Rethinking the 'Coloured Revolutions'

David Lane, Stephen White, David Lane, Stephen White

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781317987147
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique

The communist world was supposed to have had its 'revolution' in 1989. But the demise of the Soviet Union came two years later, at the end of 1991; and then, perplexingly, a series of irregular executive changes began to take place the following decade in countries that were already postcommunist. The focus in this collection is the changes that took place in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan between 2000 and 2005 that have together been called the 'coloured revolutions': of no particular colour in Serbia, but Rose in Georgia, Orange in Ukraine and Tulip in Kyrgyzstan.

Apart from exploring political change in the 'coloured revolution' countries themselves, the contributors to this collection focus on countries that did not experience this kind of irregular executive change but which might otherwise be comparable (Belarus and Kazakhstan among them), and on reactions to 'democracy promotion' in Russia and China. Throughout, an effort is made to avoid taking the 'coloured revolutions' at face value, however they may have been presented by local leaders and foreign governments with their own agendas; and to place them within the wider literature of comparative politics.

This book was previously published as a special issue of Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics.

‘Coloured Revolution’ as a Political Phenomenon

David Lane

Different forms of political change from putsch to revolution are described and ‘coloured revolutions’ are analysed as revolutionary coups d’etat. Conditions promoting and retarding the success of such movements are discussed and cases of ‘decremental relative deprivation’ are discovered which predisposed the public to insurgency. Conditions for success involved a united and organized opposition with an alternative ideology and political policy. Counter-elites when in power neither carry out revolutions nor promote democratic development. An unintended consequence of democracy promotion is that autocratic regimes learn to counteract it and in so doing weaken genuine civil society associations.

Following the transformation of the European state socialist countries in the period after 1989, the East European countries formed several distinct blocs: the new members of the European Union, those that aspired to membership (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia) and a group of only partially reformed countries (Serbia, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan). In several of these countries ‘coloured’ revolutions have occurred: Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005). These public protests have adopted a colour (orange for Ukraine, rose for Georgia) as a symbol to identify their supporters and the character of the movement, although Serbia is referred to as a ‘bulldozer’ revolution. In 2005, in other countries with a similar economic and political trajectory (Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) comparable events were initiated although they were thwarted before they occurred or were successfully suppressed. Such phenomena, moreover, are not restricted to the former state socialist societies, Lebanon had its ‘cedar’ revolution in 2005 and George W. Bush referred to the ‘purple’ revolution in Iraq as the coming of democracy after the 2005 elections.

These processes have been linked to the earlier wave of ‘transitions from autocratic rule’.¹ Portugal’s ‘Revolution of the Carnations’ of April 1974 is seen as the beginning of this movement, which ‘crested’ with the collapse of communist regimes in 1989.² However, the Portuguese ‘revolution’ was more like a military coup in which, to express solidarity with the people, soldiers carried carnations in the muzzles of their rifles and tank guns. This coup-like character continued, I shall argue, in the later coloured revolutions.

The activities given the popular appellation of ‘coloured revolutions’ all had in common a proposed socio-political transformation intended to introduce ‘democracy from below’. Although differing in content, they shared a common strategy: mass protests occurred within the constitutional framework to widen forms of public participation in the regimes: they were legitimated as a movement for ‘greater democracy’: they were all targeted on removing the incumbent political leaderships; electoral procedures, allegedly fraudulent, were a regular focus for the insurgents; the public gatherings were constituted from a mass base of young people, particularly students. In comparison with traditional political demonstrations, a novel feature was the orchestration of events through the use of modern media technology – mobile phones, the internet and assistance from local and foreign media. The demonstrations, in support of a supposedly democratic champion, once under way were accompanied to a greater or lesser degree by mass cultural events: rock and pop music, which helped mobilize, create solidarity, and entertain mass audiences.

The promotion and organization of these popular manifestations required considerable resources – propaganda, musicians, entertainers – and even the organizers and participants received payment and subsistence during the events. While these protests were legitimated in democratic terms, whether they achieved ‘democratization’ is another matter. It is also debatable whether this type of political event constituted a ‘people’s revolution’ or a form of coup d’état.

The International Perspective

It is clear that these public events were cumulative and sequential in the sense that the earlier successful protest activity (particularly in Serbia and Ukraine) acted as positive models for subsequent demonstrations.³ However, they each had their own peculiarities dependent on local circumstances, the configuration of elites, and the predispositions of people to mobilization. Such conditions provided the opportunity for public demonstration, the lack of such opportunity, or the suppression of it.

Analysis of the coloured revolutions requires an international perspective. Proponents of democracy promotion have widely utilized the work of, and protest techniques defined by, Gene Sharp’s From Dictatorship to Democracy.⁴ All had moral and financial support from external sources, particularly Western foundations supporting democratic institutions and processes. A form of ‘soft’ political power was utilized by the West to undermine established governments. Such policy is derived from the ideas of writers such as Joseph Nye, who have advocated a shift from the use of military force and coercion to the promotion of internal change through manipulation of the norms and values of citizens.⁵ Through the use of multiple channels of communication, the projection of the domestic achievements and international performance of the West is likely, claims Nye, to be to the advantage of the USA and Europe. ‘Attraction’ can refer to political values (democracy, freedom, justice), cultural artefacts (pop music, art) and consumption articles (McDonald’s food, mobile phones). Promotion of internal change through manipulation of the norms and values of citizens is a major strategy.

The countries that are likely to gain from soft power are those closest to global norms of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the most access to multiple channels of communication; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance. These dimensions of power give a strong advantage to the United States and Europe.⁶

Foreign policy, derived from this standpoint, involves support of civil-society associations to pursue, by peaceful and legitimate means, regime change in authoritarian states. This position has been adopted by successive American administrations. George W. Bush, in his inaugural address in 2005, made clear that ‘it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture’.⁷ Policies of ‘democratization’ abroad are an important part of the neo-conservative value of creating an international order of values associated with American (and its allies’) ways of doing things. Support of coloured revolutions that contest allegedly fraudulent elections in authoritarian states are forms of ‘soft power’. Unlike the 1974 ‘Revolution of Carnations’ in Portugal, which had a leftist orientation advocating not only democratic reforms but also the nationalization of property, the political complexion of the ‘coloured’ revolutions has been right-wing. The insurgents have emphasized freedom, rights to private property, market mechanisms and opposition to state regulation. Moreover, in appropriate cases, they have advocated support for joining Western alliances such as NATO and the European Union (EU).

Most Western interpretations of the ‘coloured revolutions’, academic and journalistic alike, have emphasized their positive intentions and consequences and legitimated them as part of the ‘Third Wave’ of democratization identified by Samuel P. Huntington.⁸ They ‘remov[ed] authoritarian leaders from political power … What we have witnessed in the postcommunist world, therefore, is an unexpectedly successful diffusion of electoral revolutions … where illiberal leaders were replaced by their liberal counterparts’.⁹ Such writers project ‘the electoral model of regime change’.¹⁰ ‘[E]lections are the indicator of democracy – a form of government that has become a global norm’.¹¹ Such writing borders on the political authorization of an electoral process that is a tool in neo-conservative politics. By limiting the definition of ‘democracy’ to a narrowly conceived political mechanism,¹² the concept is emptied of any policy outcomes on, and continuous deliberation of, public issues.¹³

Critics argue that what appear to be popular revolutions are disguised coups d’état. Opposition forces – counter-elites – who are unable to mobilize effectively against incumbent governments, organize revolutionary events to galvanize support and legitimate a transfer of power through popular elections. Natal’ya Narochnitskaya¹⁴ argues that the ‘voice of the people’ is an illegitimate use of modern media technology (television, radio and the press) to create public opinion to force political change. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with powerful sponsors, become political bodies working through networks and the media – rather than being rooted in civil society and acting on behalf of citizens. Sponsors,¹⁵ directly or indirectly financed by outside governments, become involved in insurgent activity, defining democracy in terms of their own conceptions and magnifying election frauds to promote and legitimate a coup d’état to their political advantage.

The accusation of ‘fraud’ is sometimes made before the election results are counted and follows a campaign of discrediting the incumbent power-holders. Exit polls are an instrument of politics, and once election fraud is declared it is amplified by the media. The initial claim of ‘election fraud’ in Ukraine, for example, was based on exit polls in October 2004 and again in the following month showing the challenger, Yushchenko, as victor. These claims set the political scene – the ‘taken for granted’ political assumptions – that election fraud had taken place. In the case of the failed ‘revolution’ led by former President Levon Ter-Petrossian in Armenia in February 2008, despite statements by international observers that the elections were close to European standards and that few irregularities took place, opposition media reports asserted that the election was accompanied by ‘brawling, threats and manipulation’.¹⁶ Like the other phenomena discussed here, the Armenian disturbances had the character of an attempted coup d’état by a former politician supported by crowds estimated at between 10,000 and 50,000 in number.

What is portrayed in the media as ‘people’s power’ is in reality an elite-manipulated demonstration. While the masses may be captivated by euphoric revolutionary ideology, they are in political terms instruments of indigenous counter-elites, often encouraged by foreigners with their own agendas. If successful, rather than such revolutions leading to significant socio-political change, a circulation of elites follows the ousting of former rulers or their co-option into a new elite structure. The coloured revolution phenomenon is a new type of political movement that needs to be fitted into a paradigm of political change. In this essay, I first consider different forms of political change. Second, I conceptualize the coloured revolutions as novel types of revolutionary activity: a combination of public protest and coup d’état – a revolutionary coup. Third, I consider the conditioning factors leading to the rise of the phenomenon of the coloured revolution. Finally, I consider the extent to which ‘coloured revolutions’ might be a success or a failure.

Types of Political Change

In analysing political change, one may distinguish between a putsch, a coup d’état and a revolution. The criteria used to define these types of political change are:

• type of organization of political activity;
• level of public participation;
• intentions of the insurgents and counter political elitism; and
• the consequences.

The definition of various types of political change in terms of organization, level of public participation and intentions of insurgents and counter-elites is summarized in Table 1. A putsch may be defined as a sudden illegitimate overthrow of a ruling elite by another competing elite (for example, the installation o...