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Part I
Social and economic mobilization
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1
Mobilization for war
On 26 May 1948, the Israeli provisional government approved the decision to establish a regular army. Five days later, on 31 May, an order signed by David Ben-Gurion, who served both as prime minister and as minister of defense, was issued establishing the Israel Defense Forces. The significance of this decision, which was taken during the first round of fighting with the Arab armies, and just two weeks after the establishment of the state of Israel, extended beyond the military sphere. The process of establishing the Israeli army during the course of the 1948 War became one of the main components in the consolidation of the authority and sovereignty of the new state, and in shaping its character.
During the transition of power that accompanied the formation of the state, structural features in the sphere of the military forces showed elements of both continuity and change. The transition from the Haganah (“Defense” in Hebrew) as the main military organization of the Yishuv to the Israel Defense Forces reflected an attempt to combine a popular and voluntary army in the spirit of the Haganah with the foundation of an army with a professional and regular character, in accordance with the British model as applied during the Second World War. The process of building and exercising power, including changing methods of warfare and their adaptation to the progress of the war, was undertaken alongside the military mobilization. The mobilization for war, which would have been impossible without the subject of civil society organizations and voluntary participation in the war effort, took place with an emphasis on the just division of the burden of war and on striking a balance between military needs and ensuring the ongoing functioning of civil society. This policy was reflected, in particular, in the public campaign against evasion of the draft and in the concern for the families of soldiers – aspects we will discuss in this chapter.
This chapter focuses on the participation of society in the mobilization of personnel for military, labor, and emergency services. This includes an examination of the changes that occurred in recruitment patterns following the establishment of the state of Israel and the declaration of the state of emergency on 19 May 1948. The essence of the change was a transition from a self-mobilization based on voluntary action in a community lacking sovereign authority and subject to the control of the British mandate to mobilization directed by government ministries and institutions in a centralized manner and on the basis of law and discipline. The transformation created by the transition from the Yishuv to the state and the increase in the powers and functional responsibilities during the war were especially evident in the process of mobilization in general, and the mobilization of personnel in particular.1 Until late in 1948, the mobilization of personnel constituted the dominant aspect of mobilizing the society for war. However, during the course of the decisive military campaigns toward the end of that year, and against the background of the deteriorating economic situation, the process of demobilization was the focus of particular emphasis.
Self-mobilization
On 2 October 1947, David Ben-Gurion, then chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, made a keynote speech to the members of the Assembly of Representatives of the Yishuv. The session was held at the Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus in Jerusalem. The speech was made approximately one week after the announcement by the British minister of colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, on the British decision to withdraw from Palestine, and following the publication of the conclusions of the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). In his speech, Ben-Gurion emphasized the need for the Jewish community in Palestine to defend itself and mobilize ahead of the expected war. He called for the total mobilization of the economy and of manpower, encouraging all sections of the Yishuv to take part in the coming war effort.2 The Assembly of Representatives, as the highest elected institute of the Yishuv, was urged therefore to introduce a security regime in order to adapt the economic, public, and educational life of the Yishuv to urgent security needs.
Ben-Gurion’s speech marked the beginning of military, social, and economic mobilization which would dictate the patterns of life of the Jewish population during the war that would erupt some two months later.3 Ben-Gurion had spent the Second World War in London and had observed the manner in which the English home front withstood the trials of the German Blitz. His wartime experiences in England helped shape his conviction regarding the importance of mobilizing all the resources of society and his understanding of the manner in which the war should be waged.
After his appointment as the head of the Security Department in the Jewish Agency at the end of 1946, Ben-Gurion worked in what became known as “the Seminar” to examine the Haganah preparations for the possible outbreak of war against Arab armies. Over a period of several months, and alongside his position as chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, Ben-Gurion undertook an intensive examination of the suitability of the Haganah in command, budgetary, organizational and operational terms, and its capability as a popular militia to cope with the challenges of modern war. This period of preparation, which took place during the course of the political and diplomatic struggle that lead to the adoption of the Partition Plan by the United Nations, contributed significantly to the organizational capacity and functioning of the Haganah following the outbreak of the war. At the same time, Ben-Gurion also worked to prepare the Jewish community for the war. His demand for the total mobilization of society ahead of the war, which he presented at public gatherings of the Zionist movement and the National Institutions of the Yishuv, was accompanied not only by organizational action, but also by inculcating an awareness among the Jewish public that the expected war would determine the national future, and the physical existence, of the Yishuv.
At a meeting of the Zionist General Council, the supreme institution of the World Zionist Organization, held in Zurich, Switzerland in August 1947, Ben-Gurion described the goal of the Arab side as the total destruction of the Jewish presence in Palestine – a threat he compared to that posed by the Nazis to the Jews of Europe. This description of the Arab goals also included reference to a newspaper interview with Fawzi al-Qawuqji, one of the leaders of the Arab Revolt in the 1930s and the commander of the Arab Liberation Army in 1948. Al-Qawuqji was quoted as describing the confrontation between the Jews and the Arabs as a total conflict.4
After the war began, Ben-Gurion continued to describe the goals of the war in language emphasizing its character as a total war. On 13 November 1948, during a military conference, Ben-Gurion stated that “this year, we faced a total war. Everything was subjugated and mobilized for the needs of the war – manpower, the economy, capital, science; because everything was threatened.”5 Ben-Gurion made similar comments at a meeting of the Council of the Workers’ Party of the Land of Israel (Mapai), held on 12 January 1949. Speaking to members of his own party, Ben-Gurion explained: “In modern times, war is total, and depends on industrial, transport and technological strength no less than on the organization of the army.”6 Ben-Gurion recognized the close connection between society and war, and understood that success in the war required the mobilization of the nation’s resources in favor of the war effort. These perceptions were reflected in the rhetoric he employed and in the manner in which he prepared, encouraged, and organized the mobilization of the Yishuv before and during the war.
During the early stages of the war, the Yishuv was organized on two levels. The first was the organization of the home front and the mobilization of personnel and economic resources as part of the preparation for war. The second was organization ahead of the end of British rule and the establishment of the institutions of the Jewish state. In October 1947, on the initiative of the Jewish Agency and the National Council (Va’ad Leumi), as the two main national institutions that led the Yishuv, a coordination committee known as the “Emergency Committee” (literally, the “Situation Committee”) was established in order to examine the establishment of the institutions of state and ensure the maintenance of public life and the operation of public and economic services. The Emergency Committee established several subcommittees focusing on governmental aspects, such as regulating the machinery of state; on economic affairs (the supply of food, fuel, and currency); and aspects relating to the functioning of public services (education, health, transport, and communication).7
The central body responsible for the mobilization of personnel and economic resources was established under the auspices of the Emergency Committee.8 Known as the National Service Census, the body included two presidential members: Golda Meir (Meyerson), one of the leaders of Mapai and acting director of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency served as the Agency’s representative; while David-Zvi Pinkas, a member of the Tel Aviv city council for the national religious Mizrachi movement, served as representative of the executive of the National Council. In addition to the presidential members, an executive committee and public council were also established. The National Service Census included representatives of political movements, public bodies, and professional and social organizations such as the Association of Industrialists, the Histadrut (the General Federation of Jewish Workers in the Land of Israel), the Workers Councils, women’s organizations, the Association of Local Councils, and the Tel Aviv city council.9
The composition of the National Service Census and the organization of mobilization thus reflected the social, political, and organizational structure of the Yishuv. As a voluntary society, the Yishuv included various organizations that played an important role in creating a sense of belonging and identity among the Jewish population. During the early stages of the war this was a voluntary society, and not a sovereign state capable of imposing legal means of enforcement in order to execute mobilization. During the first period of the war (through May 1948), mobilization of personnel reflected volunteering and desire based on self-conviction and free will rather than the use of coercion and discipline.
From the beginning of November 1947, the National Service Census was made responsible for the recruitment of personnel for the war. The National Service Census decided that mobilization would begin in a public and open manner. In order to create a suitable public atmosphere encouraging mobilization, it was decided to exploit the Hanukkah celebrations, holding youth parades and a popular rally in Tel Aviv under the slogan “All in the Service of the People.”10 Mobilization posters were also prepared, such as a poster for the youth movements calling on those aged 17–25 to report for national service. The poster emphasized the Zionist interpretation of the ethos of heroism in Jewish history:
From Modi’in and Yodefat, from the wall of the Warsaw Ghetto, from the camps of our displaced people, from the illegal immigration boats, and from the Land of our Fathers, a single call arises: Lend yourselves to the service of the people! Let no one be absent! Youth – report now!11
The National Service Census based the registration of mobilization on data from the Statistics Department of the Jewish Agency, which estimated that the total potential for military mobilization was 185,000 men, including 97,000 aged 18–35, 78,000 aged 36–50, 9,500 youths aged 16–17, and 41,000 women aged 18–25. This estimate highlights the nature of the Yishuv as a young immigrant society, an additional important feature in its ability to mobilize in the 1948 War.12
The mobilization of personnel began on 9 December 1947: persons aged 17–25 were required to report to recruitment centers. After orders were issued requiring the recipients to report to the center and register, recruitment orders were also issued requiring the drafting of the recipients for service in the nascent military frameworks. At the beginning of February 1948 a full mobilization order was issued for men aged 18–25, and at the end of the same month a full mobilization order was issued for married men without children, and single men, aged 18 through 35. At the end of April 1948, after the application of the mobilization order to married women without children and single women aged 18–25, the mobilized force numbered approximately 25,000. In May mobilization was extended to fathers aged 26–35. By the end of May 1948, on the termination of the activities of the National Service Census and after the establishment of the state of Israel, the number of mobilized persons was 45,574.13
The character of the war was not yet apparent at the beginning of 1948. In its early stages, the war had more in common with the Arab Revolt of 1936–39 than with a total war.14 Until April 1948, the fighting took place between armed militias with manpower less than that of a brigade. Most of the confrontations between the Jewish forces – the Haganah, the IZL (Irgun Z’vai Leumi – National Military Organization) and LEHI (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel – Stern Group) and the Palestinian Arab forces took place along the friction lines between the two populations at the time, and particularly in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa. This stage also included fighting for control of roads. With the support of the Arab Liberation Army, the Palestinian side attacked isolated Jewish communities, particularly in the Galilee and in the Jerusalem area. Both sides also employed terror tactics against the civilian population. During this stage of the war, the fighting showed a lack of strategy and the absence of any overall plan, and was instead characterized by tactical efforts to manage small-scale exchanges suited to guerrilla warfare and irregular militia forces, such as the Haganah on the Jewish side and Holy Jihad on the Palestinian Arab side. As the fighting intensified, the organizational structure of the Haganah was modified and its units were expanded. On 7 November 1947, an order was issued defining the national structure of the Haganah. Thereafter, and through the end of the mandate, the Haganah forces were organized in nine infantry divisions. Three regional divisions: Givati, Alexandroni, and Golani; three urban divisions: Etzioni, Kiriyati, and Carmeli; and the three Palmach (Plugot Mahatz – Strike Forces) divisions: Yiftah, Harel, and Hanegev. Through May 1948, there was a clear trend to increase the combat power of the Haganah; this was also reflected in the activities of the Air Service, the Medical Service, and the Artillery Service, as well as in the divisional structure of the general headquarters of the Haganah.
During this military building process, the experience of the Jewish population on the home front was one of the main tools for encouraging military mobilization. The war was portrayed by Ben-Gurion as just and moral, and as one that would be won by the side that maximized the mobilization of its forces.15 This explains the leitmotifs that appeared repeatedly in Ben-Gurion’s speeches that “the front line is not there but here inside each one of us” and that “each one of us must make a supreme effort and each mu...
