The Vietnam War from the Other Side

Cheng Guan Ang

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136869815
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Vietnamkrieg

Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book, based on extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, presents a history of the war from the perspective of the Vietnamese communists. It charts relations with Moscow and Beijing, showing how the involvement of the two major communist powers changed over time, and how the Vietnamese, despite their huge dependence on the Chinese and the Soviets, were most definitely in charge of their own decision making. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the many one-sided studies of the war, and presents a very interesting new perspective.

Chapter One

Prelude to the Armed Struggle

The 6th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party

The 6th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee (15–18 July 1954) is the appropriate point to begin the reconstruction of the history of the Vietnam War from the perspective of the Vietnamese communists. According to the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, the 6th Plenary Session was the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Vietnamese people ‘the period of resisting the Americans to save the country’. Significantly, the session was held when the Geneva Conference was meeting on the other side of the globe. At the plenary session the Hanoi leadership acknowledged that the country could not be reunified by peaceful means and Ho Chi Minh already identified the US as the new enemy.¹ The Vietnamese communists were cognisant of the fact that the US was an opponent not to be treated flippantly. They were fighting a new aggressor that had the greatest economic potential and the most powerful armed forces amongst the imperialist powers.² In the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, the Americans were depicted as being the most influential and dangerous counter-revolutionaries they had ever confronted.

The meeting decided on two courses of action. The first was to rebuild the economy and lay the foundation for socialism in the North, badly damaged by the many years of struggle against the French, so that it could be a strong base for the reunification of the country. They hoped to achieve this goal within a period of three years from 1955 to 1957. The second course of action was to transform the VPA into a modern and regular revolutionary army that would not only be responsible for the security of the country but also would partake in the reconstruction of the economy. No deadline was set for this as it was expected to be a long and complex process.³

The Chinese shared the view that it would be impossible for Vietnam to be reunited peacefully. Based on their own experience in fighting the Guomintang, they were of the opinion that the Vietnamese communists should prepare for a protracted struggle which meant that they should lie low for a period of time, muster strength, keep in touch with the people and wait for an opportunity to strike.⁴ Chinese assistance had been a critical factor in the success of the Vietnamese communists against the French. Thus, despite their disagreements with the Chinese during the Geneva Conference,⁵ the Hanoi leadership continued to consult Beijing about the reunification strategy.⁶ In July/August 1955, Beijing had decided to withdraw their military advisers (who had been sent to North Vietnam in July/August 1950) in three phases – September/October 1955, end of 1955 and spring 1956. The North Vietnamese leaders, however, requested for continued Russian assistance in the form of military specialists to help in the modernisation of the VPA.⁷

Although Moscow was the co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference, it did not play an active role in ensuring that the general election stipulated in the Geneva agreements was held.⁸ Moscow did not pay much attention to Southeast Asia and left Southeast Asian affairs to the discretion of China. Some time between 1955 and 1956, a gentleman’s agreement was apparently reached between the two countries whereby Burma, Thailand, Laos Cambodia, Malaya and Vietnam would fall within the Chinese sphere of operation. India, Afghanistan, and all of Asia to the west of those countries would come under the Russian sphere. The exception was Indonesia where both the interests of Moscow and Beijing overlapped.⁹

In February 1956, Khrushchev declared at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that war was not inevitable between the socialist and capitalist camps, and both camps could peacefully coexist with each other.¹⁰ Under this new policy (which Hanoi did not agree with),¹¹ both North and South Vietnam should coexist peacefully and engage in friendly economic competition. Moscow was confident that as the socialist mode of production in the North was far superior to that of the capitalist South, over time the latter would naturally yearn to be unified with the North.¹² Although Moscow supported the Chinese suggestion that a new and enlarged Geneva Conference be convened to discuss the enforcement of the 1954 Geneva Accord, in 1956, Khrushchev, through the Soviet ambassador in Washington, also floated the idea of admitting both North and South Vietnam to the United Nations.¹³ In November 1956, when Zhou Enlai visited Hanoi, he described Khrushchev’s action as a ‘selling out’ and assured Ho Chi Minh that China would not be ‘a party to this betrayal.’¹⁴

Le Duan’s 14-point plan

Meanwhile, in December 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem announced that he would conduct unilateral election in South Vietnam the following year. According to the evaluation of the United States Country Team, the Vietnamese communists’ subversive capability in the South had declined since mid-1955. Diem’s policies and actions in the South had caused the Vietnamese communists to lose much of their earlier bases of support. The consolidation of the Saigon government’s position and new security arrangements, particularly in the central provinces, had also severely curtailed the strength of the communist resistance.¹⁵ Thus, although there were some attempts by the Vietnamese communists to sabotage the unilateral election in the South on 4 March 1956, they were unable to disrupt it.¹⁶

The setbacks suffered by the communist cadres in the South and their attendant low morale prompted Le Duan to put forward a 14-point action plan that called for a more aggressive and militant approach to complement the political struggle in the South.¹⁷ The plan called for military action to support the political activities in the South, the creation of support bases and more battalions and the consolidation of the military organisations in the inter-zones. As Cambodia was considered to be of strategic importance, it also recommended an increase in the budget for activities in Cambodia and for senior cadres to be posted there. It also called for the consolidation of the leading organisations and the creation of a support base to aid activities there.

In late March 1956, the Hanoi leadership met to consider the 14-point plan that had been endorsed by the Nam Bo Regional Committee.¹⁸ The leadership surmised that the Vietnamese communists were not ready to step up the military struggle in the South. Furthermore, their two allies, China and the Soviet Union, whose support they would need, were also not in favour of any move that could lead to a new military confrontation. It thus rejected the 14-point plan and directed Le Duan and his associates in the South to continue to exploit the agrarian issues in the South.¹⁹

In the light of Hanoi’s rejection of the 14-point plan, in early April, senior party officials in Nam Bo convened a special conference to re-evaluate the situation in the South. The meeting concluded that the tactical use of violence had not only failed to yield the desired result, but had also undermined Hanoi’s diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue. As such, any further use of violence at that point of time would be inappropriate. It then decided on a new approach focussing on the economic struggle.²⁰ However, not everyone was pleased with the decision. Some were unhappy that Hanoi had imposed the new strategy upon them.

Despite the decision taken at the meeting, the Hanoi leadership was not totally dismissive of the use of violence to achieve reunification. This was discernible in the closing speech made by Ho Chi Minh at the 9th Plenary Session (enlarged) of the Lao Dong Central Committee on 27 April 1956 when he said, ‘Although it is possible that certain countries may achieve socialism by peaceful means, we must understand that in those countries where the administrative machinery, the military powers and the secret police of the bourgeois class are still powerful, the proletariat must prepare for an armed struggle. While noting the possibility of achieving the territorial unification of Vietnam through peaceful means, we must not forget the American imperialists and their lackeys still occupy one half of our national territory and are preparing for war. That is why, while holding high the flag of peace, we must be prudent and vigilant.’²¹

An official North Vietnamese historical record noted that during this period, ‘the struggle of the people in the South to achieve the unification of Vietnam became increasingly fierce … The revolutionary movement demanded guidance that was appropriate to a situation that was undergoing new development.’²² There were certain quarters amongst the Vietnamese communists who felt that the ‘North Vietnam first’ policy needed to be balanced by more consideration for the situation in the South. While they did not necessarily object to the strategy adopted by the Hanoi leadership, they felt that more attention needed to be paid to the problems faced by those in the South.²³

The Politburo convened a meeting on 8–9 June 1956 and subsequently issued a directive on 19 June that clarified the roles and responsibilities of the southern cadres in the revolutionary struggle. According to the directive, the struggle at that point of time was necessarily a political and not a military one. Therefore, they should resort to arms only in circumstances that called for self-defence. The establishment of a popular front and the consolidation of the Party in the South were to be the key tasks. In this regard, the strategy was to focus on the development of the armed forces and to consolidate those forces that they already control. They were instructed to organise self-defence forces, develop more base areas and arouse the political consciousness of the masses and, when possible, attempt to free those who had been arrested.²⁴ On the same day, in a letter written to the Southern cadres who had regrouped in the North, Ho Chi Minh affirmed that North Vietnam was the foundation of the struggle to achieve the liberation and reunification of the country. Whatever was being done for North Vietnam was not only to increase the strength of the North but that of the South as well.²⁵

Due to difficulties in communication, a number of regions in the South did not receive the 19 June directive. After the failed attempt to reunite the country in July, some comrades in the Plain of Reeds (region in Kien Phong and Kien Tuong provinces and parts of Dinh Tuong, Long An and Hau Nghia provinces) were already making preparations to restart armed struggle. On 18 August, the Politburo had to send another letter to the Nam Bo Regional Committee reiterating the main points of the June directive.²⁶

The general election, which was supposed to be conducted not later than July 1956 under the supervision of the International Supervisory and Control Commission (ISCC) as stipulated in the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference regarding Vietnam, failed to take place. Thus the prediction of the Hanoi leadership at the 6th Plenary Session in 1954 that Vietnam could not be unified by peaceful means had proven correct. Surprisingly, all three parties involved – Hanoi, Beijing and Moscow – each allowed the deadline to pass somewhat uneventfully. Nevertheless, up to the end of July 1956 and for some time after, Hanoi continued to press for a meeting to discuss the general election. The political and diplomatic charade had to be maintained. Le Duan explained that Hanoi had to continually call for the general election to be held (as stipulated in the Geneva Accord) because of its propaganda value in presenting the North Vietnamese as the aggrieved party.²⁷ The Hanoi leadership also had to show the communist cadres, expecially those in the South, who had been told to expect reunification in 1956 that efforts were being made towards that end. It was also a convenient camouflage for Hanoi’s preparation for the anticipated confrontation with the US-Diem regime.

Le Duan’s thesis: ‘The road to the South’

Readers would recall that at the 6th Plenary Session in July 1954, it was decided that the first target was to restore the war-shattered economy, pave the way for North Vietnam’s economic recovery and advance to socialism within three years (1955–1957).²⁸ Since the consolidation of the North was seen as a prerequisite for the reunification of Vietnam, any delay in the timetable would automatically prolong the reunification process. From August 1956 onwards, the agrarian reform debacle in the North and the increasing disaffection of the intellectuals with the policies of the Lao Dong Party consumed much of the attention of the Hanoi leadership and threatened to derail the schedule. Hanoi had to convince the Southern cadres that had gathered in the North and those in the South that the leadership was working hard on the reunification agenda and to persuade them to be patient.²⁹ This responsibility was delegated to Le Duan and he was directed by the Politburo in August 1956 to remain in the South to guide the revolutionary struggle. Le Duan had by then completed the thesis, ‘Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam’ (The Road to the South), which elucidated the path in which the struggle in the South would gradually develop into a violent revolution.³⁰ In August, he travelled from U Minh (the area extending along the coast of the Gulf of Siam in An Xuyen Province) across the Plain of Reeds up to Ben Tre. He instructed the Southern comrades not to conduct any further struggle in the name of the religious sects. He also entrusted Comrade Sau Duong to write a thesis on the proper conduct of armed propaganda.³¹

The Lao Dong Party Central Committee held its 11th Plenary Session in December 1956, which affirmed that revolution was the correct way to liberate South Vietnam.³² At that session, it was agreed in principle that Le Duan’s blueprint, ‘Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam’, would serve as the basis of a three-pronged strategy: (1) The consolidation of the North, (2) Sustaining the struggle in the South, and (3) Winning international support for their cause.³³ Although the available official Vietnamese sources acknowledged that the Lao Dong Party’s strategy for the South was based on the ‘Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam’, Tran Van Tra noted that it was neither formalised nor fully implemented till three years later.³⁴ For the meanwhile, the strategy for the reunification of the country as enunciated at the 6th Plenary Session remained essentially un...