Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding

Peace from the Ashes of War?

Mikael Eriksson, Roland Kostić

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415638357
• eBook ISBN: 9781136189166
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book offers a state-of-the-art examination of peacemaking, looking at its theoretical assumptions, empirical applications and its consequences.

Despite the wealth of research on external interventions and practices of Western peacebuilding, many scholars tend to rely on findings in the so-called 'post-agreement' phase of interventions. As a result, most mainstream peacebuilding literature pays limited or no attention to the linkages that exist between mediation practices in the negotiation phase and processes in the post-peace agreement phase of intervention.

By linking the motives and practices of interveners during negotiation and implementation phases into a more integrated theoretical framework, this book makes a unique contribution to the on-going debate on the so-called Western 'liberal' models of peacebuilding. Drawing upon in-depth case-studies from various different regions of the world including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Sierra Leone, this innovative volume examines a variety of political motives behind third party interventions, thus challenging the very founding concept of mediation literature.

This book will of much interest to students of peacebuilding, statebuilding, peacemaking, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general.

1 Peacemaking and peacebuilding

Two ends of a tail

Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić

Framework of the research

Exploring the conditions and requirements that lead to durable peace is a cornerstone of peace and conflict studies. Consequently, numerous studies have highlighted the challenges in implementing negotiated agreements that end armed conflicts (e.g. Stedman et al. 2002, Stedman 2003). The main problem is illustrated in recent scholarly findings suggesting that nearly onethird of the 69 peace agreements concluded in the period 1989–2000 resulted in civil war within five years of signing them (Jarstad and Sundberg 2007; see also Kreutz 2012: 45). Each return to violence comes with enormous costs in terms of human lives and suffering. Therefore it is not surprising that scholarship continues to focus on why some peace processes fail during the implementation phase, while others endure. In this context, we identify two challenges that need to be addressed in the current literature on peacemaking. First, contemporary studies pay only limited attention to the connection between peacemaking and peacebuilding and its implications for a more durable post-conflict peace. Second, although making important contributions to policymaking, current studies pay less attention to the normative aspects of peace processes.

While the transition from war to peace may include practices such as violence prevention and peacekeeping, this book primarily deals with the peacemaking and peacebuilding ‘phases’ of conflict resolution.¹

For the purposes of this study, peacemaking is defined as a set of diplomatic and legal actions geared towards promoting a peace agreement and conflict resolution between the parties (Ouellet 2003).² More specifically, the goal of peacemaking is to eliminate sources of tension and transcend underlying incompatibilities by peaceful means (Galtung 2012: 9; Galtung 1976). In the context of negotiation that flows from such peacemaking efforts, this is achieved by bringing hostile parties to agreement through voluntary action and in good faith (Bercovitch 1998: 232; Miall et al. 1999: 22; Darby and MacGinty 2003: 2). According to the conventional interpretation of peace-making, there should also be requirements that the opposing sides are equally committed to, and take responsibility for, implementation under conditions that may be unique to their particular societies (Wallensteen 2012: 3). This framing of peacemaking, resting on autonomy, consensus and neutrality, is closely linked to an early normative understanding in peace research of peacebuilding as self-supporting conflict resolution (Galtung 1976: 297). Furthermore, peacebuilding is about societies creating a structure that enables them to remove the causes of wars and to produce their own peaceful alternatives when war is likely to occur (Galtung 1976: 298). In sum, then, this definition of peacebuilding implies the autonomy of the participants to create conditions that will eliminate reasons to resort to violence.

Yet, the normative shift from an absolutist protection of state sovereignty to human security and human rights, as well as the increasing application of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter together with the post-Cold War order, has had a major impact on the understanding and practices of both peacemaking and peacebuilding. Whereas inter-group negotiations and neutral mediation were traditionally seen as the most effective forms of peace-making, in the past two decades members of the international community have resorted more frequently to third-party power mediation. A fundamental reason for this is the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar order in the 1990s, which allowed Western governments, and in particular the United States, to engage more freely in their exercise of power. Influential mediation experts abandoned the requirement for impartiality and argued that persuasion is best achieved when mediators possess resources and leverage (Bercovitch et al. 1991: 11). This type of peacemaking has been supported by the findings that powerful and third-party mediators outperform neutral mediators in delivering agreements (Svensson 2007b). Based on this premise, policy recommendations have also increasingly made a call for mediators to approach primary parties with ready-made solutions for conflict resolution (Lindgren et al. 2010). In particular, the inclusion of forward-looking liberal norms is believed to support conflict resolution and a durable peace (Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005: 3; O’Brien 2005: 90). More specifically, current practices of peace-making entail that, in the case of imposed conflict transformation, a powerful third party provides most of the normative and practical solutions intended to promote a durable settlement. The typical bundle of norms that comes with such third-power-brokered practices and is frequently promoted in the peace-making phase includes human rights, democracy, the rule of law and a free market economy. In practical terms, the powerful third party guarantees the commitment of the primary parties and may also supervise implementation. In the peacebuilding phase, external administrators may abandon supervision only when the normative conflict-resolution mechanism imposed, that is, liberal peace, becomes self-sustaining and there is no risk of war resuming (Downs and Stedman 2002: 50; Paris 2004). Domestic autonomy and ownership of the process are seen as expressions of the end result, while during the actual process ownership is curtailed by external actors through notions of shared ownership or by external supervision (Chesterman 2007; Narten 2009: 254). In essence this means that domestic actors do not have control over project management and development (Reich 2006: 17–18). Taking a critical stand on power mediation, one could ask what such engagements really entail.

Third-party power mediation is related to the idea discussed in peace research as imposed conflict transformation (Galtung 2012: 111). In this vein the practice of power mediation does not require voluntary participation by the primary parties, nor do peacemakers necessarily strive to cultivate autonomous conflict-resolution mechanisms in the short term. Power mediators often define immediate implementation priorities and conflict-resolution mechanisms. Turning against such views and approaches, scholars such as Galtung argue that imposed conflict transformation is likely to suffer from weak legitimacy and weak commitment by the primary parties (Galtung 2012: 111).

To address the problems of imposed conflict transformation, this edited volume illustrates a number of problems with power brokering for sustainable peace. As is demonstrated in recent quantitative studies, trends show that peace agreements are more likely to be durable if they include a procedural justice component in their peacemaking phase. In other words, peace is more likely to last if the parties to negotiations are treated by the same token and share the burden of negotiations equally (Albin and Druckman 2012: 177). According to this finding, the way in which negotiations are conducted, that is, how the parties relate to each other when in the process of transcending their incompatibilities and root causes, and how they are represented and whether the parties participate in decision-making, is important for the legitimacy and durability of the resulting peace (see Albin and Druckman 2012: 178). In other words, equality and a higher degree of participation by the primary parties in designing conflict transformation and conflict-resolution mechanisms are likely to bring more ownership and therby legitimacy. It is suggested that these together are intimately linked to the durability of peace. Moreover, as research has shown, negotiations among primary parties and neutral mediation are both based on consent and non-coercive participation by the primary parties, and are more likely to be based on reciprocity. In such instances, conflict transformation is tailored by the primary parties themselves and is likely to be seen as more legitimate. In addition, the resulting conflict-resolution mechanisms are likely to be self-sustaining and to carry a reduced risk of renewed violence.

Neutrality and ownership among negotiating parties do not come without problems. Neutral mediation and negotiations are often more protracted, achieving peace takes longer, and in the meantime suffering and destruction continue. The question arises whether this is a price worth considering in the midst of heated conflict, when human suffering calls for action. Another aspect that remains to be studied in this context is whether domestically handled mediation efforts (e.g. without the involvement of an external party) lead to more durable conditions for peace. To capture such a dynamic, we need to consider cases that contrast power-brokered peace processes with domestic efforts.

With this in mind, this study takes an in-depth look at a number of contemporary negotiations and cases of agreement implementation across the world. We address a number of dilemmas and tensions imbedded at various stages of the peace process and in the structure of a peace agreement. Many of these dilemmas are an intrinsic part of the peace processes studied in this book. By looking at the peace processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Sudan, we hope to elaborate further on the links between negotiations and peacebuilding, and the consequences that these have for our understanding of the self-sustaining conditions for peace.

The rest of this chapter outlines some general themes and concepts in the study of mediation and negotiations. This is followed by a discussion of some of the main issues in the so-called liberal peacebuilding debate and the way this debate links to the experience of peacemaking. We then outline the guiding research questions and introduce the case studies examined in the book

Peacemaking

The literature on mediation, peace processes and the quality of peace agreements for the purpose of ending interstate and civil wars has a rich academic tradition (for an overview see Fen Osler 1996; Walter 1997; Stedman et al. 2002; Fortna 2003; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Werner and Yuen 2005; Svensson 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Mattes and Savun 2009; Svensson and Wallensteen 2010). Such attention is rightly justified. There is much that can be learned from how peacemaking has been practised and how it can contribute to conflict resolution, but also how it sometimes lays the foundations for the re-emergence of armed conflict. Seminal works in this regard cover a range of variables that may have an impact on the success or failure of peacemaking attempts. Common features studied include mediation styles, the personality and culture of negotiators, the symmetries and asymmetries of negotiating parties, the kind of incompatibility being negotiated, the influence of great powers, the structure of the peace process, the management of peace process spoilers and the geopolitical standing of the parties during negotiations (Fisher 1983, 2006; Fisher and Loraleigh 1991; Zartman 1985, 2001; Bercovitch and Wells 1993; Regan and Stam 2000; Crocker et al. 2003; Touval 2003; Bercovitch and Deroun 2005; Quinn and Cox 2009; Beardsley et al. 2006).

Although the various components included here all contribute to shaping the outcome of a peace process, we contend that there are a number of problems with the kind of literature that compartmentalizes mediation. Below, we tackle two of the typical problems in the literature. The first concerns a tendency to over-rely on a positivist epistemology of how best to conceptualize peacemaking (in particular with regard to ‘efficiency’). The second concerns the impact of biased power mediators and mediators with profound self-interest.

In regard to the first problem, a number of studies and scientific approaches to mediation and peace processes tend to divide them into sequences in order to quantitatively examine peacemaking efforts. For example, much of the mediation literature seeks to ‘evaluate’ peace processes in terms of efficiency, scoring their impacts according to the presence and number of agreements, and recording failures in peacemaking when agreements are not reached (Kreutz 2012; Wallensteen 2012: 134–35). Assessment is often narrowly based on the process itself, and the durability and fairness of the peace that follows is only marginal (Albin and Druckman 2012).

In this context, Bercovitch (2009) refers to two broad common criteria of assessment: subjective and objective. Subjective assessment of the success or failure of mediation efforts could measure or recognize the concepts of fairness (e.g. fairness perceived by the parties to the conflict), participant satisfaction, quality of effectiveness (e.g. as measured by the results achieved) or efficiency (e.g. vis-à-vis the procedural and temporal dimension of conflict management) (Bercovitch 2009: 348–49). On the other hand, objective conditions are more straightforward, as they can be more easily observed. Accordingly:

one can consider a particular mediation successful when violence has abated, fatalities are reduced, conflict intensity has lessened, or a cessation of violent behaviour and the opening of some dialogue between the parties have been achieved. Or one can call mediation successful when a formal and binding agreement that settles the conflict's issues has been signed.

(Bercovitch 2009: 349–50)

We argue that such assessment, and quantification of social phenomena such as ‘peace’ has its shortcomings and does not do enough to inform our understanding of peacemaking. First, there are a number of unmeasurable aspects, such as norms and influences, which are not captured in quantitative studies, which means that a full account of efficiency is rarely achieved. Second, conventional studies in this regard usually do not take account of the long-term processes that shape the outcome of peace (e.g. involving complex social processes that may prevent or contribute to resolving societal tensions, such as reconciliation, or the presence of emotions, symbols, memory, etc.). Instead, these positivist, assessment-oriented studies are primarily concerned with investigating the impact of the short-term goals of the peace process and the peace agreement itself.

The way in which the success or failure of mediation efforts is measured also has implications for the debate on the practice of powerful, biased mediations. This brings us to the second problem in this literature. A study of mediation in civil wars concludes that although all types of mediators have a positive effect in terms of reaching agreements, power mediators outperform impartial mediators (Svensson 2007b). Moreover, findings also suggest that the most effective mediation attempts occur when both power and pure mediators are active as third parties (Svensson 2007b: 245). However, these and similar findings are not likely to tell us much about the long-term durability of peace, or how the normative underpinnings of third parties affect the content of the peace. Nonetheless, based on the argument of the efficiency of powerful third-party mediators, policy recommendations have been made suggesting that mediation interventions should be more ‘directed’, to ‘strive to go beyond reaching compromise’ and to ‘deliver ready-made solutions’ to conflicts in order to achieve a more durable peace (Svensson and Wallensteen 2010; Grussel et al. 2010: 23–24, 27).

This type of recommendation does not explicitly deal with the issue of the self-interest of powerful third parties. Instead, it is implied that such actors act solely in the interests of the primary parties. Yet, as discussed by others, some mediators and third-party actors are neutral, but other mediators and peace promoters are not (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Bercovitch 2009: 340). The issue of mediator self-interest has also been discussed in other studies (see e.g. Greig 2005; Touval 1992).

Morover, the self-interest of individual mediators and of political mediators such as the state is likely to play an important role in shaping the ensuing peace. For example, there is often an underlying ideological agenda or normative tradition in which the mediator operates. The normative element of a peace process is rarely publicly articulated (either in practice or in theory). On the contrary, it can operate in a concealed or disguised way through underlying norms, principles, orders and practices. As noted by Bercovitch, the self-interest of mediators causes them to do something about a ‘conflict whose continuance could adversely affect their own political interests’, or, for instance, ‘preserve intact a structure of which they are part’, or to pursue mediation as a ‘way of extending and enhancing their own influence by becoming indispensable to the parties in conflict’ (Bercovitch 2009: 344).

In the mediation practices of powerful third parties, the mediator may try to conceal its power by presenting its own role as consensual and in line with what the other parties want. For example, according to the National Security Adviser under US President Bill Clinton, power brokering is about convincing a party to do ‘what you want him to do, an effort to make the other think doing something you want was his idea rather than yours’ (Lake 2000: 128).³ However, it is highly uncertain whether such an approach can pave the way for a durable and self-sustaining peace. While some research attention has been directed to biased mediators and biased peace processes, few in-depth case studies illustrate the tensions these may cause in the search for durable conflict resolution and a self-sustaining peace.

How to treat ownership, participation and legitimacy in negotiations has been explored in recent studies. As noted in Albin and Druckman's findings on procedural justice in negotiations, peace is more likely to endure if the parties to the negotiations are treated by the same token and share the burden of negotiations equally (Albin and Druckman 2012: 177). These findings are in line with the more traditional understanding of peacemaking, which emphasizes the needs, ownership and responsibilities of the primary parties in order to deliver a self-sustaining peace. In addition, such findings are of high normative and practical relevance to the debate on post-1990s’ peacebuilding practices, which are frequently discussed under the heading of liberal peace-building. In the light of the above, the key elements of the mediation process are discussed below.

Conceptualization of mediation

Mediation practices and the structure and dynamics of peace processes entail a whole host of factors that make this peacemaking tool too difficult to define in all contexts and purposes (Bercovitch 2009: 340; Svensson and Wallensteen 2010). Nonetheless, several attempts have been made to define it. For instance, Folberg and Taylor (1984) define mediation as ‘the process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs’ (Folberg and Taylor 1984: 7). Moore suggests that mediation entails ‘the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in vo...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title
• Routledge Studies in Intervention and Statebuilding
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of contributors
• Foreword by Kwesi Aning
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Peacemaking and peacebuilding: Two ends of a tail
• 2 American nation-building abroad: Exceptional powers, broken promises and the making of ‘Bosnia’
• 3 Reconstituting crisis: Revisiting the Dayton and Rambouillet Agreements and their impact in Kosovo
• 4 The liberal trap: Peacemaking and peacebuilding in Afghanistan after 9/11
• 5 Sudan: The role of foreign involvement in the shaping and implementation of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement
• 6 The Ouagadougou Political Accord
• 7 Going it alone: The Casamance conflict and the challenges of internal peacemaking
• 8 An appraisal of the liberal peacebuilding exercise in Sierra Leone
• 9 Rethinking peacemaking: Peace at all costs?
• Bibliography
• Index