Legislatures of Small States

A Comparative Study

Nicholas Baldwin, Nicholas D J Baldwin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415538336
• eBook ISBN: 9781135102982
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política

This book provides a comparative study of the legislatures of small nations, states and territories, to explore the extent to which size is a factor in how they function and fulfil the roles and responsibility of a legislature.

Though the physical nature and environment of states is a neglected subject in political science research, this book examines the impact of small state size on the structure and functions of legislatures and contributes to a better understanding of the interplay of physical and social factors. Focussing on legislatures in democratic nations or in territories that are parts of democratic units, the book features case studies on Malta, Bermuda, Jersey, Guernsey, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, the Isle of Man, Commonwealth Caribbean, Nunavut (Canada), Pacific islands, Swaziland, and Scotland. Contributors employ an interdisciplinary approach to examine both the outcomes and causes of different political mechanisms, and bring to the surface underlying correlation between small states through their analysis.

Legislatures of Small States will be of interest to students and scholars of international politics, comparative politics and legislative studies.

1 Introduction I

Legislatures

Nicholas D. J. Baldwin

Introduction

Legislatures have different names from one nation to another – ‘Parliament’ in the United Kingdom, ‘States General’ in the Netherlands, ‘Cortes Generales’ in Spain, ‘Federal Assembly’ in Russia, ‘Diet’ in Japan, ‘Supreme Council’ (or ‘Verkhovna Rada’) in Ukraine and ‘Congress’ in the United States, for example. They also vary in structure, form, shape, size, powers, functions, autonomy, procedures and traditions.¹ Some are unicameral (single-chamber) legislatures, such as in both Denmark (the Folketing) and New Zealand (the House of Representatives); others are bicameral (two-chamber) legislatures, such as in the United Kingdom (the House of Commons and the House of Lords), France (the National Assembly and the Senate), Russia (the State Duma and the Council of the Federation) and the United States (the House of Representatives and the Senate), for example. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union there are currently 114 unicameral legislatures (59.07 per cent) and 79 bicameral legislatures (40.93 per cent) functioning in the world today.²

Whether or not a nation has a unicameral or a bicameral legislative structure does not depend on the size of its population. For example, the People’s Republic of China with a population of more than 1.3 billion has a unicameral legislature with a statutory 3,000 members (though currently 2,978 members), while Antigua and Barbuda with a population of some 87,884 is bicameral, consisting of the House of Representatives (with 19 members) and the Senate (with 17 members). Similarly, some countries were bicameral but have moved to a unicameral structure – Denmark in 1953, Sweden in 1970 and Peru in 1993, for example. Yet others were unicameral and subsequently moved to a bicameral structure – Tunisia in 2005, for example (although both chambers ceased to function as a result of the political upheavals in early 2011). Some have even gone from one format to the other and back again: Turkey was unicameral from 1921, became bicameral in 1961 and reverted to unicameralism in 1982. When Czechoslovakia went through its velvet divorce, the Czech Republic adopted a bicameral legislative structure while the Slovak Republic adopted a unicameral one. In short, structure in this regard is the result of the political and constitutional history and development of each country.

In addition, there are the highly disciplined, tightly controlled legislatures of one- party authoritarian states such as the former Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and other Soviet bloc countries, or those that can be seen today in the People’s Republic of China (the National People’s Congress) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (the Islamic Parliament of Iran, or Majles). On the other hand there are unruly, fragmented legislatures, the Knesset in Israel, for example, in which any idea of control often appears difficult if not impossible to establish. Similarly, in the United States, the working relationship between the House of Representatives and the Senate, particularly when one party has a majority in one chamber and a different party is in a majority position in the other (as in 2010–12 when the Republicans controlled the House and the Democrats controlled the Senate), can lead to an inability to get anything through the legislative process, producing ‘legislative logjam’.

Nonetheless, almost all these legislative bodies have one thing in common, namely: ‘They are constitutionally designated for giving assent to binding measures of public policy, that assent being given on behalf of a political community that extends beyond the government élite responsible for formulating those measures.’³

It is for this reason that legislatures are generally categorised according to their capacity to influence policy. Consequently, the following four types of legislatures can be identified:

• policy-making legislatures (sometimes termed ‘active’ legislatures);

• policy-influencing legislatures (sometimes termed ‘reactive’ legislatures);

• legislatures with minimal or marginal policy effect (sometimes termed ‘marginal’ legislatures);

• legislatures with no real policy effect (sometimes termed ‘rubber-stamp’ legislatures).

Policy-making legislatures enjoy significant autonomy: not only can they amend or reject measures brought forward by the executive but they can substitute their own policy. The US Congress is the prime example of such a legislature. Policy-influencing legislatures react to executive initiatives in that they can either amend or reject measures brought forward by the executive but cannot – either formally or in practice – substitute for these measures policy of their own. The British Parliament – both the House of Commons and the House of Lords – is an example of such a legislature. Legislatures with only minimal or marginal policy effect have very little ability in theory or in practice to amend or reject measures brought forward by the executive or to generate and substitute their own policies. Such legislatures are under executive domination and simply rubber-stamp executive decisions. Examples include the National People’s Congress in the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme People’s Assembly in North Korea.

There are three questions that are particularly important in this regard when looking at legislatures:

1 Does a legislature have authority over the full array of public policy issues or only over certain aspects of public policy?

2 Does a legislature have not only the ways but the means to intervene in policy issues?

3 Does a legislature have the ability, not only in theory but in practice, to exercise independent analysis and formulate an independent judgement on public policy?

The functions of legislatures

There is however more to legislatures – much more – than either formulating policy or influencing the formulation of policy. Indeed, a wide range of functions – some intended and some unintended – can be identified. (See Table 1.1.)

Table 1.1 Functions of a legislature

Representation, redress and express	On behalf of constituents.On behalf of interests.On behalf of causes.On behalf of a party.
Legitimisation	Latent – through meeting regularly and uninterruptedly.Manifest – the formal stamps of approval.‘Safety valve’ – as an outlet for tensions and an arena for resolving disputes.
Recruitment, socialisation and training	Recruitment – of individuals into the political system.Socialisation – of individuals into the norms of political behaviour.Training – of individuals in political skills.
Education and informing	Educating – to teach the nation what it does not know.Informing – to bring matters to the forefront through discussion and deliberation.
Legislative	The scrutiny of legislation.The revision of legislation.The passage of legislation.
Scrutiny	Of the actions (and inactions) of the executive.Of the activity of the executive.

Sources: Derived from Bagehot (1867), Packenham (1970), Norton (1990) and Forman and Baldwin (1999).

From analysis it is apparent, firstly, that we cannot expect legislatures to operate and function in the same way in every country or political system. There may indeed be similarities, but they should not blind us to the differences that exist. Secondly, it is apparent that legislatures are very often subordinate institutions within the framework of the constitutional and political system within which they operate. Whatever theories of the constitutional responsibility of ministers and governments to the legislature in parliamentary systems may say, the reality of the position is that real power resides in the executive – the Prime Minister and Cabinet – and not in the legislature. Indeed, instances of policy-making legislatures are rare – with, as previously stated, the United States Congress being the most notable example. Thus, although the President of the United States can exercise executive power (by his position as commander-in-chief and through issuing executive orders), he cannot control the Congress in the same way as a British Prime Minister can normally control the House of Commons (though not necessarily the House of Lords). Indeed, the President’s ability to lead or influence the Congress is lessened even more if his party does not control either or both of the houses, as President Obama found when the Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives in the mid-term elections of 2010.

Most legislatures can be identified as either policy-influencing legislatures or legislatures with only marginal policy effect. Against this backdrop it is interesting to note that one concept that appears to permeate the topic is the idea of ‘the decline of legislatures’. Such a concept is not new. Viscount Bryce published his Modern Democracies in 1921,⁴ in which, although stating that legislatures were an indispensable part of the machinery of government, he identified a number of what he described as ‘chronic ailments’ that had undermined such bodies. Ever since then the literature has been dominated by the thought that legislatures have been in decline, not least of all in comparison with – and as a direct result of – the increased power of executives. Within the literature a variety of specific causes for this decline have been identified, including:

• the emergence of organised, disciplined political parties;

• the growth in the activity and scope of government at both the national and the international level and the resulting increase in the size of governmental bureaucracies;

• the greater capacity of an executive to respond to developments in a timely fashion, formulating policy and providing leadership on the national stage and in the international arena;

• the rise of pressure group politics;

• the power of the media, the impact of 24-hour news coverage and the media’s tendency to portray politics in terms of personalities.

Despite the increased institutional capacity of legislatures within the new democratic structures found among the nations of Eastern Europe, they have not been able to enhance their position. In fact the contrary has been the case because of changes in the context in which they operate, with increasingly assertive executives, centrally controlled state administration and better organised and disciplined political parties. Also important in this regard has been admittance into the European Union and the executive, administrative and legislative consequences flowing from this. These factors combined show that legislatures in the new democracies of Eastern Europe have begun to resemble their sister institutions in more established democracies, in terms both of internal organisation and procedures and of the external constraints that are normally placed upon such institutions in a modern democracy.

Japan provides another example following increased and strengthened executive leadership within the political system. Indeed, while the Japanese Prime Minister may still be weaker than many other chief executives, the position has been strengthened over the past 25 years and even more so in recent years, a direct result of changes in both party and electoral systems as well as administrative reforms.

Scandinavia similarly illustrates the increased importance of the Prime Minister as the chief political executive, despite the fact that, with the exception of Finland, this is not based upon an assessment of the formal powers of the office. Nonetheless, within Scandinavia elections have increasingly focused on rival prime ministerial ‘candidates’, media coverage has led to a personalisation of the office and – in the three Nordic countries that are members of the European Union – prime ministerial involvement in European Council meetings has allowed the incumbent to appear statesmanlike, if not ‘presidential’. Having said this, however, it is nonetheless still evident that prime ministers who are no longer able to carry their parliamentary group fall.

Executive leadership in the legislative arena is a highly complex phenomenon. Take for example the case of the Federal Republic of Germany: despite the genuinely parliamentary character of the contemporary polity, analysis dr...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of contributors
• Foreword
• 1. Introduction I: Legislatures
• 2. Introduction II: Legislatures in small polities
• PART I. Sovereign entities
• PART II. Semi-sovereign entities
• PART III. Sub-national entities
• Appendix. Comparative information
• Index