Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy

Tsongkhapa's Quest for the Middle Way

Thupten Jinpa

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781135024499
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Cultural & Social Anthropology
• Index: Social Sciences

The work explores the historical and intellectual context of Tsongkhapa's philosophy and addresses the critical issues related to questions of development and originality in Tsongkhapa's thought. It also deals extensively with one of Tsongkhapa's primary concerns, namely his attempts to demonstrate that the Middle Way philosophy's deconstructive analysis does not negate the reality of the everyday world. The study's central focus, however, is the question of the existence and the nature of self. This is explored both in terms of Tsongkhapa's deconstruction of the self and his reconstruction of person. Finally, the work explores the concept of reality that emerges in Tsongkhapa's philosophy, and deals with his understanding of the relationship between critical reasoning, no-self, and religious experience.

Chapter One
Context and Methodological Issues

The historical contexts of Tsongkhapa's thought

Tsongkhapa is perhaps known best by many as the great fourteenth-century reformer of Buddhism in Tibet. The impact of his reform reached many areas of Tibet's intellectual scholarship and religious praxis, as well as redefining the place of religious institutions within society. For example, Tsongkhapa's revitalization of monasticism in Tibet left a lasting impact upon the country's educational, social, and political life, consequences that are still felt to this day. In the philosophical field, Tsongkhapa's vehement arguments that critical reasoning must be an essential element of the path to enlightenment, his novel interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka philosophy, and his marriage of Dharmakīrti's epistemology to Nāgārjuna's philosophy of emptiness as read through Candrakīrti have all led to the emergence of a highly influential trend of philosophical thinking in Tibet. Finally, Tsongkhapa's systematic Madhyamaka reading of the anuttarayogatantra teachings of Vajrayāna Buddhism gave rise to a new way of understanding, at levels of both theory and practice, the convergence between Vajrayāna and many of the key elements of mainstream Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Leaving aside the question of their ultimate effect on Tibetan Buddhism as a whole, Tsongkhapa's contributions must be acknowledged as having greatly enriched Tibet's scholarly tradition as well as its religious life. Still, in my view, Tsongkhapa cannot be construed as some kind of revolutionary. He neither aspired nor did he set out to establish any revolutionary school of Buddhism. 'Revitalization' rather than 'revolution' may be closer to Tsongkhapa's own description of his task. This is, in a way, comparable to Tsongkhapa's own personal assessment of the role of both Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga within the world of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism.¹ He calls both of them shingtai sölje cbenpo (shing rta'i srol 'byed cben po), literally meaning 'great initiators of the carriageways.' They are so called because, in Tsongkhapa's view, Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, by founding the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra schools respectively, have widened the 'great' Mahāyāna path. In other words, Tsongkhapa sees them as the great revitalizers of the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition.

Of course, much of Tsongkhapa's achievement can be attributed to his time and circumstances in history. With Atīśa's arrival in Tibet in the eleventh century, the so-called second dissemination of Buddhism in that country had firmly re-established there the predominance of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka school of philosophy.² Secondly, with Patsap Nyima Drak's (b. 1045) translation of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā and Madhyamakāvatāra in the eleventh century, the philosophical literature of the Prāsangika-Madhyamaka school became more accessible in Tibet.³ Until then, the dominant school of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet had been that of Śāntaraksita's (ca 740-810) Madhyamaka-Svātantrika-Yogācāra.⁴ Furthermore, with the translation of the logical and epistemological works of Dharmakīrti in the eleventh century and also the composition of the first indigenous textbooks on logic by Chapa Chökyi Senge (1109-69) and Sakya Paṇḍita (1182-1251), the study of Buddhist logic and epistemology had become well established within the educational curriculum of the great monastic learning centres. We know that by Tsongkhapa's time Sangphu and Sakya monasteries had emerged as two of the most important centres of philosophical studies in central Tibet. Thus, Tsongkhapa must have inherited much of his interest in Buddhist scholasticism from the time he spent at these great seats of learning. Perhaps the most important of all legacies was the standardization of the first Tibetan Buddhist canon — the kangyur (translations of the scriptures attributed to the Buddha) and the tangyur (translations of Indian commentarial literature). This standard canon assumed its final form through the work of the great Tibetan encyclopedist Butön Rinchen Drup (1290-1364) in the mid-fourteenth century.

Arguably, for Tsongkhapa the most important historical event, which had a profound impact upon the intellectual climate in ancient Tibet, was the royal debate (or debates) that took place at Samye towards the end of the eighth century.⁵ The two sides in the debate were the Simuitaneist (gcig bear ba) school of the Ch'an teacher Hva-shang Mohoyen and the Gradualist (rim gyis pa) school of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism represented by Kamalas̄īla (ca 760-815). Tibetan sources characterize the dispute as centred on the question of whether or not enlightenment is attained through a gradual and prolonged process of reflection and praxis, or in the form of an instantaneous experience. The central point at issue was the role of discursive analysis in the path to enlightenment. The Simultaneists rejected this, whereas the Gradualists insisted on its indispensability. Hence, my choice of the two terms here to characterize the two views. The debate represented a rivalry for dominance in Tibet between two distinct forms of Buddhism. One was the tradition of a non-scholastic and somewhat quietist version of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism; the other was the scholastically well developed and monasticaliy organized Buddhism of India.⁶ According to the early Tibetan literature dealing with the proceedings of this debate, the Indian school represented by Kamalaśīla and his Tibetan supporters was declared the victor. As a result, the Tibetan king at that time, Trisong Detsen (730-845?), issued a royal decree announcing that, from then on,

... the people of Tibet should uphold the philosophy of Nāgārjuna. They should also engage in the way of life of the six perfections and practice the ten virtuous deeds. As regards a meditative tradition, they must train their minds in the development of the three insights and be firmly rooted in a perfect unity of tranquil abiding and special insight, the union of skilful means and wisdom.⁷

Given all these historical antecedents, as the fourteenth century was drawing to a close, the stage was set for the entrance of a grand synthesizer. Had it not been for these historical conditions, Tsongkhapa's contributions would have had far less impact and significance.

Questions of originality and development in Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka philosophy

As was noted earlier, Tsongkhapa's writings cover a wide spectrum of classical Indian and Tibetan scholarship. The focus of this study, however, is Tsongkhapa's contributions in the field of philosophy in general, and his systematic re-interpretation of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness in particular. Generally speaking, the history of the development of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet is highly complex, and it is still early days before the trajectory of its path can be fully worked out. One of the greatest difficulties lies in the fact that to understand this history it is not adequate simply to trace the lineage of the Indian Madhyamaka texts in Tibet. It is also necessary to reconstruct the evolution of Madhyamaka thought in Tibet. By 'evolution' I am referring to the question of how Tibetan interpreters of the Madhyamaka tradition appropriated the tenets of the Indian Madhyamaka schools.⁸ There is also the critical issue of whether or not Tibetan Mādhyamikas took the 'Madhyamaka discourse' further than their Indian predecessors. My own view is that they did. Tsongkhapa is unarguably a towering figure in this development. Tsongkhapa wrote extensively on Madhyamaka philosophy, including a number of highly influential commentaries on some of the principal Indian Madhyamaka texts. In these works, Tsongkhapa takes great pains to explore the wider philosophical implications of the key insight in Madhyamaka that things and events are devoid of intrinsic existence and intrinsic identity.

An important element in my approach in reconstructing Tsongkhapa's key philosophical ideas is what I would call 'listening' to Tsongkhapa whenever he says that he is arguing for a certain standpoint. A vital part of this listening is to appreciate the overall framework of the author's thought. This means that, in addition to an appreciation of the historical contexts, the reader must also be sensitive to the issues that are of greatest concern to the author. Such sensitivity naturally calls for a more sympathetic reading, thus according certain priority to the author, more so than to subsequent commentaries, when interpreting his works. This does not, however, preclude a critical approach. It does entail making the key assumption that the aspirations, concerns, and beliefs of the author have an important bearing on the meaning of his works. In other words, in attempting to understand the meaning of a text, the reader must bring to bear upon this task the overall project of the author. This is especially important when reading an author who is writing within a continuing lineage of thought. Tsongkhapa himself is sensitive to this point. Towards the end of LTC, Tsongkhapa makes an important hermeneutical point. He writes that a skilful Mahayana teacher is one who is ever sensitive to the context and overall lineage of thought of a given text. By referring to other works of the author, the teacher will be able to draw out in this way what remains implicit and sometimes unexplained in a particular text.⁹ As I see it, there are two elements to this hermeneutical requirement. The first is to discern what the author himself feels to be of greatest concern, and the second is to appreciate the inherited legacies of the tradition within which the author is writing.

Methodologically speaking, it is difficult at this stage of Tsongkhapa scholarship to determine to what extent Tsongkhapa's views on the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness can be regarded as genuinely original. This raises a serious issue with regard to the question of interpretation in our exegesis of Tsongkhapa's philosophical writings. This problem is, however, not unique to Tsongkhapa's thought, and there is the broader issue of how one might discern originality and creativity in the context of any system of thought that consciously operates within a continuing lineage of thought. Nevertheless, as far as the written legacy of Tsongkhapa is concerned, there are, fortunately, no significant disputes with regard to the authorship of his principal works. By Tsongkhapa's time, the tradition of compiling and publishing the collected works (gsung 'bum) of noted authors had been firmly established in Tibet. Although it is difficult to infer the exact dates of the actual compiling of Tsongkhapa's collected works, it is safe to surmise that this must have happened not too long after his death.¹⁰ Apart from a few items, the authorship of all works found in the standard editions of Tsongkhapa's collected works is undisputed.¹¹ More importantly for our purpose, all major writings on Madhyamaka philosophy by Tsongkhapa are not only extant,¹² but their authorship remains beyond doubt. We are also fortunate to have in Khedrup's (1385-1438) Haven of Faith,¹³ the official biography of Tsongkhapa, a tentative dating of most of these important works on Madhyamaka, thus giving us a workable basis to discern the stages of development in Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka thought.

For traditional Tibetan commentators the question of originality is not an issue. As Gareth Sparham points out, even Tsongkhapa himself, along with his followers, 'believed that his insights were free from originality and that his vision was the exact vision of the Buddha and the Mādhyamika saints described in their various sūtras and śāstras ...'¹⁴ However, from the perspective of modern scholarship, the problem of the originality of Tsongkhapa's thought remains an important issue. If nothing else, determining the answer to this question is critical at least for our historical understanding of the development of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet. Admittedly, in light of the lack of clear textual evidence of the doctrinal positions of the Kadam school, it is difficult to discern how much of Tsongkhapa's views are original. The problem is further complicated by the tradition among Tibetan authors of attributing all one's insights to an earlier 'authoritative' (tshad Idan) master. This is characteristic of a scholarship that operates within a system where tradition (gsung rgyun) is perceived as the main source of validation, and a subsequent commentator's task is seen as discerning the ultimate purport (dgongs pa mthar thug) of the master or masters. For example, Tsongkhapa attributes almost all his views on Madhyamaka philosophy to Buddhapālita (fourth century CE) and Candrakīrti (seventh century CE), whom in turn Tsongkhapa sees as expounding the ultimate standpoint of Nāgārjuna (second century CE) and Āryadeva (second century CE), the founders of the Indian Madhyamaka school. Nevertheless, insofar as an interpretation of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy is concerned, Tsongkhapa departs sign...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Technical Note
• Bibliographical Abbreviations
• List of Charts and Tables
• Introduction
• 1 Context and Methodological Issues
• 2 Delineating the Parameters of Madhyamaka Reasoning
• 3 Tsongkhapa's Deconstruction of the Self
• 4 Personal Identity, Continuity, and the I-consciousness
• 5 No-Self, Truth, and the Middle Way
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Wylie Transliteration of Tibetan Names
• Index