Defending Taiwan

The Future Vision of Taiwan's Defence Policy and Military Strategy

Martin Edmonds, Michael Tsai, Martin Edmonds, Michael Tsai

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136875410
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia de China

Recent concern about mainland China's intentions towards Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan's military strategy, in how Taiwan perceives threats to itself, and in how the Taiwanese military are reacting to these perceived threats. This book, which includes contributions by leading Taiwanese military thinkers, explores current military strategy in Taiwan and how it is evolving. It discusses Taiwan's military modernisation, and the implications of the recent defeat after fifty years in power of the Kuomintang Party, implications which include a move away from an authoritarian garrison state culture, and the beginnings of a more open debate about defence. The book concludes with an overall appraisal of Taiwan's defence vision and makes recommendations on how Taiwan's defence might be enhanced.

Part I

The external security environment

1 The United States military security policy towards China

Kao-cheng Wang

The emergence of China as a regional power has marked the greatest change to the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific area.¹ How to deal with this development has become the major concern of US Asia-Pacific security strategy. This chapter will demonstrate that the Clinton administration adopted a comprehensive approach to the region, one that included: a US military presence; bilateral alliances; engagement; and multilateralism, all designed to preserve the region's security and stability.

The emergence of China

In parallel with its successful economic reforms, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has continued since the late 1980s to increase its military expenditure and rapidly modernize its armed forces. The PRC has been able to maintain a 15 per cent average rate of annual growth in military expenditure since the beginning of 1991. It has also raised the quality and technological level of the military in pursuit of its goal of military modernization. Within the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the PRC has adopted a policy of cultivating the military elite. Correspondingly, it has reduced the total number of PLA military personnel to approximately 2.4 million men in order to improve the overall quality of the force. The majority of its obsolete airplanes in the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have been replaced with the Russian built Su-27/’FLANKER’, Su-30 MKK fighter, airborne early warning (AEW) and aerial refueling airplanes.²

The Chinese Navy (PLAN) has acquired, also from Russia, two ‘Sovremenny’ Class destroyers equipped with the SS-N-22 ‘Sunburn’ anti-shipping cruise missile and ‘Kilo’ Class submarines, whilst it has itself designed the 093-type SSN nuclear attack submarine and 094-type SSBN nuclear ballistic missile submarine.³

The PLA has also invested in both ‘information warfare’ and ‘asymmetrical warfare’.⁴ From a Taiwanese perspective, the PRC has also adopted a military doctrine of ‘winning local wars under high-tech conditions’. According to this doctrine, a rapid response is required to meet a range of contingencies along China's land and sea borders, particularly within a strategic context that encompasses the East and South China Seas.⁵

In order to implement this military doctrine, the PRC has not only made efforts to raise the high-tech capability of the military but has also built up large-scale ‘rapid-reaction forces’. As for its naval and military strategy, the PRC is pursuing a ‘Close to the Sea’ strategy (Jin Hai Zhan Lue) that stresses the need to extend Chinese naval forces towards the second chain of islands in the Asia-Pacific area.

What has most concerned the Asian countries is China's increasing missile capability. By the beginning of 2001, the PRC will have procured eighteen CSS-4 ICBMs with a range sufficient to reach the continent of the United States (CONUS).⁶ It is also developing a new generation of solid-fuel, road-mobile and MIRV-ed ICBMs, the Dong-feng 31, and increasing its short-range (SRBM) and intermediate-range (IRBM) ballistic missiles, specifically, the Dong-feng 21, Dong-feng 15 (M-9) and the Dong-feng 11 (M-ll). Current estimates are that the number of these latter M-type missiles will total c.650 by 2005.⁷ Due to this rapid increase in military capability, many Asia-Pacific countries have been forced to pay close attention to, and respond to, what is now perceived as the ‘Chinese threat’.⁸

The US military security strategy towards China

The Clinton administration took China's growing military power seriously in the formulation of its Asia-pacific security strategy. On the issue of military security, it adopted a number of important measures.

Military presence

The first measure that the Clinton administration took to cope with China's military challenge was the presence of US military forces in the region. Although a new, less confrontational, approach to international politics had characterized the post-cold war period,⁹ the PRC continued to expand its military capability. This behavior clearly was contrary to the post-cold war trend towards general disarmament. According to the realists, the most prudent approach to protect a state's national security when threatened by an adversary's military build-up is that of a balance of power. Under President Clinton, the USA had at first planned to reduce its military forces in response to what was perceived to be a reduction in international threats and its need for domestic post-cold war economic development. Indeed, in the Asia-Pacific region specifically, the first Bush administration had also planned to reduce substantially the number of US military personnel in the light of the decline in former Soviet troops stationed there.¹⁰

Almost all its Asian allies opposed US plans to reduce substantially its military presence in this area. They were concerned, first, that China might fill the power vacuum that would inevitably be created after the withdrawal of both Russian and US troops and argued that this constituted a direct threat to them. Second, in both the USA and other Asian states, there was also concern that the withdrawal of US forces might lead to intense regional military competition that could further endanger stability. China and Japan were generally thought to be the two most likely candidates to become involved in such a regional arms race. Third, even the PRC did not want US forces to withdraw quickly from this area, thinking it possible that Japan might be tempted to create a military capability to threaten China's security. This in turn would also disrupt China's economic development. For this reason the Clinton administration revised its plan to reduce the US military presence in the region and to slow down its military withdrawal.

The US revised security strategy for the Asia-Pacific region was issued in 1995 and stipulated that the US would maintain about 100,000 military personnel in the Asia-Pacific region.¹¹ Of the US forces located in the region, South Korea hosted the US 7th Air Force, including the 8th and 51st Fighter Wings, and the 8th US Army, including the 2nd Infantry Division. Japanese air bases hosted the US 5th Air Force, including the 18th Wing, 35th Fighter Wing and 374th Airlift Wings. It also harbors the US Navy's 7th Fleet, including the USS KITTY HAWK Carrier Battle Group, the USS BELEAU WOOD Amphibious Ready Group, the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the 9th Theater Area Army Command (TAACOM), and the 1st USA Special Forces Battalion.¹²

The major purpose of an America military presence is to have the capability to respond to any Chinese and North Korean military threat. The Clinton administration's defense strategy stressed the need to ‘Shape, Respond and Prepare’¹³, that is to say, the USA had to shape the strategic environment to advance its own interests, maintain the capability to respond to the full spectrum of threats, and prepare for any future short and long-term threats and dangers in the region.

The US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region conforms to this strategy. It has, however, generated several side effects. First, the presence of military force has signaled the USA's concerns for the stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the security of its allies. It has also shown America's determination to implement this concern. By demonstrating a strong commitment to, and concern for, the region's future, the USA has been able to deter the PRC from using force to attack other states in the region. Second, the current US military presence has been able to balance the PRC's increasing military power and thereby has contained, or even reduced, the latter's political and military influence in the region. The Asia-Pacific countries can therefore preserve their autonomy without being forced to bend to China's political will. Third, the US military presence provides a quick, capable, flexible and powerful capability to intervene in military conflicts between China and other East Asian states. This military intervention can prevent the crises from worsening or actually defeat any military invasion by the PRC.

Balancing alliances

The second measure that the Clinton administration adopted in response to the PRC's military expansion and modernization program was to strengthen the military cooperation between the USA and its allies. From the realists' perspective, a policy of building alliances and making them work was one way of conducting a balance of power strategy.

The USA currently has military cooperation treaties in the Asia-Pacific region with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. Japan is its most important political and military ally. In order to respond to the changes in the strategic environment caused by China's military modernization, the USA and Japan embarked on a review of the USA-Japan Security Cooperation Treaty in 1995.¹⁴ The outcome of this review was reflected in a Joint Declaration of US-Japan Security Cooperation announced by President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto on 17 April 1996. Their joint communiqué called for the revitalization of their alliance to better guarantee the security in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁵

On the basis of this joint declaration, both sides revised the ‘Guidelines for USA-Japan Defense Cooperation’, in September 1997. These new Guidelines have required a more clearly defined role for Japan in responding to situations in surrounding areas that have important implications for its peace and security. Japan needed to provide rear area support for US forces responding to any regional contingency. This Japanese-based rear support may include providing access to airfields and ports, transportation, logistics, and medical assistance. Japan also has to conduct such military roles and functions as mine-sweeping, search and rescue, surveillance, and ship inspection to enforce UN sanctions.¹⁶

The review and enhancement of USA-Japan security cooperation has transformed the purpose of this bilateral military cooperation from one of protecting Japanese security to one of stabilizing the Asia-Pacific area. Although the target state of this new cooperation is not clearly identified, it is clearly linked to China's military build up. Japan has explained that the phrase, ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan’, as embodied in the revised guidelines, is not geographical but situational. However, this explanation has made USA-Japanese military action even more flexible in respect of timing and geography. The Asia-Pacific as a whole has, in fact, now been covered by this new security cooperation mechanism. It is therefore not surprising that China strongly opposed the new US-Japanese cooperative military relationship.

Besides strengthening USA-Japan security cooperation, the USA has also sold advanced weapons to Japan. In order to protect it from threats posed by Chinese and North Korean missiles, the Clinton administration also proposed to Japan that they jointly designed and deployed a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system.¹⁷

The Clinton administration has also strengthened its military cooperation with South Korea, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. For example, US forces have regularly conducted bilateral or multilateral military exercises with these countries. In January 1998, the USA and the Philippines reached a ‘Visiting Forces Agreement’ that will permit routine combined exercises and training, and ship visits.¹⁸ Singapore is expanding its Changi Naval Station and will make it available to US naval combatants and will include a pier that can accommodate American aircraft carriers.¹⁹

Although the USA has no formal diplomatic or military ties with Taiwan, it has continued to provide the Taiwanese armed forces with necessary defensive weapons, including F16 fighter aircraft, Patriot PAC 2 anti-ballistic and anti-aircraft missiles, airborne early warning aircraft, and AIM-120 intermediate-ranged air-to-air missiles. The USA has also considered including Taiwan in the TMD system, though no concrete move has yet been made in that direction.

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