Democratization in Africa: Challenges and Prospects

Gordon Crawford, Gabrielle Lynch

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9780415754828
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135706357
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Politik

It is two decades since the 'third wave' of democratization began to roll across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. This book provides a very timely investigation into the progress and setbacks over that period, the challenges that remain and the prospects for future democratization in Africa. It commences with an overall assessment of the (lack of) progress made from 1990 to 2010, exploring positive developments with reasons for caution. Based on original research, subsequent contributions examine various themes through country case-studies, inclusive of: the routinisation of elections, accompanied by democratic rollback and the rise of hybrid regimes; the tenacity of presidential powers; the dilemmas of power-sharing; ethnic voting and rise of a violent politics of belonging; the role of 'donors' and the ambiguities of 'democracy promotion'. Overall, the book concludes that steps forward remain greater than reversals and that typically, though not universally, sub-Saharan African countries are more democratic today than in the late 1980s. Nonetheless, the book also calls for more meaningful processes of democratization that aim not only at securing civil and political rights, but also socio-economic rights and the physical security of African citizens.

This book was originally published as a special issue of Democratization

Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: an assessment

Gabrielle Lynch and Gordon Crawford

School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, UK

Over two decades have passed since the ‘third wave’ of democratization began to roll across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. The introduction to this collection provides an overall assessment of the (lack of) progress made in democratization processes in Africa from 1990 to 2010. It highlights seven areas of progress and setbacks: increasingly illegitimate, but ongoing military intervention; regular elections and occasional transfers of power, but realities of democratic rollback and hybrid regimes; democratic institutionalization, but ongoing presidentialism and endemic corruption; the institutionalization of political parties, but widespread ethnic voting and the rise of an exclusionary (and often violent) politics of belonging; increasingly dense civil societies, but local realities of incivility, violence and insecurity; new political freedoms and economic growth, but extensive political controls and uneven development; and the donor community’s mixed commitment to, and at times perverse impact on, democracy promotion. We conclude that steps forward remain greater than reversals and that typically, though not universally, sub-Saharan African countries are more democratic today than in the late 1980s. Simultaneously, we call for more meaningful processes of democratization that aim not only at securing civil and political rights, but also socio-economic rights and the physical security of African citizens.

Over two decades have passed since the ‘third wave’ of democratization began to roll across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, resulting in transitions from one-party or military regimes to multi-party systems. After one decade of political liberalization, early (if cautious) optimism regarding this ‘second independence’ or ‘virtual miracle’¹ had waned. The common conclusion was that, while African regimes are ‘obviously more liberal than their authoritarian predecessors’, they have ‘profound flaws’,² with most discussions falling into the category of ‘democracy with adjectives’.³ Alongside such mixed assessments, the 1990s also saw the growth of African exceptionalism as some analysts argued, for example, that social democracy, rather than liberal democracy, is the ‘most relevant to the social realities of contemporary Africa…[as it would allow for] an activist role for the state and strong commitment to social welfare’,⁴ or that ‘civic institution-building’ should precede democratization if countries want to avoid the rise of ‘warlike nationalism and violent ethnic conflict’.⁵

The following papers in this collection – with the exception of Nic Cheeseman’s paper on power-sharing⁶ – were originally presented at a conference on ‘Democratization in Africa: Retrospective and Future Prospects’ which we convened in Leeds in December 2009. In line with the basic rationale for the conference, this introductory paper assesses the (lack of) progress made in democratization processes from 1990 to 2010, inclusive of advances, shortcomings and reversals, and offers some ideas about ways forward. It does this by exploring and linking positive developments with reasons for caution, and by calling for a more meaningful process of democratization that would provide greater policy choice and place more emphasis on socio-economic rights and the physical security of ordinary citizens. The paper highlights seven areas of complexity and contestation, of progress and setbacks, as follows: increasingly illegitimate, but ongoing military intervention; regular elections and occasional transfers of power, but realities of ‘democratic rollback’⁷ and ‘hybrid regimes’;⁸ democratic institutionalization, but ongoing presidentialism and endemic corruption; the institutionalization of political parties and the significance of issue based politics in some contexts, but the widespread logic of ‘reactive ethnic voting’⁹ and rise of an exclusionary (and often violent) ‘politics of belonging’;¹⁰ increasingly dense civil societies, but high levels of ‘incivility’, violence and insecurity; new political freedoms and economic growth, but extensive political controls and uneven development characterized by poverty amidst plenty;¹¹ and the donor community’s mixed commitment to, and perverse impact on, ‘democracy promotion’.

Our conclusion is neither that we should be ‘lamenting the demise of democracy’ nor that we should be ‘celebrating its universal triumph’,¹² as cogently pointed out by Claude Ake, but that we should recognize differences between and within countries, and consider a reality of contradictory trends. For example, even in a ‘success story’ like Ghana, which has passed Samuel Huntington’s ‘two-turnover test’ of democratic consolidation,¹³ various shortcomings remain evident, inclusive of excessive executive and presidential powers over oversight institutions; pervasive corruption among bureaucrats and politicians; the marginalization and under-representation of women in political society; and rising inequalities amidst economic growth and poverty reduction.¹⁴ Similar contradictory trends are apparent in Kenya, even if the balance of the positive and negative aspects is reversed. Since, despite the ongoing legacies of the post-election violence in 2007–2008 and the uncertainties of trials at the International Criminal Court, as well as stark inequalities of wealth and power, Kenyan citizens clearly enjoy greater political freedoms than they did in the 1980s and recently saw the inauguration of a new constitution (see Cheeseman this collection).¹⁵

Given such mixed achievements, this introductory contribution reminds us of how genuine grounds for optimism and hope are simultaneously (and continuously) undermined and endangered by troubling institutional and structural continuities as well as by new political developments, all of which urges us to give greater attention to how a ‘right to vote’ for a choice of political parties can be translated into the realization of less centralized power, greater material inequality and less human insecurity across the sub-continent. We proceed by exploring these contradictory trends under seven thematic headings.

Increasingly illegitimate but ongoing military intervention

The first three decades of post-independence Africa were notable for the high incidence of military coups and military regimes, and even larger number of unsuccessful military plots and coup attempts.¹⁶ This is significant given that, ‘Military rule is by definition authoritarian and is very often corrupt…[while] the historical record shows that military rulers “govern” no better than elected civilians, and often much worse’.¹⁷

Unfortunately, the ‘third wave’ of democratization has not witnessed the complete withdrawal of the military from African politics. Indeed, between 1990 and 2001, there were 50 attempted coups in sub-Saharan Africa, of which 13 were successful, which represents ‘a much lower rate of success in comparison to earlier years, but no significant reduction in the African military’s propensity to launch coup attempts’.¹⁸ In the subsequent 10 years, although more infrequent, military intervention has remained a common option, as the following examples indicate. In Guinea Bissau, the introduction of multi-party elections in 1994 was followed by successful coups in 1999 and 2003, while President Vieira was killed by soldiers in 2009. The elected president of the Central African Republic was ousted by a rebel leader in 2003, and in Togo the military installed the late President Gnassingbé Eyadéma’s son in power in 2005. Mauritania has also continued to be afflicted by authoritarian rule and military intervention. In 2005, the longstanding autocratic ruler President Ould Taya (in power since a military intervention in 1984) was ousted in a military coup after having won multi-party elections in 1992, 1997 and 2003 (albeit condemned by the opposition as fraudulent), while the country’s return to multi-party elections in March 2007 ended with a further coup in August 2008. Guinea also experienced a military takeover in 2008, when Captain Moussa Dadis Camara seized power in a bloodless coup following the death of President Lansana Conte. The political upheavals in Madagascar in 2009 also entailed military involvement, with opposition leader Andry Rajoelina seizing power in March 2009 with military support, deposing President Marc Ravalomanana after a political crisis characterized by anti-government protests. (But see Hinthorne this collection for an alternative interpretation of the political crisis in Madagascar, based on local perceptions of politics and democracy¹⁹). The prolonged political crisis in Niger, following President Tandja’s dissolution of the National Assembly in May 2009 and attempts to extend his mandate through constitutional change, also led to his removal through military intervention in February 2010. Military coups thus remain widespread, especially in West Africa. Moreover, once a military coup has occurred, it can re-establish a pattern of military influence in politics either ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• 1. Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: an assessment
• 2. The abrogation of the electorate: an emergent African phenomenon
• 3. The internal dynamics of power-sharing in Africa
• 4. Taking back our democracy? The trials and travails of Nigerian elections since 1999
• 5. An autocrat’s toolkit: adaptation and manipulation in ‘democratic’ Cameroon
• 6. Can democratization undermine democracy? Economic and political reform in Uganda
• 7. Democracy promotion in Africa: the institutional context
• 8. Ethnicity and party preference in sub-Saharan Africa
• 9. Democracy, identity and the politics of exclusion in post-genocide Rwanda: the case of the Batwa
• 10. ‘Well, what can you expect?’: donor officials’ apologetics for hybrid regimes in Africa
• 11. Democratic crisis or crisis of confidence? What local perceptual lenses tell us about Madagascar’s 2009 political crisis
• Index