PART I INTRODUCTION
1
A Sociology of Organisations?
Consider the following story invented by Alasdair MacIntyre: āThere was once a man who aspired to be the author of the general theory of holes. When asked āWhat kind of holeāholes dug by children in the sand for amusement, holes dug by gardeners to plant lettuce seedlings, tank traps, holes made by roadmakers ?ā he would reply indignantly that he wished for a general theory that would explain all of these. He rejected ab initio theāas he saw itāpathetically common-sense view that for the digging of different kinds of holes there are quite different explanations to be given: why then he would ask do we have the concept of a hole ?ā1 This cautionary tale was originally directed at political scientists who offer general theories of modernisation, urbanisation or some such all-embracing concept. It might have been directed with equal force at certain species of organisation theorists. Certainly one does not venture far into the literature on organisations before discovering papers like: āFoundations of the Theory of Organisationā; āThe Structure and Function of Organisationā; āSome Ingredients of a General Theory of Formal Organisationā; āTowards a Theory of Organisations.ā2 At the same time one cannot help noticing the bewildering array of treatments from different disciplines and from the interface between disciplines which occur when organisations are actually described and analysed. Take, for example, the very large interdisciplinary reader, edited by James March, Handbook of Organisations.3 It is basically an attempt to represent the state of play in organisational analysis at the time of compilation and without doubt many of the individual contributions are of great interest. But the overall impression is of a babel of voices. The opening section is enigmatically labelled āFoundationsā. It consists of social psychological papers on leadership, decision-making, and small group studies together with a sociological discussion of social structure and organisations. But it is extremely difficult to see what these papers are the foundations of: certainly not a general theory of organisations. Following a relatively brief section on methodologies (including a paper by Scott of particular interest to the research sociologist)4 the third and major section of the book is entitled āTheoretical-Substantive Areasā. This includes papers on decision-making, communications and interpersonal relations in organisations not noticeably dissimilar to those treated under āFoundationsā. It also includes a valuable paper on the comparative method in organisational analysis which might well have been treated under the methodology section.5 Alongside papers such as these however are two other kinds. There are a series of papers which group discussion around ācommon-senseā labels such as prisons, schools, trade unions, political parties, hospitals and business organisations. In addition there are contributions which have to do with particular kinds of theorising, namely management theory and economic theories of organisation. The final section of the book cryptically labelled āApplicationsā has to do with the problem of implementing change in organisations: a number of strategies are reviewed which themselves reveal different levels of interest (the individual, the group, the organisation) and also different theoretical perspectives. Of course, if one applies what one has discovered about organisations to āthe real worldā then the implication is that oneās knowledge is practically relevant to the affairs of men and as such a prescriptive element is built in: you must do x, y and z if you would achieve a successful/efficient/happy/healthy/rational organisation.
Now those who implicitly advocate a general theory of organisations (at least in programmatic terms) tend to do so on the grounds of its (ultimate) practical relevance. Further, such a general theory will need to be interdisciplinary. The eclecticism of Marchās Handbook of Organisations is but a stage towards a unity of language, theory and purpose: a harbinger of a prescriptive discipline of organisations. The sense of this is well represented in a comment by Parsons:
āThere are many insights which social scientists have developed in this field which can be highly useful to the practical administrator here and now. But the field is one of immense complexity at the scientific level and is only at the beginning of its scientific development. An immense amount of work will be required before we can have anything that deserves to be called a theory of formal organisation. We have, however, made some very important beginnings. For administrators, the great importance of social science theory lies in the future when these beginnings will have grown into a mature science.ā6
It will be noticed that in this context, Parsons writes of social science, rather than any particular discipline within the social sciences. He might presumably have been more catholic in his advocacy, as some organisation theorists are, by including production engineering, cybernetics and ergonomics. But in any event the single discipline is seen as a collaborator in a greater enterprise. It should not escape our attention however, that the nature of this enterprise is to develop a unifying conceptual framework: āModern organisation theory represents a frontier of research which has great significance for management. The potential is great, because it offers the opportunity for uniting what is valuable in classical theory with the social and natural sciences into a systematic and integrated conception of human organisation.ā7 In other words in its developed form organisation theory is another discipline and in principle becomes subject to the same kinds of criticism as any other discipline might, notwithstanding its polyglot development. The search for conceptual unity may prove stultifying rather than liberating and the identification and handling of problems in the field standardised rather than innovating. The quest for scientific maturity might in fact end in stagnation. This leads us, not to doubt the usefulness of interdisciplinary work in the analysis of particular problems, but to argue that an economics, or a psychology or, in our case, a sociology of organisations has a claim to be considered in its own terms, rather than as some inferior species of activity the value of which is only to be measured in terms of its contribution to general organisation theory. Those who wish to make the intellectual pilgrimage towards a general organisation theory may or may not be chasing a will oā the wisp. They may be led to more and more rarefied abstraction in which, for example, general organisation theory is held to be derived from a general systems theory. That is not our purpose, although it is necessary to consider various kinds of systems analyses in the context o f a sociology of organisations.
We have suggested that the rationale of committed organisation theorists is that ad hoc collections of papers such as those represented in Marchās Handbook of Organisations, should be regarded as stepping stones towards a general theory. It should, however, be noted that even within a single disciplinary framework, readings on organisations have this same ad hoc feel. This we think to be true of Etzioniās reader on complex organisations which nevertheless contains many excellent papers.8 This should give us cause for reflection. The problem one confronts is that separating off sociological studies from other studies of organisations, in so far as that is possible, does not reveal a particular kind of conceptual unity (although some sociological imperialists are not beyond trying to impose it). What we discover is that sociologists study organisations (variously defined) for different thematic and theoretical reasons. Part of what we have in mind here may be encompassed in the distinction between formal and substantive theory put forward by Glaser and Strauss.
āBy substantive theory we mean that developed for a substantive, or empirical area of sociological inquiry, such as patient care, race relations, professional education, delinquency or research organisations. By formal theory, we can mean that developed for a formal, or conceptual, area of sociological inquiry, such as stigma, deviant behaviour, formal organisation, socialisation, status congruency, authority and power reward systems or social mobility.ā9
It is worthwhile pausing here to notice some of the implications this distinction has for Glaser and Strauss. We may enumerate them:
1. One may attempt a comparative analysis between or among groups in a substantive area. The focus is on generating a specific substantive theory.
2. One may attempt a comparative analysis of different substantive cases all of which are defined as being within a given formal area. The focus here is on developing a specified formal theory.
3. One may offer modification or confirmation of an existing formal theory or reformulate the existing theory by the development of substantive theories in relevant areas.
The methodological stance adopted by Glaser and Strauss is fundamentally of an inductive kind. Rather than put faith in a deductive āgrand theoryā from which hypotheses are logically derived and tested, the argument is that one should attempt a progressive build-up from facts to substantive theory and thence on to formal theory, which because of the way it is developed will be grounded in data. Such theories will be ever open to development and change by further substantive work.
Whether or not one accepts the whole Glaser and Strauss methodological package the distinction between formal and substantive theory does alert us to a problem inherent in discussing the sociology of organisations. What this comes to is that the organisationāor some segment, group or process within itābecomes the research site for many different kinds of study. Indeed as one checks back on the somewhat random list which Glaser and Strauss give to illustrate both formal and substantive theories in sociology, it is clear that the structure and processes of organisations are highly relevant study for practically all the examples cited. This perhaps helps to account for the somewhat untidy and arbitrary character of books on organisationsāthat is, those which attempt some sort of over-view.
But the Glaser and Strauss distinction does suggest for us a way forward:
1. We should be much concerned with indicating the state of play concerning formal theorising about organisations.
2. Since such formal theory is grounded on substantive theorising, we should draw attention to salient areas in which such theory has taken place. This enables oneās understanding of organisations as entities to be developed.
3. Since organisations are research sites for other theorising of the formal and substantive kind, we should show a modicum of awareness of these concernsāthe more particularly however as they potentially offer to contribute to formal and substantive theorising about organisations per se.
The Glaser and Strauss approach emphasises then that in the development of knowledge and theory there are various levels of sociological activityāthe direct data collection and ethnographic work which form the basis for substantive theory and which in turn provides comparative statements from which formal theory may be generated. Moreover, sociological work not only operates at various levels but is many-sided:
ā. . . besides ethnographic studies multiple substantive and formal theories are needed to build up, through discovering their relationships, to more inclusive formal theories. Such a call for multiple theories is in contrast to the directly monopolistic implication of logico-deductive theories whose formulators talk as if there is only one theory for a formal area, or perhaps only one formal sociological theory for all areas. The need for multiple substantive theories to generate a formal theory may be obvious, but it is not so obvious that multiple formal theories are also necessary. One formal theory never handles all the relevancies of an area and by comparing many we can begin to arrive at more inclusive, parsimonious levels of formal theory. Parsimonious grounded theories are hard won by this design.ā10
Glaser argues that the logico-deductive theorist is at fault in that he engages in a premature parsimony of formulation. The concepts from which he begins are too hastily constructed and the deductions from the premises are too loose-fitting in relation to reality.
Interwoven as it were with the issues raised by Glaser and Strauss is the fact that within sociology there are competing orientations. The shorthand used to designate these differences may sometimes refer to key figures in the history of the subjectāaccordingly we may refer to Marxist, Weberian and Durkheimian perspectives. Alternatively we may refer to particular stances in sociologyāfor example structural functionalism and conflict theory. More recently a critical dividing line has been suggested between social systems theory and social action theory. What is implied here ha...