American Television

New Directions in History and Theory

Nick Browne

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135020217
• Subtopic: Media Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

This work brings together writings on television published in Quarterly Review of Film and Video, from essays by Nick Browne and Beverle Houston to the latest historical and critical research. It considers television's economics, technologies, forms and audiences from a cultural perspective that links history, theory and criticism. The authors address several key issues: the formative period in American television history; the relation between television's political economy and its cultural forms; gender and melodrama; and new technologies such as video games and camcorders. Originally published in 1993.

Part I

The Establishment of American Television: Industrial Organization and Social Meaning in the 1950s

The Rise of the Telefilm and the Networks’ Hegemony Over the Motion Picture Industry

Robert Vianello

The question of monopoly must be squarely met. It is...inconceivable that the American people will allow this new-born system of communication [Radio] to fall exclusively in the power of any individual group or combination...It cannot be thought that any single person or group shall ever have the right to determine what communication shall be made to the American people.

—Herbert Hoover

Secretary of Commerce, 1924

There is a striking similarity between the television industry structure and that movie pattern condemned in Paramount [(U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.)]...[Except that] network’s control over the nation’s TV stations dwarfs the movie makers’power over theaters condemned in Paramount.

—Victor R. Hansen,

Assistant to the Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, 1956

Hence, the question which should be asked is, whether in the light of the paramount experience, is an even stronger and more powerful vertical arrangement to be tolerated?

—B. Litman,

Vertical Structure of the Television Broadcasting Industry, 1976

Introduction

The rise of the telefilm is the story of the relationship between the motion picture industry and television. This relationship was formed during the period from 1948 to the late fifties — “Possibly the most important years in the history of the motion picture industry, for it was during this period that the full impact of television was felt, and in the end it was the movies which had to make an adjustment to the acknowledged supremacy of the newer medium.”¹ The rise of the telefilm is key to understanding how television reached a position of “acknowledged supremacy.” It must be understood not merely as a chronology of isolated events, but as the result of structural circumstances within the two industries that determined the character of their relationship. Specifically, television was an industry in the process of monopoly formation; the film industry was in the process of monopoly disintegration.

Fig. 1. Lucille Ball, I Love Lucy, CBS, 1951-1957. Terrence O’Flaherty Collection, University Research Library, UCLA.

Much has been written on the question of TV’s impact on the film industry during the postwar period. The thesis that TV was the “principal reason” for the decline in attendance during the late forties to the mid-fifties has been supplemented to include other contributing factors — the suburbanization of America, the proliferation of the automobile, the postwar baby boom and the reformation of the family, etc. The project here is not to dispute that received wisdom, but to reformulate the question in terms of basic legal, economic, and political determinants behind the shift in popular preference from movies to TV. Popular preference in this instance seems to follow not only the shift in monopoly power, but also the design of the government.

The transition from movies to TV as the dominant image-making institution in the United States and the rise of the telefilm was determined on several fronts:

(1)The Rise of the Network Monopoly. While networking is based on an economic principle — centralized production and distribution are economically more efficient — broadcasting in the U.S. has never been simply a result of economic conditions. Broadcasting in the U.S. is not monopolized by networking, rather it is monopolized by the Networks — ABC, NBC, and CBS. The domination of commercial broadcasting and the formation of Network monopoly was the result of a series of regulatory decisions by the government. The vertical integration of the Networks created and maintained by the government is expressed in their power relations with program producers, local stations, and advertisers.

(2)The Role of Film in the Network Monopoly. The telefilm is not only a program format, but a program format in contrast with“live” that plays a strategic role in Network domination of TV.

(3)The Majors’ Relation to Television. The major motion picture companies’ relation to television must be understood in terms of the Paramount decision. The rise of the telefilm did not uniformly threaten the newly divided interests within the film industry. Production and distribution could exploit the new television market. It was exhibition that was threatened by TV.

The Rise of the Network Monopoly

The impact of television on the motion picture industry must be understood in terms of its legal/economic structure. First, the United States is the only major television producing and consuming nation that is clearly dominated by commercial interests rather than a government monopoly or an intermix of government and commercial interests. TV in the U.S. is in direct economic competition with other forms of entertainment and leisure activities and has an implicit project of maximizing its sphere of influence. Second, although commercial in nature, TV in the U.S. is subject to the laws of government regulation. Broadcasting has been described as “one of the few instances...in this country where the public — all of the people interested — were unanimously for an extension of regulatory powers on the part of the government.”² Rather than being viewed as an intrusion, especially by commercial interests, regulation was almost universally desired because of widespread frequency interference — a babble on the airwaves in early radio that could only be avoided by government-created order. Third, the result of government regulation did not benefit all interests equally. The result, as we shall see below, was the creation of Network monopoly. The particular legal-economic structure of television was already largely determined in TV’s pre-history — in the development of radio.

Commercial or “toll” broadcasting (in which a station leases airtime to an advertiser) began in the 1920s and proceeded to supplant all other forms of broadcasting. Advertising-supported broadcasting has an economic advantage over other forms of non-commercial broadcasting such as educational, amateur, religious, etc. because it has a systematic means of financing programming. The first principle of broadcasting is to develop audience support by maintaining continuous programming or “flow.” Not only were commercially financed stations better able to maintain flow, but they were also able to produce a greater consistency of high production value programming.

But the domination of commercial broadcasting in the U.S.. is not simply a matter of broadcasting economics. There was considerable political resistance to the nation’s airways being cluttered with “advertising chatter.” It is ironic that the rise of commercial broadcasting to the position of virtual monopoly is a result, not of economic development, but government intervention. The government failed to institute a system of public financing for programming found in all other major broadcasting nations while regulating “in the public interest.” Barunouw characterized the demise of all other competing forms of broadcasting in the 1920’s and 1930s as the result of political indecision about the limitation of commercial network power.³ However, while public officials mouthed the need to maintain the airwaves in the “public interest,” the Federal Radio Commission, created in 1927, decided to license “super stations” which were legally protected from local interference and which established an audience large enough to be attractive to national advertising. In short, it was the “clear channel” structure which drew big capital in broadcasting. Government regulation not only allowed the domination of commercial broadcasting; it actively encouraged the creation of a vehicle for national advertising interests — that is, the Networks.

In 1934, the Federal Communications Commission was formed; it would have the authority to regulate the technology of the future — television. With the creation of the FCC also came the opportunity to change the result of the FRC regulation — broadcasting dominated by the commercial Networks. The Wagner-Hatfield Amendment proposed to cancel all existing frequency assignments and “reserve and allocate only to educational, religious, agricultural, labor, cooperative, and similar non-profit making associations, one-fourth of all radio broadcasting facilities”⁴ within the jurisdiction of the FCC. “Moreover, the non-profit licensees could sell such part of the allotted time as will make the station self-supporting.”⁵ This would solve the problem of “flow” for non-profit stations outlined above. The actions of the FRC however had already created a powerful lobbying interest that was threatened by the proposed regulations. The Wagner-Hatfield Amendment, it was argued by Network-inspired mouthpieces, would “over-commercialize”the airways. The Amendment was defeated and thus was institutionalized a power structure that would be transferred directly to television.

In 1941, pressured by NBC, the FCC approved the beginning of commercial television broadcasting in the U.S. Again this action by the government was crucial in the rise of the Network monopoly in TV. The issue here was VHF (Very High Frequency) versus UHF (Ultra High Frequency) spectrum allocation. Frequent allocation of VHF is limited to channels 2 through 13; UHF has channels 14 through 83. Legally sanctioned to operate “in the public interest, convenience, and necessity,” it was obvious that UHF would foster great competition and program diversification, i.e., it was obvious that UHF would better serve “the public interest.” Since UHF was not yet technically perfected, it was argued that TV broadcasting should not be authorized until UHF was ready. But, the FCC did authorize VHF broadcasting, saying that, at a later date, either VHF would be “intermixed” with UHF or a program of “deintermixture” would be followed. The eventual domination VHF over UHF in TV parallels the domination of AM over FM in radio — a domination directly related to government action. But the government in action in TV is doubly ironic: the FCC “faced a very similar situation in AM-FM radio allocation” (and the Wagner Hatfield Amendment) “and either did not learn its lesson or did not want to learn it.”⁶ Again, government intervention vis-à-vis the FCC “created a powerful lobby concern which would not want its power diminished at a later date.”⁷

The issues raised by regulatory action and inaction in 1927, 1934, and 1941 converge in the infamous “freeze” of 1948. The “freeze” refers to the decision of the FCC to hold further allocation of TV broadcast licenses until technical problems that arose (interference) were cleared up. What was to be a mere six-month suspension of the rapid proliferation of TV stations lasted for four years — until 1952. It was during this period that the Networks gained control of television broadcasting and other interests were “frozen” out. Since early TV licenses were overwhelmingly held by radio broadcasters, the freeze had the effect of transferring the affiliate structure directly to TV. By the time of the “thaw,” new stations were forced to compete in a market that had already had its system of program supply determined. They were faced with the decision: stay independent and deal with the headaches of local production and low production value syndication programs or affiliate and have a virtual guarantee of profit. Affiliation was the order of the day.

The freeze was also a “hold” on the question of VHF versus UHF frequency allocation. While the question of UHF went unanswered, the period of 1948 to 1952 saw the sale of approximately 17 million TV sets — none of them equipped with UHF. The idea of an FCC mandate making all these sets obsolete was less than popular. It was already too late to conveniently switch to UHF and it was not until 1964 that the FCC required manufacturers to produce sets with UHF. Furthermore, the allocation plan instituted by the FCC limited the proliferation of VHF stations within the major markets — an expansion that was absolutely necessary if additional networks were to be developed: “The 1952 plan was based upon a set of assignment priorities, the two most important being the provision of television service to all parts of the United States and the allocation of at least one station to every community.”⁸ This plan “left about 70 of the top 100 markets with three VHF channels, and only about 15 of the top 100 markets with more than three”⁹ Conveniently, the allocation of three VHF channels in the major market corresponds to the existing networks-the Networks-at that time. Not surprisingly, DuMont, the “fourth” network, went out of business by 1955 — largely because there were not enough stations available for affiliation. Again, the importance of inheriting an affiliate structure from radio — as did ABC, NBC, and CBS — is demonstrated.

The earlier failure of the FCC to allocate non commercial frequencies is re-run in the 1952 allocation plan. Educational interests are generously assigned UHF frequencies; unfortunately, as we have seen, there are no UHF-equipped receivers. Once again the commercial broadcasting monopoly is institutionalized. But it is not until 1981, in a House Committee study of “The Status of Competition in the Telecommunications Industry,” that the government officially recognized its role in creating Network monopoly: “The primary reason for network dominance is the failure of the Commission to establish rules and policies which promoted the entry of additional networks.”¹⁰

So much for the highlights of the legal history which set up the Networks. Their economic power follows directly from this history. Given the “artificial restraint” of the FCC which made the airwaves safe for centralized production and distribution, the economic principle of “economies of scale” comes into play. These principles — that centralized production and distribution are more cost efficient — were also at work in the rise of the major studios and the tendency...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Orginal Title Page
• Orginal Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Introduction to the Series
• Introduction
• Part I: The Establishment of American Television: Indutrial Organization and Social Meaning in the 1950s
• Part II: Cultural Theory and Network Television: Mapping Economy and Subjectivity
• Part III: Television Formats and the Inscription of Gender
• Part IV: Video Transformations: Gaming, Pictorialization, Surveillance
• Index