Cohesion Policy and Multi-level Governance in South East Europe

Ian Bache, George Andreou

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781317986003
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book considers the extent to which EU cohesion policy and related pre-accession instruments are contributing to the development of more compound polities in south east Europe and, specifically, promoting multi-level governance. In this respect, there are two points of departure: the first is the argument that the EU is a highly compound polity that tends to pull member (and candidate) states in this direction; the second is the considerable literature that links EU cohesion policy to the promotion of multi-level governance. Following this, we have chosen a range of south east European states whose period of engagement with the EU generally differs: Greece, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, F.Y.R. Macedonia and Turkey. The case studies reveal that EU cohesion policy has created more compound polities but that system-wide multi-level governance remains weak and central governments are still prominent. However, there are interesting and potentially important developments in relation to particular features of multi-level governance, not least in states whose engagement with the EU in this sphere is relatively new.

This book was published as a special issue of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.

Europeanization and multi-level governance: EU cohesion policy and pre-accession aid in Southeast Europe

Ian Bache

Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

This opening contribution provides the framework for discussion for the case studies that follow. It outlines the key concepts employed – simple and compound polities, Europeanization and multi-level governance – and explains the origins and development of EU cohesion policy and related pre-accession instruments. It concludes by summarizing the main themes and issues addressed in the subsequent contributions.

Introduction

This volume considers the extent to which EU cohesion policy and related pre-accession instruments are contributing to the development of more compound polities in Southeast Europe and, specifically, promoting multi-level governance. In light of previous research (below), we anticipate variations in the nature and extent of EU pressures and incentives over time both across and even within states. Following this, we have chosen for this study a range of Southeast European states whose period of engagement with the EU generally differs: Greece (George Andreou) has been a member of the EU throughout the period under observation (1989–2008); Slovenia (George Andreou and Ian Bache) joined as part of the 2004 enlargement; Bulgaria (Alexander Yanakiev) and Romania (Ana Maria Dobre) acceded to the EU in 2007; Croatia (Ian Bache and Danijel Tomšić) is expected to join in the near future; and F.Y.R. Macedonia (Gorica Atanasova and Ian Bache) and Turkey (Ebru Ertugal) have a longer-term prospect of membership. In Schmidt’s (2006) terms, each of these countries would be characterized as a ‘simple polity’ and, as such, particularly susceptible to pressure for change through engaging with the highly compound EU polity. We begin the discussion by explaining the conceptual themes employed throughout the volume.

Conceptual themes

The simple–compound polity distinction and multi-level governance

In essence, simple polities are characterized by power and influence being concentrated in a single level and mode of governance, whereas compound polities are characterized by multiple levels and modes of governance. More specifically, the term ‘simple polity’ refers to a state with a combination of a majoritarian system of representation, statist policy-making processes and a unitary state structure. The term ‘compound polity’ refers to a state with a combination of a proportional representation system, corporatist policy-making processes and regionalized or federalized structures (Schmidt 2006, 227).

Using these categories, the EU is defined as a highly compound regional polity, which places it at the extreme end of the continuum that includes its member states and one that tends to pull all member states – irrespective of their place on the continuum – in this direction. However, the pressure on states furthest away from the EU on this continuum is likely to be comparatively greater:

The EU’s federalizing effects undermine the traditional concentration of power of the unitary structures of simple polities while it challenges organizing principles which assume that democracy is better served by the concentration of governmental power and authority, such that the government has the sole responsibility as well as the capacity to respond to citizens’ wants and needs effectively ‘for the people’. (Schmidt 2006, 34)

In a similar way, while the EU tends to ‘pluralize’ all member states’ policy-making processes by promoting the role of organized interests in policy-making, it is seen to have had a greater impact in those states where interests tend to have been relatively excluded (Schmidt 2006, 34–5).

Schmidt’s emphasis on the ‘federalizing’ (also ‘regionalizing’ elsewhere in her discussion) and ‘pluralizing’ effects relates directly to the notion of multi-level governance, which refers to increasingly complex vertical relations between actors organized at various territorial levels and horizontal relations between actors from public, private and voluntary spheres. It is a process of change characterized by the emergence of ‘territorially overarching policy networks’ (Marks 1993, 402–3) and one that challenges the role, power and authority of national governments. Moreover, referring to specific types of multi-level governance developed in the literature refines our focus here. Type I multi-level governance describes system-wide governing arrangements in which the dispersion of authority is restricted to a limited number of clearly defined, non-overlapping jurisdictions at a limited number of territorial levels, each of which has responsibility for a ‘bundle’ of functions. By contrast, Type II multi-level governance describes governing arrangements in which the jurisdiction of authority is task-specific, where jurisdictions operate at numerous territorial levels and may be overlapping (Marks and Hooghe 2004). In Type I, authority is relatively stable, but in Type II it is more flexible to deal with the changing demands of governance (Table 1). Type I and Type II multi-level governance typically co-exist in modern polities.

Table 1. Types of multi-level governance.

Type I	Type II
General-purpose jurisdictions	Task-specific jurisdictions
Non-intersecting memberships	Intersecting memberships
Jurisdictions at a limited number of levels	No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels
System-wide architecture	Flexible design

Source: Marks and Hooghe (2004, 17).

In relation to Schmidt’s categories of simple and compound polities, Type I governance relates to the dimension of state structures, whereas Type II governance relates to the nature of policy-making processes (pluralist or statist). Here, we are examining the extent to which Type I governance has been changed through greater regionalization of state structures and the extent to which Type II governance has been enhanced to promote pluralization of policy-making processes. In clarifying the relationship between these concepts in this way, we are able to relate our findings to two related bodies of work that are generally treated separately.

Europeanization

While the term ‘Europeanization’ has been used in a number of ways (see Olsen 2002), it is employed here in its most prominent usage to refer to the effects of the EU on domestic politics. Specifically, Europeanization is understood as ‘the reorientation or reshaping of politics (and governance) in the domestic arena in ways that reflect policies, practices or preferences advanced through the EU system of governance’ (Bache and Jordan 2006, 30). It is an approach that emphasizes both the need to understand what is ‘coming down’ from the EU (e.g. the nature and the force of a particular instrument) and how this ‘fits’ with and is mediated by domestic circumstances. In principle, the greater the degree of misfit between the EU requirements and the domestic circumstances, the greater the adaptational pressures. However, a range of domestic responses are possible, leading to varying degrees of domestic change (see Börzel and Risse 2003, 69–70; Bache 2008, 12).

Central to much of the Europeanization literature are the insights of the new institutionalisms and, in particular, the contrasting claims of rational, sociological and historical variants. The first two provide the contrasting claims of the logic of consequentiality versus the logic of appropriateness (Börzel and Risse 2003). The former emphasizes rational goal-driven action whereby actors readjust their strategies to achieve unchanged goals in a new context, whereas the latter refers to a more complex process of social learning in which actors’ goals or preferences are changed. Although, as March and Olsen (1998, 10) have argued, ‘any particular action probably involves elements of each’.

An appreciation of the new institutionalisms is helpful in understanding the relationship between Europeanization and multi-level governance through EU cohesion policy and pre-accession aid. Here, Thielemann’s (1999) work is particularly instructive because it sets out two positions on the implications for European governance of the partnership principle of EU cohesion policy (below) and links the rationalist–sociological debate with the discussion of policy networks, which is closely associated with the concept of multi-level governance (see Bache 2008, 21–38).

In this debate, there are two main views. The first position, linked to the Rhodes (1988, 1997) model of policy networks, is underpinned by the rationalist/consequentialist logic and emphasizes partnership as a mechanism for creating new opportunities for strategic interaction. In this view, power is zero-sum and Europeanization results from a redistribution of power resources between actors in the domestic arena as a result of engaging with the EU. The second position, most closely associated with Kohler-Koch (1996) and her collaborators, suggests that network governance provides the potential for a deeper transformation of actor behaviour and preferences. In this view, the regular interaction promoted by the partnership principle can generate trust through socialization that promotes problem-solving rather than bargaining as the predominant decision-making style (Thielemann 1999, 187–8).

Here can be seen a clear contrast between rationalist and sociological strands in parallel debates on new institutionalism and policy networks, which generate Assumptions Rationalist accounts Sociological accounts contrasting hypotheses in relation to the nature and the extent of the transformation of governance that has taken place through EU cohesion policy. A rationalist account would assume power to be zero-sum, expect national actors to continue pursuing established goals (albeit in a changing environment) and ascribe shifts toward multi-level governance to a redistribution of power resources brought by the EU policies. By contrast, a sociological perspective would assume power to be positive-sum, expect actors to change their preferences through socialization in a changing environment and ascribe shifts toward multi-level governance to a learning process (see Table 2).

Table 2. Rationalist and sociological assumptions underpinning Europeanization research.

Assumptions	Rationalist accounts	Sociological accounts
Power	Zero-sum	Positive-sum
Interests	Fixed	Malleable
Mechanism of Europeanization	Redistribution of power resources	Socialization/learning

Source: Adapted from Bache (2008, 13).

In both accounts, learning is seen to be a feature of change, but has a different meaning in each. The central distinction is between ‘thin’ (or single loop) and ‘thick’ (or double loop) forms of learning (Radaelli 2003, 52). ‘Thin learning’ refers to the readjustment of actor strategies to allow them to achieve unchanged goals in a new context or ‘how to get around an obstacle by using a menu of well-known responses in various ingenious ways’ (Radaelli 2003, 38). ‘Thick learning’ involves a modification of actors’ values and thus a reshaping of their preferences and goals.

So far, this rationalist–reflectivist dichotomy is relatively straightforward, but does not account for historical institutionalism, a key component in Europeanization research (Bulmer and Radaelli 2005; Bulmer and Burch 2006). As an approach, it incorporates both rationalist and sociological elements, but emphasizes the importance of practices embedded over time in explaining how institutions respond to external pressures for change. More broadly, it relates to questions of time and timing – and particularly the argument that ‘when things happen within a sequence affects how they happen’ (Tilly 1984, 14) – that deserve attention here, given the focus on states whose engagement with the EU varies across these dimensions.

Pierson (2004) makes a persuasive case for research going beyond snapshots of political life to analysis of ‘moving pictures’ that situate politics more squarely in time. At the core of this approach is not only that ‘history matters’ in explaining contemporary political phenomena, but also the need to explore how and with what effects. The approach emphasizes the importance of path dependence, highlighting the importance of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes that constrain change. Thus, historical institutionalism is often most useful in explaining outcomes approximating inertia or incremental change. However, the approach anticipates occasional sudden change through ‘seismic events that trigger a “critical juncture” or “punctuate” the pre-existing equilibrium’ (Bulmer 2007, 50).

In the context of Europeanization research, the history that matters is both that of the EU and of the member or candidate country under consideration. Thus, the research task is to understand something of both, but also the relationship between them as the...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• 1. Europeanization and multi-level governance: EU cohesion policy and pre-accession aid in Southeast Europe
• 2. The domestic effects of EU cohesion policy in Greece: islands of Europeanization in a sea of traditional practices
• 3. Europeanization and multi-level governance in Slovenia
• 4. The Europeanization of Bulgarian regional policy: a case of strengthened centralization
• 5. Europeanization and new patterns of multi-level governance in Romania
• 6. Europeanization and nascent multi-level governance in Croatia
• 7. Europeanization and F.Y.R. Macedonia: towards a compound polity?
• 8. Europeanization and multi-level governance in Turkey
• 9. Building multi-level governance in Southeast Europe?
• Index