Egypt Under Mubarak
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Egypt Under Mubarak

Roger Owen, Charles Tripp, Roger Owen, Charles Tripp

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Egypt Under Mubarak

Roger Owen, Charles Tripp, Roger Owen, Charles Tripp

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About This Book

Egypt is one of the major powers in the Middle East. The vigour of its cultural life and the extent of its influence make it a force which cannot be ignored in the Arab world. Yet, despite the comparative confidence with which its rulers handle power, the country has a politically contradictory past with which to come to terms, as well as its role in a region of shifting political identity and allegiance.

This book examines the causes and consequences of the many crises within the Egyptian political, sociological, economic and moral legacy and the strategies which Mubarak's government has devised to cope with that legacy. The book's concern is for the capacity of the present administration to avoid expediency and the generation of further crisis and rather to employ Egypt's considerable resources in the shaping of a distinct and effective role for the country.

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Publisher
Routledge
Year
2013
ISBN
9781135080556

1
Government and the State in Egypt Today

Nazih N. Ayubi
President Husni Mubarak has inherited a complex legacy from the Nasser and Sadat eras. This can represent a 'mixed blessing'; on the one hand it puts at his disposal an array of laws, institutions and practices that tend to work in favour of the head of the Egyptian state. On the other hand, it burdens him with responsibility for the outcome of state policies initiated before his term ( i.e. the emergence of the so-called 'infitah mafia', or the bitter harvest of the peace treaty with Israel). If he does not change them, they count as his own. The purpose of this chapter is to survey the main features of the governmental structure and the representative machinery that were largely inherited by Mubarak, and to illustrate the way in which the Mubarak regime has made use of these institutions since he came to power at the end of 1981.

The governmental structure

The Egyptian system of government is in a period of transition, which, among other things, is characterised by a number of contradictions. While in principle a policy of economic and political liberalisation is being promoted, the Presidency remains dominant - even in economic matters. The size of the public 'Establishment' continues - especially in terms of employment - to grow (at a time when the role of the public sector is declining) and the bureaucracy shows no signs of ceasing to be restrictive and constraining. Furthermore, the 'control' functions of the government remain more immediately felt than are its advocated developmental and welfare functions. Or, as some may put it, there is too much government where it is least needed, and too little government where it is needed most (cf. Ayubi, 1982b).

The Presidency

Egypt is a presidential state. Owing to political culture and legal traditions, the President is the dominant political and governmental authority in Egypt. Any important policy or project must normally have the 'blessing' of the President before it can proceed with a reasonable prospect of success. Presidential powers include the right to propose, veto and promulgate legislation. When the People's Assembly is not in session, the President may issue decrees that have the force of law (and which are ratified later by the Assembly), while under some circumstances, and by investiture of the Assembly, he may, and does, issue decree laws whether or not the Assembly is in session (ARE, 1971: Articles 108,112, and 147). Under Sadat the Presidency was given such a delegation for issuing laws by decree in all economic matters, in addition to an earlier delegation for the purchase of arms. Following the 'food riots' of January 1977, President Sadat declared a number of emergency decrees and called for a referendum to endorse them; this subsequently became a recurring practice.
Linked to the Presidency is the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS), headed for many years after its inception in 1964 by an ex-army general. CAPMAS is the main 'data bank' in Egypt, and is important both as a source of vital information for any project, and also for its controlling role (since any sizeable statistical study conducted in Egypt has to secure the approval of the Agency in advance). It is high in the governmental hierarchy, and should, in principle, report directly to the President. Affiliated also to the Presidency is the Central Auditing Agency (CAA), which is the supreme control and evaluation agency for the public sector and for the economic activities of the state.
Then there is the unique office of the 'Socialist Public Prosecutor', which was incorporated for the first time in the 1971 Constitution, that is, after Sadat came to power and when the regime's policies were being re-oriented away from socialism. The Prosecutor is appointed by the President and is subject to the control of the People's Assembly. His jurisdiction is ambiguous. He seems to have a mixture of legal, administrative and also political 'control' functions, and can be likened to a parliamentary ombudsman, state prosecutor, and political commissar, all put together, while his duties include 'securing the safety of the society and its political system and the preservation of the socialist achievements and commitment to socialist behaviour' (ARE, 1977: 131-132).
Other institutions directly associated with the president are the prestigious, but basically advisory, National Specialised Councils, introduced in 1974, whose declared purpose is to assist the President in drawing up national plans and policies by surveying the available resources and their potential, and advising on the optimum utilisation of existing capabilities, towards the fulfilment of the objectives of the state.
Of course, presidents who assume various posts and enjoy extensive powers are by no means an exception in the developing countries. The paradox here is the fact that Sadat had made the advocacy of 'freedom' and 'democracy' the main point when contrasting his regime with that of President Nasser, yet he ended up with more posts and titles to his name than Nasser ever did. In addition to his favourite title of 'Elder of the Egyptian Family', Sadat in 1981 had the following official posts: President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Higher Chief of the Police Forces, Higher Chief of the Judiciary, Head of the National Democratic Party (the ruling party), and Commissioner on all military and economic matters and accords touching on national security.
Sadat also added to his power by making the number of presidential periods indefinite, and he made frequent use of popular referenda in preference to 'normal' legislative procedures. He enacted a law for the 'protection of morals from shame' ('aib; signifying taboo, extremely shameful and 'not done'), and 'Morals' Courts were formed to deal with cases that were not covered by ordinary laws. Sweeping powers were given to the leadership in dealing with cases that could be classified as harming 'national integration', 'social peace', or 'religious and community values'. By the end of Sadat's era, Egypt had truly become a boss-state (état-rais) (Mirel, 1982: 242ff).

The Cabinet

The President determines the general policies of the state, and the Cabinet, headed by the Premier, supervises their implementation. To fulfil its functions, the Cabinet may issue 'decisions' pertaining to economic or other matters. 'Decisions' may also be issued, in descending order, by the Prime Minister, and by individual ministers and governors. Most ministries have a number of public companies and sometimes public authorities and public organizations belonging to them. On the other hand, all ministries dealing with matters of production, finance, trade and public sector, are usually clustered together in an interministerial committee, often known as the 'Economic Group'. Another interministerial group that is particularly active in the 1980s is the so-called 'Policies Committee'.
The Cabinet tends to be composed, as it came to be under Nasser, mainly of 'technocrats', with academic or professional backgrounds, especially engineers, economists, and university professors. Of the 163 ministers who took portfolios under Sadat (1971-1981), 131 were of a civilian career background and of the following professional specialisations: university professors 52; engineers 34; lawyers 12; diplomats 6; economists 4; ulama 5; others 18. hi addition there were 32 ministers of a military career background, of whom 18 were professional officers; 9 were military-technocrats, and 5 intelligence men. The main difference which distinguished the composition of cabinets in the Sadat era from that of Nasser's era, and which also characterises the Mubarak era, is the decline in the recruitment of ministers of a military career background from 33.6 per cent of all (131) ministers recruited in the Nasserist period, to 20 per cent of all (163) ministers recruited in the Sadat era (Badruddin, in Hilal et al. 1982: 90-96). Of all (50) ministers who served in the first three cabinets under Mubarak 10 per cent were of a military career background (CPSS,1986: 325).
In many ways CAPMAS enjoys the role one would expect a central planning agency to enjoy in a country like Egypt. By contrast, the formal planning function is entrusted to an ordinary ministry, not in any way higher in legal or in functional status than any other ministry. This is a continuation from the Nasserist era. Historically the Ministry of Planning was never very influential, as it really emerged after the preparation of the first, and to all intents and purposes, the last, Five Year Development Plan (1959/60 to 1960/65). The 1967 defeat and its economic and political aftermath had changed the circumstances, and what has actually happened since then is the preparation of annual public investment programmes. It was basically the Annual State Budget which functioned as the major tool of direction in the economic system, while the Central Auditing Agency continued to play a major role in the financial control of the public sector.
The growing number of joint ventures and other private enterprises since the adoption of infitah in 1974 has also made the grip of the planning machinery over the economy as a whole, very weak indeed. The abolition of the central 'Pricing Agency', the gradual removal (partly under International Monetary Fund recommendations) of various 'consumer' and 'production' subsidies, and the phasing out of many protective customs, means that the real grip of the planning machinery over the national economy is weakening. Indeed, the government has become so dependent on external sources for financing investment that the 'department of international co-operation' has been affiliated to the Ministry of Planning in recent years.

The Bureaucracy

The Egyptian bureaucracy remains large, and continues to expand in terms of units, personnel, salaries, and expenditure. The disproportionate growth of the public 'Establishment' is not a new phenomenon in Egypt. With the 1952 Revolution, however, the public bureaucracy grew more rapidly and extensively, under the impact of the regime's policies for expanding industrial activities, welfare services and free education. This growth was particularly striking after the 'socialist measures' of the early 1960s, which involved wide nationalisations of industry, trade and finance, worker participation in management and profits, and also an extensive programme for social services and insurance.
The public bureaucracy grew steadily in size between 1952 and 1970, when measured by the number of administrative units, the size of employment, the development of wages and salaries and of current expenditure. The most notable changes can be summarised thus: from 1962/63 to 1969/70, the national income of Egypt increased by 68 per cent, resting on an increase in the labour force of no more than 20 per cent. Yet at the same time, posts in the public bureaucracy had increased by 70 per cent and salaries by 123 per cent. Thus, the rate of bureaucratic growth had quite exceeded the rate of growth in population, employment and production.
The impetus of institutional growth continued, however, under its own momentum, even though the role of the government and the scope of the public sector started to diminish in importance. For example, the 1975 budget indicated that current expenditures and costs had risen to the tune of LE4747.6 million, of which LE652.8 million went to wages and salaries. Current expenditure accounted for 66.2 per cent of the total financial outlay of the budget, whereas wages and salaries accounted for 10.5 per cent of that total. This trend continued in the following years so that in 1979, for instance, the state budget involved total current expenditure and outlays of LE9172.9 million, of which LE1257 million were for wages and salaries. This was also accompanied by a serious rise in the budgetary deficits.
The public bureaucracy (that is, the civil service and the public sector excluding enterprise workers) employed in 1978 over 1.9 million people. If state companies are added, the public 'Establishment' was employing at the beginning of 1978 about 3.2 million officials and workers. Further, the public bureaucracy continues to receive the bulk of the country's university and college graduates, and appoints annually around 100,000 new graduates (cf. Ayubi, 1982b). By the mid-1980s, it was estimated that well over three million individuals were employed in the central and local government as well as in the public sector (excluding public companies). Furthermore, the share of wages and salaries to total current expenditures had risen from 19 per cent in 1974/5 to 29 per cent in 1984/5 (CPSS, 1986:351).

The representative machinery

Part of the liberalisation policy in the 1970s involved extending the scope for political activity, and this gave a potentially different significance to the possible role of the legislature and political parties in directing and supervising public activity (cf. Hinnebusch, 1985). The legislature consists basically of a uni-cameral assembly (the People's Assembly) which has an elected membership (currently for 448 seats), in addition to up to ten members appointed by the President. Half the members of the Assembly should be 'workers and peasants', a provision which also applies to other local and popular councils, and which represents one of the few political legacies retained from the Nasserist era.
Nobody, however, could guarantee such representation for the workers and peasants in political parties, as the country was moving away from the formula of alliance of the working forces of the people', that had been adopted under Nasser, towards a more 'pluralistic' system. In the early 1970s, a drive towards 'democracy', in the sense of liberalisation and multi-partyism, acquired some momentum, following the 'corrective movement'(harakat al-tashi ) of 15 May 1971, and the promulgation of the Egyptian Permanent Constitution in the same year. A certain formula for semi-pluralism within, and then outside, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), was eventually approved, the process starting in 1974 with a review of the ASU's structure and function. Plurality of political 'orientations' within the single organisation was accepted in 1975. Platforms (manabir), were then to be permitted within the organisation to represent certain ideological and political trends. A thirst for political activity was revealed by the application for nearly forty platforms, and after much debating of the matter, it was authoritatively decided that only three organs within the ASU would be allowed, representing the 'right', the 'centre' and the 'left'. One condition for allowing these organisations was that they should accept a number of guiding principles: 'democratic socialism', 'social peace', and 'national unity'.
The three new organisations were allowed to adopt programmes and to produce lists for the People's Assembly elections in 1976. This resulted in an overwhelming victory for the regime's 'centre' organisation, as the centre (government) 'Misr Arab Socialist' organisation received 82 per cent of the seats (Mar'i, 1977: 32). It is undeniable, however, that these elections were conducted under the umbrella of the 'government party', which had more access to financial, logistic and communicational facilities than had other organisations.
In November 1976, these three organisations were allowed to transform themselves into legalised political parties. Nevertheless, it should be observed that the regime applied its authority in deciding which political parties would be allowed and the reasons why. It may have made some sense to deny religious groups the right to form a political party on the grounds that their ideals, which are religiously oriented, would be bound to act against 'national unity'. Yet it does not make much sense, for example, to have refused to allow a Nasserist party to form on the grounds that those who considered themselves 'true Nasserists' should join the centre party. After hesitation and delay, the pre-revolutionary Wafd party was also allowed officially to reform early in 1978. However, after a few months, this party was to dissolve itself because of what its leaders considered to be government persecution of their party's policies and activities (though it re-emerged later, under Mubarak).
The 1979 parliamentary elections gave the government party even more dominance over the People's Assembly than it had had after the previous elections. Under its new name of the Nationalist Democratic Party, it acquired at least 92 per cent of the seats in the Assembly, in addition to most of the thirty newly allocated seats in important constituencies for women candidates (cf. Hilal et al., 1982). The Assembly, however, was abruptly dismissed, following a referendum in April 1979 about ...

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