Solidarity in Individualized Societies

Recognition, Justice and Good Judgement

Søren Juul

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415640985
• eBook ISBN: 9781136178719
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

In today's individualized, culturally diverse and globalized society, many sociologists have concluded that the conceptualizations developed by classical sociology are no longer sufficient to promote social cohesion. So what kind of solidarity can achieve this? Engaging with recent thought in social and political theory and philosophy (including Honneth, Forst, Ricoeur, Bauman, Sennett, Taylor, Rawls, MacIntyre and many others), this book develops a renewed concept of solidarity based on the notion of 'recognition' with regard to others.

With attention to the implications of such an account for justice and judgement – particularly where competing claims for recognition arise – Solidarity in Individualized Societies examines what, in a society based on recognition, a fair distribution of recognition would mean. The book provides a critical analysis of trends in modern culture and in the policy on welfare that seem to constitute obstacles to solidarity and social cohesion. It is a rigorous examination of forms of solidarity that may sustain social cohesion in the contemporary Western world.

This book will appeal to scholars and students of sociology, social theory, politics and philosophy.

1

Ideas, Theoretical Perspectives and Assumptions

What form of solidarity may create social cohesion in a society in which people orient themselves and are increasingly more individualist in terms of their moral responsibilities? Which societal and institutional forms of power constitute obstacles to solidarity in late modern society?

The present book wishes to contribute to the clarification of these huge questions and, in doing so continues long sociological tradition from Durkheim onwards which has understood solidarity as the cement of society: Without solidarity, no social cohesion! The book is based on the conviction that what we are missing more than anything else in the present situation is a solidarity which may create social cohesion and make it possible for people to realize their human possibilities.

However, the solidarity called for differs from both Durkheim’s idea of an organic solidarity and from the solidarity which historically has manifested itself as an inviolable cohesiveness between equals. It is the assumption that a solidarity creating social cohesion and possibilities of self-realization in a plural, differentiated and partly globalized society is nether a question of cohesiveness between equals nor a collective morality which automatically comes into existence as the result of the division of labour. The form of solidarity called for here concerns recognition and a fair distribution of the chances of gaining it.

Background and Purpose

The concept of solidarity stems from Roman law, which was concerned with a special form of joint liability according to which the members of a family or a local community were liable for a common debt based on the principle of one for all and all for one. However, from the end of the eighteenth century onwards the concept has become an important political, sociological and moral philosophical concept too. Politically, it becomes a concept of struggle in the ideology and strategy of the labour movement. In sociology it is understood as the cement of society, especially in Durkheim’s and later structural-functional theories, and in Christian ethics (especially within the Catholic Church) it is connected to the idea of caritas, i.e. love and charity towards your neighbour (cf. Bayertz 1998; Stjernø 2004).

There are no watertight boundaries between the three discourses. Classical sociology (Comte, Durkheim, Tönnies, Simmel, Weber) was far from unaffected by the political and ideological struggles taking place in France at that time. They searched for the mechanisms that might prevent the disintegration of society in an era characterized by social struggles, and in this connection they all developed concepts attempting to capture the unique characteristics of the new and the old world. Nor did later Christian ideas of solidarity arise without reference to societal developments, and the Catholic social teachings were shaped in opposition to the idea of class solidarity employed by Marxism and the labour movement, i.e. the idea of inviolable cohesiveness between members of a class opposed to other classes (Stjernø 2004).

The three discourses are often mixed together in common-sense perceptions of solidarity. Sometimes the concept is more or less identified with social democracy and the red flag. At other times it is perceived in accordance with Christian principles of caritas, altruism and care for one’s neighbour. Finally it is used, in everyday language too, as the precondition for integration and social cohesion, i.e. in a more sociological meaning. Thus solidarity is a complex phenomenon and competing discourses of solidarity relate to and interfere in a complex way with each other.

The present book mainly relates to the sociological and social philosophical discussion of solidarity, which it attempts to reformulate and develop. But as the sociological concept has from the beginning reflected societal challenges, the book also discusses important changes of modernity and the welfare state. The purpose is to formulate a renewed ideal of solidarity of relevance to present society, and on the basis of this to carry out a critical analysis of societal obstacles to the ideal.

The point of departure is that a critical social theory must be anchored in a substantiated normative ideal that constitutes a standard for the critique. Without this it is difficult to explain that some forms of social organization are preferable to others or to substantiate visions of social progress. The critical normative approach is greatly inspired by new developments within German critical theory. Thus Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition (Honneth 1995) and Rainer Forst’s theory of social justice (Forst 2002) are important sources of inspiration for the present work.

However, the two philosophers offer rather different inputs to the discussion of solidarity. While Honneth’s theory is inspired by Hegel and is about the most elementary and formal conditions for the development of a positive human self, Forst’s theory is about tolerance and social justice. His theory is elaborated through a critical dialogue with Kant-inspired liberal theories of justice (cf. Rawls 2000, 1985) and communitarian theories of the good life (Sandel 1982; MacIntyre 1985). An ambition of the present book is to reconcile elements from the two approaches in a critical normative theory of solidarity.

But one might ask: Why hold on to the concept of solidarity? If solidarity is about recognition and justice, would it not be reasonable to concentrate on that? The reason for insisting on the concept of solidarity is that the present work does not only take an interest in the conditions of human self-realization and the good life. Neither can it be seen as an effort to develop a new theory of abstract principles of justice. Rather it must be seen as an attempt to create a new theory of the conditions for social cohesion in the present era of modernity. For that reason it seems natural to refer to a sociological concept of solidarity focusing on the prerequisites for social order.

Trends in the Sociology of Solidarity and the Present Book

In this connection I shall concentrate on the sociological or social philosophical discussion on solidarity which the book attempts to reformulate and develop. But this is also a huge task, since almost all important sociologists have something to say about solidarity and social integration. There is no one agreed sociological concept of solidarity that everybody consents to, but a number of sociological schools with different conceptions of what constitutes social order, whether this order is to be studied on macro, meso or micro levels, and what in the end are the sources of solidarity. In some cases it is difficult to separate the concept of solidarity from the concept of integration (cf. Parsons 1951, 1972). Thus an overall account of the concept of solidarity in sociology would imply a description of almost all sociological positions, and this is not the aim of the present book. For this reason I shall only comment on sociological schools that are relevant to the present work in one way or another.

Even if the concept of solidarity has played an important role in classical as well as modern sociology, it has in recent years been more or less overruled by other conceptualizations as for example recognition, trust, justice and tolerance. Thus there are relatively few studies of late modern societies under the headline of solidarity. Important exceptions are the Germans Andreas Wildt (1998), Kurt Bayertz (1998) and Rainer Zoll (2000); the Swede Sven-Eric Liedmann (1999); the Norwegian Steiner Stjernø (2004) and the Americans Richard Rorty (1989) and Jodi Dean (1995, 1996).

That the concept of solidarity has not been a headline of recent sociological theory does not mean that sociological theory has not contributed to the understanding of solidarity. However, the present book is as much based on social philosophical theory and may be considered as an attempt to supply a stronger philosophical dimension to the sociological discourse on solidarity. Solidarity is in the book conceived as a matter of the good and just society and this calls for social philosophical conceptualizations. As mentioned, I share the traditional interest in social order with classical sociology, but my assumption is that a cohesive social order presupposes good and just institutions.

It was the father of sociology, Auguste Comte, who in his book Système de politique positive (System of Positive Polity) (Comte [1852] 1973) brought the concept of solidarity onto the agenda of sociology. His ambition was to formulate a ‘religion of humanity’ that might create an altruistic discipline controlling the egoistic instincts of human nature. This he viewed as absolutely necessary at a time when liberalism celebrated its triumphal progress, altering traditional social ties to exchange relations and shaking everything that traditionally had been the basis of society. Comte’s linking of solidarity and social cohesion became the model of many later sociological conceptions, and a common denominator for many of the sociologists following him was that they viewed solidarity as a precondition for society.

The classical sociologist who, without comparison, has been most influential on later sociological discussions of solidarity is Emile Durkheim. In his famous book The Division of Labour in Society (Durkheim [1902] 1997) he states that the question he fundamentally addresses and tries to clarify concerns the relationship between the individual person and social solidarity. How can it be, he asks, that the individual at the same time as he/she becomes ever more autonomous also becomes still more dependent on society? As is well known he found the answer in an ‘organic solidarity’ springing from the growing division of labour. While ‘mechanical solidarity’ that dominates traditional societies is based on similarities between people, the organic solidarity springs from diversity. The function of the division of labour is that it makes people and their activities still more diverse and specialized. But by this it also makes them dependent on each other as never before.

The social order created by the division of labour is in Durkheim’s view also a moral order. The division of labour thus gives rise to juridical and moral rules that the individuals are obliged to obey. Therefore society is not dissolved into a cloud of atoms which can only be connected through artificial and temporary contracts. The individuals are connected through moral ties and caught in a network of obligations which they cannot escape (Durkheim [1902] 1997). Solidarity is in other words a social fact. It arises naturally from the functional dependency which is the result of the growing division of labour.

In later sociology from around the time of World War II until the late 1970s Durkheim’s macro-oriented interest in social order has been continued by structural-functional sociological schools influenced first of all by Talcott Parsons. For Parsons too the central sociological question was the study of social order or integration in society. However, he did not distinguish clearly between solidarity and integration and the two concepts became in his theory almost two sides of the same coin. In The System of Modern Societies he writes:

Societal order requires clear and definite integration in the sense, on the one hand, of normative coherence and, on the other hand, of societal ‘harmony’ and coordination’. Moreover normatively defined obligations must on the whole be accepted while conversely, collectives must have normative sanctions in performing their functions and promoting their ligitimate interests. Thus, normative order at the societal level contains a ‘solution’ to the problem posed by Hobbes – of preventing human relations from degenerating into a ‘war of all against all’.

(Parsons 1972: 12)

It is easy to see that while Durkheim’s ‘organic solidarity’ is open to diversity, solidarity and integration in Parsons’ sociology is a matter of normative consensus about the basic values and norms of society. His main idea is that society is a large integrated system of differentiated sub-systems that reproduces itself when all the sub-systems carry out their functions within the overall structure. This is in the end secured by the cultural system which inculcates the members of society with the appropriate role-expectations and motivation structures (ibid. 1972). Even if both Durkheim and Parsons understand solidarity and social cohesion as a social fact, neither solidarity nor integration are value-neutral concepts. On the contrary they are obviously ‘plus-words’ contrasting with concepts such as anomie and disintegration.¹

The present book as mentioned continues the structural-functional interest in social cohesion and social order but takes a different approach. While structural functionalism understands solidarity as a social fact that is a function of the division of labour or the cultural system, I conceive it as a result of human agency. Admittedly people are not acting as they choose but are as historical individuals, inscribed in a world of meanings (the codes of the cultural system). Nevertheless there is room for human reflection. People are capable of making experiences and reflecting upon them. They do not just submit themselves to cultural rules but are able to formulate ideals for the future and strive for them.

It is in this connection the concept of solidarity becomes relevant. While the moral order in Durkheim’s and Parsons’ works is a social fact, it is in the present book conceived as a result of human agency, a product of struggles for recognition between positions that orient themselves in the world and sometimes risk their lives to change it when it is perceived to be unjust. Thus peoples’ mental activities, including their normative convictions, are ascribed great importance, and the starting point is closer to a Weber-inspired sociology of social action.

Weber, contrary to Durkheim, did not directly focus on solidarity on a macro level, but in his characterization of the traditional and the modern world he also developed conceptualizations of great importance for the discussion of solidarity. He viewed the transition from traditional to modern society as a change in the dominant forms of rationality, from traditional over affectional and value-rational behaviour to purpose-rational behaviour. According to Weber, the spread of this rationality to still more areas of social life meant that a cool, calculative reason solely oriented towards efficiency gained ground. The real meaning behind it all disappeared for the individuals who came to stand rootless without binding ties in a cold and fragmented world. They were in Weber’s famous words caught up in an ‘iron cage’ (Weber 1978).

What Weber’s excellent analyses do not offer is hope and optimistic scenarios for the future, and generally he takes a pessimistic attitude to people’s chances of escaping from the cage. His analyses thus leave us with an impressive need to formulate an ideal that people may find worth striving for. As will be described more fully in Chapter 2, Weber’s own meta-theoretical convictions prohibited him from doing this himself, as he conceived it to be beyond the task of science to take part in normative and political discussions.

Weber’s interpretive sociology has after World War II been continued by different sociological theories that focus on social cooperation on a micro level. Central names are George Herbert Mead, Erving Goffman, Alfred Schutz and Charles Cooley. A common critique against these theories has been that they do not contribute much to the understanding of society’s macro structures. Still, Mead’s theory for example may be seen as a general theory of the social world and society, and the diverse interaction theories supply a theory of agency to sociology which, in my opinion, are missing from structural-functionalist theories.

However, the interaction theories share one major characteristic with the larger part of modern social science: the absence of an explicit normative ideal that works as the standard of critique. They are focusing on the different rituals and habits that guide human behaviour in everyday life without any specified conceptualization of what constitutes the good and just life, that is without a clarified critical perspective. This is a trend of most modern forms of social critique, with German critical theory being an important exception. As will be shown in Chapter 2 it is a widespread conviction within social science that normative claims cannot be rationally grounded at all.

In relation to the micro-oriented sociological theories one also needs to mention James Coleman’s so-called ‘rational choice sociology’. The starting point here is the idea of the utility-maximizing human being, who rationally calculates the utility and costs bound up with different actions and always chooses the one that has the greatest surplus of utility (Coleman 1990). Although Coleman’s sociology is based on the idea of an independent and rational human being and thus differs from a mainstream sociological paradigm, his aim is to explain the coming of social associations and contracts. Coleman’s ideas have been continued by Michael Hechter, who has outlined a theory of solidarity that understands social associations as a voluntary contract between rational individuals (Hechter 1987). His idea is that if individuals must choose between their individual aims and the aims of the collective, they will always prioritize the former. For this reason true solidarity only arises when the individual’s goals consist of goods which necessitate collective action or responsibility.

It is easy to see that Coleman’s and Hechter’s theories are inspired by economic theories, but in fact these have long philosophical roots going back to the contract theoretical tradition of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Roussau (cf. Chapter 4). Several outstanding sociologists and philosophers (including critical economists) have opposed the idea of society and the human nature on which the rational choice theory is based (cf. Mans-bridge 1990) and it has been claimed that such theories are in fact unable to clarify what solidarity, utility, goods and happiness really are (Sen 1990, 1992). Does it make sense to assume that individual preferences are something that the individuals decide for themselves, or must individual preferences rather be understood as the outcome of a civic tradition, of shared feelings and communities?

As is clear from the declared critical hermeneutic approach taken in this book (and will appear throughout the book) I must also take a critical attitude to rational choice conceptions of solidarity. But after all, Hechter’s model of solidarity might on the face of it seem convincing. Is the prototypical form of working-class solidarity which in most European countries saw the light from the nineteenth century onwards not perfectly understandable on the basis of the model? When the worke...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• 1. Ideas, theoretical perspectives and assumptions
• Part I: Meta-theoretical orientation
• Part II: The normative ideal
• Part III: The critical analysis
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index