Making a Difference in Theory

The theory question in education and the education question in theory

Gert Biesta, Julie Allan, Richard Edwards, Gert Biesta, Julie Allan, Richard Edwards

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9781138907904
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135131685
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Making a Difference in Theory brings together original work from an international group of authors on the roles of theory in educational research and practice. The book discusses the different roles theory plays, can play and should play, both from a historical perspective and in light of contemporary discussions and developments.

Particular attention is paid to the question of whether there are or should be distinctively educational forms of theory and theorising. The double engagement with the theory question in education and the education question in theory and theorising provides original insights in what theory does, might do or should do in educational research and practice.

With contributions from internationally renowned authors in the field of educational theory, research and practice, the book will be of value to academics, researchers and postgraduate students in education.

Section III

Refractions on and agendas for theory

Chapter 8

Educational theory and the practice of critique

Robin Usher and Anna Anderson

On theory and theorizing

‘Theory’ has many connotations. In origin, it signified contemplation as against action, a species of thought, neutral, disinterested and removed from the quotidian. In contemporary everyday usage, a theory is commonly understood as something akin to speculation as against the practical. All of this of course is far removed from theory as understood in the natural sciences. Here theory refers to a comprehensive explanation of some natural feature supported by empirical phenomena gathered in a way consistent with scientific method and which enables generalisation and prediction about as yet unobserved phenomena. Whilst there have been trends in the social sciences which have sought to import the hypothetico-deductive model, developments over time have shown that an inductive model deploying ethnographic/ethnomethodological approaches to theory-building is more congenial and appropriate in the domain of the social sciences.

When we consider educational theory, we find that it has been understood in each and all these various ways. Clearly, there is no one education theory. At least, it is possible to say this without doubt and equally to claim that there are probably as many educational theories as there are disciplines that have relevance to the practice of education. If that is the case, then it could be argued that a particular educational theory is an artefact of a particular discipline or related disciplines. Despite the variety, there is one common feature that some theories in education have; they seek to interpret or explain educational phenomena as an application of theory to educational practice. Thus in much educational theorizing we find deployed a generalising/predictive model, such as constructivism in learning, or culture in schooling, whose purpose is to be applied to practice. As such, practice has generally been considered a consequence of theorizing with the implication that theory was the opposite of practice — thinking as against doing, with thinking being cognitively and temporally prior to doing.

There are a number of issues here that we want to briefly consider as they relate to our concern with the notion and practice of critique in relation to educational theorizing. The first is that of generalizability, a contentious issue commonly found not only in educational theorizing but in most theorizing in the social sciences. The issue here is not so much the generalizability per se of theory but any claim made by theorizing of universality. Indeed, one could say this is not only an issue in the social sciences but also a major problem because theory in those domains, including in education, is ineluctably specific and particular. It is a problem because generalizability and universality are not the same, even though they are invariably treated as such. Generality is not synonymous with universality since the former can take specificity and particularity on board in a way which the latter cannot.

Unfortunately, there is a drive to universality, taken for granted in the natural sciences but found even in many sectors of the social sciences, that occludes specificity and particularity. For Foucault, even though phenomena need to be studied in their specificity, this can accommodate generalisation but not universality. His genealogical methodology, which we will say more about later, requires that things be understood on their own terms, which means paying close attention to particularities. His treatment of this issue, drawing a sharp distinction between generalizability and universality, is congenial to the argument we are trying to make.

The second issue is that of the relationship between theory and practice. As Deleuze in his conversation with Foucault put it:

The relationships between theory and practice are far more partial and fragmentary. On one side, a theory is always local and related to a limited field, and it is applied in another sphere, more or less distant from it. The relationship which holds in the application of a theory is never one of resemblance…Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another.

(1977a: 205–206)

Referring to Foucault's work with prisoners in the GIP, Deleuze characterises this practice as creating conditions for them to speak — ‘it would be false to say…that in moving to this practice you were applying your theories…this was not an application’ (ibid). Following this position, we argue that theory is itself a practice, a theoretical practice, and practice is always imbued with theory. Further, using Foucault's formulation, this theoretical practice is ‘a power-knowledge’ formation; it is not abstract, transcendental, removed from the world and its actions but on the contrary it is grounded in the material, very much in and of the world but also specific and partial.

In this chapter we will argue that although there is no one single educational theory, nonetheless, critical theory and its educational cognate critical pedagogy have probably been most influential in educational circles. It offers a way of doing critique in the cause of social justice that has proved to be very attractive to educators. However, in our view, the limitations of critical theory make it necessary to consider a different approach to critique, that of genealogy, which we will argue is worthy of consideration by educators. We will present genealogy as a particular conception and method of practising critique that can be useful to producing critical studies of education but without the limitations imposed by the theory and practice of critical pedagogy.

Critical theory

It is always difficult to do full justice to the range of approaches that could be subsumed under the term ‘critical’. Indeed, that is part of the problem for the term itself has a complex and confusing range of connotations and applications. This means that there is a great deal of disagreement as to what constitutes a critical approach. Critical theory is seen as ‘critical’ because its aim is emancipation. Thus it is critical in the sense that it does not simply seek to generate knowledge of the world as it is, but to detect and unmask beliefs and practices that limit human freedom, justice and democracy and to deploy this knowledge or theory in actions that brings these things about. The task of educational theorizing and practice then is to become transformative both in relation to individuals and the social world — it itself needs to be part of the process of establishing the conditions for a rational conduct of social life free of the oppressive effects of ideology.

Critical theory argues that knowledge and truth can exist only where power relations are suspended or neutralised. The pursuit of knowledge is imagined as an emancipatory interested search for truth which power impedes, corrupts and distorts. From this perspective, knowledge that is linked with power is not ‘true’ knowledge but ideology. If true knowledge can exist only where power is absent, this leads to ‘…a longing for a space of knowledge simultaneously outside of formulations of power and yet capable of undermining them all’ (Rabinow 1997: xvii). Theorizing, research and praxis become inseparable. The theorizer, the teacher, the researcher and the activist cannot simply stand aside and adopt a passive disinterested stance. On the contrary, they have to be very much in, and part of, their world. Furthermore, they should be one and the same.

Critical theory and the approach it offers has resonated with both educational theorizers and practitioners. Its discourse of basic social needs, of distortions and false consciousness, its foregrounding of critical dialogue and praxis, provides an appealing basis for theory and practice, particularly for educators committed to social action and change. Its refusal to separate research and knowledge (theory) from action (practice) demolishes the debilitating tension between theory and practice. An approach informed by critical theory provides one possible answer to both the epistemological question — what is valid knowledge? — and the ethical question — how can it best be used? Its aim of empowerment in the cause of emancipation provides a purposive goal and a moral dimension for educational research and practice. Above all, critical theory provides a standard by which the present can be evaluated and, in the sense that the empirically existing world is never going to match up to the standard set by critical theory, it provides an endless resource for research and action.

However, critical theory is not unproblematic. Although it seeks to unmask distortions and constraints, it itself offers a very partial and limited view of human experience and social interaction. It speaks a very modernist and rationalistic discourse, redefining rather than challenging categories and hierarchies. It privileges the place of a particular kind of rationality and, although this is not positivism's narrow version, it is nonetheless a totalising and excluding rationality, which in its own way is equally oppressive. Related to this are problems arising from the commitment to an emancipatory project construed in a naturalistic and universalising way — that is, in terms of concepts of basic needs and emancipatory goals, suitable for all. The assumption is that as universals these are invariant in their meaning and interpretation across cultural contexts, readily discernible by a rational mind purged of ideology. As we have noted earlier, there are problems with a theorizing that claims such universality.

The most well-known and influential application of critical theory to education is critical pedagogy, which is characterised by the unity of theory, research and practice demanded by critical theory. For critical pedagogues, all education is not only about learning but also unlearning and relearning, reflection and evaluation leading to more learning, etc. This process, it is claimed, is prevented by traditional education, particularly schooling and by educational theory that does not recognise the unity of theory and practice and the place of education and learning in the furtherance of human emancipation and social justice.

In a sense, we are now too much influenced by the critique of critical theory articulated by scholars such as Foucault and Derrida of invariant essences, originating presences, and universalising emancipatory discourses. We have become aware that there is too much indignity in speaking for others, no matter how well-intentioned. Furthermore, we now recognise that such discourses do not always have the effect intended — in fact, very often quite the opposite. Gore (1993: 61) argues that ‘critical theory has its own power-knowledge nexus which in particular contexts and particular historical moments will operate in ways that are oppressive and repressive to people within and/or outside’.

It is not too difficult to see how critical theory itself can so easily become a ‘masterful’ discourse. The universalising thrust of theorizing in the critical theory mode can become a will to know which is also a will to govern. It could be argued that although critical theory enjoins the unity of theory and practice it is still theory that is privileged because practice requires the right and therefore prior theoretical perspective in the struggle for emancipation.

The possibility that critical theory can easily become a masterful discourse is heightened by its failure to foreground reflexivity. A significant place is allocated to reflection but critical theorists are not required to be reflexive, they are not required to submit their own position to critical scrutiny and examine the nature and effects of the power relations, operating ‘behind their backs’ but still nonetheless present, in their emancipatory project. On the other hand, as we shall see later, reflexivity is an explicit feature of genealogy.

Foucault and education

Since generally this is not always made explicit, we can only speculate that the limitations of any educational theory informed by critical theory and its interests, among other things, are what has driven many in theoretical studies in education to take up some of Foucault's concepts and instruments of analysis. In some cases however, this is made explicit and there are examples of this take-up in education. All have proved productive in different and varied ways (e.g. Biesta 2005; Fejes and Nicoll 2008; Peters 2005; Rabinow 2009). Rather than enumerate the take-up we will consider the more interesting issue of why the take-up of Foucault's concepts and methods was first resisted in education and still is by some.

Critical theory and its offshoot critical pedagogy held sway in education for a long time because there seemed to be no radical alternative. Foucault was always a possibility but for a while his work seemed too disturbing for a number of reasons. First, because it seemed to provide no plan, no programme, no ‘curriculum’, for what educators could and should do. Foucault certainly disturbed educators' modernist presuppositions but seemed to have nothing to put in its place. Second, this was exacerbated by Foucault's apparent determinism. If we are enveloped by power which shapes our very subjectivity, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of contributors
• Introduction: The theory question in education and the education question in theory
• Section I The contextual presence of theory
• Section II The practice of doing theory
• Section III Refractions on and agendas for theory
• Index