Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxian Analysis

A Critical Discussion of the Theory and Practice of a Science of Society

Barry Smart

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781134479801
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Phenomenology in Philosophy

Sociology is an established academic discipline but there has been continuing debate over its status as a science and the nature of its subject matter. This led to the emergence of a phenomenological sociology and to critiques of positivist sociology. This critical reappraisal of the relevance of Marxian analysis for a science of society shows how these developments within sociology have had their counterpart in Marxism.

The author analyses the status of Marx's work and the Marxist 'tradition' in sociology. He focuses upon those concerns which are common to both Marxian analysis and sociology – the question of subjectivity; the nature of social reality; and the dialectical relationship of the 'doing' or practice of a science of society to the social world within which such social analyses are situated. Originally published in 1976.

1 Sociology and Marxian analysis

Comte, Durkheim, Weber and Pareto were all concerned with establishing sociology as a distinctive social science, delineating in their work both the subject matter and methodology of the new science as well as providing specific examples of sociological study. Within sociology it is generally acknowledged that these nineteenth century thinkers, along with Karl Marx, represent the ‘founding fathers’ of the discipline. However, in the case of Marx a notable difference is evident in that although his concepts and ideas are to be found in the work of many sociologists, there is in fact in his own work no reference to, or analysis of, sociology either in terms of methodology, subject matter, or substantive study. In this respect the consideration of Marx as a sociologist becomes problematic, as does the nature of the relevance of his work for sociology. One thing is certain, relevance cannot merely be asserted or assumed since the only explicit reference Marx makes to disciplines in the contemporary sense is by way of critiques of both philosophy and political economy plus an assertion to the effect that he recognizes only one science, the science of history. This is not to say that Marx was unaware of developments around him, for as he noted in correspondence with Engels,

I am studying Comte on the side because the British and French make as much fuss over that fellow. What captivates them is the encyclopaedic about him, the synthesis. But compared with Hegel it is wretched (in spite of the fact that Comte as a professional mathematician and physicist is superior to him, i.e. superior in details; but even here Hegel is infinitely greater on the whole). And this trashy positivism appeared in 1832! (1953, p. 218).

Although Marx does not provide any direct refutation of sociological science his dismissal of Comte’s and Saint-Simon’s work, including a criticism of the preoccupation with the abstraction ‘society’, indicates a distinctive opposition to the new social science of society, and adds confirmation to the view that whatever Marx was, he was not a sociologist. However, the subsequent development of both sociology and Marxism in response to particular methodological and epistemological debates, as well as to societal changes, provides us with a very different historical context in which to attempt to make a judgment of the relevance and significance of Marxian analysis for contemporary sociology. One thing is certain, sociology is now rather different from the Comtean conception having developed partly in response to the various interpretations and modifications of Marx’s work. In consequence any attempt to reconsider the nature of the relationship between Marxian analysis and sociology must come to terms with not only the several sociological interpretations of Marx’s work and the range of different sociologies, but also the existence of an heterogeneous Marxism and an ill-defined Marxist sociology.

Within contemporary sociology three alternative understandings of Marxian analysis may be distinguished. First, Marx’s work is treated as an ideological rather than a scientific project. The presence and significance of explicit value judgments in his analysis is taken as a sign of its lack of scientificity (cf. Sorokin, 1928, pp. 544–5). Inherent in this position is an understanding of science as a value-free enterprise which with the assumption that sociologists should emulate the natural scientific study of the natural world has produced demands for accounts of the ‘real’ world ‘out there’ which are factual and neutral. A second understanding or treatment of Marx’s work is as a legitimating source for new concepts or ideas, the original contextually situated meanings or intentions seemingly being of little relevance in the consequent ‘operational’ usage by the sociologist. Horton’s (1964) discussion of the dehumanization of the concept of alienation provides a critique of this tendency. A variation on this general theme is to be found in the writings of sociologists who assume Marx to be a sociologist and seek to affirm this by prefixing particular sections, themes or aspects of his work by the term ‘sociology’; hence the Marxian analysis of the state and civil society becomes the ‘sociology of politics’, and the analysis of the division of labour, production and commodity fetishism, becomes ‘the sociology of the process of production’ (cf. Jordan, 1971). Further examples may be found in the work of sociologists with respect to Marx’s analysis of ideology and beliefs (which becomes ‘the sociology of ideology’) as well as in the case of the discussion of social classes and conflict. Finally, there is the understanding of Marx which constitutes the basis of what Gouldner terms the ‘liberative potential’ of modern sociology, often ambiguously referred to as ‘Marxist sociology’, ‘critical sociology’, or ‘radical sociology’ as distinct from ‘bourgeois’, ‘academic’, or ‘corporate’ sociology.

The most frequently occurring understanding of the relevance of Marxian analysis for sociology is, however, best represented by the notion above of Marx’s work as a resource for concepts and ideas which are then developed and applied by the sociologist as he sees fit. The consequence of this has been that discussion of, and extraction from, Marx’s work has tended to be substantive rather than methodological, attention being directed primarily towards three specific themes, namely social class and stratification; conflict and social change; and the sociology of knowledge and belief. Few attempts have thus been made to consider the methodological relevance of Marx’s work for sociology, a reflection no doubt of the fact that such considerations are not explicitly addressed in his work. In addition the production of a sociological method and techniques of investigation, predicated upon specific unexplicated assumptions concerning the adequacy of the scientific division of labour and consequent methodology for analysis of the social world, has provided ‘legitimate’ grounds for a dismissal of Marxian analysis and method as ideological, philosophical or unscientific. As a result the conventional range of sociological understandings of the relevance of Marxian analysis has in general precluded analysis or consideration of methodological issues. However, with the erosion of the relative consensus among the sociological community concomitant upon the decline of the functionalist paradigm and the emergence of critiques of positivist and empiricist sociological approaches, the discipline has become more open to what may be termed ‘extra-sociological’ perspectives, including Marxian analysis, phenomenology and critical theory. The discipline is now allegedly without a governing paradigm for according to Gouldner (1971) the functionalist approach no longer predominates, its domain assumptions have been shown to be inadequate and therefore rejected. A comparable analysis of the transformation of sociology is provided by Friedrichs (1972), reference being made to ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ periods in sociology.¹ However, whereas Gouldner places emphasis upon functionalism Friedrichs stresses the significance of ‘system’, pointing out that

Here was a single word that not only summed up the essential common denominator that ran through the wide array of functionalist positions, but made implicit functionalists of that broad band of non-theoretically oriented sociologists who were simply searching for a common semantic base to which they might anchor their professional vocabulary. ‘System’ had an obviously attractive ring … [whereas] … the ‘ism’ attached to ‘functional’ served to remind the cautious that the forest of functionalism was cluttered with snares to catch the unwary, system stood forth as a relatively neutral alternative devoid of apparent substantive content (1972, p. 16).

Friedrichs argues that even though the consensus over the system paradigm was only achieved in the ‘decade or two following the Second World War’ by the 1960s the passage of events was beginning to give rise to a paradigmatic revolution. Whether the description of the current state of the discipline as one of ‘scientific revolution’ is warranted is a controversial issue. However, without entering into an analysis of Friedrichs’s justification for employing Kuhn’s thesis in an analysis of sociology we are able to recognize the re-emergence of methodological questions and problems central to the sociological project. The depth and extent of the controversies surrounding contemporary sociologists are manifest not only in the re-examination of what Gouldner has termed background and domain assumptions but also in the reconsideration of the work of the ‘founding fathers’ of the discipline. It is now no longer possible to reflect that ‘the new Ph.D. [has] no need … to underpin each empirical or theoretical venture with his own first principles, his own language, methods, and standards’ (Friedrichs, 1972, p. 22). The validity of scientific sociology can no longer be taken to be self-evident. It can no longer be assumed that either functionalism is synonymous with sociological analysis itself or that empiricism equals scientific sociology, for with the re-emergence of Marxian analysis and the development of what may be generically termed the ‘sociology of everyday life’ (phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology), ‘doing sociology’ has become problematical.

Increasing recognition of the fact that knowledge is a social product, produced by a scientific community of social beings negotiating agreements, employing conventions all situated within a specific socio-cultural and historical context has led to criticism of the methodological procedures of conventional sociology (Phillips, 1973). However, although a minority of sociologists have recognized the necessity to re-open the question of the nature of the social and have worked to revise the sociological project, in other cases the absence of a dominant paradigm has resulted in an indiscriminating eclecticism, biographies of the founding fathers, or the growth of a new breed of sociologies, rather than a critical and constructive appraisal of the methodological issues at the centre of the discipline’s problems. Thus in the case of Wallace’s (1969) analysis of sociological theory ‘eleven (plus one) theoretic viewpoints’ are considered, representing in the context of his classificatory scheme a mere fraction of the total possible number of sociological theories. Similarly Martindale (1961), Sorokin (1966), and to a lesser extent Cohen (1968), offer accounts of a range of theoretical schools and approaches without providing any critical comparisons, and alongside works of this kind there is the vast expansion of the Marx, Weber and Durkheim ‘business’ which all too often has produced interpretations of their work independent of any salient comparisons with other theorists, or theoretical positions.

In addition there has been the emergence of a ‘new’ group of sociological works drawing upon the writing of Husserl, Schutz, Merleau-Ponty and others in the phenomenological philosophical tradition. A phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology materialized in terms of a critique of the positivist assumptions inherent in contemporary sociology. Broadly speaking, positivist sociology has been subjected to criticism for assuming a unity of scientific method, ‘the common identity of natural and social phenomena’ (Walsh, 1972) and accepting the ‘reality of the world of everyday experience’ as a heuristic fact (Bittner, 1973). Phenomenological sociological analysis has attempted to show the necessity of addressing common-sense assumptions inherent in scientific accounts, establishing a methodology appropriate to the intentional, interpretive and meaningful social world and recognizing the interpretive and indexical nature of sociological work. Phenomenological sociology has therefore provided a theoretical de-reification of sociology and the social world. The sociological acceptance of conventional social reality as an objective reality is an example of scientific analysis operating within the natural attitude. Phenomenological sociologists have emphasized the necessity of sociologists proceeding beyond a mere reinterpretation and elaboration of everyday typifications towards an understanding of the intersubjective process of meaning construction. Such a reorientation requires that the meaning individuals attribute to and the consciousness they have of the social world constitute the ‘data’ to which sociologists attend.

Given the discussion of ‘paradigmatic revolutions’, ‘new directions’ and critiques of well established methodological procedures and techniques, it is not surprising that the discipline is held to be in a state of crisis. Reconsideration of the nature of social reality, the appropriate scientific method as well as the relationship between sociological work and other social practices has provided the context for a renewed interest in the works of the classic sociologists. A return to the writings of the ‘founders’ of the discipline should not be thought a regressive step providing of course that it does not become a wholly linguistic, interpretational and textual exercise. Rather in the specific case of Marx it provides an opportunity for us to reconsider the nature of his analysis and the adequacy of our sociological understanding of the Marxian project. It offers us the possibility of addressing again not only the question of the relationship of Marxian analysis to sociology but also the relevance and significance of Marx’s work for an enlightened understanding of issues and problems central to a scientific analysis of the social world. Unfortunately there is a considerable problem of conceptual ambiguity in this area, for discussion frequently has revolved around the question of Marxism and sociology or Marxist sociology without recognizing that the terms employed do not refer unproblematically to a determinate corpus of knowledge or a specific group of theorists. In view of this problem I shall use the term ‘Marxism’ to refer to the heterogeneous body of thought developed by followers of Marx, the term ‘Marxian’ to refer to views and ideas attributed to Marx, and ‘Marxist sociology’ to connote the development and utilization of Marx’s work within sociology.²

To begin to assess the influence of Marx’s work on sociological thought we have to understand the nature, development and significance of Marxist sociology. It was towards the end of the nineteenth century that Marx’s work was first beginning to be accepted as a profound and original system of sociology. Bottomore and Rubel (1963) note that Marx’s work constituted a resource for not only those who were in agreement with the orientation and central assumptions of Marxist thought, for example Ferri on criminology and Sorel on ‘the materialist theory of sociology’, but also for other scholars such as Durkheim and Weber who took issue with commentaries on Marx’s work. Hence on the one hand Marx’s work was treated as a significant contribution to sociology, as providing ‘a series of discoveries which will enable man to become master of his own destiny … [giving] significance to his life’ (Bottomore and Rubel, 1963, p. 51). However, on the other hand a considerable amount of attention and time was devoted by sociologists to a critical examination and rejection of Marxian analysis. Although the beginning of the twentieth century was accompanied by an increase in the positive influence of Marx’s work on sociology Bottomore argues that by the 1930s interest in Marx’s sociology had waned. Whether the growth of sociological science modelled on the natural sciences and adopting the doctrine of detachment and value-freedom accounts for the diminished interest in a Marxian analysis frequently associated with revolutionary politics and ideology is a controversial issue. Certainly it seems that as sociologists began to strive after scientific status the direct influence of Marx’s work diminished although Marxism and Marxist sociology still remained reference points for sociological work.

While the idea of a ‘Marxist Sociology’ represents for some scholars a contradiction in terms, for others it offers a synthesis of disparate world-views. For example in the work of Sartre (1968) and Bottomore (1968) the concept of a Marxist sociology is redundant whilst for Lefebvre (1972) it represents a specific sociological domain. In the case of Sartre it is not a question of either rejecting sociology entirely and adopting Marxian analysis nor is it a matter of incorporating Marx’s work into the prevailing sociological orthodoxy; on the contrary, sociology has to be subordinated to the methodological considerations of Marxian analysis. Either therefore sociology stands opposed to Marxian analysis or alternatively it must be situated within the Marxian framework which alone can provide the possibility of an understanding of the historically changing totality of social life. Sartre argues that the sociologist

wants to hold on to the benefits of teleology while at the same time maintaining the attitude of positivism – that is while suppressing or disguising the ends of human activity. At this point sociology is posited for itself and is opposed to Marxism, not by affirming the provisional autonomy of its method – which would, on the contrary, provide the means for integrating it – but by affirming the radical autonomy of its object (1968, p. 68).

In developing a critique of sociological ‘objectivism’, the removal of the sociologist from the field of investigation, as well as the frequent neglect of history in sociological work, Sartre seeks to ‘reintegrate the sociological moment into the historical totalization’. Sociology for Sartre becomes a catalyctic agent in the development of Marxian analysis providing ‘information which is capable of developing the dialectical method by compelling it to push its totalization to include this information’ (ibid., p. 74). Hence, for Sartre, sociology constitutes a method for Marxian analysis, revealing new relations, discovering new mediations between concrete men and the material conditions of life, which must be integrated into the historical totalization.

In contrast Bottomore has suggested that the integration of Marx’s work within sociological thought produces the disappearance of a distinct Marxist sociology. Three possible interpretations of Marxist sociology are examined by Bottomore. First, as referring to the sociology of those thinkers who on other grounds are Marxist in their general philosophical and political outlook; in which case they first have to reconcile the empirical findings of sociological research to their Marxist ideas and then further consider whether a separate Marxist sociology has any viability. Second, the term can refer to all those sociologists who attach prime importance to economic factors, class relations, or group conflicts in the explanation of social events whilst not necessarily agreeing with the conclusions of Marx. Employed in this sense the term would encapsulate the sociologies of such diverse theorists as Weber, Pareto, Coser, Galbraith, Dahrendorf and Rex. In this sense the concept of Marxist sociology becomes almost as meaningless as Kingsley Davis’s understanding of functional analysis. Finally Bottomore states that Marxist sociology may refer to a methodology, a persistent critique of the aims and methods of the social sciences. In this form it has of course achieved particular significance, largely through the writing of Lukács, Marcuse, Sartre and Goldmann. However, he concludes that in this sense Marxist sociology becomes ‘Marxist anti-sociology’. For Bottomore, therefore, it seems that either the term Marxist sociology is too ambiguous for intellectual discourse or alternatively it connotes an earlier stage in the development of sociology as a discipline prior to the adoption of Marx’s ideas in sociological practice.

Lefebvre argues that not only is Marx not a sociologist but what is more ‘every positivist sociology presenting itself as “Marxist”’ (1972, p. 21) is tending towards reformism. However, whilst being critical of sociology as a conservative discipline which separates knowledge from criticism Lefebvre asserts that there is a sociology in Marx, namely a ‘sociology of the family, of the city and the countryside, of subgroups, classes, and whole societies, of knowledge, of the state etc.’ (ibid., p. 24). In particular he suggests that Marx’s concept of praxis contains many sociological elements, a sociology of needs, objects, knowledge and everyday life. In other words contemporary sociology is not entirely incompatible with the Marxian project. Although it is clear that Lefebvre does not rule out a reconciliation of aspects of Marx’s work with sociological inquiry the specific nature of the relationship is left somewhat ambiguous. For example he recognizes that sociologists have interpreted Marx’s critical comments on philosophy to refer to the replacement of philosophical concepts by empirical sociological fact, a consequence of this misunderstanding being the ‘tug of war betw...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 Sociology and Marxian analysis
• 2 Sociological readings of Marx
• 3 Phenomenological sociology — an alternative sociology?
• 4 Phenomenology and Marxism
• 5 For a critical science of society
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index