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Notes
I. CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE, 1800–1980
1. The end of the 18th century marked a low point in the long history of the region; this question is discussed in Issawi 1970, 1977, and 1980a; Ashtor 1978; Owen 1977. Stagnation or retrogression from Roman, early medieval, or, in Turkey and Iran, early modern periods is shown by such indicators as population, cultivated area, quality of handicrafts, and intellectual and cultural levels.
2. See Myint 1964:chap. 3.
3. See Berg 1965.
4. See the penetrating remarks of Lord Cromer (1910). Cromer was keenly aware that modern European imperialism (British, French, Dutch, and Russian) in Asia and Africa would prove to be far more ephemeral than Roman, and pointed out clearly its main weaknesses: differences of race, religion, and culture, religious and social barriers to intermarrige, and lack of knowledge of the local vernaculars, on the part of the rulers, preventing easy social intercourse. Moreover, unlike the Romans (except in the latter’s dealings with the Jews and, one might perhaps add, the Egyptians) the Europeans were faced with powerful national feelings, largely based on religion. As regards North Africa, Cromer quotes (p. 89) M. Morand, Director of the School of Law at Algiers, who states: “Plus les indigènes musulmans nous connaissent, et mieux ils nous connaissent, plus ils s’éloignent des nous” and describes their revulsion at many aspects of Western civilization and their increased conviction of the superiority of Islam.
5. EHT.168, 174; EHFC.
6. “The Dissolution of the Village Community, in Baer 1969; Baer 1964, 1970a; Issawi 1965; Lewis 1961:82–125; EHME:244–47; EHI:284–92; EHT:13–15.
7. For Egypt, EHME:449–51; for Iran, EHI:339–42; for Turkey, EHT:332–38; for Iraq and Syria, EHFC and Gerber and Gross 1980.
8. For the rising cost of ships see EHT:163.
9. EHT: 55–56.
10. Berque 1972:190.
11. Eliot 1965:153.
12. EHT:23–24; R. Ricoux cited in Nouschi 1961:744.
13. Cromer 1910:113.
14. For Egypt see Issawi 1963:46–62; for Turkey EHT:366–69; for the more general trend toward nationalization and socialization, and its driving forces, see Johnson 1967 and Gouldner 1970:60–62 and passim.
15. See EI2, s.v. “Imtiyazat.”
II. EXPANSION OF FOREIGN TRADE
1. MacGregor 1844: 2:13.
2. CEHE: 3:399–400.
3. Ibid.: 3:281–361, 408–19, 4:566–75.
4. Miège 1961: 2:82–84.
5. Urquhart 1833:188.
6. See texts in Hurewitz 1975: 1:1–49.
7. Text in EHME:39–40 and Hurewitz 1975: 1:265–66; details and documents in EHT:85–100 and Issawi 1980c. Europeans were not the only ones to complain; in 1801 the Imam of Musqat protested against the arbitrariness of the Basra customs. Seton to Bombay, 18 February 1801, IO PS 381/20.
8. Texts in Hurewitz 1975: 1:197–99, 231–37, 280–81; EHI:72–82.
9. Text in Hurewitz 1975: 1:324–36; Miege 1961: 2:261–347; Ponasik 1977.
10. Douin 1927:88; for details on commercial policy see Crouchley 1937; idem 1938:85–90; Owen 1969:19–88; Rivlin 1961:171–90.
11. See EHT:75–76.
12. Hunter 1877:89.
13. Demontès 1930a:98; Levasseur 1911:477.
14. Tunisie 1900:85, Donon 1920:passim; Piquet 1912:418, Isaac 1906:passim; Bloch-Lainé 1956:432–33.
15. Knight 1937:passim; Hoffherr 1932:passim; Bloch-Lainé 1956:432–33.
16. Rinascita 1926:255, 474.
17. Gordon 1932:162–70; Hershlag 1968:21–22.
18. For Iraq see Jamil 1949:194–201; for the eastern Arab countries, Musrey 1969:passim.
19. EHFC.
20. Musrey 1969:passim; Himadeh 1936:229–59, 1938a:432–39, 1938b:421–28; Burns 1933:passim; Saba 1960.
21. Wilmington 1971:passim.
22. See Issawi 1980d; Musrey 1969; Sayigh 1978:691–710; United Nations 1980:104–7.
23. Rostow 1978:67; Imlah 1958:97–98, 189.
24. Aden’s trade was purely entrepot; if the land trade of Iraq and Syria, which may actually have declined during this period and at best grew slowly, be included, the overall rate of increase of those two countries would be greatly reduced. See EHFC.
25. W. A. Lewis 1978:196–217; Lewis’ figures show real growth and should therefore be increased by some 20 percent to reflect the rise in the prices of primary products in 1880–1913.
26. Rostow 1978:67.
27. See memorandum by Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, 1784, EHME:31–37; for Egypt, Raymond 1973: 1:107–305; for Ottoman Empire, Mantran 1970.
28. Furber 1976:230–34, 332.
29. EHME:270–73, 301–3; EHT:76–77.
30. Miège 1961: 4:417; Chevallier 1968:214–15.
31. Crouchley 1938:267–68; Pamuk 1978:appendix A; EHI:128–35; Bharier 1971:114–17; Hasan n.d.:appendixes 2 and 3; EHFC.
32. For figures on the Middle East, see United Nations 1951:76–77; for North Africa, Bloch-Lainé 1956.
33. For details see Issawi 1970b.
34. EHME:30–37; EHT:3; Raymond 1973:182–84; Masson 1896, 1903, 1911:passim; Paris 1957;passim.
35. In 1913 per capita exports plus imports were $24.30 in Egypt, $39.60 in Algeria, $15.00 in Syria, $31.00 in Tunisia, $15.20 in Turkey, and $10.30 in Iran; except for Iran these figures rank rather high in the international scale (see Issawi 1968:384). The ratio of exports to GNP in Egypt was about 32 percent and of imports 28; in the Ottoman Empire 14 and 19, respectively, again high figures; in Algeria and Tunisia they were probably still higher.
36. EHME:359–74, 446–48; Owen 1969:passim, Issawi 1963:224–26.
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