The EU as a Global Player

The Politics of Interregionalism

Fredrik Soderbaum, Luk Van Langenhove, FREDRIK SODERBAUM

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415463904
• eBook ISBN: 9781317997795
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Globalisation
• Index: Politics & International Relations

A new look at the European Union's role as a global actor, with special focus on the theme of interregionalism in its relations with key regions around the world: Africa, Asia, South America, North America and Central-Eastern Europe.

This new collection clearly shows how, since the end of the Cold War, the European Union has gradually expanded its external relations and foreign policies and become a global actor in world politics. During the last decade interregionalism has become a key component of the EU's external relations and foreign policies. In fact, the EU has quickly become the hub of a large number of interregional arrangements with a number of regions around the world. Promoting regional and interregional relations not only justifies and enhances the EU's own existence and efficiency as a global 'player', the strategy also promotes the legitimacy and status of other regions, giving rise to a deepening of cross-cutting interregional relations in trade and economic relations, political dialogue, development cooperation, cultural relations and security cooperation.

This book was previously published as a special issue of the leading Journal of European Integration.

A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation Between the European Union and Africa

MARY FARRELL

1. Introduction

Relations between the European Union and Africa extend back far beyond the origins of the EU itself, and pre–date the institutionalised framework for cooperation that the two regions have built up over the past three decades. Nowadays, these relations are conducted under the auspices of the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, and the successor to the series of Lomé Agreements that spanned the period from 1975 to the eventual agreement on a new framework. While containing elements of the practice, and some of the philosophy of the earlier agreements, the Cotonou Agreement has been hailed as a new departure in terms of both its substance and approach to Africa–EU relations. Broader in scope than the original agreements, it does retain the concept of partnership that, in the early 1970s, was considered innovative in the conduct of North–South relations. This notion of partnership is still fundamental to Africa–EU relations and has in fact been given stronger emphasis in the current agreement.

Even today, international cooperation among states and/or between regions tends to be explained through one or other of the interpretative lenses available within international relations theory. Different interpretations of the nature of the international system, and the behaviour of individual states within that system are key questions. Realism (and its variants) consider states as the key actor, in pursuit of self–interest, and the defence of the national interest, averse to international cooperation except as a second–best option. Liberalism (and its variants) enshrined the virtues of freedom and rejected the notion that conflict was inherent in the human condition, advocating the view that institutions can promote a Kantian international order based upon peace and justice. Idealism was even more strongly of the view that an international order should be the goal, built around normative thinking, for building peace and making a better world through international institutions and frameworks with explicit and implicit value–laden agendas (e.g., Baylis & Smith 2001; Jackson & Sørensen 2003).

Where does the contemporary framework for EU–Africa cooperation fit into this kaleidoscope of approaches to international relations? It is difficult to find much reference to the concept of partnership in any of the main theoretical approaches, much less to find a useful definition of the term in any of the explanations of international cooperation on offer in contemporary literature. Turning to the European Union, itself the architect of the ‘partnership model’, one is struck by the lack of definitional clarity in the various policy papers of the European Commission on the one hand, and by the diversity of partnership arrangements that operate in practice with other regions of the world.

Even a cursory glance through European Commission publications and the various country and regional strategy papers produced over the past three years reveals the extent to which such normative values as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law appear as fundamental principles and often key conditions in the development of substantive cooperation between the European Union and its respective partner(s). Implicit in this approach to international politics is the view that cooperation is necessary and desirable not merely in the pursuit of self–interest but as part of a wider agenda for peace, justice and equality, where power and politics are supplanted by an institutionalised framework to support dialogue and enhance the achievement of core values, including democracy and the rule of law.

How does the EU model of partnership work out in practice? To what extent does this institutionalised form of interregional cooperation reflect the core values that the EU claims to espouse and, equally important, are these values shared by the other partner? The real measure of success for any political partnership is the extent to which substantive outcomes can be measured against the aspirations of each party. However, the introduction of the partnership concept brings an added dimension for it suggests free will, equal weight in terms of influence and ability to shape negotiations and outcomes, and the expectation of favourable results for each partner. When cooperation is conducted through formal, institutionalised channels over a long period of time, rather than as a result of ad hoc and informal arrangements, the possibility exists of reinforcing mutual understanding, establishing credibility and certainty in respective policy initiatives and proposals, and reassuring the participating countries that common interests can be maintained and continually reinforced through collaboration.

There is a broader question to be considered here, and this relates to the nature of the European Union as an international actor. Recent events on the world stage have thrown into sharp relief the apparent differences between the US approach to international cooperation, and its reliance upon military power and the creation of ad hoc coalitions of the willing to support international policy. By contrast, the European Union represents itself as the supporter of a world order based upon the rule of law, where multilateralism rather than unilateralism is the driving force behind collective actions to solve common problems and resolve disputes. In contrast to the hard power which is the basis of US influence, the European Union favours the use of soft power in order to exert influence on the international stage, with an agenda that is considered much more normative in tone. Indeed, the normative aspects of EU foreign policy seem to be extending across its relations with almost every country and region of the world.

How does this image square up with the reality of EU–Africa relations? EU–Africa relations have long been characterised by an institutionalised framework for cooperation.¹ The Lomé agreements brought together seventy–eight countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) with the member states of the European Union in a privileged relationship which allowed the ACP group to sell their primary products in the European Union market without the requirement of granting reciprocal market access in return. The original partnership arrangement implicit in the Lomé accords was substantially modified through the Cotonou Agreement signed by the EU and the ACP states in 2000.

The new millennium has brought in a new era in relations between the EU and Africa. This study will attempt to define the cooperation between the two regions, and to elaborate on the evolving partnership between the world’s poorest continent and one of the leading economic powers in the contemporary global economy. The major contention of this analysis is that EU–Africa relations have, from the beginning, been characterised by the realist tendencies of individual European states and that, under the current EU policy, similar tendencies are driving the proposals of the Cotonou Agreement with the on–going negotiations on economic partnership agreements between the European Commission and groups of countries within the ACP bloc (see Tanner 2004). The earlier phase of EU–Africa relations was initiated because certain member states wished to retain formal links with former colonial dependencies in order to ensure continued access to raw materials and natural resources, and to protect economic investments already made or bring contemplated in what were now newly independent states.² The contemporary phase of EU–Africa relations reflects both continuity and discontinuity with former policy and practice.

There is continuity in the desire to keep market access and to prise open new markets through the negotiation of regional economic integration agreements between the EU and selected ACP states on the one hand, and the encouragement of regional economic integration among the countries of the ACP bloc on the other. Yet, contemporary policy goes further than the Lomé accords did to promote economic liberalisation and impose greater conditionality on the partners through the demands for reciprocity of market access, plus the requirement that the regional integration/economic liberalisation agreements should conform to the WTO rules on trade liberalisation.

Certainly, regional integration has become a major plank of EU external relations policy but, as the case of EU–Africa relations demonstrates, the EU is promoting a model of regional integration that is far removed from the model of regional integration that has evolved within the EU itself. In fact, what the EU is promoting is a model of economic liberalisation across the African continent and, in the process, attempting to secure for itself continued market access and privileged economic status in the continent’s emerging markets. However, the European policy is much less active in addressing the real problems of poverty and instability that are likely to place severe limitations on either achieving economic liberalisation or securing broad–based societal benefits in the long term.

To support these claims, the arguments are developed in the following sections. The first deals with the early phase of EU–Africa relations with a brief examination of the Lomé agreements, and reviews the broad outcomes of this first experiment at a European–African partnership in a post–colonial world. The second section examines the shift in the European approach, epitomised in the espousal of the economic partnership agreements that were first proposed through the Cotonou Agreement. The European Union’s approach towards the more normative elements that are generally attributable to the European stance in international affairs is considered briefly — focusing particularly upon democratisation. In Africa, the end of colonialism failed to bring peace and prosperity, and many countries continue to battle with war and internal instability while weak and failing states have constrained the path to full democracy.³ Nonetheless, support for regional integration remains strong and has even shown signs of renewed vigour. The final section considers whether and to what extent the current model of EU–Africa relations is supportive of the renewed regional integration efforts at continental and sub–regional levels across the African continent. The question is of particular relevance since the constitutive treaty of the African Union proposes a form of regional integration that is closely modelled upon that of the European Union.

2. From Independence to Lomé

The origins of European relations with the countries of Africa and the Caribbean can be found in the historical ties between them, based largely upon the legacy of colonialism. Through the Yaoundé Convention of the 1960s and the successor Lomé agreements, the European countries sought to retain the economic links, the access to natural resources and raw materials and other strategic economic interests they had enjoyed under colonialism (Holland 2002). From the beginning, the then European Community built relations with Africa and the Caribbean around a set of institutionalised arrangements based upon the concept of partnership.

Not surprisingly, the Lomé Convention was hailed as an innovative arrangement for the conduct of North–South relations, and the management of political dialogue among countries with an extreme asymmetrical distribution of power. Of course, it evolved over time as successive accords were signed by the participating states to create an institutional framework for regular dialogue between the political representatives of the two regions, ultimately through five different joint EU–ACP institutions. Decision–making authority lay with the ACP–EU Council of Ministers, while day–to–day matters were addressed by the ACP–EU Committee of Ambassadors. Three other institutions completed the structure upon which partnership was based. The ACP–EU Joint Assembly, comprising representatives from the ACP States and an equal number of representatives from the European Parliament allowed for a democratic forum where views were exchanged, interests defended and opposing perspectives laid open for discussion. In addition, two technical institutions — the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation and the Centre for the Development of Industry — were intended to support the development of the agricultural and industrial sectors in the ACP countries (Ravenhill 2004).

Building upon the colonial legacy, provisions for EU–Africa relations can be found in a number of Treaty of Rome clauses, including the Treaty’s articles 131 and 136, which allowed for the inclusion of the then colonies of the six founder members in the customs union. Following the granting of independence, the new states were granted preferential access to the common market under the Yaoundé Convention. The Lomé Convention of 1975 was represented as the successor to Yaoundé, offering market access, without the requirement of reciprocity, to the primary products originating in the ACP group.

As a preferential arrangement, the Lomé Convention offered the ACP countries the highest level of privileged access (i.e., lowest tariff rates) compared to the other preferential agreements between the EU and trading partners. Moreover, the political dimension with its provision for regular dialogue at the highest level made the agreement distinctive. While the first Lomé agreement related primarily to trade cooperation, subsequent agreements were broadened in scope to include clauses on such issues as human rights, the rule of law, economic, social and cultural rights, and good governance (Ravenhill 2004; Holland 2002).

While it is not within the scope of this study to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the successes and failures of the Lomé agreements, a couple of observations concerning the overall record of the agreements are in order. Despite the developmental orientation of the Lomé agreements, the ACP bloc failed to secure any noticeable increase in levels of development, and in many countries growth had collapsed below levels that had prevailed during the 1960s. By 2000, ACP countries’ share of the EU market had declined to half the level of the 1970s, while imports from the EU continued to rise. The asymmetrical trading relationship was mirrored in the unbalanced nature of political dialogue between the two partner–regions. The ACP group never had the necessary political weight to exercise influence within the partnership, and their bargaining strength was clearly limited to what could be negotiated with the EU countries by appealing to the conscience of individual countries or by embarrassing the EU into extending the agreement. It was a relationship based less on partnership than on inequality and general institutional inertia, described by commentators as a form of collective clientelism.

3. Cotonou and Economic Liberalisation

From the beginning of the 1990s, pressures were mounting both within the European Union and at the global level to force a change in this traditional partnership. Within the EU, the strategic interests of the individual member states and the union as a whole had changed from those that motivated the original Lomé Convention almost thirty years earlier. New preferential arrangements were under consideration by the EU, and the geographic focus of its external relations was changing to encompass diverse areas — from Eastern Europe and the countries bordering the EU–25, south–east Europe, Asia (and especially China) and Latin America. The partnership with Africa no longer held the political salience of the past, and the EU’s political priorities now lay closer to home. Unlike the previous consensus among member states on some form of partnership, the closing decade of the twentieth century was marked by disagreement among the EU member states over the nature and substance of any new agreement (Forwood 2001).

The decade also witnessed a shift in EU policy on development and aid, to reflect the belief that ‘trade not aid’ was the route towards development. Moreover, the EU had shifted its position towards the approach long adopted by the international institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, with conditionality clauses attached to agreements on aid and trade–related development programmes. In 1999, an internal reorganisation of the European Commission meant that responsibilities for matters relating to ACP trade were moved from the Development Directorate to the Trade Directorate. For many European commercial interests, the Lomé Convention threatened to compromise their own special interests, and disputes over the protective regimes offered to such products as bananas, rum, sugar and cotton showed just how complex these commercial relations had become, and how difficult it was to disentangle the web of interests.

Perhaps the greatest pressure for a change in the EU–Africa partnership came from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with a rules–based trading system supporting a global open trading order. The EU–ACP agreement clearly contravened the WTO rules, since it offered preferential access to selected countries and discriminated against non–signatories to the agreement — something that was acknowledged by the European Commission in its Green Paper on EU–ACP relations, published in 1996.

The Lomé trade preferences were contrary to the principle of multilateralism and the most–favoured nation clause embodied in the GATT/WTO a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• CONTENTS
• Preface
• Introduction: The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism
• 1. A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation Between the European Union and Africa
• 2. The European Partnership with Mercosur: a Relationship Based on Strategic and Neo-liberal Principles
• 3. New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia
• 4. The Limits of Interregionalism: The EU and North America
• 5. The EU and Central and Eastern Europe: The Absence of Interregionalism
• 6. The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism: a Comparative Analysis
• Index