Wittgenstein-Arg Philosophers

Robert Fogelin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136293733
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First Published in 1999. The purpose of this series is to provide a contemporary assessment and history of the entire course of philosophical thought. Each book constitutes a detailed, critical introduction to the work of a philosopher of major influence and significance. Except for the two closing chapters, this book is a careful examination of Wittgenstein's chief works: Part One considers the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus; Part Two considers the Philosophical Investigations.

PART ONE

WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

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I

The Atomistic Ontology of the Tractatus

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1
Introduction

The central concern of the Tractatus is the status of propositions,¹ yet the work begins with a discussion of the character of the world. To many commentators this seems backwards, since it is often maintained that Wittgenstein derives his basic ontology from commitments concerning the nature of language. Certainly a case can be made for this reading, but at the start, at least, I think that we will do better to avoid heavy reconstruction of the text. In any case, Wittgenstein's order of exposition is natural in one way: it begins with the claim that the world is all that is the case (the totality of facts) and then proceeds to consider a centrally important subset of this totality; i.e., those facts that are used to represent other facts. Wittgenstein calls such facts “pictures.” Thus in whatever direction the argument may move, the exposition of the picture theory presupposes the exposition of the theory of facts. I shall therefore begin at the beginning.

2
Facts in logical space

The opening propositions of the Tractatus introduce themes or motifs that echo throughout the text. Though lacking detail, they introduce ideas that give the Tractatus much of its “characteristic physiognomy.” At the start we are told that the world is all that is the case: a totality of facts, not merely a totality of things (1 and 1.1). The world cannot be identified with a totality of things, since the totality of things can constitute a variety of possible worlds depending upon their arrangement. At this point, however, we cannot say with confidence what Wittgenstein means by saying that the world is the totality of facts, for we have yet to be told what facts are.²

These opening passages also contain a principle of closure or limitation:

1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.

This is systematically important because it allows Wittgenstein to argue—as he does on a number of occasions—that something cannot lie within the world just because it is not a matter of fact or a feature of a matter of fact. Of course, what this closure principle comes to can be seen only after the central idea of a fact is itself explained, but right from the start we see the kind of system with which we are dealing. It is not a descriptive theory, open-ended and subject to further developments perhaps of a wholly unexpected kind. It is a closed system that, at various points, invokes this feature of closure for argumentative purposes.

The opening propositions introduce a further notion that has persistent influence in the text:

1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.

Here the central idea of a logical space is introduced without explanation. Even so, the idea of space is rich in analogical suggestions and these are exploited throughout the Tractatus. To begin with, space, i.e., physical space, presents us with a set of locations, positions or places. Space is a manifold. At the same time, this set of locations forms a single space where each location or place stands in a wholly determinate relationship to every other. At this stage we cannot say what logical space is, but the analogy indicates this much: facts do not compose the world as a heap; they are somehow embedded in a manifold of systematically related “places.”

This broad sketch of the world is completed by a principle of atomism:

1.2 The world divides into facts.

and as an elucidation of this:

1.21 Each can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.

Now this idea that the world divides into facts seems to go against the earlier idea that facts are embedded in an internally related manifold, but a closer comparison with the character of physical space overcomes this difficulty. The set of places in physical space forms an internally related manifold, but this manifold is wholly indifferent to the way things are disposed in its various places. This interplay between a structure of necessary connections (logical space) and a purely contingent set of items embedded in it (the totality of facts) is fundamental to the Tractarian world view.

3
Wittgenstein's version of ontological atomism

Although Wittgenstein begins by talking about facts, it becomes clear that the idea of a state of affairs is more fundamental:

2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

At this point it is not clear what kind of reduction is implied by this proposition, so I shall proceed naively (but quite literally) by identifying each fact F_i with the obtaining of a set of states of affairs (S_i,… S_n). In the limiting case the set contains a single state of affairs and thus every state of affairs is a fact, but not conversely.³ States of affairs in turn are explained through the notion of objects (or things):

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

It is this relationship between objects and states of affairs rather than the relationship between states of affairs and facts that will be the subject of the present section.

Wittgenstein's elucidation of the role of objects in states of affairs is atomistic in a traditional sense of this word. Classical atomism is more or less adequately characterized by the following fundamental theses:

1 Change (in a wide sense) is a matter of the combination and separation of constituent entities.

2 Not everything is subject to change, for there must be an unchanging basis for change. Atoms, entities that are not the result of combination nor subject to division, constitute this unchanging basis.

3 Combination and separation are possible because atoms exist in a void (in a space) that provides a field of possible combinations.

Wittgenstein's version of this “perennial philosophy” is purified in at least two ways: it is not restricted in its formulation to physical entities (bits of matter), and it is not supported by empirical considerations. But granting these differences, the similarity between the Tractarian system and ancient atomism remains striking. The possibility of change, in the wide sense in which it was used by the ancients, approximates the more modern notion of contingency, and the text of the Tractatus will make it clear that Wittgenstein accepted the following variation on the first thesis of atomism:

1w Contingency is always a matter of the combination and separation of objects and (conversely) the combination and separation of objects is always a matter of contingency.

Although the reasoning that lies behind it is extremely complicated (and perhaps unsatisfactory), it is also evident that the Tractatus is characterized by a commitment to the second thesis of atomism given above. Unlike the believer in infinite divisibility, Wittgenstein holds that not everything can be the result of the combination and separation of constituent entities. In general terms, he accepts the following thesis:

2w There is a set of entities upon which all contingencies are non-contingently based.

I shall say something about Wittgenstein's version of the atomist's third thesis (concerning space as the field of possible change) after we have a better hold upon the notion of a logical space.

In the sections that follow, I shall look at Wittgenstein's atomism in two ways. I shall first show how Wittgenstein elaborates or unfolds his atomistic theory. This is largely a matter of examining his way of thinking through the commitments I have labeled theses 1w and 2w. I do not think that this side of his philosophy has received the attention it deserves. Later I shall examine Wittgenstein's defense of his atomistic ontology. This reasoning involves (or, at least, seems to involve) a transcendental deduction from the structure of language to the structure of the world. This side of Wittgenstein's philosophy has received considerable attention, but for the moment I shall set it aside.

In explaining how objects constitute states of affairs, Wittgenstein is unsurpassed in grasping the fundamental consequences of an atomistic ontology. Consider, for example, the following claim:

2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.

Suppose for a moment that it is not an essential feature of objects that they are possible constituents of states of affairs. This would mean (given 2w) that for it to be possible for an object A to be a constituent in states of affairs, some further contingency, i.e., some further combination of objects, would have to obtain. Then, however, A would not count as an object (i.e., something essentially basic) in the sense demanded by atomistic theory. Somewhat more surprisingly, we are given the following claim:

2.0121 It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own.

This goes against a natural way of viewing an atomistic theory. We tend to think of atoms moving about freely, combining and separating again. In between they are uncombined. Here Wittgenstein flatly denies the possibility of an object having a potential for both a combined and an uncombined status. There are no eligible bachelors in the Tractarian world.⁴ Wittgenstein seems to be reasoning in the following way: if a thing could exist entirely on its own, then it would be an accidental (contingent or inessential) feature of such an object that it could also exist in combination with other objects. But if this feature were accidental, then it must concern the combination and separation of objects and, once more, the envisaged object fails to meet the standards of objecthood.⁵ Objects, then, that do enter into combinations forming states of affairs are said to be unable to enjoy a status outside of states of affairs.

Wittgenstein might have developed a purely combinatory theory, i.e., he might have held that all objects are alike in being fit to enter into combination with any other objects. The logical space of this world would be all the possible ways in which its objects can combine. Although I do not think he talks about the matter directly, Wittgenstein's language suggests that he is not presenting a th...