Progress, power, and violent accumulation in Zimbabwe
David Moore
Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Zimbabwe's recent travails have challenged the concept of progress as it is popularly conceived, as they have forced social scientists to revisit many of the verities of nationalist history and the initial euphoria of Zimbabwean âliberationâ. Critics of âfast-trackâ land reform and patriotism, however, have been as simplistic as the regime's academic praise singers, and often simply turn celebratory scholarship upside down. Historically rooted and specifically applied concepts of primitive accumulation can assist the understanding of the development of Zimbabwe's coercive networks of accumulation and their more recent manifestations, but they do not solve the problems of how to lessen violence and deepen democracy in the short term.
As Roger Southall raised the idea for this special edition of the Journal of Contemporary African Studies many years ago, the popular political theorist John Gray's gloomy reflections on the idea of âprogressâ seemed to be very relevant to Zimbabwe. Gray's Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (2007) spoke of theories of âdevelopmentâ and âmodernisationâ â surely âscientificâ syntheses of liberal philosophies of âprogressâ in âlesser developedâ places such as Africa â as dreams. For Gray they are ânot scientific hypothesis but theodicies â narratives of providence and redemption â presented in the jargon of social scienceâ. As such they are part of the economistic (sometimes âneo-liberalâ) âbeliefs that dominated the last two decades⌠residues of the faith in providence that supported classical political economyâ (2007, 75). Perhaps the political, economic and social collapse of Zimbabwe amidst the ability of its rulers to maintain â and perhaps even to gain â power, buttresses Gray's pessimism. Closer than Gray to Zimbabwe, Peter Godwin wrote that events in his homeland moved him to wonder if âthe whole idea of progress is a paradox, a rocking horse that goes forward and back, forward and back, but stays in the same place, giving only the comforting illusion of motionâ (2006, 51â2).
It was in such a context that this issue's theme â and that of the approximately 150 person November 2010 Bulawayo conference that was its prelude1 â came to be. A society in which the economy had plummeted to such an extent that the state no longer had a currency in its name, and even the thinnest form of democracy (elections) seemed still-born in the form of a âtransitional inclusive governmentâ, might have been a good place to test the optimism of believers in progress.
Aside from those who received middling or large plots of land in the âfast-trackâ reform process,2 a small elite within the accumulation networks within and beyond the ZANU-PF party, state and society complex benefitting from the tacky triumvirate of âfast-trackedâ land, finagled forex and bloodied diamonds (eg Mawowa and Matongo 2010), and perhaps a few in the top echelons of the diaspora, by late 2011 for whom in Zimbabwe had âprogressâ unfolded? Very few indeed, it would seem. The vast majority had lost their jobs to âworkâ in the informal sector if they were lucky, had migrated to South Africa and further abroad to work â often informally too â if they were somewhat luckier (although leaving Zimbabwe for South Africa put migrants at risk of xenophobia), while a significant minority who kept up their political opposition in Zimbabwe (or were even suspected of voting against the ruling party) and its counterpart in civil society (see Helliker in this edition for important theoretical considerations) suffered violent abuse or death (Sachikonye 2011; Staunton 2009; Orner and Holmes 2011). Many died from easily avoidable illnesses, such as those in the cholera epidemic of 2008â9, or ones that can be kept at bay in ânormalâ circumstances. To be sure, the secular celebrants of the âland to the poorâ litany maintain their beliefs (Scoones et al. 2010; cf Rutherford in this edition3) but the statistical rebuffs to what appears to be their positivist rectitude are incubating. In general, even the most sanguine of those following the varied dicta of the ânational democratic revolutionâ â such as South Africa's former president Thabo Mbeki (2001; Moore in this issue) â could not apply the laws of deferred socialism to Zimbabwe easily, while John Hoffman in these pages (perhaps with post-NDR as well as post-liberal lines) can only offer us the hope that the momentum of progress, albeit stalled, has taken root in Zimbabwe and will appear more obviously again: but even in a post-Mugabe era there will be âtremendous problems to overcomeâ, needing a âhard headed notion of progress, rooted in painful and complex realitiesâ.
âAccumulationâ is a âhard-headed notionâ indeed, as are those of power and the violence that accompanies it when widespread consent and legitimacy disappear, to emerge again only with a combination of coercion and patronage (see Kriger in this edition). Thus this issue â veering somewhat from the more varied topics at the Bulawayo conference â has moved towards bringing together the ideas of accumulation and power. As the time of publication approached, so too did the mirage of elections to take Zimbabwe out of its inclusive government impasse, and thus the reality of ZANU PF's increased intimidation: this time, the new twist seemed to be that marauding urban youth gangs headed by ZANU PF affiliates sought to control the once laisser-faire informal marketers captured so well in Chagonda's contribution to this issue (Moyo 2011), as well as deterring activists and electors from their preferred party choices.
As the transitional inclusive government or the âgovernment of national unityâ mired deeper into its deadlock while a parallel form of governance emerged (Kriger, this issue), the links between violence and accumulation â and lack of the latter for some: those without access to alternative accumulation possibilities are easily recruited to brutal enterprises such as the Chipangano, as are they to the National Youth Service (contrary to Shumba 2006, 2010 more akin to a recruiting ground for torturers than a relatively benign site for âidentity constructionâ) and the longstanding Green Bomber militias â were tightening as never before. Yet even this connection â a ârationalâ and âlogicalâ association between the meting out of cruelty and the gathering of often excessive wealth amidst extreme scarcity â may still lock us into the development theodicy of which Gray speaks. We can attempt to explain Zimbabwe's violence in terms of the original sin of primary or primitive accumulation if we are Marxists, or the painful transition to modernity if we are liberals: as Ahluwalia, Bethlehem, and Ginio (2007, 2) take it from Mamdani, the ânotion of historical progress⌠ensures that our modern sensibility is not repulsed by the endemic violence that has marked the modern conditionâ, but when that violence seems senseless â if it âcannot be justified by progressâ â it is much more disturbing; it becomes explained away as âevilâ, a category too often applied to the Third World âotherâ by denizens of wealthy capitalist countries whose historical memories have disappeared. Perhaps explaining is a lesser evil â or a better religion â than explaining away, so social scientists continue in that attempt. In any case, explaining means teasing out particularities rather than resting on general platitudes such as âprimitive accumulation is always violentâ (the âmaterialistâ social scientists), âAfricans are always violentâ (the racists), and âliberation wars always lead to violent and predatory ruling parties and/or classesâ (a version of the liberal view). Perhaps too, the movement of âprogressâ can only be measured by examining standards of life rather than whether or not humanity's spiritual essence has improved: saints are quite often poor.
Those who live in Zimbabwe and who study it once invested much âhopeâ for its progress on the possibility of its settler-colonial heritage of relatively advanced forces and relations of production negating the need for more violence than that expended in the first phase of primitive accumulation (the settler conquest) and the struggle to spread its gains to a new generation of differently coloured politicians and citizens (the âliberationâ war). In 1980, many feared the supposedly âMarxist-Leninist Terroristâ Robert Mugabe (although not a few âMarxist-Leninistsâ were fooled too). Yet his kind, if stilted (and, in retrospect, not so soothing), words on the dawn of independence â âif yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you⌠the wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten⌠we are all Zimbabweans nowâ seemed to dissipate those qualms as Mugabe was compared favourably with figures of Mother Theresa's stature (De Waal 1990; Kilgore 2009). When those dreams were dissipated during ZANU PF's âthird chimurengaâ, many were surprised. Robert Mugabe's bromides were remembered with a bitter nostalgia and he was turned quickly into a mendacious, if not mad, dictator. Some mourned the metamorphosis of ânationalistâ to âpatrioticâ history,4 (see Ian Phimister's account in these pages: for him there was no metamorphosis, but a nearly natural evolution in nationalist history â and histories of nationalism as some define them â far too silent on class and contradictions that we all should have seen coming) while others with some sense of that discipline saw the roots of all the current problems in the violence of the national/patriotic war. Yet many of those who wrote against the celebratory nationalist current were prone to seeing a mirror image.
Sithole and Makumbe, for example, wrote that the when the liberation war's âphilosophy of annihilationâ was âcomplimented [sic] with the monopoly of state power at independenceâ it was only a matter of time until violence â especially against opposition forces â resumed (1997, 133; see others cited in Moore 2009). This is a rather simplistic explanation: Uganda did not have a war of liberation, but had lots of violence well after independence; the Democratic Republic of the Congo's continuing devastation and death is not a result of battles against colonialism â and has elections, for what they are worth, alongside the simmering war; Mozambique experienced an anti-colonial war against the Portuguese and Frelimo and Renamo fought tenaciously thereafter â but Frelimo now bears faint resemblance, at least in the way it dispenses its state's monopoly on force, to ZANU PF. Nor has South Africa's freedom struggle led to a Zimbabwean-style denouement. To be sure, there were many characteristics of the Zimbabwean nationalist war that veered it far away from the trajectory of a âjust warâ, with propensities carrying through to the present (Kriger 1992, 2003). However, these traits and tendencies were uneven, and contested â and they did not proceed to the next era inevitably.
Other currents critical of the nationalist-patriotic hegemony over history emphasise so many bizarre ideologies within what might be called âMugabeismâ that even those who attempt to chronicle it get confused: is Mugabeism a pernicious blend of nativism and Stalinism, or has it reinvented the old tropes of tribalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2011)? Perhaps these confusing complexities, however, were also embedded in the nationalist strain of historiography, which seemed to take any espoused ideology on face value: on Mugabe's rise to the pinnacle of power Terence Ranger said he was a radical âin the Castro fashionâ (1980, 83), just as far to the left as the young Turks in the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) he had thrown out to Mozambique's prisons a few years before (Mhanda 2011): they needed teaching, Ranger said (1980, 89), although how that was to take place under incarceration was never revealed. Just a few years earlier an American emissary to Mugabe's own place of restriction in Quelimane (a pleasant house, however, not a prison) was impressed with his commitment to democracy and his antipathy to war, Mozambican militarism, and Soviet-style rule (Solarz in Moore, forthcoming). Politicians and diplomats were bamboozled just as easily as nationalist historians.
It is clear one cannot understand the Mugabe mode of accumulation by attempting to read his ideological mutterings and discerning whether or not his party follows them. However, if one examines the ways in which a historically particular Zimbabwean blend of violence and accumulation came together during the anti-settler struggle, a strand of continuity can be perceived that takes us right into the zones of accumulation outlined in different but complementary ways in this issue by Kriger, Dawson and Kelsall, and Magure.
There is a section in Lloyd Sachikonye's understated but very powerful When a State Turns on its Citizens entitled âcoercive accumulationâ (2011, 37â40) where links are established between the Zimbabwean elite's âpropensity for acquisitivenessâ and a âregression to coercion and brazen expropriation and extortion of property in clear violation of existing law and practiceâ in the post-2000 period. This concept could be extended to encompass the war of liberation and the violence between the parties and their predecessors in the 1960s to draw the lines historically and thematically. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the trade unions and nascent nationalist parties engaged in much violence, as Scarnecchia (2008) documents and Sachikonye notes. Scarnecchia, however, puts the propensity for acquisitiveness â for largesse offered by American union federations and, later, by the American state â close to the c...