Gender and Power in Indonesian Islam

Leaders, feminists, Sufis and pesantren selves

Bianca J. Smith, Mark Woodward

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781136024405
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

The traditional Islamic boarding schools known as pesantren are crucial centres of Muslim learning and culture within Indonesia, but their cultural significance has been underexplored. This book is the first to explore understandings of gender and Islam in pesantren and Sufi orders in Indonesia. By considering these distinct but related Muslim gender cultures in Java, Lombok and Aceh, the book examines the broader function of pesantren as a force for both redefining existing modes of Muslim subjectivity and cultivating new ones. It demonstrates how, as Muslim women rise to positions of power and authority in this patriarchal domain, they challenge and negotiate "normative" Muslim patriarchy while establishing their own Muslim "authenticity." The book goes on to question the comparison of Indonesian Islam with the Arab Middle East, challenging the adoption of expatriate and diasporic Middle Eastern Muslim feminist discourses and secular western feminist analyses in Indonesian contexts. Based on extensive fieldwork, the book explores configurations of female leadership, power, feminisms and sexuality to reveal multiple Muslim selves in pesantren and Sufi orders, not only as centres of learning, but also as social spaces in which the interplay of gender, politics, status, power and piety shape the course of life.

Part I

Female leadership and Muslim agency

1 Between Sufi and Salafi subjects

Female leadership, spiritual power and gender matters in Lombok

Bianca J. Smith and Saipul Hamdi¹

DEWI mengirim sebuah kelapa

Tinggi pohonnya lima ribu depa

Batu keliling tugasnya menjaga

Pulau Lombok selama-lamanya

[DEWI sends down a coconut,

Its tree is five thousand fathoms tall;

Encircling stone with the duty to guard

The island of Lombok forever and ever]

(Zainuddin 1981)

In post-Suharto Indonesia, a revival of what is popularly known as Salafism has gained prominence in the public sphere at a national level and is challenging what it means to be Muslim. As Salafis seek to fulfil a vision of Islam in accordance with the practices of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, gender issues feature in their efforts to de-culturalize Islam in accordance with restricted definitions of Islam based on literalist interpretations of the Qur’an. Feminist ethnographers of Islam have not yet examined widely the diversification of Islamic religiosity as it is being shaped by Salafi discourses and practices; thus we know very little about the cultural politics of Salafi interactions with Muslim majorities in everyday life situations in terms of gender.

The worlds of pesantren (a traditional Islamic boarding school for the study of the Qur’an, Hadith and other classical Islamic texts) and Sufi orders are exposed to Salafi discourses that groups and individuals disseminate through proselytizing practices in urban and rural areas, therefore subjecting pesantren and Sufi selves to ideas that contrast with their culturally anchored practices.² We show how in practice Salafism diversifies as it intersects with culture, and in doing so broadens meanings attributed to it while shaping a range of violent and non-violent Salafi identities and subjectivities. Our points correspond with Roel Meijer’s (2009), who surmises that Salafism is a fragmented movement that evades concrete definition, and Bernard Haykel’s (2009) observation that Salafism is not restricted to those with clearly formed Salafi subjectivities, but also attracts interest from non-Salafis who strategize with its visions.

This chapter develops understandings of interactions between Sufis and Salafis as fluid by moving beyond discourses on transnational Salafi movements to examine how Salafi ideas are strategically adopted by Muslim majorities in pesantren and Sufi orders. We examine the interplay between gender, Salafism and Sufism within a local Islamic organization’s pesantren and Sufi order in Lombok which has had a turbulent history of female leadership based on notions of inherited spiritual power (ilmu).³ Intra-Muslim debates about female leadership reflect the variety of ways gender is interpreted in Islam and suggest that culture plays a critical role in decision-making processes about what it means to be Muslim. Cultural notions of spiritual power may play roles in determining leadership succession in Sufi orders and pesantren (Smith 2012). In the cultures of Muslim Southeast Asia there are opportunities for women to assume leadership roles by inheriting spiritual power through spiritual bilateral kinship systems (Smith 2011, 2012). This spiritual bilateralism is situated in cultural practices that contrast to the patrilineality of shari’ah and sheds light on contrasting subject positions between Sufis and Salafis in orthodox contexts.

We bring to light different possibilities for Muslim female agency at a crossroads where theorizations of feminism, religion and culture intersect. This is an intersection that Saba Mahmood (2005) has described as vexed, because it challenges feminists to consider notions of piety and docility as agentive in religious movements. This is especially true for Muslim women whose formations of piety subscribe to patriarchal gender ideologies in Islam. To this rubric we add the female Sufi subject who also strives for male-defined piety based on shari’ah and at the same time is shaped by spiritual bilateral elements in local culture. This suggests that in pesantren and Sufi orders ideas about gender are subject to debate in the formation of pesantren selves. We examine the cultural politics between local notions of Sufism and Salafism based on debates about Islamic female leadership and gender issues to reveal the multiplicity of Muslim subject positions in pesantren and Sufi orders and the role of culture in shaping these.

Salafism and Sufism in Nahdlatul Wathan

Our arguments are based on anthropological fieldwork we conducted together and individually from 2006 to 2012 among the Sasak ethnic group on the small island of Lombok in the Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) province, eastern Indonesia.⁴ The island’s identity as a symbol of potent Islamic piety was challenged when Ummi Siti Raehanun (b. 1953), the daughter of a local Sufi saint, transgressed Islamic law in 1998 to become the leader of the island’s largest local Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Wathan (NW). She did so by using a combination of kinship based inheritance practices and a democratic election. This was the trigger for sets of violent conflicts that in 2002 divided the organization and the Nahdlatul Wathan community more broadly. The organization remains divided ten years later under a double leadership. Raehanun’s leadership is opposed by her only sibling and half-sister, Ummi Siti Rauhun (b. 1947), whose son also claims leadership of the organization (Hadi 2010; Hamdi 2011; Hamdi and Smith 2012; Mugni 2005; Nazri 2001). The issue of Islamic female leadership has unleashed ongoing rivalry within the Nahdlatul Wathan organization and different kinds of pesantren selves have emerged reflecting Sufi and Salafi subject positions on gender issues. While it is possible to identify clear differences between Sufi and Salafi subject positions, it is also true that these are fluid; Sufi Salafis are an example of this fluidity.

Because Salafis seek to reform Muslim societies by establishing an ideal Islamic society based on literal interpretations of the Qur’an, they therefore may also be described as reformists. The Salafi movement dates to the premodern Islamic period; Bernand Haykel (2009) notes that the term ‘Salafi’ was first used in the ninth century to refer to a literalist interpretation of the Qur’an. Although it is possible to contrast radical Salafis with modernist reformists who strategize with democracy, modernity and religious pluralism (Van Bruinessen and Howell 2007), we argue against polarizing the two because Salafi individuals may also embrace such principles. The varieties of meaning attached to the term ‘Salafi’ in Indonesia illustrates the different subject positions Salafis may possess. In Indonesia and elsewhere in the world, the term ‘Salafi’ is often used interchangeably with the term ‘Wahhabi’ and these movements are assumed to have links with Saudi Arabia (Hasan 2009; Rohmaniyah and Woodward 2012; Woodward 2008). Saudi Arabian Wahhabism is a variant of Salafism and its ideologies inform fundamentalist movements such as Al-Qaeda and the Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia-MMI) (Rohmaniyah and Woodward 2012). These groups contrast with popular non-violent pan-Salafi groups in Indonesia such as Hizbut Tahrir and Tabligi Jamaah.

It is important to note that Salafism is not a homogenous global movement but is rather one that is fragmented and unstable (Hasan 2009; Meijer 2009). As Salafi ideas have gained more prominence in the public sphere as a result of proselytization practices, individuals from a range of backgrounds are interacting with these ideas across discursive spaces. As a result, we see new kinds of Muslim individuals emerging who describe themselves as Salafi without identifying with any group or movement. Examples include kyai (male Muslim leaders) who preach Salafi forms of Islam free from the confines of Islamic schools of law yet do not belong to a movement. The literalism of Salafism contrasts with Indonesia’s Sufi cultures which until the twentieth century dominated communal religious practice (Ricklefs 2006; Woodward 1989) and it is at this intersection where we locate our debates about the fluidity of Sufi and Salafi selves in pesantren environments. This distinction helps to situate our view that processes of Salafication contribute to the diversity of Islamic practice in Lombok as well as in the Nahdlatul Wathan organization.

In Lombok, the largest and most influential local Islamic organization is Nahdlatul Wathan, an ethnicized (‘Sasakized’) model of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama that follows the Syafi’i school of law (Noor et al. 2004; Nu’man 1999). An estimated 50–70 per cent of Lombok’s three million people identifies to varying degrees with Nahdlatul Wathan, mainly because the organization’s founder became instrumental in the spread of Islamic education in the 1940s with the establishment of pesantren and madrasah in villages around Lombok (Hamdi 2011). Significant numbers of Sasak Muslims identify with the national Islamic organizations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and other national groups such as Marakit Ta’limat, as well as Sufi orders and local forms of Sasak Islam known as Islam Wetu Telu.⁵ Since the downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998, Wahhabi and Salafi groups have acquired popularity, especially in East Lombok. Nahdlatul Wathan, too, has accommodated elements of Salafism; however, the domination of Sufi elements remains a powerful social force in East Lombok. The strong Sufi influence assisted in Raehanun’s rise to the leadership of Nahdlatul Wathan based on a local understanding that she had inherited her father’s spiritual power. The maintenance of the organization which is based on dynastical rule reflects the structure of ownership of pesantren and Sufi orders more broadly.

The founding father of Nahdlatul Wathan (hereafter NW) is Tuan Guru⁶ Kyai Hajji Zainuddin Abdul Madjid (1898–1997), popularly known by several names, including ‘Maulana Syeikh’, ‘Tuan Guru Pancor’ and ‘Tuan Guru Datok’. Locally, he was considered to be a Sufi saint, spiritual leader and part-time politician (Nu’man 1999). His passing was a luminous transition from a particular way of life embedded in Sufi power structures built on notions of sworn loyalty to the guru, to a new life-stage that coincided with the downfall of President Suharto and the country’s entrance into democracy. Since the onset of democracy, the Nahdlatul Wathan family dynasty has maintained a considerable influence on local politics in Lombok, holding important government positions, including that of governor (2008–13), head of the regional legislative assembly in East Lombok, Mayor of East Lombok and heads of several political parties. Many women emerged as candidates for political parties in the early phases of democracy with the national aim of filling a 30 per cent quota of women in politics. In 2009 at the NTB provincial level women constituted approximately 7.4 per cent of the parliament, compared to only 4 per cent in 2004. In Lombok, women from the NW family dynasty and non-kin NW practitioners actively pursue political careers. In 2012, approximately 28 of 378 parliament members were women. Some of these women embraced Salafi inspired political agendas.

Salafi reformist discourses became visible in NW when Rauhun’s son – grandson of Maulana Syeikh – Muhammad Zainul Majdi assumed leadership of NW in 1999 in opposition to his aunt Raehanun’s leadership. A decade later, he became Governor of Nusa Tenggara Barat province (2008–13) and acquired the nickname ‘Tuan Guru Bajang’ (young tuan guru – male Muslim leader). Through his leadership positions Tuan Guru Bajang has strengthened Salafi reformist discourses in NW, influenced by his exposure to the Salafi Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) organization in Egypt, where he also acquired his doctorate degree from Al-Azhar University.

Tuan Guru Bajang has subtly introduced a Salafi reformist discourse to the wider community that challenges the normative Sufism that the NW community practised during Maulana Syeikh’s era. This discourse aims to reform Sufi cultural practices by injecting new ideas about social relations in order to deculturalize Sasak society in line with narrow definitions of Islam. Unlike clearly formed Salafi groups that strongly reject culture and intra-Muslim difference, Tuan Guru Bajang uses culture as a method for the Salafication of NW from within, which means that he does so within a Syafi’i context consistent with the normative theology of the organization. In East Lombok, the force of Sufi practice has been defined by paternal and patron–client relations between elites, tuan guru and ordinary villagers. Sufi relationships were instrumental in determining Raehanun’s rise to power and opposed the Salafi belief in absolute male leadership. The critical role of tuan guru leaders in both groups reflects the emphasis on piety and orthodoxy in NW.

Lombok is known for its Islamic piety as the ‘island of a thousand mosques’. Zamakhsyari Dhofier’s (1999) analogy of the Javanese kyai as ‘a king’ and his pesantren as ‘his kingdom’ also applies to Sasak Muslim leaders known as tuan guru, whose revered authority provides them with significant amounts of social and political capital (Avonius 2004; Cederroth 1996; Hadi 2010; Hamdi 2011; MacDougall 2007). Reverence for tuan guru is expressed in several ways, including the practice of ‘throwing money’ (melentong kepeng logam) (which allows impoverished people to contribute to social charity and has the symbolic meaning of throwing satanic influences from one’s life reflective of stone-throwing practices for the hajj) and by kissing the hands of Maulana Syeikh’s family (including Tuan Guru Bajang) as they pass through crowds of thousands who attend their sermons. Scholars have noted that Sasak reverence for tuan guru has led to their own impoverishment by choosing devotion to a version of orthodox Islam that harbours anti-development (Western) attitudes (Bennett 2005; Grace 1997).

NW was founded in 1953, in Pancor, Selong, East Lombok, by Maulana Syeikh upon his return home from lengthy study in Mecca. It is an Islamic education, social and missionary (dakwah) organization. A product of his time, Maulana Syeikh followed other tuan guru to Mecca’s Madrasah Shaulatiyah, where his spiritual abilities and religious knowledge crystallized. His charisma made him popular, but feared, in his local community, and in the early days he was seen as a reformist when he built the Pesantren Al-Mujahidin in Pancor, East Lombok (1937–40), which he later transformed into a formal madrasah with a modern curriculum (Baharuddin and Rasmianto 2004; Noor et al. 2004; Nu’man 1999). Over time his spiritual potency asc...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Series editor's foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction De-colonizing Islam and Muslim feminism
• Part I Female leadership and Muslim agency
• Part II Female spiritual authority in Sufi orders and mystical groups
• Part III Muslim feminisms Islamic and Islamist orientations
• Part IV Sexuality, shari'ah and power
• Glossary
• Index