Talking Criminal Justice

Language and the Just Society

Michael J Coyle

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136184772
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

The words we use to talk about justice have an enormous impact on our everyday lives. As the first in-depth, ethnographic study of language, Talking Criminal Justice examines the speech of moral entrepreneurs to illustrate how our justice language encourages social control and punishment.

This book highlights how public discourse leaders (from both conservative and liberal sides) guide us toward justice solutions that do not align with our collectively professed value of "equal justice for all" through their language habits. This contextualized study of our justice language demonstrates the concealment of intentions with clever language use which mask justice ideologies that differ greatly from our widely espoused justice values.

By the evidence of our own words Talking Criminal Justice shows that we consistently permit and encourage the construction of people in ways which attribute motives that elicit and empower social control and punishment responses, and that make punitive public policy options acceptable.This book will be of interest to academics, students and professionals concerned with social and criminal justice, language, rhetoric and critical criminology.

1 The sociology of Language of Justice

It is in this connection that a moral code arises, which is a set of rules or behavior norms, regulating the expression of the wishes, and which is built up by successive definitions of the situation. In practice the abuse arises first and the rule is made to prevent its recurrence. Morality is thus the generally accepted definition of the situation, whether expressed in public opinion and the unwritten law, in a formal legal code, or in religious commandments and prohibitions.

William I. Thomas
The Unadjusted Girl

Introduction

I have two purposes in this chapter. My first purpose is to define the conceptual background for Language of Justice research and to place my work within the social sciences. Although my research relates intimately to many disciplines, my focus on the process and products of human interaction situates it squarely in the social sciences. More specifically, my research belongs to the discipline of justice studies because I study the social and “criminal” justice of everyday life. My second purpose is to demonstrate the logic and arguments of Language of Justice work. To clearly illustrate this I deconstruct the justice language of two more moral entrepreneurs of justice: Joe Arpaio and Michael Hennessey.

In Language of Justice work I examine language as a means of studying the sociology of justice. I read everyday language (media documents, moral entrepreneurs’ speech) to interpret how humans act to invent, develop and organize justice in everyday life. I do this by scrutinizing how people converse about justice. My research tracks language closely, and while it may contribute to other scholarly disciplines with a central concern for language, it does not belong to linguistics, sociolinguistics or any of those intellectual traditions that place language at their analytic core. In my work, the central concern is the interactional production of justice. Studying language is seminal; however, my main purpose is to contribute to that inquiry that concerns itself with justice in everyday life, or justice studies. I study justice language to access and interpret justice discourse. I study justice discourse in turn to demonstrate how justice norms are created and modified, and to interpret how moral entrepreneurs employ such discourse in order to accomplish various goals, such as social control.

As with all sociological research, Language of Justice work rests on a body of assumptions about human action and social life. In this chapter I consider the conceptual paradigms that are foundational to my work. First, I examine the argument that all situations of social life are defined. Second, I explore the argument that all situations of social life are constructed. Third, I use these two lines of thinking as an entry point to the broader paradigm of sociology I use to interpret social life, symbolic interactionism. Finally, I consider a broad array of theoretical approaches that Language of Justice research draws from, stands in importance difference to, and contributes to: content analysis, structuralism, poststructuralism, pragmatics, semiotics, sociolinguistics, critical theory and discourse analysis.

Defining the situation

Introduction

I derive a central premise, that social situations are defined, from the work of William Thomas (1923). I am interested in Thomas’ idea that “situations are defined,” because I want to demonstrate how “justice situations are defined.” I am also interested in tracking how moral entrepreneurs work to define justice situations, and how their tools are language choices that produce such definitions.

In the epigraph that introduces this chapter, Thomas suggests that morality rises from a generally accepted definition of the situation. The idea is straightforward enough to seem simplistic. For example, although killing one's partner during an argument and killing an enemy soldier in wartime are both acts of killing, the first is broadly seen as objectionable and the second as suitable. The definitions of these two situations as respectively abhorrent and heroic are generally accepted. Much in the way that Thomas establishes how we develop a sense of what is moral, I will demonstrate that we develop a sense of what is just – a sense we use to explain, support and legitimize sets of justice rules, justice norms and justice laws – by defining justice situations. Simply put, as with morality, so with justice: what is seen as just is the generally accepted definition of the situation.

In his 1923 work, The Unadjusted Girl, Thomas demonstrates that people enter social situations that are already defined. In other words, human beings are born into communities that have already defined the vast majority of situations that any individual will encounter. To bolster his argument Thomas cites numerous interview and observation examples from his fieldwork in small communities in Poland and Russia. He uses the criminal code as an example to demonstrate how an individual's definition of a situation may differ from the broader social definition: one may wish to define the situation of taking food to feed one's starving child as an innocent or appropriate act, but the situation is clearly defined by the criminal code as a criminal act of theft, and no amount of insistence will shift this definition of the situation. Thomas establishes that social situations are so well defined that the individual “has not the slightest chance of making his definitions and following his wishes without interference” (1923: 42). For example, theft is a clearly defined action in social life, and in most cases no amount of individual interference can redefine the situation. The example of theft also demonstrates Thomas’ point that situations are defined before actors step into them, e.g. before actors take food that is not theirs, this act is defined as theft.

Historical shifts in “defining the situation”

Thomas’ work shows how social situations are, more than ever before, susceptible to being redefined. In his fieldwork in the small communities of Eastern Europe, Thomas observes that the family and community are the primary definers of situations. When he turns his analytic gaze to the West he distinguishes that family and community lack a similar power to define situations; oppositely, he finds them weak and continually declining. Thomas demonstrates that in the West,

... by a process, an evolution connected with mechanical inventions, facilitated communication, the diffusion of print, the growth of cities, business organization, the capitalistic system, specialized occupations, scientific research, doctrines of freedom, the evolutionary view of life, etc., the family and community influences have been weakened and the world in general has been profoundly changed in content, ideals, and organization. Young people leave home for larger opportunities, to seek new experience, and from necessity. Detachment from family and community, wandering, travel, “vagabondage” have assumed the character of normality. Relationships are casualized and specialized. Men meet professionally, as promoters of enterprises, not as members of families, communities, churches. Girls leave home to work in factories, stores, offices, and studios. Even when families are not separated they leave home for their work.

(Thomas 1923: 70–71)

For Thomas, history and progress have meant a decline in the ability of powerful social institutions to define situations of everyday life. He finds that by the early twentieth century, the ability of social institutions to define situations has markedly fallen, partly due to changes in how we work and socialize, partly due to the pervasive ramifications of technology on our lives, and partly due to how all these changes have fundamentally altered human relationships. As he says:

The world has become large, alluring, and confusing. Social evolution has been so rapid that no agency has been developed in the larger community of the state for regulating behavior which would replace the failing influence of the community and correspond completely with present activities. There is no universally accepted body of doctrines or practices.

(Thomas 1923: 78)

Thomas associates the waning of family and community influence in defining situations with a rise in individualism. He defines individualism as directly opposed to situations being defined by the community. As he says, individualism is “the personal schematization of life, making one's own definitions of the situation and determining one's own behavior norms” (Thomas 1923: 86). Thomas highlights how the social changes of modern life where new inventions, new friends from diverse backgrounds and exposure to new environments have resulted in a world where it is now possible to constantly redefine a situation, or to knowingly introduce changes that will eventually redefine situations for individuals, a community or of the whole world (1923: 71).

Moral entrepreneurs “defining the situation”

Thomas’ work lays a foundation for my argument that moral entrepreneurs can redefine the situations of social and “criminal” justice. He argues that in time individuals can introduce definitions of situations and can influence communities to assume attitudes toward values other than those conventionally accepted – even ones that can de-legitimate plans of action or rearrange existing norms (Thomas 1923: 234). He identifies how a problem of modern Western social life is the presence of multiple discourses that compete to “define the situation.” He recognizes that competition among leaders of public discourse (moral entrepreneurs) to define situations is intense: “The churchman, for example, and the scientist, educator, or radical leaders are so far apart that they cannot talk together. They are, as the Greeks expressed it, in different ‘universes of discourse’” (Thomas 1923: 78). Thomas also recognizes the impact of this competition. As an example, he discusses a Johns Hopkins University study, which aimed to produce the consensus of the medical community in order to address problems in sex education; however, finding no agreement, the situation of sex education was left undefined (Thomas 1923: 79).

Thomas’ elucidation of the “definition of the situation” highlights the importance of the moral entrepreneur in modern social life. With the collapse of consensus among previous organizing powers, such as the family, the church, science or education, situations are more open to redefinition. Alternative definitions of the situation are possible, at times frequent, and moral entrepreneurs now compete for who will define the situation. It is interesting to note how Thomas’ discussion reflects the stress of modern life: the need to define situations in ways that are congruent with one's immediate environment while not conflicting too harshly with the definitions of those older institutions that have by no means disappeared (the family, the community groups one participates in, etc.).

Thomas demonstrates that the problem of “the definition of the situation” is so critical that it is felt by every individual. He characterizes the rise of individualism as a shift between living in a world where situations are defined by the community to a world where, as he says, one makes “one's own definitions of the situation and determine(s) one's own behavior norms” (Thomas 1923: 86). In other words, the world has become a place where one must choose which, or rather whose, definitions of the situation one will accept. The implication of Thomas’ argument is that individuals must draw on imagery, values or other meanings in their environment to construct their definitions of situations. The question of which moral entrepreneur will provide such influence or ready-made meanings, becomes one of deep importance.

Thomas highlights the powerful rise of the moral entrepreneur above and beyond the influence of the churchman, scientist, educator or radical leader. Though he never uses the term “moral entrepreneurs” to discuss the influence of individuals or organizations, he clearly distinguishes their role as brokers of influence who work to define situations. As he writes: “There are in society organized sources of influence, institutions, and social agencies, including the family, the school, the community, the reformatory, the penitentiary, the newspaper, the moving picture. These are sources of mass influence ... ” (Thomas 1923: 249).

The multiplicity of sources of mass influence generates stiff competition for defining the situation. Thomas uses a plethora of examples to demonstrate that while in the Russian Mir or “in the American rural community of fifty years ago nothing was left vague, all was defined,” in the modern West “[t]he definition of the situation is equivalent to the determination of the vague” (1923: 81). As he outlines:

But in the general world movement to which I have referred, connected with free communication in space and free communication of thought, not only particular situations but the most general situations have become vague. There are rival definitions of the situation, and none of them is binding.

(Thomas 1923: 81–82)

Thomas demonstrates that in modern social life innumerable moral entrepreneurs exist, and they use their influence – however acquired – to compete for the definition of the situations of everyday life. The centrality of this cannot be underestimated, for as discussed at the very beginning of this section, one must have already defined a situation in order to be able to act in it. Thus, modern social life entails a flurry of activity to define situations, and a flurry of moral entrepreneurs weighing in with their influence. As Thomas writes, we are “met at every turn with definitions of the situation” and with ongoing attempts to influence the definitions of situations (1923: 62). The point is this: we are often acting within situations already defined by moral entrepreneurs.

Thomas’ argument about the numerous influences available for the definition of a situation raises an important question for each of us: “What definitions of situations am I operating out of?” This question is in many ways the heart of Language of Justice work: when we act to achieve justice (build law, judge in the courtroom, etc.), what definitions of justice situations are we operating out of? Thomas proves how important and necessary moral entrepreneurs have become and how key their influence is to how we think and act in the justice situations of everyday life. Moral entrepreneurs are central, for as Thomas discovered in his fieldwork, “[t]he measurement of the influence is the definition of the situation” (1923: 249).

Joe Arpaio, moral entrepreneur

To demonstrate the strength and usefulness of Thomas’ argument regarding the “definition of the situation,” I present a case study of one moral entrepreneur, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, and his efforts to define “crime” and justice situations.

Arpaio has been Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona since 1993. As the highest ranked law enforcement officer of the fourth most populous county in the US, Arpaio's approach to his work has earned him local, national and international attention. Frequently, his methods are reviewed in the world media and he is variously applauded, criticized or ridiculed as “America's toughest sheriff.” One highly critical appraisal appeared in The Economist under the title “Joe Arpaio – Tyrant of the Desert,” and judged that “Mr. Arpaio styles himself America's Toughest Sheriff, and seems determined to ensure that the honor is never snatched away from him” (“Joe Arpaio” 1999). Arpaio is profiled as a man who has “decided to do away with country club jails,” who houses inmates in army tents (including during the long desert summers when temperatures exceed 115° F), who has banned cigarettes along with coffee and hot meals, who has resurrected chain-gangs, and who requires all males in jail to wear pink underwear and striped prison clothing (“Joe Arpaio” 1999).

Arpaio consistently goes to great lengths to characterize the distinctiveness of his correctional approach. As the Sheriff's Office webpage declares: “Arpaio has done many unique things as Sheriff,” including instituting the “world's first ever female chain gang” (Maricopa County Sheriff's Office 2006). Arpaio expresses pride that he budgets more money per day to feed a canine unit dog than the 20 cents a day he budgets for feeding a person imprisoned in a county jail. He boldly claims to subject persons in jails to undesirable, physically tormenting and psychologically humiliating lives (Maricopa County Sheriff's Office 2006 and Arpaio 2004).

Arpaio's justice recipe combines the ingredients of “pink underwear,” “chain-gangs,” “115 degree heat desert tent-living,” “banned cigarettes, coffee and hot meals,” and “eating less well than a dog” to define the “jail situation” as one that should not “coddle criminals” or be “country club,” but one that produces generally undesirable, physically tormenting and psychologically humiliating experiences. Consequently (according to his logic), those who come to his jails will not want to come back, and therefore (again, according to his thinking) will not come back (Arpaio 2004, “Joe Arpaio” 1999 and Maricopa County Sheriff's Office 2006).

Arpaio's claims are buttressed by results, however. The prize of all correctional policy, reduced recidivism rates, has eluded him; a study commissioned by Arpaio's own office found that his “tough” policies had virtually no effect on whether people leaving his prisons would return again (Hepburn and Griffin 1998). His unorthodox policies have cost taxpayers more than 50 million dollars in lawsuits (Rangell and Tomasch 2011), and in 2012 the US ...