International Relations in Latin America

Peace and Security in the Southern Cone

Andrea Oelsner

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135477035
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Latin American & Caribbean History
• Index: History

This work studies the development of bilateral relations in two pairs of states (dyads): Argentina-Brazil and Argentina-Chile. It takes on a moderate constructivist approach that incorporates into the analysis of international relations the role of identities, ideas and perceptions as well as of material forces, and understands that the former are affected and changed during interaction. It also uses to securitization theory to explain how issues come or cease to be considered security matters through social constructions.

Part One

Introduction and Framework

Chapter One

Introduction

During the last sixty years or so, specific core regions of the world have moved beyond situations of balance of power and absence of war. This was most notably the case for Western Europe, North America, and the North Atlantic area. Within these areas, reasonable expectations of peace and peaceful change have become the norm, while the use of violence in bilateral and regional relationships has become inconceivable. In most instances, the processes underpinning these changes began in the aftermath of the Second World War, taking shape earlier or later depending on the region in question. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these areas can arguably be seen as zones of peace, and among them, some have even come to constitute zones of stable peace.

To many, however, this conclusion may seem completely untenable. In the present age of globalization, terrorism and international crime—and the violence they generate—appear to reach, or at least to have the capacity to reach, every corner of the world. Peace and tranquility can no longer be guaranteed in any state, regardless of how distant and remote that state may be from the center of the international scene or how strong its defenses may be. Recent events speak for themselves: there is no need to detail the many examples beyond 9/11 that confirm this trend.

This argument is in tune with the principles of the (neo)realist school of International Relations, in that it undermines any perception of regional peace as a stable feature. According to this view, states have thus to look after their own interests if they want to survive, even if this is at the expense of others. In this self-help system, no one state should rely on anyone else for security, particularly since enemies are now very likely to be non-state and transnational. States may well seek alliances and even multilateral action, but “not out of goodwill or a rush to world government, but out of clear-eyed self-interest.”¹

The existence of invasive terrorist activities and violence, and the persistence of a (neo)realist mistrust, do not preclude, however, that these coexist with geographical regions in which political dialogue and mutual trust have become the norm. The argument that the following chapters develop and chart is how the countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America have followed a similar path, developing into a zone of stable peace over the past twenty years. Nevertheless, in the one hundred and fifty years preceding the late 1970s, relations between Argentina, Brazil and Chile were predominantly unstable and characterized by tension and mistrust, if not open hostility. The regional scenario was dominated by war plans, which made up a substantial part of their security doctrines, and were used as a justification for the expansion of defense budgets. By the early 1980s, however, the geopolitical environment had started to relax, and since then it has continued to improve.

1. WHAT IS THE SOUTHERN CONE?

Before advancing into the argument, some of the geographical terms used in this book must be clarified: partly to avoid confusion for readers not familiar with the terminology, and partly because some of these terms are not at all unequivocal in their definition. Firstly, within this work, ‘the Americas’ are taken to mean one single continent, being constituted by the sub-regions of North, Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean. While this is how geography is conventionally taught from Mexico southwards, U.S. and Canadian literature usually holds that North and South America constitute two different continents. In the present study the terms ‘the Americas,’ ‘Western Hemisphere,’ and ‘American continent’ will be used as synonymous, and are understood according to the former definition.

This geographical division into three sub-regions is easily outlined: Canada, the United States, and Mexico belong geographically to North America; Central America extends from Mexico's southern border to the Isthmus of Panama; and South America, which begins at the south of the Isthmus of Panama, includes Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina.

Secondly, alongside the subdivision of the Americas into North, Central and South America, a secondary distinction can be made between Latin and Anglo-Saxon America, which refers to cultural and linguistic idiosyncrasies. Anglo-Saxon America indicates an area covering Canada and the United States, as well as the English-speaking islands in the Caribbean. Latin America, meanwhile, incorporates all the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries, including Mexico, regardless of whether they are geographically located in North, Central, or South America.² A further complication is introduced here by the fact that in Spanish, at least, there is often mention of Spanish America (Hispanoamérica), thus stressing the difference between the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies.

With the exceptions of Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana, the whole of South America belongs to Latin America, although not all of Latin America is located in South America. Therefore, the terms Latin America and South America are not used here as exact synonyms. Some claims will be made about the whole of Latin America, whereas some others will simply refer to South America, thereby not including Central America and Mexico.

This seems sensible, since despite the fact that Latin America shares an important cultural heritage, many of the political, economic, social, and security questions differ enormously between its sub-regions. This is true even within South America. For example, the Andean states are tied together by issues that combine guerrilla warfare and drug trading in a way that has so far had little impact on the Southern Cone. Similarly, the Amazon area has had its own regional dynamics regarding certain environmental problems, although sometimes these have been further complicated by a spillover of the factors encountered in the Andean zone. Finally, the Southern Cone has its own distinct set of questions. As Selcher observes, “this region has been identified as particularly conflict prone, because it is the setting for numerous frontier disputes, resource conflicts, and the two major axes of historical interstate rivalry on the continent (Chile-Argentina and Argentina-Brazil).”³

Finally, the last term that needs some clarification is that of the ‘Southern Cone.’ The Southern Cone refers to the shape on the map of the southernmost part of South America rather than to some strict and original affinity among the countries. But both history and vicinity have unquestionably left their mark on these regional relationships. Unfortunately, there is no clear definition of the geographical limits of the Southern Cone. All authors agree that Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay form part of it. However, many also include Brazil (or just its southern region) or Bolivia or both in their account of the Southern Cone.

This study takes the latter, broader approach, holding that the Southern Cone encompasses all six states. However, it also acknowledges the difficulties involved in delimitating regions conceptually. As Andrew Hurrell points out,

contemporary debates remind us that there are no ‘natural’ regions, and definitions of ‘region’ and indicators of ‘regionness’ vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation. […] Moreover it is how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region that is critical: all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested.⁴

The Southern Cone is identified as a region, basing this claim more on Regional Security Complex (RSC) Theory than on any positive process of regionalization or regional integration.⁵ As will be discussed in Chapter Two, an RSC is distinguished by the interdependence of the security concerns and the security perceptions of a set of units; in the present case these are states. These can be either positive or negative—that is, the RSC can be characterized by patterns of amity or enmity, although the term has been used more frequently to describe the latter.

In the case of the Southern Cone, when the area originally turned into an RSC, it undoubtedly did so driven by patterns of enmity. The so-called A-B-C countries (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) have been at its core ever since. Rivalry and disagreements shaped the A-B-C into two pairs of states, or dyads—Argentina-Brazil and Argentina-Chile. These have, in turn, dragged the other, smaller states of Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay into the RSC, doing so in two ways that are most distinctive in the cases of Argentina and Brazil. First, the smaller neighbors were attracted in by the larger states' competition for influence, thereby functioning both as ‘prize,’ and as buffer states. Secondly, when these relationships eventually changed from negative to positive, that is when rapprochement started in the dyads, the smaller countries were attracted into the region, perceiving the higher costs of exclusion vis-à-vis the potential benefits of inclusion. The most obvious and concrete example of this was the creation of Mercosur (or Mercosul in Portuguese); an economic integration agreement of which Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay are at present full members, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru are associated members, and Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico are at different stages of the association process.⁶

2. SUBJECT OF THE BOOK

The main focus of this book is the development of the relationships within the dyads formed by Argentina and Chile, and Argentina and Brazil. In particular, the focus is on the positive transformation that they have undergone over time. Thus, the questions “Why and how has the geopolitical agenda in the Southern Cone lost its prevalence over other issues?” or, to put it another way, “Why and how did desecuritization in the region develop?” are central to this research.

One could attempt to answer these questions on the basis of theories of interdependence and neoliberal institutionalism. These would argue that in an interdependent world—or rather, in the part of the world that is interdependent—the traditional realist distinction between high and low politics loses its relevance, and issues change their position in the agenda. However, the Southern Cone hardly conformed to the minimum requirements of interdependence in the 1970s and 1980s. Rather, it was a case of rapprochement first, then followed by the construction of a regional integration project, followed only later by the growth of interdependence. And even if it had not been so, the questions would still hold: why and how did it happen that countries in the Southern Cone increasingly ceased to behave according to realist assumptions, and over time started behaving according to the principles of interdependence? What made it possible for countries in this region to rule out geopolitical premises from their relationships, and instead start talking about cooperation and integration? How can this transformation be explained?

A striking observation at the beginning of research was the speed of the rapprochement that occurred between Argentina and Brazil, which allowed the relationship to move from open hostility to a comprehensive cooperation and integration project in a matter of some six years. This project initially started in the sensitive field of nuclear technology, giving rise a few years later to Mercosur. How and why these states, still ruled by military regimes, managed to set this process in motion and favorably alter their perceptions of each other, thus developed into a central research question.

A second focus of this book is on how and why improvements within the two dyads occurred at such different paces, despite a certain number of commonalities. For instance, both disputes escalated in the late 1970s, in both cases this happened after long histories of animosity, in neither case did war actually break out, and both rapprochement processes started when at least one of the states was still ruled by a military government.⁷ However, together with these similarities, the processes were marked by several differences. Although the peaks of tension in the dyads occurred at around the same period—in 1978 in the case of Argentina and Chile; throughout the 1970s in the case of Brazil and Argentina—the Argentine-Chilean rapprochement took considerably longer to take off and, once it started, its dynamic was also completely different. Thus, another set of key questions informing this study refers to the reasons for such differences. What had precluded rapprochement in each case for so long? And what eventually encouraged it? Why did these processes take such diverse paths, the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement being much faster, more far-reaching and deeper than the rapprochement between Argentina and Chile?

Finally, after having observed these two dyads in a more systematic fashion, some other questions arose. Is desecuritization in the Southern Cone a regional trend? If it is, is it leading to a pluralistic security community? Is there any room for formal security cooperation, and eventually political integration, in the region?

In answering these questions, this study will first explore the particular domestic conditions of each of the three countries during the period that goes from the end of the Second World War until the 1980s, as well as the regional and hemispheric contexts. The focus will then shift to each of the two dyads, and only then to the state of the region in the 1990s, in order to discuss, in Chapter Seven, the regional transformations that resulted from the rapprochement processes. Throughout the study, particular attention will be given to the blending of security, economic and political aspects involved in these processes, as well as the security, economic, and political considerations of the actors.

This approach is thus different from those employed by the majority of previous studies. Apart from a few exceptions that deal with rapprochement and integration in the Southern Cone in a more comprehensive manner,⁸ the region has been mostly studied either in economic terms—focusing on Mercosur⁹—or institutional terms—stressing the effects of regime change on the region.¹⁰ Additi...