Mirage Of Power Pt1 V3

C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135033774
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Italian History
• Index: History

Published in 2001, Mirage Of Power Pt1 V3 is a valuable contribution to the field of History.

Chapter 1

The Anglo-French Entente

A better understanding with France would not improbably be the precursor of a better understanding with Russia.

Lansdowne, 1903

Introduction

The Anglo-Japanese alliance and the end of the Boer War on 31 May 1902 enabled Lansdowne to face the future with greater confidence, and temporarily lessened the urgency for a settlement of outstanding problems with France and Russia. This was evident from his response when, in August 1902, Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, put out feelers for an Anglo-French agreement on Morocco and Siam. Lansdowne, fearing complications with Germany and Austria, decided to await a more favourable moment. Although he recognized that the political and economic influence of France in Morocco was increasing, he hoped that the country could be kept going as a nominally independent state, at least for a few more years.¹

Nevertheless, it was still evident that in the long run an accommodation with these two powers would be of advantage. Britain’s commitments were still as over-extended as against her resources as they had been in the 1890s,² whilst in addition England now wanted to avoid all conflicts with these Powers so that she could concentrate on recovering from the stresses and strains imposed by the long, drawn-out South African struggle. The Committee of Imperial Defence, the Elgin Committee (to enquire into the disasters in South Africa) and the Esher Committee on War Office reform were all established by Balfour in 1902–3.³

Of the two it was France’s ally, Russia, who represented the more dangerous threat to British security, especially in India, and with her the atmosphere for negotiations appeared to be more propitious in the months following the signature of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The alliance relieved the Admiralty from some of its more pressing problems in Far Eastern waters,⁴ and British satisfaction with developments in that theatre was further increased when, in April 1902, Russia agreed to withdraw her troops from Manchuria in stages over a period of eighteen months, commencing in October 1902. The way now seemed clear for a Russo-Japanese settlement. Japan was still anxious to discuss with Russia their future relations in Manchuria and Korea, the British had no really vital interests in these areas and, provided that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was not affected by any Russo-Japanese agreement, Lansdowne was not alarmed by the prospect: indeed he was relieved that the alliance had not encouraged Japanese intransigence.⁵

A satisfactory Russo-Japanese arrangement might react favourably on Anglo-Russian relations. The British seemed helpless both militarily and economically to resist Russia’s penetration of the countries bordering India. Persia was the most serious problem, although rumours of Russian intrigues in Afghanistan and Tibet were also causing considerable perturbation in Calcutta and in London. The Government of India feared that Persia would eventually succumb entirely to Russia’s influence. Even if the Russians occupied the north of the country, England doubted that her financial and military resources were adequate to enable her to make an equivalent advance in the south.⁶ An arrangement with Russia about these areas seemed the obvious solution, but although Lansdowne made several approaches to Russia during 1902 and 1903, and had friendly exchanges with the new Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, Russia’s response was scarcely encouraging.

Relations with Germany were also causing Lansdowne increasing concern. During the summer of 1902 there was a serious quarrel between the two countries over concessions in the Yangtze valley. German press and Reichstag attacks on the conduct of the British Army in South Africa naturally aroused great resentment in Great Britain and provoked angry ripostes. Lansdowne was greatly alarmed by the rising anti-German tide in England which was affecting the Cabinet, the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, as well as public opinion.⁷ Apart from China and the Baghdad Railway there appeared to be few tangible grounds for poor relations between the two countries. The Admiralty, it was true, was concerned about the growth and efficiency of the German navy, but its fears were only just beginning to affect public opinion to any great degree. Lansdowne hoped that the ill-feeling would soon subside; as early as 22 April 1902 he wrote to the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir Frank Lascelles, that, ‘I am sanguine enough to hope that the bitter feeling which now prevails against us in Germany may not last for ever.’⁸

Lansdowne’s efforts to ameliorate relations by co-operating with Germany to solve two questions which affected the interests of both countries—Venezuela and the Baghdad Railway—merely exacerbated the existing ill-feeling. In December 1902 British and German warships blockaded Venezuela, whose failure to pay her debts to foreign creditors had long exasperated the British and German Governments. However, the affair assumed a rather different aspect when the German commander bombarded the Venezuelan port of Maracaibo in January 1903. Opinion in the United States, already uneasy about the Anglo-German venture, was outraged, and suspicions were voiced that Germany had more ambitious designs than the collection of her debts from Venezuela. The British press soon took up the cry, and alarmist reports were published that England might become involved in a war with the United States for the sake of Germany’s ambitions in Central America. The uproar came at a difficult moment for Lansdowne, since he was edging towards a settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute with the United States.⁹ Venezuela’s debt problems were eventually settled by recourse to arbitration, but Lansdowne was irritated by the fuss, especially as the Germans ‘ran straight as far as we were concerned’.¹⁰

The prospect of a settlement of the Baghdad Railway question became more hopeful during 1902. Before 1900 the British had viewed with relative indifference the potential threat to their economic and strategic interests in Turkey and the Persian Gulf posed by this railway. The Sultan had granted a concession to an Anglo-German combine in 1888 to build a railway from Constantinople to Angora in Anatolia. In 1892 he granted a further concession to the Company to extend the line to Konia. The Anatolian Railway Company was by now solely German owned, the British financiers having sold their interests to their partners in 1890. In January 1902 the Company secured Turkish authority to extend the line via Adana and Mosul to Baghdad, its ultimate destination being Basra and the Gulf, where Company agents had been active in 1900 in searching for a suitable terminus. The Company, however, now required Anglo-French capital if it were to make further progress in constructing the line, and in 1902 it approached British financiers with a view to obtaining British investment in the enterprise. Lansdowne, keenly aware of the importance of the railway, was eager to secure British participation, and was even prepared to recommend the injection of British Government funds if British capitalists did not come forward. In return he wanted to secure the internationalization of the railway as far as Baghdad, plus British control of any branch built from Baghdad to the Gulf. In his view England could not expect to delay the completion of the line indefinitely, and since it would encourage the expansion of trade in the Middle East, from which British traders would profit, he thought that a reasonable settlement would be of benefit to all parties, as well as conducing to better Anglo-German relations. He therefore encouraged the British bankers to negotiate an agreement with their German counterparts.¹¹

British public opinion, however, did not share his enthusiasm, and there was an outcry in the press and Parliament when it became known, in 1903, that the Government was contemplating this further measure of co-operation with Germany. Eventually, in April 1903, after attacks on his proposals in the Cabinet, led by the now anti-German Joseph Chamberlain, Lansdowne was compelled to abandon an agreement which had been drawn up so laboriously by the Anglo-German financiers, and which provided for Franco-British participation in the line. ‘I am afraid that in the long run our attitude will be hard to explain,’ Lansdowne lamented. The Government could only fall back on warnings as a means of defending British interests in the Gulf—in May 1903 Lansdowne told the House of Lords that England would ‘regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf as a very grave menace to our interests’. There the question rested for the time being.¹²

The Negotiation of the Entente

During 1903 Lansdowne became more anxious to reach agreement with France, a result of the deteriorating situation in the Far East, and of the outbreak of serious unrest in Morocco at the end of 1902, which, he feared, would lead to international complications unless France and England reached agreement on the future of the country.¹³ His efforts were encouraged by Joseph Chamberlain, who was now a fervent advocate of an entente with France, and had become extremely suspicious of Germany. ‘She is more unpopular than France ever was,’ he wrote in October 1903.¹⁴

In the Far East the triumph of the forward party in the councils of the Tsar was demonstrated by the refusal of the Russian Government to complete the withdrawal of her troops from Manchuria, and by increasing Russian activity on the borders of Korea. The Foreign Secretary reasoned that a friendly France would restrain Russia from impetuous action in the Far East which might precipitate a war with Japan. Should the worst happen and hostilities break out between Japan and Russia, a neutral France might enable England to escape involvement in the struggle. France too had no wish to become embroiled in the Far Eastern adventures of her ally, while Delcassé, long suspicious of Germany’s ambitions, was keen to settle the Moroccan question with England. Relations between the two countries were much improved as a result of King Edward’s successful visit to Paris in May 1903 and a return visit to London by President Loubet in July, which enabled Lansdowne to enter into direct negotiations with Delcassé, who accompanied the President. On 7 July the two men discussed the framework of a possible settlement, which was to include British recognition of France’s preponderant position in Morocco, in return for French recognition of the British position in Egypt, the protection of Britain’s strategic interest in Tangier and agreements on Newfoundland, Siam and the New Hebrides.

The advantages of a Franco-British agreement became even more obvious during the summer and autumn as relations between England and Russia and between Japan and Russia continued to deteriorate. To the crisis in the Far East was added renewed tension in the Near East in the spring, when a serious revolt against the Turks broke out in Macedonia.¹⁵ For a time Lansdowne feared that Bulgaria would intervene on behalf of the Macedonians, with the prospect of England and Russia being drawn in on opposite sides in the ensuing Turco-Bulgarian war. The immediate crisis died down in the autumn when Russia and Austria-Hungary drew up a new reform scheme for the province, which proved to be as futile as previous efforts by the two Powers to ease the lot of the inhabitants.¹⁶ King Edward might grumble at the feeble British response to the situation in Macedonia, but Lansdowne recognized that England, isolated at Constantinople,¹⁷ had little chance of persuading the Porte to accept reforms, and that even limited action by Austria and Russia was better than no action at all. One hopeful sign was that Lansdowne had managed to get negotiations started with Russia on Central Asia, although they had little chance of success while Japan and Russia were steadily drifting towards war.

Discussions between Japan and Russia on the Far East continued during the autumn and winter of 1903, but as a result of Russian obstructiveness they made little progress. Russia was behaving more and more arrogantly in Manchuria, and was stepping up her efforts to penetrate Korea. Thus, by the end of 1903, the British were faced for the first time with the prospect of a conflict between Japan and Russia. As a result the alliance with Japan was now regarded in London as a serious liability, since it was not thought that the Japanese army and navy stood much chance against the Russian colossus. Although the Treasury warned the Cabinet that British finances could not stand the strain of war, few Ministers believed that Britain could stand aside while Japan was being crushed—it would be a terrible blow to British prestige as well as to her own interests. Thus, even if France remained neutral, England might still have to intervene in the conflict. Lansdowne and his colleagues hoped, however, that Japan would at least be able to hold her islands against Russia. The King summed up the position on I January 1904:

It looked to him that if France should join Russia in the coming conflict then we should be bound to take part with Japan. But if France stood out, the King agreed with the Prime Minister, it was only in the improbable contingency that Russia would crush Japan that any question of England’s intervention would arise.¹⁸

It was a gloomy outlook. Russia’s victory would confirm her hegemony in the Far East, would make her more difficult to deal with elsewhere, and would lead to the absorption of Japan into Russia’s sphere of influence. In consequence British naval and military estimates would have to be dramatically increased. On the other hand, British statesmen shrank from the equally dangerous course of intervention in a war over Manchuria and Korea, areas in which British interests were negligible, with Russia extending the conflict into Central Asia, with France as a belligerent, and with Germany, if she did not come in on Russia’s side, using the occasion to extract concessions from Great Britain as the price for her neutrality.¹⁹ As Balfour commented in January 1904, ‘I trust that whatever the course of events in the Far East, this country will not be dragged into hostilities, as for obvious reasons this could hardly occur without involving half, or more than half, the world, in a war which would benefit nobody but the neutrals and chiefly Germany,’²⁰ while the anti-German Louis Mallet of the Foreign Office warned the Prime Minister that ‘Germany will leave no stone unturned to involve us in the war, and if she succeeded we should be at her mercy’.²¹

Lansdowne was extremely pessimistic. By the end of December 1903, he was even prepared to throw Japan overboard by informing her that she should accept any reasonable Russian offer concerning Korea. He dwelt on the risks at stake if war broke out. British public opinion might insist on England coming to the aid of her ally if the latter were in danger of being crushed, a course which would aggravate England’s already pressing financial difficulties. ‘For these reasons I should like H.M. Govt. to try its hand as a mediator or at all events as a friendly counsellor, rather than wait until it can appear on the scene as a “deliverer”,’ he wrote.²² However, he was overruled by Balfour and the other Ministers, who insisted that England must maintain the alliance, and not alienate Japan by offering her unwelcome advice, or by proposing mediation.²³ On the other hand the British Government was anxious to avoid upsetting Russia too much, since it still hoped, eventually, to resume the Central Asian negotiations with her. Lansdowne assured Benckendorff on 8 February that England intended to remain neutral, and Austen Chamberlain, the chancellor, supported by Balfour (who thought it might be regarded as ‘an act of war’), refused to provide a loan to the Japanese, who had to depend on private British sources during the war.²⁴

The outbreak of war between Russia and Japan on 8 February 1904 encouraged the British and French to hasten the conclusion of their negotiations, which had begun in earnest the previous September. Nevertheless there were last-minute delays. Delcassé was anxious to secure the Gambia in return for the loss of French fishing rights in Newfoundland, a demand which was rejected by Lansdowne and the Cabinet as excessive. Eventually, in February, Lansdowne agreed to the transfer of the West African lies de Los to France. When France rejected this offer as inadequate, the Foreign Secretary threatened to break off the negotiations. Although France gave way, she did not give up hope of securing the Gambia in the years down to 1914.

The agreement was signed on 8 April 1904. It was a comprehens...