War and Intervention in Lebanon (Routledge Revivals)

The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue

Yair Evron

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135051174
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Diplomatie et traités

Despite the bitter conflict that divided Jerusalem and Damascus, a fascinating process of indirect – through the United States – and tacit understandings emerged with regard to Lebanon in the 1970s. This derived largely from the Israeli deterrence posture which held in check Syrian military involvement in Lebanon. This book, first published in 1987, traces the development of the Israeli and Syrian involvement in Lebanon between 1975 and 1985, and of the deterrence dialogue which evolved between them. It also places this dialogue within the larger context of the overall Israeli-Syrian deterrence equation. War and Intervention in Lebanon is a fascinating and relevant work, of great value to those with an interest in International Relations and Middle Eastern history, politics and diplomacy.

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The Lebanese Civil War 1975–76: A Brief Historical Account

THE LEBANESE STATE¹

Lebanon is traditionally identified with Mount Lebanon. Yet, when France received the Mandate over Syria and Lebanon after World War I, it introduced a major change in the borders of Lebanon. Le Grand Liban was created. To the traditional area of Mount Lebanon, where the Maronites constitute a clear majority (with the Druze second in importance), were added large tracts of land in the south, east and north. The change ultimately proved to be the major factor in the decline of Maronite political power. The areas newly appended to Mount Lebanon were inhabited in great part by Muslims: in the south and east, the Beqa, primarily by Shi‘is, while in the north, in the area of Tripoli, Sunnis were more dominant. Since World War I modern Lebanon has witnessed a continual gradual change in its demographic make-up. At the time of the formation of le Grand Liban, the Maronites constituted about half the population. In subsequent years, the proportion of Maronites has diminished significantly. This decline has been due primarily to the extensive Maronite emigration (mainly to the United States and Latin America), and also to the higher Muslim birth-rate.

When Lebanon received its independence in 1943, the elites from the different communities agreed to the creation of a peculiar, yet very realistic, political system, based on the recognition that Lebanese society is divided into several religious communities, and that religion is the main locus of communal identity. Moreover, the argument took into consideration the fact that the various communities also differ along other important lines, and recognised that the political system should accept and incorporate these differences. In fact, the arrangements of 1943 were deeply rooted in a political system whose origins can be traced to the regime created in Mount Lebanon after the 1860 civil war. At that time, the mutasarifiyya (Governorate) of Mount Lebanon was given privileged status under a non-Lebanese Christian governor, who was to be assisted by a council consisting of four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox Christians, one Melchite, one Shi‘i and one Sunni Muslim.² The roots of Lebanon’s confessional political system date back to the nineteenth century.

The 1943 national pact agreed upon orally by the Maronite and Sunni elites recognised the predominant position which the Maronites should assume in the political life of Lebanon. Accordingly, the most powerful political position, the presidency, was given to a Maronite. Similarly, the role of Chief of Staff of the armed forces was also allotted to a Maronite. However, the constitution created a delicate system of checks and balances, which, while giving the predominant position to a Maronite, also delegated slices of political power to other communities. Thus, the Prime Minister had to be a Sunni Muslim, the Minister of Defence a Druze, and the Chairman of the Parliament, a Shi‘i. In this way the important governmental positions were held by representatives of the various religious communities. The actual functioning of such a system depended on continued agreement among the communities’ elites. The system could not be maintained by the imposition of the will of one community only, but was dependent on the elites’ recognition of their shared interests.

Until the collapse of law and order in Lebanon with the outbreak of the Civil War in 1975,³ the political system, despite being under continuous pressure, nevertheless functioned successfully, and even made possible a measure of personal and social liberty unparalleled in any Arab state. Lebanon has enjoyed a free press, freedom of expression and freedom of political organisation to a degree almost equal to that of the Western democracies. Lebanese development has not been without its irony: rapid economic modernisation and an advanced educational system (for part of the population) have been the awkward bedfellows of a semi-feudal system of economic and political power.

INHERENT INSTABILITIES

The Civil War and the subsequent instability result from several processes indigenous to Lebanon, but which have become increasingly intractable due to the pressures of external actors. Several factors must be taken into account, although it is difficult to assess their relative importance.⁴

Firstly, it is important to survey the forces resulting from the heterogeneous ethnic and religious character of the country, and from social processes, that gradually undermined erstwhile political structures. The Maronite community has existed since the fourth century, and moved to Mount Lebanon in the eighth-ninth centuries. The Druze community emerged in Mount Lebanon at a later stage. Until the nineteenth century the two communities co-operated with each other, and indeed from the late sixteenth century created a viable political system, the Imarah of Lebanon. However, animosity between them broke out in the mid-nineteenth century when general intercommunal fighting broke out.

French aid to the Christian Maronites in 1860 contributed to the development among the Maronites of an increasingly European, and particularly French, orientation; indeed they tended to regard France as their external backer. Moreover, an extensive system of education, again largely French-oriented, developed in the Maronite community, transforming its educational levels, and consequently its general world outlook.

Even prior to the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Maronites entertained aspirations for the creation of a separate political entity, and to this end had developed strong links with external non-Ottoman powers. They welcomed the creation of the French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon with enthusiasm, seeing in it the promise of political self-fulfilment. However, the extension of Lebanon’s political boundaries introduced a major change in the composition of the population. The Maronites ceased to be the majority and became one minority in a country of several religious and ethnic minorities. The decline in the Maronite demographic status has accelerated since World War II.

The Sunni community, which was concentrated in Beirut and in the region of Tripoli in north Lebanon, accepted the Maronites ‘leading role only after obtaining an agreement which, as already stated, allowed the Sunnis the second most important position in the political system. Indeed, the understanding reached in 1943 was really a compromise worked out by the Maronite leader Bishara al-Khuri and the Sunni leader Riad el-Sulh. Once this compromise was settled, the leaderships of the two communities formed a coalition to underwrite the system, and enabled Lebanon to remain united, in the face of internal and external pressures, until 1975. Indeed, the Maronite-Sunni coalition was critical throughout the duration of the regime.

The traditional animosity between the Maronites and Druze persisted in modern Lebanon, but remained dormant for many years, while the Druze were allowed their share in the political system. However, this underlying tension also broke out once the system came under increased pressure.

Since the establishment of le Grand Liban major demographic and social processes have taken place. The Maronite community, other Christian communities, and upper-class groups within the Sunni community, rapidly raised their levels of education, and since the 1960s, have also enjoyed unprecedented material affluence. Beirut became the centre of banking for the entire Arab Middle East, and much of the income from oil was invested there.

Notwithstanding the economic success enjoyed by some parts of the population, other sectors, primarily those belonging to the Shi‘i community in the south, remained poor and uneducated. In the demographic context, the Maronites and other Christian communities grew at a much slower pace than the Muslims, and this was particularly evident with respect to the Shi‘is. The rate of emigration to Western countries also contributed to the change in the relative size of the communities, since many more Christians than Muslims emigrated. By the 1970s, the Shi‘i community had grown in size to become the largest single minority in the country, close to a third of the population.

These economic and demographic trends were highly visible and were perceived with apprehension from two opposing points of view. The Maronites were concerned lest their political position be adversely affected by their relative decline. On the other hand, the Muslims, and primarily the Shi‘is, became increasingly restive because of the growing gap between their economic level and that of the Maronites. Indeed, in order to defend their political position the Maronites have refused to allow another census since that conducted in 1932, on which all the demographic calculations which served as the basis for the 1943 pact were founded.

The economic system in Lebanon has always been laissez faire. Only limited attempts have been made to encourage the development of social services of any kind, which might have served as a corrective to the country’s deepening social and economic problems. The only attempt to alleviate the social inequalities occurred during the presidency of Fuad Shihab from 1958 to 1964. In that period, several social and economic programmes were undertaken. For example, the Litani irrigation project was established and the Qarun artificial lake dug. The beginnings of a somewhat more equitable social system seemed to be emerging. However, in subsequent years, many of these programmes were abandoned. The lack of governmental intervention benefited the more active and educated sectors of the population and increased the economic gap from which the Shi‘is were suffering. Their frustration was deepened by the Israeli strategy of retaliation (to be discussed below), which hurt the Shi‘is, the main population grouping in the south, more than the other communities. Many moved north and settled in shanty towns around Beirut. In addition to their old frustrations, this migration involved the new experience of living in a large and difficult metropolitan area.

However, despite their numbers, the Shi‘is remained without significant economic and political power. They were also disorganised, although this began to change in the 1970s when one of their religious leaders, the Imam Mousa al-Sadr, laid the foundations of a Shi‘i political organisation. Thus, on top of the traditional conflict between Maronite and Druze, and the inherent tension between Christians and Muslims in general, there emerged another set of tensions — that of a frustrated community, unable to match economic and political power to its demographic growth. Once the Shi‘is began to organise and to articulate their demands, a change in the status quo became difficult to resist.

The intercommunal tensions were also reflected in another strain within the Lebanese body politic. This concerns the national self-identification of the various groups within the society. On the one hand, there were those who searched for a separate Lebanese identity, with an invariable emphasis on a Western-oriented cultural approach. On the other hand, there were many groups which sought their national ‘redemption’ in some kind of ‘Arabism’. These differences emerged from the heterogeneous religious and ethnic character of the population, and were also connected to the rise of militant Pan-Arabism in the 1950s and 1960s. While there were, of course, many variations to both approaches, a broad dichotomy coloured the political scene.

The ‘Lebanese’ orientation, promulgated primarily by the Maronites, has had several emphases. Not without support was a Christian thrust, arguing that Lebanon should be a Christian-Maronite state. Simultaneously there was the contention that, because of the pluralistic structure of the society, Lebanon should maintain a separate identity, distinct from the Arab world. One aspect of this approach calls for the continuation of Maronite hegemony and of the confessional political system. Only Maronite hegemony could protect the separate identity of Lebanon. Other national-cultural variations developed in the 1920s conceived of the Lebanese entity as the culmination of all the cultures developed in Lebanon beginning with the Phoenicians. They also stressed the ‘Mediterranean’ nature of Lebanon.⁵

‘Arabism’, on the other hand, emphasises the common destiny and culture that Lebanon shares with the other Arab states. Not surprisingly, most of its adherents have been Muslims.

The clash between ‘Lebanese Nationalism’ and ‘Arabism’ does not necessarily follow the divide between Christians and Muslims. Many Christians, in particular the Greek Orthodox but also other Christian denominations, identify themselves as Arabs. Some have even adhered to Pan-Arab ideas. Similarly, Muslims from various quarters have emphasised that Lebanon must find a special and separate role within the Arab world.

Side by side with an ‘Arab’ orientation, there has also been another school of thought claiming that Lebanon was a part of Syria, and which supported Syrian nationalism. The Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS), founded in 1932 by Antoun Sa‘adeh, called for the re-establishment of Greater Syria, to include most of the Fertile Crescent and even Cyprus.⁶ The PPS opposed Arab nationalism, but was equally opposed to Lebanese separatism. In any case, its influence dwindled over the years and the party itself modified its ideology. Yet notions emphasising the Lebanese-Syrian connection, while usually part of an ‘Arab’ approach, have remained prevalent among some political sectors in Lebanon.

In addition to these pressures — religious, ethnic, social, economic and ideological — on the political system, the Palestinian issue became critical for Lebanon after the 1967 War. During the 1948 War, tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees fled from northern parts of Palestine to Lebanon and Syria. Many of them were gradually integrated into Lebanese society. The majority, however, lived in refugee camps, relying on aid supplied by the United Nations Refugee Welfare Agency. Palestinians became more and more active in Lebanese intellectual and political life, but until 1967 were not allowed to organise themselves politically, and most retained their second-class status. The change came with the 1967 War, and the subsequent rapid growth of the Palestinian organisations. Fath itself, the main Palestinian organisation, moved its centre of activity to Lebanon in the early 1960s, but initially operated there underground; in any case, until 1968 the size of the Fath and its operations was miniscule. The other leading Palestinian organisation, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, was essentially created by Egypt in 1964 following the first Arab summit meeting. However, following the 1967 War, and the merger of the Fath and the PLO, the now united PLO was perceived ...