Play, Dreams And Imitation In Childhood

Jean Piaget, Piaget, Jean

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415210058
• eBook ISBN: 9781136318115
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Medicine
• Subtopic: Health Care Delivery

First published in 1999. This volume is the third of a series devoted to the first years of the child's development, the two others being concerned with the beginnings of intelligence and the child's construction of reality (La naissance de intelligence chez Venfant and La construction du réel chez Venfant). Although this book contains frequent references to the two other volumes, which deal with the same three children and study the relationships between their mental activities, it nevertheless constitutes in itself an independent and complete study

Imitation

Imitation does not depend on an instinctive or hereditary technique as P. Guillaume shows in a work which has thrown new light on the question. The child learns to imitate, and this learning process, like any other, raises all the problems involved in sensory-motor and mental development. This conclusion would still be true even if in the tendency to imitate there were an element transmitted through heredity, since a distinction must be made between a tendency and the technique which makes its development possible.

We would go further, and consider the pre-verbal imitation of the child as one o f the manifestations o f his intelligence. In tracing the development of imitation during the first two years, we cannot fail to be struck by its active character. During this period it is in no way “ automatic ” or “ non-intentional.” O n the contrary, very early we find evidence of intelligent co-ordinations, both in the acquisition of the tools it uses and in its aims. Moreover, as we shall see, the connection between the stages of imitation and the six stages we found in the development of sensory-motor intelligence ¹ is so close that in the analysis which follows we shall use the same scale.

See La naissance de l’intelligence chez l’enfant and La construction du réel chez l’enfant (referred to later as N.I. and C.R. respectively).

This being the case, the facts can at once be interpreted in the following way. Sensory-motor intelligence is, in our view, the development o f an assimilating activity which tends to incorporate external objects in its schemas while at the same time accommodating the schemas to the external world. A stable equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation results in properly intelligent adaptation. But if the subject’s schemas of action are modified by the external world without his utilising this external world, i.e., if there is primacy of accommodation over assimilation, the activity tends to become imitation. Imitation is thus seen to be merely a continuation of the effort at accommodation, closely connected with the act o f intelligence, of which it is one differentiated aspect, a temporarily detached part.

It is clear from the outset that the problem o f imitation is linked with that of representation. Since representation involves the image of an object, it can be seen to be a kind of interiorised imitation, and therefore a continuation of accommodation.

Chapter I The First Three Stages: Absence of Imitation, Sporadic Imitation and the Beginnings of Systematic Imitation

DOI: 10.4324/9781315009698-1

At what stage of development does imitation begin? The varying opinions of writers with regard to this question are evidence of the difficulties involved in making a sharp distinction between properly representative imitation and its preparatory forms. Wallon goes so far as to say that “imitation does not occur before the second half of the second year.”¹

¹ De l’Acte de la Pens/e, p. 157.

Such an opinion is admissible on the hypothesis that mental evolution takes place by discontinuous stages, but it begs the question by assuming an absolute opposition between the representative and the sensory-motor. As a matter of fact, even if there were justification for relating the various stages of mental development to well-defined neurological levels, the fact remains that, in spite of the relative discontinuity of the structures, there is a certain functional continuity, each structure preparing for its successors while utilising its predecessors. It is no explanation to say that there is a succession of superposed psycho-neurological mechanisms at work, even if it can be Shown exactly how each one integrates those which precede it. This is the point of view of the medical man, but the attitude of the psychologist who wishes to profit from the findings of experimental embryology must be based on a closer comparison between psycho-genesis and organogenesis. The various stages which embryology shows to exist in the construction of a living body are characterised not only by a sequence of quite distinct and discontinuous structurations, but also by a dynamics involving both continuity and a certain direction, the latter being a tendency towards equilibrium or state of completion of growth.²

¹ “In embryology,” says Brachet, “the true significance of the word ‘development’ must always be kept in mind. It means that all forms and all organs are built up by a slow, progressive series of complications, closely interrelated and ending only when the adult state is achieved.,, La vie criatrice desformes (Alcan, 1927), p. 171.

Thus, when we studied the beginnings of intelligence (see N.I.), we were forced to go as far back as the reflex in order to trace the course of the assimilating activity which finally leads to the construction of adapted schemas, for it is only by a principle of functional continuity that the indefinite variety of structures can be explained. In the same way, if we call the act by which a model is reproduced imitation (and this does not imply ability to represent the model, which may simply be “perceived”), we again find ourselves obliged to trace step by step, through the same stages as those of sensory-motor activity in general, all the behaviours which may achieve this result, beginning with the reflexes.

§ 1 Stage I: Preparation through the reflex

Since the reproduction of a model seems to involve an element acquired by experience, imitation would appear by definition to be excluded from the level of pure reflexes. The matter is, however, worthy of examination, since so many authors have believed in the hereditary character of imitation, not only as a tendency but also as a technique. We will begin with the few observations we have been able to make with regard to our own children:

OBS. 1. On the very night after his birth, T. was wakened by the babies in the nearby cots and began to cry in chorus with them. At 0;0 (3) he was drowsy, but not actually asleep, when one of the other babies began to wail; he himself thereupon began to cry. At 0;0 (4) and 0;0 (6) he again began to whimper, and started to cry in earnest when I tried to imitate his interrupted whimpering. A mere whistle and other cries failed to produce any reaction.

There are two possible interpretations of these commonplace observations, but neither of them seems to justify the use of the word imitation. On the one hand it may be that the baby was merely unpleasantly affected by being wakened by the cries of his neighbours, yet without establishing any relation between the sounds he heard and his own crying, whereas a whistle or other sound left him indifferent. On the other hand, it is possible that the crying occurred as a result of its repetition, owing to a kind of reflex analogous to that we saw in the case of suction (N.I., Chap. I, § 1-2), but in this case with intensification of the sound through the help of the ear. In this second case, the crying of the other babies would increase the vocal reflex through confusion with his own crying.

Thus in neither case is there imitation, but merely the starting off of a reflex by an external stimulus. But although the reflex mechanisms do not give rise to imitation, their functioning involves certain processes which make imitation possible during the later stages. In so far as the reflex leads to repetition, which continues after the removal of the initial stimulus (cf. suction in the void), it is being used for functional assimilation, and although there is not as yet any acquisition through external experience, this will become possible with the first conditioning through accommodation. Indeed the transition is so imperceptible that it is difficult to be sure whether, in the case of obs. 1 there is a beginning of conditioning or not. But if the second interpretation is correct, i.e., if the child’s own crying was intensified through his failure to differentiate between it and the crying he heard, we have an illustration of the point at which the simple reflex will give rise to reproductive assimilation through incorporation of external elements in the reflex schema. After this point, imitation becomes possible.

§ 2 Stage II: Sporadic imitation

The second stage is characterised by the fact that the reflex schemas are broadened, by the incorporation of certain external elements as a result of real experience, into “differentiated” circular reactions. In the case of suction, for instance, new gestures such as the systematic putting of the thumb into the mouth are added to the reflex schema. In the same way, reflex crying is differentiated into wailing or vocalisations reproduced for their own sake, and vision is broadened to include accommodation to moving objects. Now the extent to which the schemas integrate new elements determines how far accommodation to these elements can be continued as imitation when the models presented are identical with the original elements. Indeed, during this second stage, accommodation to new data keeps pace with the ability to recapture them through reproductive assimilation. Thus it is in so far as the child can accommodate his hearing and his phonation to new sounds that he is capable of reproducing them through circular reactions. From then onwards, he has only to hear the sound in question, even though he himself has not just made it, for it to be assimilated to the corresponding schema and for accommodation of the schema to the sound to result in imitation.

Two conditions, then are necessary before imitation can occur. The schemas must be capable of differentiation when confronted with the data of experience, and the model must be perceived by the child to be analogous to results he has himself obtained, i.e., the model must be assimilated to a circular schema he has already acquired.

In the case of phonation, these two conditions already obtain as early as the second month of life:

OBS. 2. At 0;1 (4) T. was wide awake, looking straight in front of him, motionless and silent. Three times in succession the crying of L. (four years old) started him crying also. Such a reaction appeared to be quite distinct from those in obs. 1. As soon as L. stopped crying, he too stopped. It therefore seemed to be a clear case of contagion, and no longer a mere starting off of a reflex by an appropriate stimulus.

At 0;1 (9), for the first time, T. kept up, through circular reaction, a whimpering which usually preceded tears. I imitated him just at the moment when the whimpering turned into crying. He stopped crying, and resumed the earlier sound.¹

¹ This observation confirms that of C. W. Valentine on Bat 0;1 (1): mutual imitation of whimpering. See Brit. Journ. of Psychology, XXI (1930), p. 108.

At 0;1 (22) he spontaneously produced certain sounds such as eu, e, etc., and seemed to do so more emphatically, with or without a smile, when they were reproduced after he had uttered them himself. Same observation at 0;1 (23) and 0;1 (30).

At 0;2 (11) after he had made the sounds la, le, etc., I reproduced them. He repeated them seven times out of nine, slowly and distinctly. The same day, I reproduced the sounds he usually made when he himself had not made them for more than half an hour. He smiled silently, then began to babble, and stopped smiling. He did not reproduce each individual sound, but uttered sounds under the influence of my voice when I confined myself to sounds with which he was familiar.

At 0;2 (14) he showed no reaction to the voices of half a dozen little girls, but as soon as I uttered sounds reminiscent of his own, he began to croon.

At 0;2 (17) he imitated me as soon as I uttered sounds identical with his own (such as an), or even when it was merely my intonation which recalled his. He again imitated me even when he had not been crooning himself immediately before. He began by smiling, then made an effort with his mouth open (remaining silent for a moment) and only then produced a sound. Such a behaviour clearly indicates the existence of a definite attempt at imitation.

At 0;2 (25) I made the sound aa. There was a long, ineffective effort, with his mouth open, followed by a faint sound. Then a broad smile and regular imitation.

To sum up, in T.’s case, from 0;1 (4) onwards, there was a sort of vocal contagion which developed into a general mutual stimulation, and then at 0;2 (17) and 0;2 (25) into an attempt at differentiated imitation. But from then until the end of the stage there was no further development of differentiated imitation. Mutual imitation alone persisted, with sporadic attempts to reproduce specific sounds uttered spontaneously shortly before the experiment.

OBS. 3. In the case of J., vocal contagion seemed to begin only during the second half of the second month. At 0;1 (20) and 0;1 (27), for instance, I noted vocal responses to her mother’s voice. At 0;2 (3) she replied a score of times in similar circumstances, stopping after each one, and at 0;2 (4) she reproduced certain specific sounds which she had uttered spontaneously a short time before.

Then, even more so than in the case of T., there occurred a kind of period of latency, during which J. continued to show signs of vocal contagion and sometimes of mutual imitation, but without any attempt to imitate specific sounds. Even at 0;5 (5) I noted that J. reacted to a voice without imitating the specific sound she heard.

At 0;5 (12) J. had been silent for some time when I said rra two or three times. She gazed at me attentively and suddenly began to croon without imitating the exact sound. Same observations at 0;6 (0), 0;6 (6), 0;6 (16), etc.

At 0;6 (25), however, there began a phase of much more systematic imitation characteristic of the third stage. (J. developed more slowly than her brother and sister. See N.I.)

OBS. 4. At 0;1 (21) L. spontaneously uttered the sound rra, but did not react at once when I reproduced it. At 0;1 (24), however, when I made a prolonged da, she twice uttered a similar sound, although she had previously been silent for a quarter of an hour.

At 0;1 (25) she was watching me while I said “a, ha, ha, rra,” etc. I noticed certain movements of her mouth, movements not of suction but of vocalisation. She succeeded once or twice in producing some rather vague sounds, and although there was no imitation in the strict sense, there was obvious vocal contagion.

At 0;1 (26) when I made the sound “rra” she replied by a kind of rolled “rr” eight times out of eleven. During the intervals she said nothing. Same observation the following day, and again at 0;2 (2), etc.

At 0;3 (5) I noted a differentiation in the sounds of her laughter. I imitated them. She reacted by reproducing them quite clearly, but only when she had already uttered them immediately before.

At 0;3 (24) she imitated aa, and vaguely arr in similar conditions, i.e., when there was mutual imitation.

There were no further developments until about 0;5.

This beginning of vocal imitation, belonging to the second stage, appears to us to be characterised in three ways. Firstly, there is obvious vocal contagion as soon as the child becomes capable of circular reactions with respect to phonation. In other words, the voices of others stimulate the child’s voice, whether it be a case of crying or some other sound. When it is a case of crying, the contagion is almost automatic, probably as a result of the emotion which accompanies the utterance. In the second case, however, the contagion is subject to two kinds of restrictive conditions. In order to stimulate the baby’s voice, the other voices must either reproduce certain familiar sounds already uttered by the child, or certain intonations known to him. Moreover, the child must be interested in the sounds he hears, in which case the contagion is in no way automatic, but is a kind of spontaneous circular reaction. In a word, vocal contagion is merely stimulation of the child’s voice by another voice, without exact imitation of the sounds he hears.

Secondly, there is mutual imitation, which is apparently exact imitation, when the experimenter imitates the child at the very moment when he is uttering this ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Author’s Preface
• Translators’ Note
• Contents
• Introduction
• Part One—Imitation
• Chapter I. The First Three Stages: Absence of Imitation, Sporadic Imitation and the Beginnings of Systematic Imitation
• Chapter II. Stages IV and V: Imitation of Movements Not Visible on the Body of the Subject, and Imitation of New Models
• Chapter III. Stage VI: Beginnings of Representative Imitation and Further Development of Imitation
• Part Two—Play
• Chapter IV. The Beginnings of Play
• Chapter V. Classification of Games and their Evolution after the Beginnings of Language
• Chapter VI. Explanation of Play
• Chapter VII. Secondary Symbolism in Play, Dreams, and “Unconscious” Symbolism
• Part Three—Cognitive Representation
• Chapter VIII. Transition from Sensory-Motor Schemas to Conceptual Schemas
• Chapter IX. From Practical to Representative Categories
• Chapter X. Conclusions: General Trends of Representative Activity
• Index