, in the sense of a socially inclusive religious institution, may contain a different content in (say) Christian, Confucian and Islamic societies. Of course, these relationships must be formulated at a rather high level of abstraction. The selection of types of religious logic lies along an analytic continuum, and the names of the actual historical religions are attached to these types for convenience of exposition.

The assumption is then that each type of religious logic (or basic attitude to the world) implies a certain range of sociological categories and also alters to some extent the content of those categories. The question of content is selected first for treatment, although it will be clear from the exposition that it cannot be separated from the question of range.

In order to exemplify varieties of content we may make a comparison between Christianity and Confucianism. Both Christianity and Confucianism imply the category of Church in the sense of an institution or pattern of institutions concerned with conservation and conformity. But there are degrees of conformity, and the content of the ecclesiastical category in Christian societies indicates a differing degree of conformity from its content in Confucian society. Confucianism more readily implies the category of Church in the sense of the formal definition relating to an institution rooted in conservation than does Christianity. There is, of course, no institution in Confucian society which can be described as a ‘church’ which exists separately from the pattern of conservative institutions. Just because Confucianism is the extreme case of simple conservation the ‘church’ is merged in the social pattern and becomes invisible.

This ready propriety of Confucianism to the ecclesiastical idea is the reverse side of its inability to imply another category beside it. Christianity views the world as sacred only in principle (and not in fact) whereas Confucianism views the world as an immanent sacred harmony maintained, with occasional abnormal divergences, by the Mandate of Heaven. Thus the Christian Church must embody some reserve towards the world and towards ‘natural relations’ (e.g. those of the family) whereas Confucianism sanctifies these social relationships without reservation. The element of Christian reserve, which is logically related to a sense of tension between body and spirit, implies a tension between Church and State. Christian societies tend therefore to achieve some distinction, however vestigial in some cases, between Church and State, the spiritual and the temporal. The monastic order is a permanent witness to these Christian reservations, which are maintained by those within the ecclesia who wish communally to rise above average possibilities. The closest analogy to Confucianism within Christian societies is the Erastian Anglicanism of the eighteenth century with its emphasis on the rite, its preoccupation with propriety and taste and its hatred of ‘enthusiasm’.

So much for an example of differing content. We now turn to examples which bear more directly on the question of the range of categories. An appropriate example may be provided by Manichean dualism in the hope that the very extreme character of the instance may serve the more clearly to illuminate the situation. Manichean dualism regards the world as evil and conceives of God as standing in diametric opposition to the natural world. Believers must, therefore, set themselves aside from all activity in the world, including war and procreation. In this way religious ethics and social ethics are placed in almost total opposition, the only concession to social requirements being a distinction between inner and outer rings of initiates practising different degrees of detachment. Hence Manichean religion implies no sociological category apart from the passive sect. Its adherents must either constitute an ultimately parasitic minority or society as a whole must commit suicide.

In the discussion so far two religious attitudes have been described which imply only one category. Confucianism and the Church Manicheanism and the passive sect. Certain consequences follow from these limitations, either at one extreme or the other. Obviously, Confucianism can only be completely adequate in an entirely static situation. Equally obviously, so far as dualism is concerned there is the problem of continuing historical existence. These difficulties could be resolved in two ways: either the religion can develop another basic motif, somewhat analogous to the second subject in sonata form, in order to ensure continuity and to exercise a major influence, or other religions can provide the content of the vacant categories as need arises. As regards the two examples given the degree of extremism in terms of a continuum of acceptance and rejection is so great that the development of a second attitude is hardly possible. Dualism is too simply based on rejection and Confucianism on acceptance to be able to provide plausibly related alternative formulations. Hence they exemplify the type of situation where other religions provide the content of the vacant categories. For instance, in the case of Confucianism these categories are met by Buddhism and Taoism.

However, where some element of flexibility exists the religion itself provides an alternative formulation through organic development. An example of this process may be found in Buddhism in the course of its development from Hinayana to Mahayana. Because classical Buddhism does not envisage the world as evil but as neutral it possesses a margin of flexibility absent from dualism. Classical Buddhism, strictly interpreted, implies little beyond the category of the order, but Mahayana Buddhism can involve attitudes to the world more overtly positive and therefore including a wider range of categories. In any case, the psychological cultivation of the monastic is conceived in such a way as to have positive cultural by-products, even though these are incidental rather than intended.

We come now to consider in turn three religions which include almost the complete range of sociological categories and are therefore capable of integrating whole societies: Islam, Hinduism and Christianity. Islam involves submission to the power of a God who is conceived as transcendent without qualification. The world is valueless in so far as it is compared with His majesty and man is the instrument of His will. Man does not share in the Being of God but can be the tool of the inscrutable divine purpose. Conceived in this way Islamic religion implies only the Church in the sense of a unitary theocratic society. The norms provided by Islam are not the norms of an absolute justice yet to be realized but social norms given an unqualified divine imprimatur. There is therefore no logical point of appeal for the perfectionist sect. However, there are elements within the Islamic deposit of faith which veer towards Christianity in stressing the justice of God and which therefore anticipate an eschatological event when that justice will be realized and incarnate in the world, through the agency of semi-divine Mahdi. Hence there is a historical point of attachment for sectarianism even though the logic of Islam's more central doctrines precludes it. However, sectarian developments are less pronounced than in Christianity, where they spring directly from the basic norm.

Hinduism can include all sociological categories since it does not possess any fundamental norm. It is a number of different religions: the only basic principle of Hinduism is syncretism. This syncretistic character not only gives it a wide range of categories but also involves relatively weak impulses towards sectarianism and Messianism. Aspirations towards absolute justice have no universally accepted point of reference. The various incarnations of Hinduism embody a whole range of principles none of which has undisputed supremacy. Because it includes so many varied principles Hinduism is an appropriate vehicle for a whole society but lacks the dynamism of a universal religion.

We have seen that Islam includes a range of sociological categories by virtue of a historical combination between principles which are logically incompatible and that Hinduism is ecumenical by virtue of a basic incoherence. Christianity, however, is sociologically inclusive through varied implications arising directly from its root principle. The Christian incarnation provides a unique point of reference, and is simultaneously cap...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title
• The International Library of Sociology
• Title Page
• Copyright
• CONTENTS
• PREFACE
• INTRODUCTION
• PART I: THE FRAMEWORK
• PART II: PACIFISM IN BRITAIN
• Appendix: The Denomination
• List of Sources
• Index