Political Representation and European Union Governance

Peter Mair, Jacques Thomassen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781317986638
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Democracy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book confronts and discusses different conceptions of political representation with respect to their application to the system of multi-level governance in the European Union. Political representation is an essentially contested concept. Its meaning has evolved with the development of representative democracy at the level of the nation state, and normative theories of political representation often evolved as a reflection on developing practices rather than the other way around.

Since the EU is not a conventional nation state, and since the effectiveness and legitimacy of classic notions of political representation at the level of the national state has also become a matter of dispute, the EU has become a playground for the development of alternative or additional conceptions of democracy. The contributions to this volume evaluate these alternative conceptions with regard to both their effectiveness and their legitimacy, and combine both conceptual and empirical analyses.

This book was based on a special issue of Journal of European Public Policy.

Democracy without democracy? Can the EU’s democratic ‘outputs’ be separated from the democratic ‘inputs’ provided by competitive parties and majority rule?

Richard Bellamy

ABSTRACT Various European Union (EU) analysts suggest that although a democratic deficit exists from the perspective of ‘input’ democracy, democratic processes such as competitive parties and majority rule are neither necessary nor suitable to secure democratic ‘outputs’ of the kind the EU delivers. This article disputes this claim. ‘Input’ arguments are vital to the legitimacy of decision-making in the EU’s policy areas, and the non- and counter-majoritarian mechanisms these analysts advocate have perverse rather than beneficial effects on the quality of ‘outputs’.

Notwithstanding Schattschneider’s famous remark that ‘modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties’ (Schattschneider 1942: 1), political theorists and political scientists have come increasingly to think the unthinkable. Normative theorists have long been tempted to distinguish the ideal of democracy from the modern reality, favouring the various ideas Joseph Schumpeter lumped together as the ‘classic theory’ of democracy over his ‘other model’ of ‘that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter 1976: 269). While these scholars view this alternative as an accurate account of actual democratic practice, they regard it as normatively limited (e.g. Duncan and Lukes 1963). Meanwhile, declining party membership and voter turnout has begun to challenge the descriptive value of this model, prompting a number of political scientists also to return to the ‘classic theory’ as a source of democratic ideals that might be better realized by somewhat different democratic practices to those found in most working democracies (e.g. Dalton 2004).

The European Union (EU) has offered particularly fertile ground for such thinking (Cohen and Sabel 1997; Majone 1998, 2001; Moravscik 2002; Sabel and Zeitlin 2007). With the traditional forms of competitive party democracy and majority rule proving harder to establish and more attenuated at the EU level than in any of the member states, it has become a veritable laboratory of new modes of democratic governance. The basic normative claim of these schemes has been to see democracy in terms of ‘outputs’ rather than ‘inputs’. ‘Input’ considerations relate to the democratic character of the decision procedure, and in particular the right of all citizens to participate on an equal basis in political decision-making. By contrast, ‘output’ considerations relate to the degree to which the substance of the decision may be said to promote collective interests in a manner compatible with the democratic goals of equal concern and respect (Scharpf 1999a: 2, 6–13). Their proponents argue that the ‘actual existing’ model of majoritarian, party democracy may have reasonable, if weakening, credentials on ‘input’ grounds, but what count are democratic ‘outputs’. These might be achieved better by more idealized forms of democratic decision-making that possess limited conventional democratic ‘input’. Indeed, such limitations may be necessary to obtain democratic ‘outputs’ due to distortions in the standard ‘input’ process.

What follows explores the merits of ‘input’ and ‘output’ democracy in relation to the EU. I start by outlining the basic arguments for democratic ‘input’, noting how they are broadly met by a system comprising majority rule and competing parties. I then examine two versions of the ‘output’ argument found in both the literature, and the EU’s structures and policies. Neither can justify curtailing democratic inputs. The conclusion briefly proposes how ‘input’ and ‘output’ considerations might be met within the EU given the persistent difficulties experienced in establishing the former.

‘INPUT’ DEMOCRACY

Some commentators suggest ‘input’ arguments carry no independent weight apart from their contribution to a certain kind of ‘output’. Thus, Fritz Scharpf in his influential use of this distinction within EU studies argues that ‘modern input-orientated theorists rarely derive legitimacy primarily from the belief ‘that the people can do no wrong’. Instead, they insist that policy inputs should arise from public debates that have the qualities of truth-orientated deliberations and discourses’ (Scharpf 1999b: 269). He suggests ‘input’ assumes not just ‘participation’ but also convergence on a ‘consensus’ that reflects the general will – itself only likely among a demos sharing a strong cultural identity, so that ‘the justification of majority rule must be considered as the crucial problem of input-orientated theories of democratic legitimization’ (Scharpf 1999a: 7). However, this argument misrepresents much mainstream work in democratic theory (e.g. Dahl 1989; Weale 2007), while overlooking why we might value ‘input’ in itself. Liberal societies regard people as entitled to go their own way, even at the expense of making mistakes. True, part of the reason is so they may learn from their errors. But more significant is the importance of treating individuals as responsible agents, the empirical difficulties as well as the problematic moral justifiability of others defining what is right for someone else, the dangers posed by even an enlightened despotism given human fallibility and so on. None of these issues imply that individuals can do no wrong, merely that it is more legitimate for them to take decisions – even wrong ones – than for others to take them on their behalf, especially given that these others may err about what is good for them too. Such factors motivate the ‘input’ account of democracy as much as considerations about good ‘outcomes’.

Three related arguments play a key role in justifying democracy: considerations of political equality; the reasonableness of political disagreement and the proneness to fallibility of most human decision-making; and the need to ensure that politicians are accountable and responsive to the public interest (Weale 2007: ch. 3). All three reinforce the importance of ‘input’ considerations as vital to, and to some degree having a quite independent force from, ‘output’ considerations.

Many accounts prioritize autonomy rather than equality (e.g. Lakoff 1996: 163; Held 2006: ch. 10). However, viewing democracy as a system of self-government proves hard to sustain (Christiano 1996: ch. 1; Weale 2007: 106–15). All but the most civic minded will experience some tension between their pursuit of personal autonomy in the private sphere and participation in public decision-making. Private autonomy may depend on a public system of rules, giving us an instrumental incentive to play a part in shaping them – a point central to the third argument for democracy. Yet, seeing these collective arrangements as expressions of individual autonomy requires fairly stringent demands be met that amount to a form of anarchism unlikely to be realizable (Wolff 1970). Not only is it improbable that all public decisions could reflect a consensus on what each citizen regards as necessary for their private autonomy, but also, designing a decision-making procedure in which such a result could theoretically be achieved is practically impossible, given that it would have to include the opportunity to vote on all conceivable options for any potential collective decision. Some accounts that adopt this model seek to overcome these difficulties by employing perfectionist reasoning about the goods and rights needed for individuals to be ‘truly’ autonomous. These theories tend to shade into ‘outcome’ versions of democracy – stipulating so many pre-conditions for citizens to exercise their private and public autonomy that little remains to be decided by the democratic process (e.g. Held 2006: 282). Indeed, their democratic credentials seem circular, stipulating what kinds of ‘output’ would be democratic and making these pre-conditions of the democratic process. By contrast, an ‘input’ perspective distinguishes a process that accords each person equal standing as an autonomous reasoner about our collective life from one that produces decisions that might correspond to and not inhibit the autonomous decisions of each and every citizen. Whereas the latter may be impossible to achieve, the former follows from any process that accords us an equal weight in making and contesting decisions.

The second argument enters here, noting how democratic procedures reflect the need to make collective decisions in the ‘circumstances of politics’, where those concerned have valid differences about the justification or advisability of different policies based on potentially incommensurable and incompatible normative and empirical judgements (Waldron 1999: 107–13; Weale 2007: 12–18). As Rawls noted, not all political disagreements arise out of malign, selfish or myopic thinking. Most result from ideological divisions that reflect reasonable disagreements stemming from the ‘the burdens of judgement’: namely, ‘the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life’ (Rawls 1993: 55–6). They involve both the empirical difficulties within complex and open societies of weighing up evidence, identifying causal processes, and estimating the consequences of different decisions and policies, and the normative difficulties of assessing which factors are morally relevant or how moral factors of different kinds might be combined or prioritized, overcoming the vagueness of our concepts, especially when it comes to hard cases, and reconciling the divergent moral and political views that people’s different life experiences may lead them to adopt (Rawls 1993: 56–7). Accordingly, a consensus is unlikely on what course of action best promotes the public interest on any given issue. Rather, people will hold numerous alternative and potentially equally valid points of view. Consequently, democracy cannot be defined by ‘outputs’ that supposedly enshrine the democratic values of equal concern and respect. Instead, we need equitable ‘input’ processes for reaching and contesting decisions – including decisions about these very processes – that ensure all positions obtain an equal hearing and policies can be reviewed in the light of evolving views and experience.

Finally, political equality and the ‘circumstances of politics’ require rulers to be accountable and responsive to the ruled. If political equality demands all citizens be treated equally in their capacity as autonomous reasoners and sources of information about their collective life, while the circumstances of politics suggest they will often disagree, make mistakes and change their minds, then we need mechanisms to encourage rulers to consult the ruled regularly and accord them equal concern and respect. These incentives come from institutionalizing ways of screening politicians to select those inclined to respond to public views in an even-handed and effective way, and sanctioning them when they do not, are incompetent or their policies prove flawed.

Taken together, these three arguments give citizens an interest in processes that respond to their concerns in ways that are fair and impartial. Meanwhile, they need not regard the results as ‘right’, merely as legitimate. What counts is being included in the process, having their views treated on a par with everyone else’s, and not feeling permanently excluded from consideration. If a core function of democracy is to allow necessary binding collective decisions to be made despite valid disagreements and uncertainty about their potential effects, these qualities seem vital. In addition, they promote mutual respect and reciprocity among citizens. For the losers in any vote are not being told they are mad or bad, merely that they have been outvoted. Moreover, they can hope to win in future – a possibility that invariably gives them some influence even when they lose.

The case for the Schumpeterian model of democracy that characterizes the 20 or so ‘working democracies’ worldwide lies in its capacity to meet these three ‘input’ criteria to an adequate degree (Bellamy 2007: ch. 6). Indeed, those that perform best on Freedom House measures tend to be the democracies with the fewest deviations from this model towards ‘output’ democracy of the sorts examined below (Dahl 2002: 164–5). The Schumpeter model has two basic elements: majority rule and party competition. Together they promote political equality, respect the circumstances of politics, and ensure decisions are both responsive and accountable.

Majority rule offers a fair and impartial equal weighing of votes that is anonymous, neutral and positively responsive as well as decisive (May 1952). Moreover, the Condorcet jury theory suggests that if there is a better than even chance that people are more right than wrong, then the probability is that the majority view will indeed be right too – with that probability increasing dramatically the higher the majority (Condorcet 1976). What about the problems Condorcet revealed of cyclical majorities, and the related Arrovian issues of instability, incoherence or manipulation? Mackie (2003) has shown that, though logically possible, these phenomena are rare – not least because party competition socializes voters so that their preferences resemble each other sufficiently for cycles to be unusual and eliminable by relatively simple decision rules. Competition in a two-dimensional space also promotes convergence on the median voter, which is generally the Condorcet winner (Ordeshook 1986: 245–57). In these respects, elections do work as a process of ‘truth-orientated deliberation’ that precedes the simple aggregative phase. Moreover, the fact that most majorities within pluralist societies are shifting coalitions of minorities means that the proneness of any ruling coalition to cycling gives it an incentive to reach out beyond its immediate membership to excluded groups to retain power (McGann 2004: 56, 71).

These standard features of a Schumpeterian ‘actually existing democracy’ promote political equality because they instantiate the status of voters as political equals – none has a lower status than anyone else and all are potentially involved in decisions. It meets the ‘circumstances of politics’ because majority voting on the basis of one person, one vote, offers an impartial mechanism for resolving disagreements that is neither biased towards any view nor assumes the superiority of any one of them. However, the dynamics of party competition also encourages equality of concern as well as respect through instituting a ‘balance of power’ between both different sections of the electorate and rulers and ruled. The need to construct majorities from shifting coalitions of minorities while converging on the median voter means that voters are effectively forced to compromise with each other. Party programmes involve trade-offs between millions of voters that involve either bargains that seek to split the difference between different sets of preferences or identifying agreed second-bests. Because an alternative government always waits in the wings, governments must engage in an almost daily referendum, whereby policies are updated in anticipation of a future election. As a result, they are responsive to and accountable for changing attitudes and conditions and policy failure (Bellamy 2007: ch. 6).

None of the above means that majoritarian, competitive party democracy works perfectly or even – given voter decline – that it is in good health. Merely that when it functions reasonably well – with either a plurality or some proportional electoral system – it has the capacity to reflect a coherent set of ‘input’ criteria. Moreover, these ‘input’ qualities invariably have positive benefits for the quality of ‘outputs’. It is against this background that the adoption of pure ‘outcome’ approaches needs to be assessed.

‘OUTPUT’ DEMOCRACY

Scharpf defines ‘output’ democratic legitimacy as collectively binding decisions that ‘serve the common interests of the constituency’ (Scharpf 1999b: 268; 1999a: 11). Differentiating such decisions from those that result from standard democratic ‘inputs’ turns on one of two claims (Scharpf 1999a: 12–13, 16; Majone 1998, 2001). On the one hand, ‘non-majoritarian’ arguments suggest that an appropriate process exists for determining substantive democratic outcomes, at least in certain well-defined domains. These render ‘input’ arguments unnecessary and possibly even subversive of democratic ends. On the other hand, counter-majoritarian arguments seek to correct supposed distortions of the ‘input’ process so that these favour more equitable outcomes – something especially necessary in culturally diverse societies that do not share a national political identity. Both mechanisms are rampant within the EU. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), European Central Bank (ECB) and a host of standard-setting bodies are allegedly ‘non-majoritarian’. Co-decision procedures and consensual or qualified-majority voting in the Council of Ministers are counter-majoritarian in requiring super-majorities on the grounds that only in this way will the common interests of all concerned be addressed in an equitable manner.

These two arguments share the view that standard democratic ‘inputs’ distort decision-making by registering false ‘positives’ or false ‘nega...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Abstracts
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• 1 Democracy without democracy? Can the EU’s democratic ‘outputs’ be separated from the democratic ‘inputs’ provided by competitive parties and majority rule?
• 2 Political representation and government in the European Union
• 3 The European Parliament: one parliament, several modes of political representation on the ground?
• 4 Consistent choice sets? The stances of political parties towards European integration in ten Central East European democracies, 2003–2007
• 5 ‘With or without you’? Revisiting territorial state-bypassing in EU interest representation
• 6 Civil society and EU democracy: ‘astroturf’ representation?
• 7 The EU’s many representative modes: Colliding? Cohering?
• Index