Negotiating with North Korea

The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue

Leszek Buszynski

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415682732
• eBook ISBN: 9781135044848
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

North Korea's nuclear weapons program has provoked much apprehension in the international community in recent years. The Six Party Talks were convened in 2003 to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. They brought together the US, China, Russia, Japan as well as North and South Korea in the effort to negotiate a multilateral resolution of North Korea's nuclear program but the parties had widely different views and approaches. This book will examine the Six Party Talks as a study in multilateral negotiation highlighting the expectations vested in them and their inability to develop a common approach to the issue. It holds out some important lessons for multilateral negotiation, diplomacy and dealing with North Korea.

1 Bargaining and negotiation theory

Introduction

How are negotiation outcomes explained? Why is it that powerful parties cannot always get their way in negotiations? A commonly accepted idea of negotiations is that the strongest party wins. Nonetheless, power as defined in terms of the usual indicators of national power may not always result in a capacity to prevail in negotiations for various reasons. In multilateral negotiations, parties come together with various objectives, not all in agreement with the stronger party; some will be opposed while others will swing from one side to another. With a sufficient number of parties involved each adopting different functions, balancing and bargaining become necessary, and it becomes much more difficult for stronger parties to impose their will on the proceedings. Power alone may not prevail in this situation and the way the negotiations are conducted will very often impact on the final result, and in some cases may even decide the outcome. The interaction that develops between the parties shapes the pattern of negotiations, influences expectations, modifies bargaining positions, and eventually leads to an outcome. The result can be a considerable departure from what the stronger party had intended, and its negotiating position may be weakened and undermined as a result. If the US comes into negotiations with a number of small states or allies that are dependent upon it we can generally foresee how the negotiations will develop, and we may predict the outcome. But if the US enters into negotiations with a mixed group of powerful states such as China and Russia as well as allies, the outcome of the negotiations becomes uncertain and is very much dependent on the process, how the negotiations are structured and how they are conducted. Interaction within negotiations is the key concept of this study

Power and the structure of negotiations

Power is a slippery concept. National power can be quantified according to economic and military indicators. It is not an inherent quality or element but is a relational concept based on an ability to bring about a desired outcome. Power has been defined in various ways as the ability to get results, or to achieve objectives, or to ensure outcomes.¹ Power may be understood in terms of an ability to have others endorse and accept one’s viewpoint, to draw up and control the agenda in negotiations, and to have the outcome accepted. It is relational because it very much depends upon the perceptions of others, their willingness to cooperate with intentions, or their inability or reluctance to oppose them. Power may entail the use of force, which is direct physical pressure, or influence being a derivative form of power which is suggestive of power as the capacity to persuade others to cooperate. What counts is the ability to get one’s way which may not correspond to power rankings in international affairs. When a strong power, that is, one that is rated highly according to the indicators of national power, is unable to prevail in negotiations for whatever reason we have a definitional problem. We can argue that the strong power becomes a weaker, or is unable to apply its power during negotiations, or it is hamstrung by all kinds of constraints and limitations. This is telling us, however, that the ability to get one’s way in negotiations is something else and not automatically assured by national power. A more convenient way of dealing with this problem is to separate national power from negotiating strength, which is evident when a strong power is unable to apply its power during the course of negotiations. What is important for this study is the format of negotiations, the parties involved, the particular functions they adopt and the way the negotiations are conducted.

Negotiation is a process according to which conflicting positions are combined to form a common decision, when parties stipulate the terms of their cooperation and give priority to common over conflicting interests.² Negotiation theory examines the format and conduct of negotiations or what Zartman calls structure to explain why power does not always determine outcome.³ Structure is defined in terms of the factors that influence the process of interaction such as the number of the parties to the negotiations, their assessment of the value of potential outcomes, and tactical possibilities.⁴ Negotiation theory identifies the roles of the parties and the positions they adopt, the differences between public positions and their bottom line positions, the outcome they expect and press for, their relations with each other, the negotiating coalitions they may form, the tactics they will adopt to reach their objective, and their commitment to the final result. An analysis of the structure of negotiations will help us to understand that new dynamics are created between the parties when they sit down to discuss a particular issue, which would influence the final outcome. Not every structure will shape the outcome of negotiations and in many cases the positions are clear and the results are largely predetermined. The US may assume a leadership position in negotiations when it is supported by smaller powers dependent upon its resources or diplomatic leverage. As leader and framer of the consensus, the US role may be accepted and uncontested for the most part, and it will act to coordinate the views of others in a largely predetermined outcome where the major issues have been defined by it in advance. In complex multilateral negotiations where issues are contentious, and where parties are divided in their expectations, the outcome becomes much more uncertain and may even work against the stronger party.

Negotiation as interaction

The structure of negotiations is largely shaped by the interaction of the parties. Indeed, interaction is the key to understand how negotiations proceed in complex cases and the results obtained. When a strong power such as the US goes into negotiations with parties of opposing positions, a dynamic of interaction is created as they react to each other. As the US brings its influence to bear over the negotiations new power relationships are created that may constrain and limit its options and which frustrate its intentions. When the US seeks to act with great powers that dispose of resources and apply diplomatic leverage of their own, it would then be obliged to negotiate with them to obtain their willing participation. Should a strong power have an overweening sense of omnipotence and a belief that it can decide outcomes on its own, and should the other parties be determined to resist it, a complex pattern of interaction is created. The stronger party may be committed to a particular view of the common purpose, one that it regards as the most important objective of the negotiations or the raison d’être of their meeting, but which is not necessarily shared by others. The other parties may join for other reasons for which they hope to obtain the support of the strong party. They may plan to steer the multilateral effort towards their own concerns, or they may also value the multilateral effort for the relationships formed and the opportunity to work with others. They would, however, express their public intention to support the common purpose as understood by the strong power. Their true intentions, however, may be elsewhere, and their public and true negotiating positions will be very different. They would tend to regard the common purpose as defined by the strong party as a restriction on their freedom of action, to which they may react in various ways. Some states may resort to the tactics of opposition and frustration while others may appear to support the stated goals of the multilateral effort but will pursue other priorities during the negotiations, which are regarded primarily as a means to promote them.

Interaction is a learning process as each side attempts to gauge and test the commitment of the others in various ways and to push them to change or adjust their positions. Negotiations therefore are about a mutual adjustment of expectations in an action–reaction process which is intended to reach a final outcome.⁵ States have the expectation that a bargaining position may be improved, or protected through negotiation which motivates their entry into the process. The adjustment of expectations is essential to the negotiating process as negotiators test the waters and discover that their demands have been excessive, or that those of others cannot be supported. Negotiators bring in their as yet untested expectations into the negotiations and maneuver to have them accepted and endorsed by the other parties. Negotiators also have expectations of how other parties would respond to their own positions and negotiate in conditions of uncertainty, not knowing exactly what the other parties will accept. They will test the field with proposals or trial balloons intended to draw a response in the hope that the bargaining positions of others would be exposed. States may harbor certain bottom-line positions which they cannot compromise, and come into negotiations with deliberately imprecise bargaining positions that will allow them to maximize the opportunities which present themselves. The process of negotiation ultimately defines the positions and interests of the parties more clearly and reveals what is possible under the circumstances, and what may have to be surrendered. A process of interaction is created as the parties react to each other’s positions, sometimes being drawn closer as they realize that they have common interests, while on other occasions pulling away as they understand what divides them.

Interaction unleashes new dynamics between negotiating parties as they learn more about each other’s bargaining position, and the difference between what is said and what is actually demanded. Interaction reveals the discrepancies between public and actual bottom-line positions which are not understood at the time of entry into negotiations. Interaction will translate interests which are broad policy positions into specific negotiating positions related to the issue in hand, and will separate what is possible from what is not. Non vital positions are dropped along the way if they obstruct the process of negotiations and may be sacrificed as a necessary quid pro quo to get the negotiations moving. They may be held for some time and pushed aggressively in the hope of obtaining equivalent concessions, until the limits are realized. States will protect their core position or their bottom line which may be reformulated according to a policy reassessment or reinterpretation brought about by a continuing and frustrating deadlock. When no progress is made and a party has a strong commitment to a positive outcome to the negotiation, there may be a reassessment of its bargaining position to avoid the prospect of a break down in negotiations. The interactive process comprises three phases: first there is the pre-negotiation phase where the issues are identified and the positions clarified before actual negotiations begin and commitments are made. The agenda and the format for negotiations are laid out at this stage. Once the issues have been clarified, the parties move into the testing phase. During this phase the parties test the permissible negotiation range by making new demands or withdrawing from previous positions as they attempt to establish the boundaries for the negotiations. Once they have clarified what may be possible in negotiations they then enter the final stage when they move to secure an agreement.⁶

Negotiations are often understood according to the theory of utility maximization. This assumes that negotiations have the purpose of maximizing tangible benefits for parties which are achieved through tradeoffs and concessions. It assumes that negotiation generates feedback according to which positions are adjusted and gradually there is convergence towards an acceptable agreement which maximizes the benefits for all involved.⁷ Utility maximization may be applicable to dyadic negotiations where the parties seek to maximize tangible gains within a limited time framework. It assumes reasonability in negotiation in that the parties share a commitment to the outcome and will avoid deliberately obstructionist activities. This may be the case in negotiations over trade, market access, or arms control where the benefits are identifiable. The difficulty is applying the theory to cases where intangibles are involved, or where the benefits are unidentifiable or in dispute. In these cases there may be no adjustment of expectations or convergence towards agreement because of an absence of a consensus on how to proceed. The tactics used may depart considerably from those expected according to the logic of utility maximization. Willful caprice may be the means to induce indulgent attitudes from others and the appearance of irrational and unpredictable action can be a way of extracting concessions from them. There may be a learning process as the positions of the parties are understood more clearly but there is no assurance of a favorable outcome, or indeed, much progress.

States enter into negotiations with certain interests which are long-term policy objectives. They then devise suitable bargaining positions which are the tactical means to secure interests. Interaction is a process of testing bargaining positions against interests to determine what is possible and acceptable. If common points are discovered with others well and good, the negotiating position is fleshed out in greater detail and given greater definition. Agreement should rapidly follow. However, if resistance or downright opposition is encountered a feedback loop is created back to the decision makers who will be required to decide whether the negotiating position should be adjusted, and whether the adjustment will continue to reflect their interests. Interaction reveals the external constraints to policy and decides what is feasible and what will be retained, and what is overly ambitious or unrealistic and should be discarded. In this sense, interaction contributes to the formulation of policy and resolves disputes and dilemmas that cannot be resolved domestically. In some cases, however, the feedback loop may be aborted for various reasons and the adjustment to external constraints may not always take place. When interests or policy objectives outrun the ability of a bargaining position to secure them no adjustment would be acceptable. Decision makers may suffer from ideological rigidity and prioritize unrealistic goals in which case change is rejected. Alternatively, they may face interagency conflict or hostile public opinion, in which case their negotiating position is characterized by inflexibility. Negotiators concerned will then become locked into futile positions which needlessly prolong the negotiations for no good purpose.

Negotiating tactics

Negotiators will resort to various tactics based on assessment of their relative strength to achieve their objectives, and to include their own position in the final outcome, or to prevent others from gaining a particular advantage. Negotiation theory outlines a process of mutual concession-making in which a compromise is achieved. Making fair concessions is regarded as an optimal strategy as it would oblige the other side to reciprocate and would create a pattern of convergence. It can be seen as a “social exchange” and has “strong potential for creating lasting bonds of friendship.”⁸ Negotiators start with opening bids and exaggerate their demands expecting them to be reduced under pressure of negotiation to something closer to their basic position. According to this approach, negotiators must be “scrupulously fair” and “avoid the temptation to take advantage of the opponent.”⁹ Insisting on a harsh position that is disadvantageous to the opponent may result in concessions in the short term, but would create resentment in the longer term and may result in the undoing of an agreement. It could provoke a tough response in turn, prolonging and complicating negotiations and breaking the trust that may have been built up between negotiators. These generalizations were drawn from the experience of US–Soviet negotiations over strategic arms limitation talks in the 1970s. As these negotiations were dyadic other parties were not involved to complicate the picture, and moreover both sides had an interest and a shared responsibility for the outcome. This example would not apply to a situation where the commitment of the parties is uncertain at best and where expectations are deliberately left ambiguous. In this situation conces-sion-making and scrupulous fairness would be the tactic of a loser. It would entail giving away concessions with no assurance of reciprocity, and could encourage an opponent to increase his or her demands.

How do we know the expectations of parties? Negotiation tactics can be an important indicator of intentions though they may not throw light on the content of negotiating positions. In the US–Soviet case, the two parties after much rivalry realized that to avoid the risk of conflict they had to cooperate over strategic arms control and crisis management, they communicated their intentions accordingly. They adopted explicit bargaining tactics which entails the open communication of intentions, demands, and concessions. Should parties adopt explicit bargaining they would signal that they have a commitment to an agreement but are negotiating the terms and conditions. They may begin with issues of principle but they would then clarify the details of their negotiating position to send a signal to the other side that an agreement is possible. They would then move to the next step which involves testing the intentions of the other side and mutual concession-making, in a process of reciprocal adjustment. The negotiations over strategic arms limitation between the US and the Soviet Union, known as SALT I and II, and free trade agreements where benefits were tangible were conducted in this way. This approach, which depends so much on mutual concession-making, may resolve a territorial or trade dispute where resources can be shared and where compromise is logical.

There are issues of principle, however, over which mutual compromise would be constrained by the nature of the issue and would create an undesirable precedent that concerned parties would wish to avoid. Th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Bargaining and negotiation theory
• 2. Strategies and bargaining positions of the players
• 3. The formation of the Six Party Talks
• 4. South Korea and China and the September 2005 agreement
• 5. The nuclear test and the February 2007 agreement
• 6. From the February agreement to the end of the Six Party Talks
• 7. Efforts to revive the Six Party Talks
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index