Communicating Security

Civil-Military Relations in Israel

Udi Lebel

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415585064
• eBook ISBN: 9781317998211
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Civil Rights in Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book analyzes the changes and tendencies expressed in the relation between army and society in Israel.

Since its inception, Israel has been defined as a nation in arms, a public space in which the security needs became central and, to a great extent, dictated the agenda and functioning of all the public arenas operating in it. The theoretical investigation is accompanied by case study illustrations of special instances related to the nexus between:

• security and society
• security and politics
• the army and the media
• the army and public relations
• security and culture
• bereavement and commemoration
• social motivation to serve in the army
• the army and foreign policy.

Lebel explores the connection between the military and culture in Israel against the backdrop of globalization, individualism, liberalism, and social burn-out in the face of survival and change.

Political–Military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003

AMIR BAR-OR

Shortly before Israel’s national elections in 2003, the chief of staff (hereafter, CGS), Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, completed his military service and was appointed defence minister in Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s first government. Israel’s ‘Cooling-Off’ Law calls for a period of one year after discharge from the army before a senior military officer can be elected to parliament. Although the law has no jurisdiction over ministerial roles, as illustrated by Mofaz’s entry into the Defence Ministry, his appointment aroused widespread public criticism over the new defence minister’s expected function as a ‘super-CGS’. The Supreme Court also berated Mofaz for trying to get elected to parliament before the end of the legally required cooling-off period.

The attempt to reach public office by someone who ‘only a few months earlier was in uniform and bore the rank of lieutenant general … raises concern that decisions he made in the recent past within the framework of his military or security office, were influenced by his political views’.¹ This statement seems to be an additional indication of the lack of clearly defined rules in Israel regarding the division between the political and military spheres. ‘For many years, no clear boundaries existed regarding relations between the military and civil authorities in Israel. In Israel’s government system there was no title as commander-in-chief of the armed forces’.²

The turning-point in this state of affairs took place in 1976 with the passage of the Basic Law: The Army that was intended to define formally and explicitly Israel’s political-military relations. Up to this time, the relationship had been characterized by manifest ambiguity over the allocation of authority among the prime minister, government (cabinet), defence minister, CGS, and Knesset. This modus vivendi lasted until the 1973 war. In its aftermath the benign vagueness of responsibility could no longer continue, especially in light of the investigating Agranat Commission that studied the war’s mismanagement. The commission reached a unanimous decision regarding the nature of political-military relations: they had to be legalized and formally defined.

To fully grasp the complexity of the government’s legal authority as supreme commander of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) it must be kept in mind that political-military relations in Israel are based on the ‘informal nature’ of the political system and culture. This informal network developed from the lack of a precise distinction between the political and military, the absence of formal legislation regulating their relationship, and from the need to maintain workable political-military ties during Israel’s first three decades.

The Basic Law: The Army was designed to correct the failings of the 1973 war. The law stated that the CGS is subject to governmental authority and is subordinate to the defence minister. This implies that the government, as a collective body, is the indisputable supreme commander with the right to rescind any orders issued by the defence minister – who is granted legal control of the army by government consent and whose job it is to execute government policy. Such convoluted legalistic language regarding the chain of command, and the allocation of unprecedented authority in the hands of the government and defence minister, left ample room for interpretation and did little to alter the basic rules of the political–military game. The specific situation as outlined in the Basic Law: The Army were supposed to clarify the chain of command vis-à-vis the government, defence minister and CGS, but the wording was sufficiently vague to leave the protagonists room for manoeuvre.

Furthermore, over the years, even partial attempts at establishing formal government supervision of the army, via professional advisory bodies, were hampered by various obstacles. Although the creation of a National Security Council in the Prime Minister’s Office is mandated in the Basic Law: The Government, it never materialized in a way that guaranteed its success. The appointment of relatively low level, non-influential figures to this body during the Shamir (1986–1992) and Rabin (1992–1995) governments ended in failure mainly because the work style of these two decision-makers left little space for consultation.

The vacuum was filled by the army, whose proposals and politicalmilitary recommendations were generally accepted by the political echelon. The army acts according to orders from the military command – as is essential for the proper functioning of any military organization. The IDF and the CGS, in conjunction with the general staff and its various branches, execute their staff work schedule according to a smooth process. This places the CGS in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the government, the prime minister, and even the defence minister. All the attempts at setting up professional advisory boards for the prime minister and defence minister, and installing senior consultants for military affairs, have come to naught. The National Security Advisory Staff established during Ariel Sharon’s term as defence minister (1982–1983) was an all-out effort to contend with the lack of an advisory board. Its failure was due to its ambitious attempt to replace the general staff. Later efforts at creating an advisory board within the Prime Minister’s Office were more limited in scope and heedful to curtail the army’s main functions.

The Basic Law: The Army did not bring about the necessary transformation of political-military relations. The shortcomings pointed out above and the oversights that have been revealed since the law’s passage rendered it almost irrelevant. The political-military relationship maintains its informal character. The ascendancy of the informal processes whose significance grew in the absence of a dominant political leadership came to expression in the army’s increased strength, status, and influence over the political system despite repeated attempts at truncating it. The most significant attempt was made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (1996–1999) who endeavoured to reshape Israeli civil–military relations. Ironically, the CGS whom he appointed, Lt. General Shaul Mofaz (1998–2002), strengthened both the army’s status and his own position as the IDF’s supreme commander. While Netanyahu attempted to introduce fundamental, destabilizing changes in the modus vivendi that had crystallized over the years, Lt. General Mofaz, who, as CGS, served three prime ministers (Netanyahu, Barak, and Sharon) and four defence ministers (Mordechai, Arens, Barak, and Ben-Eliezer), drew more fire during his term (that ended in early July 2002) than any previous chief of staff.

Following the 1996 elections, the new administration headed by Benjamin Netanyahu tried to reform Israeli civil–military relations. The first-ever direct election of an Israeli prime minister was an important factor in strengthening the new prime minister’s position. Direct elections provided him with greater authority than in the past when he was only ‘first among equals’. Responsibility for the army was supposed to be transferred directly to the prime minister instead of being held collectively by the government. This was intended to give the prime minister additional leverage in security matters. But Netanyahu overlooked the fact that the government’s status had not formally changed and that it was still able to deliberate and decide matters of national security. The gap between the prime minister’s expectations of his power and his actual performance as the de facto supreme commander of the IDF intensified the trend in the army toward alienation from political matters. This occurred against the backdrop of Netanyahu’s criticism of a number of IDF generals for their involvement in politics during the Rabin administration.

Netanyahu believed that the army should be removed from all aspects of political decision-making. The moment he took office, he reversed the previous norm and sought to concentrate power in his own hands and sideline the CGS. Above all, he made a transparent attempt to distance high-ranking officers, who had supported the policies of the two previous governments (Rabin and Peres), from the decision-making process. This may have been the reason why Netanyahu adopted an entirely new approach towards civil–military relations and dismissed the army from the political arena. This was only the first move by the newly-installed Netanyahu government that would widen the gap between the political and military leaderships.

If the new government’s aim was to narrow the senior military command’s influence in the political arena, then very soon the army was removed even from discussions relating to its own role. The chief of staff and his deputy were kept out of meetings on cutbacks in the security budget, and the prime minister cancelled what used to be routine work-sessions with the CGS. Moreover, Netanyahu initiated a highly skewered presentation of the ‘exaggerated’ salaries of military personnel as part of a pre-planned campaign designed to finance basic changes in the IDF’s priorities according to his outlook. The sense of alienation did not abate even when the new defence minister, Yitzhak Mordechai, took office shortly after completion of a long military career. On the contrary, it increased once he became a fulltime partner in the government’s policy of distancing itself from the army.

Even a ‘positive’ security initiative by Netanyahu, such as the reinstalling of the National Security Council, was seen as another attempt to sever the direct communication line between the Prime Minister’s Office and the senior military command. Netanyahu’s plan to establish a National Security Council in his office, as required by the Basic Law: The Government, could have created a new set of ground rules in civil–military relations. The council was to be headed by Maj. General (Res.) David Ivri, a former air force commander and one of the most respected figures in the national security establishment. Ivri had served in the high-profile role of director general of the defence ministry for over ten years and was now expected to usher in a major overhaul in the prime minister’s capacity to oversee military operations. In addition, the National Security Council was designed to coordinate several inter-ministerial projects, such as the Anti-Terror Unit. In addition, Ivri would be directly responsible for such major areas as strategic co-operation with the United States and the Arms Control Steering Committee.

The amassing of all these roles in the Prime Minister’s Office should have reduced the IDF’s influence and enabled the prime minister, acting on behalf of the government, to exercise unprecedented control over national security policies. But the reforms encountered stiff resistance from Defence Minister Mordechai who succeeded in downsizing the council into a consultative forum headed by Ivri within the framework of the Defence Ministry rather than the Prime Minister’s Office. The defence minister had clearly won this round. Another point of friction between the prime minister and the senior military command developed when commanders were no longer invited to political colloquiums to present their professional opinion on military matters.

Two examples are worth mentioning: First, when the cabinet discussed the Hebron withdrawal plan in 1996, the military, and especially the head of the Central Command, were kept in the dark. Secondly, before the disastrous opening of the Western Wall tunnel in the Old City of Jerusalem in September 1996, the military received no information about the timing of the opening or specific orders once the decision was made. All it received was painfully short notice to muster the troops. The fact that military figures were no longer ‘in the game’ consigned them to the awkward position of having to provide military solutions for political contingencies that they were not consulted on in the first place.

In light of the worsening relationship between the prime minister and the army after the Western Wall tunnel fiasco, when blame was placed on the army, and the IDF became, in effect, a political punch-bag, distrust between the different sectors soared to its highest level since the 1967 war. Some political analysts claimed that the prospect of a putsch in Israel was on the rise because of the combined effects of the deep credibility gap and the direct election of the prime minister. This analysis, as expected, sparked a heated public debate that exposed the government’s inept handling of relations with the army and other security services.

But public criticism had little impact on the prime minister’s management of civil–military relations, which worsened as the 1999 election campaign approached. A minor incident mushroomed into a major clash between the prime minister and CGS, who was now seen as a growing threat to the prime minister’s political future. When Netanyahu, as the state’s supreme authority on security matters, cut short the CGS’s delivery of a routine report during a government session, criticism was levelled at the prime minister for interfering in the proper funtioning of the government. To recall, after the 1973 war the Agranat Commission had warned that proper decision-making by the government on security matters depended on the free flow of information. By obstructing the government from receiving up-to-date information from the army’s best-informed soldier, the prime minister, who has no status in the Basic Law: The Army, had been in the wrong.

Not surprisingly, a backlash against Netanyahu erupted, emanating from anonymous voices within the military establishment and surfacing in the media. In vitriolic language the prime minister was criticized for mishandling his relations with the IDF high command and for upbraiding the top brass on public occasions such as the graduation ceremony at the National Security College in the summer of 1996.

The cumulative effect of the continuous marginalization of the army led to a further exacerbation and polarization of relations between the prime minister and the CGS. The prime minister targeted the brunt of his criticism at the chief of staff, Lt. General Shahak who, more than any other figure in the IDF, was identified with the previous government’s support for the Oslo peace process. Netanyahu’s brazen disregard of Shahak’s military expertise was in line with his constant whittling down of the CGS’s stature and authority and attempt to discredit the general.

Netanyahu brushed aside the CGS and replaced him with a general who was considered a more professional and less political officer – Shaul Mofaz. Defence minister Yitzhak Mordechai, was also replaced toward the end of the administration. At this point Netanyahu established the National Security Council within the framework of the Prime Minister’s Office. If the council can be considered an improvement in civil–military relations, although it failed to play a significant role in national security decisions, then Netanyahu’s behaviour toward the IDF general staff and his co-option of the role of supreme commander without the required legal backing should be seen as a negative, dangerous development in the fragile, complex relationship between the political and military sectors in Israel.

Over the years, senior IDF military commanders acquired almost mythic admiration and professional respect from the political leadership. The government and defence minister granted them near total freedom of action, even if it meant the gradual reduction of the civilian authority’s involvement in military affairs. It is natural, then, that in the course of time the CGS has become a very influential figure indeed in the political arena.

Mofaz replaced Lt. General Shahak after a stormy episode of prime minister-CGS relations and after beating out a rival who had better prospects of getting the job. Expectations for Mofaz were modest. He assumed the role during a relatively quiet period and planned on being the ‘Peace CGS’ by devoting most of his time and energy to building up the army in a plan entitled – ‘IDF 2000’.

Netanyahu appointed Mofaz chief of staff in 1998. The following year a new government came to power headed by Ehud Barak, who also appointed himself as the new defence minister. The Barak government, too, was short-lived, and after a trouncing at the polls it handed over the reins of power to Ariel Sharon. Prime Minister Sharon headed a national unity government at a time of worsening conditions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After Sharon’s ascension, Lt. General Mofaz precipitated incidents that created a crisis in civil–military relations. Simmering tension between Mofaz and the political leadership reached a boiling point in the conflict with the Palestinian Authority (PA).

If the main reason for appointing Mofaz to CGS had be...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• CONTENTS
• Introduction ‘Communicating Security’: Civil–Military Relations in Israel
• 1 Political–Military Relations in Israel, 1996–2003
• 2 The Growing Militarization of the Israeli Political System
• 3 Civil–Military Relations and Strategic Goal Setting in the Six Day War
• 4 Society Strength as a Base for Military Power: The State of Israel during the Early 1950s
• 5 Under the Threat of Terrorism: A Reassessment of the Factors Influencing the Motivation to Serve in the Israeli Reserves
• 6 The Creation of the Israeli ‘Political Bereavement Model’—Security Crises and their Influence on the Public Behaviour of Loss: A Psycho-Political Approach to the Study of History
• 7 Holocaust Survivors in the Israeli Army during the 1948 War: Documents and Memory
• 8 The Military and the Media in the Twenty-First Century: Towards a New Model of Relations
• 9 Three ‘Travelling’ Models of Politics and the Mass Media in the Context of Israeli National Security
• 10 Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case
• 11 The Media and National Security: The Performance of the Israeli Press in the Eyes of the Israeli Public
• 12 Competing Land Uses: The Territorial Dimension of Civil–Military Relations in Israel
• 13 Defending Territorial Sovereignty Through Civilian Settlement: The Case of Israel’s Population Dispersal Policy
• Index