Beyond the Letter (Routledge Revivals)
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Beyond the Letter (Routledge Revivals)

A Philosophical Inquiry into Ambiguity, Vagueness and Methaphor in Language

Israel Scheffler

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eBook - ePub

Beyond the Letter (Routledge Revivals)

A Philosophical Inquiry into Ambiguity, Vagueness and Methaphor in Language

Israel Scheffler

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Ambiguity, vagueness and metaphor are pervasive features of language, deserving of systematic study in their own right. Yet they have frequently been considered mere deviations from ideal language or obstacles to be avoided in the construction of scientific systems. First published in 1979, Beyond the Letter offers a consecutive study of these features from a philosphical point of view, providing analyses of each and treating their relations to one another.

Addressed to the fundamental task of logical and semantic explanation, the book employs an inscriptional methodology in the attempt to avoid prevalent forms of question-begging, and, further, in the conviction that sparseness of assumption often reveals points of theoretical interest irrespective of methodolgical preference.

The author distinguishes and analyses several varieties of ambiguity, developing new semantic notions in the process; recasts the philosophical treatment of vagueness in the light of recent criticisms of analyticity; discusses the bearing of vagueness on logic; and provides a systematic critique of major recent interpretations of metaphor, developing a revised version of contextualism.

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Publisher
Routledge
Year
2013
ISBN
9781136961625

III

METAPHOR

I METAPHOR, MENTION-SELECTION AND E-AMBIGUITY

We have twice had occasion, in earlier discussions, to touch briefly on the topic of metaphor. First, having introduced the notion of elementary ambiguity, we remarked that such ambiguity comprehends metaphor, a metaphorical predicate-inscription within D characterizable as having a divergent replica therein, offering some clue to the application of the former.1
Secondly, in introducing the notion of mention-selection, we suggested that denotative and mention-selective uses are intimately connected in the learning process, exhibiting transfer phenomena reminiscent of metaphor: No picture is a man; yet, forced onto a given array of pictures, a ‘man’ inscription will not function arbitrarily, but will select man-pictures in fact.2 Such selection is of course not innate, guided as it is by prevailing styles of picturing. In turn, every selection strengthens, refines, or elaborates prevalent representational standards, helping to embed each sign within a recognizable family of signs.
In suggesting that mention-selection is reminiscent of metaphor, I do not mean to imply that it can be taken as a typical case of metaphorical transfer. A salient point of resemblance is the fact that, in both cases, terms may be employed in ways felt to be not only precluded but apt. Nevertheless, there is also a critical difference which requires notice. Mention-selection does not fade under prolonged repetition: To caption a man-picture ‘man’ is an act that does not lose its mention-selective character even after frequent analogous mention-selections. Metaphorical use, by contrast, fades into literal use; metaphors die. That is to say, metaphorical applications by given coextensive replicas give way, after a while, to literal applications by further such replicas. The metaphorical past of the latter applications may even become obscured and require considerable effort to reconstruct. Even if original literal uses have also survived, i.e. if replicas are still being employed that are coextensive with original (pre-metaphorical) inscriptions, they typically afford no practical clue to the later divergent application, and we now have simple E-ambiguity rather than metaphor in particular. For we have extensionally divergent replicas, all literal, in concurrent use, i.e. in a suitable D contained within sufficiently recent temporal bounds.
A comparison of peculiarly metaphorical with other sorts of E-ambiguity will now introduce the main problem of metaphor to which our further discussion will be addressed. It will be recalled that two inscriptions are E-ambiguous with respect to one another if and only if they are replica-related and extensionally divergent. Now these conditions are met by accidental inscription-pairs and by indicator pairs, as well as by metaphorical-literal pairs.
In the case of accidental pairs, knowledge of one inscription’s extension gives no clue or special advantage in determining that of the other. Consider two ‘cape’-inscriptions, of which one denotes certain articles of clothing and the other denotes certain land areas. To determine the extension of one of these inscriptions is of no help in determining that of the other. Repeated exposure to replicas coextensive with the first gives no added assistance in judging the denotation of replicas coextensive with the second. Now imagine three replicas, every two of which make up an accidental pair (e.g. three ‘case’-inscriptions, one denoting examples of a certain sort, one applying to legal actions, and the third denoting cartons containing bottles of wine). Finding the extension of any two of these is of no more help in determining that of the third than finding the extension of only one. There appears to be no useful diagnostic regularity projecting from already determined instances to divergent instances yet to come.
In the case of indicator pairs, by contrast, extensional variation relates regularly to contextual features in a way that furnishes a useful clue to new instances. Thus, an ‘I’ normally denotes its own producer and a ‘here’ refers to a suitable spatial region within which it lies. True, the apprehension of such regularities normally requires exposure to a variety of divergent indicator replicas. Thus, knowing the extension of only one such inscription, or even of several of its coextensive replicas, may give no advantage in determining the extension of a new divergent replica. Yet, unlike the case of accidental pairs, finding the extensions of additional, divergent, replicas here gives a clear advantage in interpreting still newer instances.
The case of metaphorical-literal pairs seems to lie between the two sorts just considered, sharing certain features with each, but not assimilable to either. To begin with, metaphorical-literal pairs are unlike accidental pairs. For, as we have seen, knowing the extension of one member of an accidental pair gives no advantage in determining that of the other; nor does knowledge of all but the last link in a chain of accidental pairs yield any help in determining the last extension. There is no scope for ingenuity in finding this last extension; the problem resembles that of learning a new language from scratch.
In the case of metaphor, however, ingenuity clearly has a place. Knowing the extension of the literal member of the pair, one has a definite advantage in determining the extension of its metaphorical replica. Finding this extension is not like learning a new language from scratch; it is rather a matter of employing the old language in solving a new problem. Whereas, moreover, ambiguities of accidental sort may usefully be encompassed in dictionary entries, the same cannot be said of metaphorical ambiguities, which continually break new ground. Here the interpreter cannot rely on the record of past metaphors. He must rather try to understand the fresh metaphorical inscription through recourse to its literal counterpart.
Now in this respect the case of metaphor resembles that of indicators. For the understanding of indicator replicas is also not encompassed in dictionary entries but rather brings to bear the import of prior divergent replicas. Yet there is still an important difference. Among indicators, extensional variation is regularly related to contextual features. No comparable regularities are available for metaphors any more than for accidental pairs; that is to say, no such regularities govern individual literal-metaphorical pairs and, a fortiori, no single regularity governs all.
Learning the regularities characteristic of indicators may, indeed, call for ingenuity. Having been learned, however, such regularities generally require no special ingenuity for their application, i.e. for finding the contextual features pertinent to each inscription. Metaphor, in this respect, is strikingly different. In no case does the interpreter have a regularity that, once learned, eliminates the need for ingenuity thereafter, leaving only routine inquiry into specified contextual features. On the contrary, metaphor always poses a fresh challenge to the interpreter.
The main problem is to explain its success in communication. How is the application of a metaphorical inscription discerned if it diverges from all its prior replicas, is unanticipated by dictionary entries, and escapes capture by contextual regularities? How can the understanding of prior literal replicas offer an advantage that carries over to metaphorical replicas without the help of underlying regularities? Yet how, if the need for ingenuity is never overcome (unlike accidental pairs for which it is of no avail, and indicator pairs for which it is unnecessary), can there be such regularities guiding the interpretation of metaphorical inscriptions?
Various approaches to the interpretation of metaphor have been suggested and I shall organize my remarks by reference to six such approaches, which I call: (a) the intuitionistic, (b) the emotive, (c) the formulaic, (d) the intensional, (e) the interactional, and (f) the contextual.3 I do not mean to suggest that these labels refer to cohesive schools of thought; they are devices for highlighting theoretical directions that I judge to have central philosophical interest.

2 INTUITIONISTIC APPROACH TO METAPHOR

For the intuitionistic approach, metaphorical meaning cannot be derived by formula from analysis of literal constituents; added on to these constituents, such meaning requires an act of intuition for its discernment. M. Beardsley interprets such an approach, which he calls ‘the supervenience theory’, as beginning with the observation that metaphor ‘is capable of conveying meanings that literal language cannot convey.’4 According to this theory, Beardsley writes, ‘the meaning of a metaphor does not grow out of the literal meanings of its parts, but appears as something extraneous to, and independent of, them. The literal meanings are overridden and lost; the metaphorical meaning is inexplicable in terms of them.’5 In this respect, metaphor is thought to be analogous to, or (as Beardsley puts it) ‘a species of’ idiom.6
Yet, while idioms proper are typically treated as independent items, to be learned as such, and indeed recorded as separate units in dictionaries, metaphors can be understood, in favorable cases, through recourse to prior literal meanings and without reliance on dictionary entries. Since, however, the meaning of a metaphor does not derive from the meanings of its parts, it is accessible, if at all, not through analysis, but through an act of intuition that bridges the gulf between the past literal applications of constituents and the emergent metaphorical application of the whole. ‘A metaphor cannot be construed from the interactions of its parts; it calls for a special act of intuition.’7
In illustration of the view under consideration, Beardsley cites M. Foss who, he says, ‘seems to hold that in a metaphorical attribution, the separate terms lose all sense of their original designations and that “the metaphorical sphere 
 realizes a simple and indivisible unity.”’8 In the metaphorical process, writes Foss, ‘the known symbols in their relation to each other are only material; they undergo a complete change in losing their familiar meaning in each other and give birth to an entirely new knowledge beyond their fixed and addible multitude.’9
An important feature of the intuitionistic approach is its affirmation of the power of metaphor to outstrip the range of literal expression and its consequent denial that metaphors are always replaceable by literal equivalents. This denial itself, however, requires analytic attention. For what criteria of replaceability are here in point? If equivalence of, say, emotivity or suggestiveness is required, then it is no more to be expected that literal expressions will find literal replacements than that metaphorical expressions will. But then, rather than offering a contrast between analysis and intuition – the first suitable for grasping the meaning of literal expressions, the latter for grasping that of metaphorical ones – the intuitionistic approach offers us no contrast at all. For the literal paraphrase of literal expressions is no more feasible than such paraphrase of metaphorical expressions. Intuition is required everywhere.
If, alternatively, equivalence is understood as specifically cognitive in reference rather than having to do with emotivity, suggestiveness or other supposed non-cognitive features, there are still various interpretations to be considered. Does cognitive equivalence imply synonymy, for example? If so, the claim of non-replaceability is too obscure to be taken seriously, or else it is, once again, clearly true not only of metaphorical but also of literal expressions. Does equivalence require translatability? Then, since the latter notion is flexible, varying with purpose and context, it is hardly surprising to say that metaphor ‘is capable of conveying meanings that literal language cannot convey’,10 i.e. that metaphor may, in certain contexts and given certain purposes, be untranslatable. For the same may indeed be truly said of literal expressions. Again, the intended contrast of analysis and intuition evaporates.
Suppose the equivalence in question is taken as co-extensiveness. The claim is then, let us suppose, that metaphors are not always replaceable by literal expressions extensionally equivalent to them and belonging to the language in question; metaphors may bring powers of expression to the language that were previously unavailable. This claim too, while true, is not peculiar to metaphorical as contrasted with literal terms. A new literal primitive term of a systematic language adds to the power of the language in question.
However, it might be argued, no one supposes that the learning of a new primitive term is guided by already available primitives, whereas the meaning of a new metaphorical expression is in fact somehow grasped through reliance on available literal counterparts. Does this not show a special role for intuition in the realm of metaphor? The contrast itself may be conceded to exist; in fact, the description of it points to the problem of metaphor with which we started. Nevertheless, this contrast is not explained by the analysis-intuition distinction invoked by the intuitionist. For learning the application of a new primitive term hardly fits any evident norm of analysis, and describing the process of understanding metaphorical expressions as an act of intuition does nothing more than put a name to the mystery.
Several obscurities of the intuitionistic approach should now be noted. For one thing, the statement of the approach with which our discussion began purports to refer to meanings as entities; for another, its denial that metaphorical meanings ‘grow out of’ the literal meanings of their parts is hardly clear. Perhaps the point is to deny that there is a formula which, applied to the literal constituents of any metaphorical compound expression, yields a literal formulation of its metaphorical meaning. If so, the relation of this anti-formula thesis to the intuitionistic anti-replaceability thesis we have been considering (i.e. the denial that metaphorical expressions are always replaceable by literal equivalents) needs clarification.
Suppose, to begin with, that the anti-formula thesis is true, that there is no formula or systematic method yielding the metaphorical meaning of any compound expression, given solely information concerning its literal constituents. It does not follow that there is no such formula or method operating upon a wider, or a different, informational base. Nor, a fortiori, does it follow that the anti-replaceability thesis is true. For even if there is no method for deriving the metaphorical meaning of an expression from specified, presumably available, information, such meaning may in fact be shared by a literal equivalent.
Now suppose the anti-replaceability thesis to be true. Does it follow that the anti-formula thesis is true? Not if the requisite relativization to language is taken into account. The anti-replaceability thesis is, after all, groundless if taken absolutely...

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