The International Anarchy (RLE Anarchy)

G. Dickinson, G. Lowes Dickinson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415839433
• eBook ISBN: 9781135037635
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political History & Theory
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume, a classic of its time, discusses the tragic evolution of European politics from 1870-1914. The main part of the book describes the development of the relations between France, Germany, Russia and Britain and follows the sequence of political events, the Triple Alliance and Bismarck's secret treaties, the Triple Entente, Morocco and the Conference of Algeciras, The Annexation of Bosnia, Agadir, Tripoli, the Bagdad Railway, Persia, the Far East, the Balkan Wars.

Its value remains because while other books deal with the actions of individuals, this volume indicates the underlying forces of which they were the victims.

Chapter I
The International Anarchy

I. The General Situation

THE special subject of this book is the series of events and situations which led up to the Great War. But that subject is regarded from a certain point of view, and it is the point of view that is important. The distinguished French writer, M. Romain Rolland, published during the war a little book called Above the Battle. When the battle is raging such appeals do not meet with much response. But after the battle they must be heard, if any real attempt is to be made to escape from similar calamities in future. In the pages that follow the reader is invited to forget that he is an Englishman and to remember that he is a man; for it is the future of mankind that is at stake.

If we look back over the course of history we find war to be a normal part of its process; and historians are so hypnotised by that fact that they commonly consider, not the fundamental conditions which make war inevitable, but the superficial occasions out of which this or that war happened to arise. These occasions, of course, vary indefinitely in detail; but underneath them all lies a general situation which makes it certain that war will come, though it is always doubtful by what particular circumstances or at what precise date it may be precipitated. It is this general situation which is the real theme of this book, although it has seemed timely to take as an illustration the particular events that led up to the last and worst catastrophe. The general situation, then, must first be made dear to the reader. It results from the juxtaposition of a number of States, independent and armed. That was the condition of civilisation in the three periods of European history that are most studied—ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, and modern Europe; and under that condition war is not an accident. It springs inevitably from the facts which we shall now proceed to analyse and illustrate, choosing our illustrations from recent times.

II. The Balance of Power

It matters little, in this analysis, at what point we begin, for all the points are connected; so that, metaphorically, we shall be describing a circle, and shall complete the same figure wherever we start. For convenience we will begin with the fact that States are armed. That they should be so seems to men so much a matter of course that it is difficult to find anyone who will take seriously the idea that they need not be. But why are they armed? The usual reply is, for defence. The rejoinder lies close at hand that, in that case, there is no need for any of them to be armed, since none of them has offensive purposes. But, in fact, each believes or fears that some other has such purposes. There thus develops the theory known as the “balance of power.” States pursuing contrary aims will, it is urged, nevertheless not go to war if they are confronted by forces equal to their own. In that case, it is supposed, they will prefer to find some peaceful way of settling their differences. The balance may be “complicated,” in the sense that there may be several weights pulling against one another, or “simple,” in the sense that there may be only two. The latter was the case during the years preceding the Great War; and a few sentences of M. Nelidoff, then Russian Ambassador at Paris, written in 1909, may serve as an illustration of what such a balancc is held to mean. After referring to a recent diplomatic victory of Germany, he proceeds:

“The two Western Powers, together with Russia, must now pay their attention to the systematic development of their forces in order to be able, once they are in a position not to fear a challenge of the Triple Alliance—and in this case Italy would separate herself from the Triple Alliance—to set up on their part demands which would restore the political balance which has now been displaced in favour of Germany and Austria. The experience of the last five years has shown us that a policy of this sort need not necessarily lead to war. During the Morocco crisis the close unity of the Dual Alliance in conjunction with England brought the German attempts to a standstill. Also in the present case the supremacy of the one side has been attained without the shedding of blood. It is merely necessary to establish a close agreement between the Powers, and to be firmly determined not to admit further provocations on the part of the Triple Alliance, disposing at the same time of sufficiently strong forces which would enable us to offer resistance. This is the direction which the Cabinet of Paris and also, apparently, that of London wish to give to their policy, in the firm conviction that Russian policy is also directed towards this end, since the shifting of the European balance of power closely concerns Russia.”¹

That was the attitude, five years before the war broke out, of one of the two groups into which Europe was divided. That of the other group is thus described by an Austrian statesman. It was, he says, the conviction of Germany and Austria that Russia was working methodically for war, and that “the only possibility to avoid a European conflict lay in redressing the balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, to the advantage of the Middle European Group.”²

These passages, it will be observed, both describe the same situation, but viewed from opposite standpoints. The balance is conceived as substantially equal, but as oscillating now to one side, now to the other, though never far enough to make it worth while for either side to proceed to actual war. Under such circumstances advantages wTill be attained now by this party, now by the other, but there will not “necessarily” be war. What Nelidoff desires is a permanent superiority of the Triple Entente, so that the solutions reached would be its solutions, not those of the other side. But, and equally, the opposite result is desired by the Triple Alliance. Each group aims at being sufficiently stronger than the other to dictate rather than accept results. Thus both increase their armaments; rivalry, fear, and suspicion increase with these; and war, in due time, is produced.

The positions thus illustrated bring us at once to the fatal defect of the balance of power. As a distinguished historian has wittily put it, the word “balance” has two meanings. It means, on the one hand, an equality, as of the two sides when an account is balanced, and, on the other hand, an inequality, as when one has a “balance” to one’s credit at the bank. The balance of power theory professes the former, but pursues the latter. It is thus, in fact, a perpetual effort to get the better of the balance; and as this effort is prosecuted on both sides, the ultimate issue is war. All history shows this, for every balance has ended in war. Let us take another example.¹ In the year 1878 the Austrian Minister, Count Andrássy, writes to Count Beust, his Ambassador in London, requesting him to lay before the British Government the Austrian wish to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russo-Turkish War, he urges, has disturbed the balance of power in favour of Russia and her Slav clients. However much the peace of San Stefano may be modified, from the standpoint of Europe, the fact of the liberation of a great nationality by Russian intervention cannot be undone, and it implies an increase of Slav influence. It is in the interest of Europe to create a counterbalance to this. The counterbalance should be the annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary.² This proposal, it will be observed, is a plea for what States call “ compensation,” that is, the seizure by one State or group of States of some piece of territory to compensate a similar seizure by some other State, and thus restore the balance. It is also a good example of the erroneous calculations which run through history. For, in fact, the newly liberated Bulgaria, instead of becoming a client State of Russia, became, in the next year or two, her enem y; and the acquisition by Austria-Hungary, thirty years later, of that full sovereignty over Bosnia which she was demanding in 1878 was one of the most marked steps in the series of events which led to the Great War. Such is the comment of actual history on the argument of Andrássy. That argument he concludes as follows: “If Austria-Hungary takes the place of Turkey in Bosnia, a further grouping of the Slavs under Russian protection will be ruled out, and a peaceful balance opposed to the prevalence of Russian influence, without any alteration in the relations of the Powers. There is no Power in Europe whose real interest will be touched by this extension of Austrian territory. For our monarchy itself it involves no increase of power, but an act of defence against threatening dangers, an act which is calculated at the same time to safeguard the peace of Europe against any disturbance in the near future, a sacrifice which Austria takes upon herself and the fruits of which will redound to the good of Europe.” Whether Count Andrassy believed this statement I am not in a position to say. What followed, in fact, was a long and bloody war to subdue the province, an agitation of the Serbs which reached its climax when the occupation was converted into annexation, and, in a direct line; this cause co-operating with others, the Great War of 1914.

III. Armaments and Counter-armaments

The balance of power means a balance of military and naval forces. Hence the competition of armaments. These are said, by any one State or group of States, to be for defence, but are not believed to be so by the possible or actual opponent; and thus the formal distinction between defence and offence disappears. Examples abound in diplomatic literature. Thus, an Austrian historian, discussing the situation between Russia and Austria in 1887, writes that if Russia wanted to attack Austria, she had only to threaten her enough to drive her into making an attack first; if war appeared to be inevitable, Austria would be compelled to attack, and to pass from the political defensive to the military offensive.¹ The same view is implied in a Prussian historian’s remark on the Anglo-German naval rivalry: “The firm determination to strike the first blow makes every moment of such a tension dangerous, for it is impossible to calculate whether and when the other Power wrill hold that the moment has come for that first blow.”² “ Nothing is easier,” says another German, “than to construe the conception of attack in any way one likes.”³ These are not aberrations of the German mind; they are deductions from the logic of the situation. “All wars,” said Lord Aberdeen, who was in revolt against the doctrine, “are called or pretended to be defensive.”¹ For offence may always be interpreted as “really” defence. It was a German Emperor who said: “In 1870 we did not provoke the war, but yet we began it offensively, that is, we attacked.”² But equally the Italian Minister, Robilant, promising Italian aid to Germany in case of a Franco-German war (1886), says: “Twenty days after mobilisation we shall have 150,000 men at the north-west frontier for a defensive-offensive war against France.”³ It was Bismarck who said to Crispi in 1877, when an alliance between Germany and Italy was under discussion: 44 The alliance must be both offensive and defensive. Not because I wish for war, which indeed I should do all in my power to avoid, but as a natural consequence of prevailing conditions. Suppose, for example, that the French assemble 200,000 men at Lyons. Their intention would be too obvious. Are we to wait for them to attack us?”⁴ But it was an Austrian, Kalnoky, who said, when Italy was joining the Dual Alliance in 1882: “In theory one can dispute as to what provocation is; but in practice this makes little difference…. To establish who has been attacked is always impossible.”⁵

Has this view been abandoned after the experience of the war to end war? Not at all. It is only confirmed, at any rate in the minds of soldiers. For in a Report to the Council of the League of Nations by the Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments, the representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Sweden, and France sign the following statem ent:

“Hitherto aggression could be defined as mobilisation, or the violation of a frontier. This double test has lost its value.

“Mobilisation, which consisted until quite recently of a few comparatively simple operations (calling up reserves, purchases or requisitions and establishment of war industries after the calling up of the men), has become infinitely more complicated and more difficult both to discover in its origin and to follow in its development. In future, mobilisation will apply not merely to the army, but to the whole country before the outbreak of hostilities (collection of stocks of raw material and munitions of war, industrial mobilisation, establishment or increased output of industries). All these measures (which give evidence of an intention to go to war) may lead to discussion and conflicting interpretations, thus securing decisive advantages for the aggressor unless action be taken.

“The violation of a frontier by ‘armed forces’ will not necessarily be, in future, such an obvious act of violence as it has hitherto been. The expression ‘armed forces’ has now become somewhat indefinite, as certain States possess police forces and irregular troops which may or may not be legally co...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• FOREWORD TO THE POPULAR EDITION
• PREFACE
• CONTENTS
• CHAPTER I The International Anarchy
• CHAPTER II General Sketch, 1870–1914
• CHAPTER III The Triple Alliance
• CHAPTER IV The Triple Entente
• CHAPTER V Morocco and the Conference of Algeciras
• CHAPTER VI The Annexation of Bosnia
• CHAPTER VII Agadir
• CHAPTER VIII Tripoli
• CHAPTER IX The Bagdad Railway
• CHAPTER X Persia
• CHAPTER XI The Far East
• CHAPTER XII The Balkan Wars
• CHAPTER XIII The Last Year
• CHAPTER XIV The Hague Conferences
• CHAPTER XV Armaments
• CHAPTER XVI The Last Three Weeks
• CHAPTER XVII Conclusion
• List of Authorities cited in the Text
• Index