Introduction
Japan's rise from a state of post-war devastation to an economic superpower has been referred to as an âeconomic miracleâ (Vogel 1979). Despite a long-term economic recession that began in the 1990s, the Japanese standard of living remains relatively high, and Japan's GNP is outranked only by the United States. Japan's present success reflects a strong work ethic, which was divided along the lines of gender. Corporate sarariiman (white-collar salaried employee) devoted long hours to their workplaces while sengyĂ´ shufu (full-time professional, housewife) managed the entire household and enabled their husbands to devote themselves to their careers. I will trace the development of the salaryman and full-time housewife and demonstrate how they have become hegemonic archetypes of masculinity and femininity which are still prevalent today.
Salaryman masculinity
Japan experienced a period of high economic growth following World War II, from about 1955 to 1973. Following its pernicious defeat, Japan required a large workforce to rebuild and industrialize the nation (Yamada 2001: 170â1). Accordingly, men transitioned out of self-employment in agriculture and family businesses into white-collar, salaried employment while women managed domestic affairs. During this time, some men could access a stable lifestyle through corporate employment and women through marriage and full-time domesticity (196). As a result, a gendered division of labor emerged within the middle-class that continues to constitute current notions of masculinity and femininity (Dasgupta 2005: 172; Taga 2006: 79; Tokuhiro 2010: 73; Yamada 2001: 197). While âsalarymanâ does not represent the majority of Japanese men, the term nevertheless continues to provide a template for notions of hegemonic masculinity (Dasgupta 2009: 83; Dasgupta 2012: 28â34).
A salaryman is typically a graduate from the ranks of an elite university who is employed by a large corporation where he works continuously until retirement. Employers expect absolute loyalty, diligence, steadfast dedication, and self-sacrifice from their employees who are compensated with the coveted âthree treasuresâ of permanent lifetime employment, seniority-based promotions, and company unionism (Dasgupta 2000: 192; Nemoto 2012: 4; Roberson and Suzuki 2003: 9). These treasures, however, are not easily attained but require self-sacrifice, economic capital, and eventually absolute dedication to the corporation.
In a gakureki shakai (education-credential society) (Allison 2000; Holloway 2010; White 1987), a strong academic record is a prerequisite for an aspiring salaryman (Allison 1994: 92â3). Japan's education system is defined by a series of standardized examinations that students must pass in order to ensure a place in a prestigious high school and later university. In order to increase the likelihood of their children's success, many parents send their kids to juku (cram schools), which specialize in preparing students for particular examinations. Clearly, successful navigation through Japan's education system requires not only hard work and discipline, but also a significant amount of financial capital. This investment does indeed pay off as corporations tend to hire applicants based upon the reputation of their alma maters (Tachibanaki 2010: 85â7). Academic credentials become a source of tangible evidence to prospective employers that a candidate possesses perseverance and the ability to overcome adversity, as well as conforms to the school's requirements. In a similar way, corporations expect that their employees will sacrifice personal time, offer total commitment to the organization, and submit to the hierarchy embedded in the institution, so in some ways the self-discipline learned in school can be seen as a precursor to and preparation for the regimentation of corporate employment.
Corporations reward their employees with benefits that can include health care, housing subsidies, a marriage bonus for newly married employees, subsequent bonuses for each child, and pension coverage for non-working women, and for this reason they can be seen as âtotal providersâ (Borovoy 2005: 74, 81â2). In fact, tax policies and the social insurance system presuppose a single provider household and thus discourage women from working full-time (Broadbent 2003: 91, 99â101). The benefits that companies offer to their employees are built upon the heteronormative assumption that salarymen marry and serve as the prime family breadwinners while women are full-time housewives or part-time workers and reflects normative conceptualizations of gender roles in Japan.
The âtotal careâ provided by companies is not without costs. The other side of job stability, regular promotions, a family wage, and after-hours socializing is that employeesâ loyalties can be manipulated to the point of exploitation (Borovoy 2005: 82â3). The costs incurred from total devotion to one's workplace are well documented and include unpaid overtime, frequent job transfers, work-induced health problems, estrangement from one's family, and feelings of isolation upon retirement (Allison 1994: 197; Mouer and Kawanishi 2005: 81â5). So, while companies provide for their employees, they expect exclusive corporate allegiance in return, which can have devastating consequences for individuals. The inordinate amount of time that men spend at work can result in estrangement from their families and failure to develop a network of acquaintances outside of work. Terms such as nure ochiba (wet fallen leaves) and sodai gomi (oversize garbage) are often applied to salarymen to capture the loss of identity that may accompany retirement (Dales 2009: 25; Hidaka 2010: 177; Taga 2006: 157).
The Japanese practice of tsukiai or mandatory after-hours socializing is an example of a work-related endeavor in which companies expect their employees to participate. Tsukiai materializes in the form of formal events such as farewell parties, welcome parties, and Christmas parties but more frequently as informal socializing after work or golf sessions on the weekends (Allison 1994: 8â10; Nemoto 2010; Roberts 1994: 111â13). Tsukiai can be viewed as a cost incurred from âtotal careâ since workers are not free to leave work at the end of the day, but are expected to form social bonds with their colleagues outside the office. Nevertheless, men may not regard tsukiai as a duty or obligation but instead eagerly anticipate after-work socializing (Allison 1994: 199). By encouraging tsukiai, organizations blur the distinction between work and leisure and benefit from the bonds that develop between employees and conceivably carry over to the workday.
Tsukiai can be regarded as another aspect of âtotal careâ provided by workplace organizations. Corporations take care not only of their employeesâ material needs by providing them with a generous employee benefits package, but also of their psychological need to socialize and relive stress after work. By providing employees with socializing venues that are connected to the workplace, organizations strengthen their employeesâ bonds with each other and ultimately their connection to the corporation (Allison 1994: 198â9). Organizations benefit from this arrangement because the public realm of work and related socializing becomes more familiar and comfortable to the salaryman than the private realm of family and home. Ultimately, a salaryman becomes closer to his colleagues and further estranged from his family and a sharp distinction emerges between the feminized space of home and masculinized realm of work.
The homosocial nature of tsukiai and the sexually charged environment where encounters take place can result in women's exclusion from this important component of a salaryman's lifestyle in two significant ways. First, the long hours that salarymen spend at work and related socializing is rendered possible by the domestic support provided by a stay-at-home wife. The grueling demands imposed by corporations prevent salarymen from playing a more active role in domestic life and thus achieve a work-life balance (Taga 2011). Since professional working women are still held responsible for performing household labor and childcare (Allison 1994: 106; White 2002: 91), the domestic support of parents, in-laws, or paid caregivers is the only conceivable way for a married woman with a family to pursue a career (Dales 2009: 26). Second, women may be uncomfortable in sexualized venues such as hostess clubs. Indeed, the presence of female colleagues may hinder the heterosexist banter which usually occurs and make it harder for male workers to relax, bond with each other, and ultimately construct their masculinity. On the other hand, men may expect their female colleagues to enact a quasi-hostess role, which involves performing tasks such as pouring alcohol and sometimes accepting sexual advances (Nemoto 2010: 215â19). Regardless, women who refrain from engaging in tsukiai are excluded from an important networking opportunity and access to organizational power (213). Salarymen may also have a personal investment in excluding female colleagues from tsukiai because they threaten the masculinized environment and male solidarity which permeates these public spaces. In particular, venues such as hostess clubs relegate women employees to a subservient role where they inflate their male patron's egos (Allison 1994). The preceding reasons indicate that while women may work, only men can have careers (Allison 1994: 24).
Salarymen are rewarded for not only displaying dedication to the organization but also for conforming to a related âheterosexual patriarchal ideologyâ (Dasgupta 2000: 194). Men are thus expected to marry by a certain age and then perform the gender appropriate role of primary family breadwinners (Dasgupta 2003: 123). This ideology constructs both heterosexuality and marriage as central practices for the accomplishment of masculinity and femininity. Organizations have a vested interest in encouraging their employees to marry and serve as main family breadwinners since the domestic support provided by a full-time housewife enables them to prioritize work. A full-time housewife can therefore be seen as the complement to salaryman masculinity.
Despite the long-established authority of salaryman masculinity, social changes have at least somewhat undermined this hegemonic archetype. The 1990s and following decades have witnessed a long-term economic recession that has resulted in corporate restructurings and an overall decrease in the number of permanent positions (Dasgupta 2009: 83â4; 2010; 2012: 38â9; Taga 2011: 11). Thus, men are no longer guaranteed lifetime employment in a single institution. Indeed, increasing numbers of younger men are unable to secure permanent employment and are forced to accept non-permanent forms of employment (Dasgupta 2009: 83â4; 2010; 2012: 41; Hidaka 2010: 89; Taga 2011: 31; Yuji 2005). Simultaneously, a growing number of younger men is unwilling to completely devote themselves to a workplace organization and thus are actively challenging hegemonic masculinity (Dasgupta 2009: 83â4; Hidaka 2010: 178â81; Yuji 2005). Taga (2011: 89) maintains that many younger men tend to attach more importance to independence and self-interest rather than their corporate identities. These trends indicate that alternative masculinities are emerging that concurrently depart from and undermine the hegemonic archetype (Dasgupta 2009: 80). As the notion of gender equality infiltrates mainstream Japanese society, many women now expect men to play a more active role in domestic life (Dasgupta 2009: 90; Holloway 2010: 34; Taga 2011). In reality, however, women still perform the lion's share of household labor and childcare (Dasgupta 2009: 91; Tachibanaki 2010: 24). While the salaryman's cultural authority has somewhat diminished, many scholars continue to maintain that it serves as a model of hegemonic masculinity (Dales 2009: 31; Dasgupta 2009: 90; 2010; Hidaka 2010: 163; Tokuhiro 2010: 55â8).
Bankonka (late marriage) and hikonka (non-marriage) are two other social phenomena that are arguably impacting constructions of masculinity. Nemoto's (2008) interviews with professional women indicate that these women may find marriage unappealing due to its association with a loss of autonomy and men's unwillingness to equally share domestic work. More recently, Nemoto, Fuwa, and Ishiguro (forthcoming) have demonstrated how men regard marriage as infringing on their individual autonomy and thus may postpone or avoid marriage. We can infer that marriage is a less central part of masculinity than it was in previous generations.
Full-time housewife emphasized femininity
The end of World War II also saw the emergence of sengyĂ´ shufu (full-time, professional housewife) who provided the indispensable domestic support that enabled men to dedicate themselves to their workplace organizations. The classification of a housewife as a profession indicates that domesticity is regarded as a full-time endeavor comparable to salaried employment (Imamura 1987: 18).
As discussed, the arduous demands that corporations impose on their employees render a wife's domestic support an indispensable component for professional success. Whereas their husbands devoted themselves to the workplace, women were expected to manage all aspects of the domestic realm (Dales 2009: 22â3; Holloway 2010: 36). This included managing the household budget, performing housework and childcare, supporting their children's education, and performing eldercare (Kurotani 2005: 127). Women's caregiving role encompasses âaround-the-body-careâ, which includes laying out their husband's clothes, drawing their baths, and packing their suitcases for business trips (Holloway 2010: 37; Lebra 1984: 131â2). Traditionally, devoted mothers rise early to prepare their family's breakfast and for the time-consuming endeavor of assembling their children's obentĂ´ (lunch box), which are nutritionally balanced and aesthetically appealing and a sign of women's maternal devotion (Allison 1991). While contemporary women may no longer perform âaround-the-body care,â they nevertheless remain responsible for most aspects of housework and childcare.
In addition to managing the physical needs of their families, women assume the indispensable role of supervising their children's educational progress. Japan's education system measures success by studentsâ performance on standardized examinations that determine the junior high, high school, and eventually university they can enter. The nomenclature kyĂ´iku mama (education-oriented mother) is used to signal the pivotal role mothers are expected to play in their children's educational success (Allison 1991: 202; 2000: 106; Holloway 2010: 148; Imamura 1987: 3). Schools expect that mothers regulate their children's completion of homework assignments, participation in supplementary classes (juku), hedules during summer holidays (Holloway 2010: 205). Mothers encourage and support their children through âexamination hellâ by preparing nutritious snacks, taking them to cram schools, providing tutoring or hiring private tutors, and creating a stable home environment (Allison 2000: 106; Holloway 2010: 148). The unflagging effort education-mothers make to support their children's education is often cited as the determining factor that makes or breaks a child's success in examinations (Allison 1991: 202â3).
Similar to how paid labor is the sine qua non of masculinity, motherhood is synonymous with femininity to the point that it âeclipses all other identitiesâ (Borovoy 2005: 146; Kurotani, 2005: 16; Nemoto 2008: 223). In a society which stigmatizes illegitimate children (Suzuki 2007: 6), marriage and assuming a full-time domestic role is the only legitimated access point to a maternal identity. Motherhood is neither a part-time endeavor nor a role someone else can fill; hence, entrusting the care of one's children to a babysitter has not gained widespread approval (Brinton 1993: 92). Even if workplace conditions were more humane, the social expectation that women are natural caregivers and that motherhood is a full-time, stay-at-home endeavor inevitably inhibits women from pursuing careers (Allison 1991: 203; 1994: 108). Thus, a pattern has emerged since World War II and has persisted where women work after graduation from university, resign upon marriage or the birth of the first child, and later re-enter the labor force in the capacity of a part-time employee.
An M-curve is used to depict the aforementioned female labor force participation pattern (Mouer and Kawanishi 2005: 133; Suzuki 2007: 16â18). Basically, women work for a period during their mid to late twenties, resign once they marry or bear their first child, and then resume part-time work in the tertiary industry once their children enter school. When displayed graphically, the working patterns of women form the contours of the letter âMâ. This trend, however, is changing as more women are postponing marriage and childbirth and expressing a desire for both a career and family and are thus resisting the conventional model of domesticity (Broadbent 2003: 8â9; Mouer and Kawanishi 2005: 134; Nemoto 2008; Tachibanaki 2010: 14). Nevertheless, in spite of the passage of equal employment opportunities legislation, women who attempt to combine a career with motherhood continue to face various obstacles due to the normative assumption that women assume sole responsibility for domestic work and childcare (Holloway 2010: 213; Kim 2007: 43; Suzuki 2007: 16). Thus, paid labor is gendered masculine while domestic work and parenting are gendered feminine.
Gender equality rhetoric
The promulgation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) in 1985 and subsequent Child-care Leave Law in 1992 can be seen as a major step toward the promotion of greater gender equality; however, neither has a penalty clause, which essentially neutralizes their effectiveness. In addition, international pressure rather than a commitment to end gender discrimination was the dominant force that prompted the passage of this legislation (Holloway 2010: 176). The EEOL prohibits gender-based discrimination in recruiting, hiring, job assignment, pay, and promotion (Mouer and Kawanishi 2005: 133; Tachibanaki 2010: 200â1) and subsequent amendments (1999 and 2006) forbid both gender discrimination and the establishment of gender-based career trajectories; however, I will discuss how the establishment of a dual career-track system reaffirms rather than undermines the entrenched gender division of labor.
The Child-care Leave Law guarantees male and female employees the right to take unpaid leave of up to eighteen months in order to care for a newborn child (Tachibanaki 2010: 185); however, in practice it is difficult for employees to utilize this leave for various reasons. First, employees who neglect to take their annual leave are favorably regarded by their employers as dedicated to the organization (Mouer and Kawanishi 2005: 85â6; Roberts 1994: 74). For this reason, female clerical workers may prefer to resign from their jobs rather than burden their colleagues with the extra work caused by their absence (Ogasawara 1998: 66). Second, social values that associate childcare with women may make it difficult for fathers to take leave, or hinder the career advancement and salary of those who utilize their leave (Ishii-Kuntz 2003: 208). Since companies promote their employees based upon length of service, a leave of absence may figure into an employee's evaluation and ultimately hinder advancement within the organization (Suzuki 2007: 18). Third, since men's salaries are typically ...