Foreign Pol France 1914-45 V7

Nere

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781134555260
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Italian History
• Index: History

First published in 2001. This is Volume VII of the Foreign Policies of the Great Powers eleven part series and focuses on on the policies of France from 1914 to 1945. It includes sections on French diplomacy of the War 1914 to 18, the Peace Settlement, from Versailles to the Ruhr and the Dawes Plan, the Franco-Italian Rapprochement, the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the policies around the beginning of the next War.

Chapter 1

French Diplomacy in the War of 1914–18

Introduction

There is a story about the old French geographer A. Demangeon who, when he had to give a course on the British Isles, began by declaring: ‘Gentlemen, England is an island; now you know as much about it as I do.’ This will serve as an apology for stating first of all that one can understand nothing of the foreign policy of France unless one bears in mind always that France does not have the good fortune of being an island. She is attached to a continent of which she cannot avoid being an integral part. Her capital and her most vigorous provinces are without natural defences of any note and they are within striking distance of an invader advancing into the great plains of northern Europe. It is true that these open spaces which present no obstacles can be crossed in either direction; and the French armies have more than once invaded the Netherlands and the German states, under Louis XIV, Louis XV and Napoleon. In 1914, however, these events were already long past, and France had neither the strength nor the wish to expand into Europe. What had dominated her for several decades was fear – fear of Germany. In 1870 France had a sharp revelation of a superior military power, which conquered her, and which took Alsace-Lorraine from her, disregarding the wish of the population. France never wholly resigned herself to this loss, but she soon had to abandon the illusion that she could recapture Alsace-Lorraine by force, for, since 1871 the population of Germany had continued to increase while that of France remained static, and although the French economy had not remained in the state of stagnation too often claimed, the growth of the German economy had been more extensive and more rapid than hers. French diplomacy sought to counterbalance this German power, which the French had never ceased to believe to be malevolent and hostile. For a long time the only possible counterweight seemed to be Russia, and the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance did in fact give to many French people several years of seeming tranquillity. After 1905, however, the German peril appeared in a new form, for Germany had launched its Weltpolitik, or world policy. No doubt this policy was no longer directed exclusively against France, as in the time of Bismarck. Its aim was rather to overthrow the English position; but France, which Wilhelm II and his chancellor Bülow at times contemplated integrating into their system, would have to submit, in their opinion, to the continental hegemony of Germany, which meant in fact that she must lose her independence. The year 1905 symbolized this new threat, for in that year Germany demanded, and obtained, the resignation of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Théophile Delcassé.

The threat was from then on, however, no longer perceptible only to diplomats and politicians; it made itself felt every day to much wider strata of the population, for it had spread from the military and political level to the economic level.

It is difficult to imagine today the effect which the modern and dynamic characteristics of the German economy that now seem to us so normal, produced about 1910 on Frenchmen accustomed to more traditional concepts and practices. At this time we find that many socially very conservative French authors analysed Germany as bent on export, and on the conquest of opportunities by its production system; these analyses are reminiscent of the post-Marxist theorists of ‘imperialism, the last stage of capitalism’. The French point of view at this time was in fact different: it was not because of her advanced economic development that Germany had become imperialistic; it was imperialistic by nature and economic expansion was for it only one of the means of conquering the world. For example, the very important work published in 1915 by one of the pioneers of economic history in France, Henri Hauser, should be read again. In his Méthodes allemandes d’expansion économique (Paris, 1915), he tells us (here):

German industry must appear . . . as a bloc of forces. . . . The economic struggle is a war like other wars. . . . Everything must be organized with a view to the goal to be achieved, which is rational exploitation of the planet. In the field of commerce, as in that of strategy and politics, this methodical organization will achieve the sovereign formula: Deutschland über Alles. [or (p. 135)] German dumping is not a process of economic action, it is a warlike measure in the midst of peace and under the deceitful appearance of peace.

Here we have the basic argument: contrary to practices in other countries, in Germany it is the state which presides over economic expansion (here):

By this concentration of all its energies, by this unity of direction, the economic Germany has become a power which is at least as formidable as the military Germany, and of the same order: a power of domination and conquest.

Winning the War

France did not enter the war in 1914 because of subtle clauses of some secret treaty, or by virtue of special links with threatened Serbia; she did this because her leaders did not think they could take the risk of losing the Russian alliance by too feebly supporting or too harshly restraining Russia in a venture to which the latter was utterly committed. Also, the mass of the population followed because they felt that a war against Germany was inevitable sooner or later, and that there was no use in prolonging the agony of suspense indefinitely. This fatalism explains the comparative passivity of French diplomacy in the international crisis which ended in war: not that they wished for a military confrontation with a formidable enemy, who, there was no doubt, was stronger than they were, but that France, in her continental position, did not consider that she was free to choose.

Once committed to the war, France felt that she was fighting for her independence and perhaps for her very existence. During the first years of the conflict, one single idea took possession of her: to win the war. French diplomacy was then concerned only with reinforcing the cohesion between the allies and achieving new alliances. By the agreement of 5 September 1914, concluded on the eve of the victory of the Marne:

The British, French and Russian governments undertake not to conclude a separate peace during the present war; the three governments agree that, if there are grounds for discussing peace terms, none of the allied powers can stipulate peace conditions without previous agreement with both the other allies.

This agreement gave each of the three countries a precious feeling of security, but on the other hand it obviously confined their freedom of political action within narrow limits, especially for peace overtures. The quest for new allies is the substance of Entente diplomacy, not specially of French diplomacy. One point, however, must be stressed: since the end of 1914 the German army had dug itself into a continuous network of trenches, opposite the French front, which the French troops were unable to penetrate in spite of enormous sacrifices. To achieve victory, and in the meantime to reassure her Russian ally, against whom the majority of the Austrian and German forces were turning, France herself felt the need for new allies: her aim was not only the increase of forces which these allies would bring, but also the possibility of opening new theatres of operations in which, she believed, the military decision would be easier to achieve. Hence France would, generally speaking, be inclined to make greater sacrifices to the countries whose support she wished to enlist and to consider long-term interests or difficulties which would become apparent after victory as less important.¹

First of all she contemplated Italy, the only great European country which had not entered the war in August 1914. Italy was the ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but as far as the latter was concerned, she had territorial claims to assert: provinces, whose population was partly Italian, in the Alpine valley of Alto Adige and in the Istrian peninsula around Trieste. The Entente would have no difficulty in promising these enemy lands to the Italians. However, Italy had other ambitions, especially on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, formerly the possession of the Venetian Republic, but at that time inhabited mostly by Slavs related to the Serbs. Here she encountered the resistance of Russia, who regarded herself as the protector of the Slav world. It was owing to France that she obtained satisfaction for the most part. Italy entered the war on 20 May 1915, a great diplomatic success. However, the military result was limited: access to Austria from the Italian side was blocked by the Alpine range.

North of the Balkans, however, the Danube plain presented a wide path without obstacles to Budapest and Vienna; that would be the means of striking at the rear of Austria-Hungary which was the weak point of the enemy alliance. Even apart from this brilliant prospect, the immediate need arose of coming to the rescue of little Serbia, who was being threatened by the great Austria-Hungary, and who could not be aided directly because she had no access to the sea. The diplomacy of the Entente believed that it had found a great field of action there: in 1912–13, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, allied under the aegis of Russia and supplied with French equipment, achieved a brilliant success against Turkey. It was this same Turkey which entered the war on the side of the Central Powers on 19 October 1914. Would it not be possible to re-form the 1912 alliance against Turkey and extend it in such a way that it would also act against Austria-Hungary? There was a great obstacle to this hope: in 1913 Bulgaria, actuated by Austria-Hungary, had turned against her recent allies. Moreover, she had been conquered and had lost many of the advantages she had acquired; and she dreamed of revenge. So we see the diplomats of the Entente making attractive promises to Bulgaria, foreseeing even restoration of territory at the expense of Serbia. This proved a waste of time: in September 1915 Bulgaria, in her turn, joined the war on the side of the Central Powers. This failure was so strongly resented that it may have been responsible for the final resignation of Delcassé, the great French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The diplomacy of the Entente was not much happier as far as Greece was concerned. A problem of internal politics was encountered here: the minister Eleutherios Venizelos, who was willing to honour the alliance of his country with Serbia, and who was a supporter of the Entente, came up against King Constantine who was supposed to favour Germany. The situation was complicated by the fact that an Allied army under French command had gained a foothold in the Greek port of Salonika at the very moment when Bulgaria was attacking Serbia, and Greece stood aside. In order to safeguard the rear of this expeditionary corps, France would gradually be led to involve her allies in measures which respected Greek neutrality less and less. The army of Salonika, moreover, would remain powerless for all practical purposes until September 1918.

The prospects seemed more favourable as far as the last remaining Balkan State, Rumania, was concerned. She had territorial claims to assert against Hungary, and the influence of French culture mere was considerable. Rumania in fact entered the war on the Allied side in August 1916, but perhaps through over-caution, she had allowed the favourable moment to pass and was soon militarily crushed.

Japan, the ally of Great Britain, had declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914. In fact it was up to her solely to immobilize the German positions in China (in the Shantung peninsula) and in the Pacific. Nevertheless, throughout the war, French opinion and even certain leaders beguiled themselves with illusory hopes that the Japanese armies, which had proved their worth against the Russians in 1905, would be induced to intervene in Europe. Neither the reservations of Great Britain and Russia, nor the unequivocal refusals of the Japanese government, could dispel this idea. The result was that France was undecided about opposing Japanese ambitions in China about which Great Britain and the United States, on the other hand, were very concerned.

Hence, during the first years of the war, French diplomacy was preoccupied with immediate problems which need only be recalled briefly, for they have little to do with the permanent factors of French foreign policy.

Peace Feelers and War Aims

Various neutral countries, however, and one of the enemy powers, Austria-Hungary, almost from the beginning of the war tried constantly to find the basis of a possible return to peace,² either by diplomatic probings or by talks between unofficial intermediaries. It must be acknowledged that French diplomacy paid little attention to these attempts, since she saw them chiefly as possible traps. Since these peace feelers required great secrecy, the belligerent who became a party to them could always be afraid of seeming to negotiate behind his allies’ backs, and hence being disloyal to them, and it is known how much the cohesion of the Entente was essential for France. Moreover, the adversary could at any moment reveal these talks and thus give the impression that France was losing confidence in victory, for one of the great preoccupations of French governments throughout the war was the fear of seeing the country’s ‘morale’ waver. Finally, negotiations with Austria-Hungary, even if surrounded by guarantees, could not take France very far: it was from Germany that the dangerous demands could come, and it was from Germany that France herself had demands to make. Hence, without examining all these attempts in detail, we will confine ourselves to examining the most important of them: that of Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma.

Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma was the brother-in-law of the Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary who had succeeded to the throne in November 1916; he was, moreover, an officer in the Belgian army. He was therefore the ideal intermediary, because of his rank and his connections in both camps. From March to May 1917 he plied backwards and forwards between the Emperor Karl and the president of the French Republic, Raymond Poincaré. The Emperor Karl appeared very generous as far as Germany’s affairs were concerned: complete restoration of Belgian independence and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France which were the two things which the German government of the time, as we know from other sources, absolutely refused to contemplate. On the other hand the Emperor Karl was silent about the Italian claims with regard to Austria. Finally, contrary to what Prince Sixtus gave to understand, Austria-Hungary did not contemplate making a separate peace; furthermore it is doubtful whether she would be able to do so, even if she wished, because being already very weakened, she depended greatly on Germany. Italy, moreover, as soon as she was informed, insisted on the promises made to her by the Entente, and the talks soon came to an end. Even this attempt, in spite of the quality of its participants, was not without danger; for in order to dispel Germany’s mistrust, which these peace feelers had aroused, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs allowed himself to say in public at the beginning of 1918 that France had petitioned for peace. This elicited a blunt denial from Clemenceau who was then President of the Council.

There was, however, one case of steps taken by a neutral country, which must be treated separately because it has its own characteristics. This was the proposal for mediation made by the United States and developed by Colonel House, who was in the confidence of President Wilson, in the first months of 1916. According to an unofficial agreement signed by House and the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, on 22 February, an international conference could be called at the request of the Entente; if the Germans refused, ‘the United States would probably join in the war against Germany’. One cannot help looking back and thinking of the evils which could have been avoided and the number of human lives which could have been saved, if this initiative had been successful. However, the fact is that the French did not encourage the British, who were themselves hesitant to follow it up, and one may wonder why. In the first place no basis for the future negotiations had been given, and perhaps they did not dare submit in practice the claims which they considered vital, to the arbitration of the United States. But was the decisive trump-card, which United States intervention would have represented for the Entente, worth running a number of diplomatic risks for? At this point the disillusioned wisdom of diplomats, as expressed by the following anecdote, must be remembered: When a pretty girl says ‘no’ she means ‘perhaps’, and when she says ‘perhaps’ she means ‘yes’. When a diplomat says ‘yes’ he means ‘perhaps’, and when he says ‘perhaps’ he means ‘no’.

No doubt President Wilson’s ‘probably’ appeared in French eyes as too improbable a foundation to be relied upon, thereby committing the country’s policies to completely new paths.

The United States met with more success when they asked the belligerents at the end of this same year, 1916, to disclose their war aims. Until that time France had taken hardly any interest in this, since the anxiety about victory obliterated everything else. French censorship had tried to avoid discussions of this subject in the press, for fear that excessive claims would give a false impression to the neutral countries and cause the enemy to harden: this was the very result that had been achieved by certain claims expressed by Germany. On the other hand, faced with the American demands, it was Germany who stood aside and not France.

If the document presented by France in the name of the Allies³ is compared with the Fourteen Points which were made public a year later by President Wilson, ...