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Part One
Origin and Development of the MÄdhyamika Philosophy![]()
Chapter One
The Two Traditions in Indian Philosophy
I. The MÄdhyamika SystemāIts Role and Significance
BUDDHISM profoundly influenced the philosophy and religion of India for over a thousand years. It was a challenge to complacency and a call for renouncing dogmatism. It adopted the method of critical analysis (vibhajyavÄda) from the very outset.1 Buddhism occupies the central position in the development of Indian philosophy. BrÄhmanical and Jaina systems grew under the direct stimulus of Buddhism. Schools and sub-schools sprang up without number. Doctrines were systematised and details were worked out under this pressure. Great attention came to be paid to logic and epistemology. Precise terminology was evolved, and an immense ÅÄstra-literature came into being. Indian philosophy became critical and richer; it gained in depth and comprehension.
There were sharp twists and turns in Buddhism itself. It had a momentous and varied life. Its schools and sub-schools, judged even by Buddhist standards, are bewildering. The tendency to split and divide itself into sects and sub-sects appeared very early in the history of Buddhism. The several Councils held from time to time to decide the orthodox creed and to stamp out heresy are evidence of this vitality. The KathÄvatthu is perhaps the earliest record in PÄli of the doctrinal differences of the schools. Buddhist historians like Buston and TÄranÄtha speak of the Three Swingings of the Wheel of Law (dharmacakra-pravarttana).
At first the earliest Teaching completely excluded the nihilistic point of view (i.e. everything, all the elements, were considered to be real in themselves). Owing to this an (incorrect) realistic imputation could easily grow prominent.
With a view to this (the Buddha) has expounded the Intermediate teaching in which a negativistic standpoint predominates. But this (scripture of the latest period) introduces (different degrees of Reality), demonstrating the elements in their imputed aspect (parikalpita) as totally non-existing, the elements in their causally dependent aspect (paratantra-svabhÄva) as having a real existence from the standpoint of the Empirical Reality (saį¹vį¹ti), and the two forms of the Ultimate Aspect (pariniį¹£panna) as representing the Absolute Reality. It is accordingly that which puts an end to the two extreme points of view, contains the direct meaning (nÄ«tÄrtha) and cannot be an object of dispute. On the contrary, the other two (Swingings of the Wheel of the Doctrine) are of conventional meaning (neyÄrtha) and can be made an object of controversy. This is the opinion of the VijƱÄnavÄdins. . . . The MÄdhyamikas however say: "The Lord having begun with the teaching that all elements are devoid of a real essence of their own, that they neither become originated (anutpanna) nor disappear (aniruddha) and by their very nature merged in NirvÄį¹a and that they are quiescent from the outset (Ädi-ÅÄnta), has swung the second Wheel of the Doctrine for the sake of those who had entered the Great Vehicle. The teaching, marvellous and wonderful as it is, demonstrates the principle of non-substantiality and Relativity. . . . According to the MÄdhyamikas,1 the earliest and the latest Scriptures are both conventional (ÄbhiprÄyika) and only the Intermediate contains the direct meaning.2
Stripped of metaphor and partisan colouring, this means that there were three principal turning-points in the history of Buddhism. And these are:
- The earlier realistic and pluralistic Phase comprising the HÄ«nayÄna schoolsāTheravÄda and VaibhÄį¹£ika (SarvÄstivÄda). This can be called the Äbhidharmika system. The SautrÄntika school is a partial modification of this dogmatic realism;
- The middle phase or the MÄdhyamika system of NÄgÄrjuna and Ärya Deva advocating ÅÅ«nya-vÄda (Absolutism);
- The last idealistic phaseāthe YogÄcÄra system of Asanga and Vasubandhu and the later VijƱÄnavÄda of DignÄga and DharmakÄ«rti.
These historians of Buddhism, Buston (1290-1364) and TÄranÄtha (1574-1608), were neither too near nor too far removed from the movement, and hence they could comprehend it as a whole. The Madhyamika is the turning-point of Buddhism. It is the central or the pivotal system. Like Kant in modern European philosophy, the Madhyamika system brought about a veritable revolution in Buddhist thought. "It never has been fully realized," says Stcherbatsky with regard to this system,
what a radical revolution had transformed the Buddhist church when the new spirit, which however was for a long time lurking in it, arrived at full eclosion in the first centuries A.D. When we see an atheistic, soul-denying philosophic teaching of a path to personal Final Deliverance consisting in an absolute extinction of life, and a simple worship of the memory of its human founder, when we see it superseded by a magnificent High Church with a Supreme God, surrounded by a numerous pantheon, and a host of Saints, a religion highly devotional, highly ceremonial and clerical, with an ideal of Universal Salvation of all living creatures, a Salvation not in annihilation, but in eternal life, we are fully justified in maintaining that the history of religions has scarcely witnessed such a break between new and old within the pale of what nevertheless continued to claim common descent from the same religious founder.1
In metaphysics, it was a revolution from a radical pluralism (Theory of Elements, dharma-vÄda) to an as radical absolutism (advaya-vÄda). The change was from a plurality of discrete ultimate entities (dharmÄįø„) to the essential unity underlying them (dharmatÄ). Epistemologically, the revolution was from empiricism and dogmatism (dį¹į¹£į¹i-vÄda) to dialectical criticism (ÅÅ«nyatÄ or madhyamÄ pratipad). Ethically, the revolution was from the ideal of a private egoistic salvation to that of a universal unconditional deliverance of all beings. Not mere freedom from rebirth and pain (kleÅÄsavaraį¹a-nivį¹ttiįø„) but the attainment of Perfect Buddhahood by the removal of ignorance covering the real (jƱeyÄvaraį¹a) is now the goal. The change was from the ideal of the Arhat to that of the Bodhisattva:2 Universal love (karuį¹Ä) and Intellectual perfection (prajĆ±Ä or ÅÅ«nyatÄ)1 are identical. The Theoretic and the Practical Reason coincide.
In Religion, it was a revolution from what was almost a positivism to an absolutistic pantheism. Religion is the consciousness of the Super-mundane Presence immanent in things, the consciousness of what Otto happily calls the 'mysterium tremendum'. Early Buddhism (TheravÄda) was not a religion in this sense. It was an order of monks held together by certain rules of discipline (vinaya) and reverence for the human Teacher. It enjoined a very austere moral code, primarily for the ordained. But there was no element of worship, no religious fervour, no devotion to a transcendent being. No cosmic function was assigned to Buddha; he was just an exalted person and no more. His existence after parinirvÄį¹a was a matter of doubt; this was one of the inexpressibles. The rise of the MÄdhyamika system is at once the rise of Buddhism as a religion. For the MahÄyÄna, Buddha is not an historical person. He is the essence of all Being (dharmakÄya); he has a glorious divine form (sambhogakÄya) and assumes at will various forms to deliver beings from delusion and to propagate the dharma (nirmÄį¹akÄya). The essential unity of all beings became an integral part of spiritual life. Worship and devotion to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas was introduced, possibly owing to influence from the South.2
This laid the foundation for the last development in Buddhismā the TÄntric phase. TÄntricism is a unique combination of mantra, ritual and worship on an absolutist basis. It is both religion and philosophy. This development occurred in BrÄhmanism too, influenced no doubt by the corresponding development in Buddhism.
The ÅÄlistamba SÅ«tra says1: "Whosoever sees the PratÄ«tyasamutpÄda sees the Buddha, and whosoever sees the Buddha sees the Dharma (Truth or Reality)." NÄgÄrjuna expresses himself similarly in his MÄdhyamika KÄrikÄs2: "One who perceives truly the PratÄ«tyasamutpÄda realises the four sacred truthsāpain, (its) cause, cessation and the path." Buddhism has always been a Dharma-theory3 based on the PratÄ«tyasamutpÄda, and every Buddhist system has claimed to be the Middle Path. PratÄ«tyasamutpÄda has, however, received different interpretations at different times. The earlier Buddhism of the Äbhidharmika systems took it as denying the permanent Ätman (substance) and at once establishing the reality of the separate elements. PratÄ«tyasamutpÄda is the causal law regulating the rise and subsidence of the several elements (dharma-sanketa). The middle path is the steering clear of Eternalism (substance or soul) and Nihilism (uccheda-vÄda, denial of continuity). The MÄdhyamika contends that this is not the correct interpretation of the doctrine. PratÄ«tya-samutpÄda is not the principle of temporal sequence, but of the essential dependence of things on each other, i.e., the unreality of separate elements (naissvÄbhÄvya, dharma-nairÄtmya). The entire MÄdhyamika system is a re-interpretation of PratÄ«tyasamutpÄda.4 It is now equated with ÅÅ«nyatÄāthe empirical validity of entities and their ultimate unreality.1 The middle path is the non-acceptance of the two extremesāthe affirmative and the negative (the sat and asat) views, of all views. In the VijƱÄnavÄda, ÅÅ«nyatÄ is accepted, but with a modification. The formula is: That which appears (the substratum, i.e., vijƱÄna) is real; the form of its appearance (the duality of subject and object) is unreal.2 The middle path is the avoidance of both the dogmatism of realism (the reality of objects) and the scepticism of Nihilism (the rejection of objects and consciousness both as unreal).3
An intelligent reading of the development of Buddhist thought shows the MÄdhyamika system as having emerged out of a sustained criticism of the Äbhidharmika schools, which themselves grew as the rejection of the ÄtmavÄda of the BrÄhmanical systems. It is thus a criticism of both the Ätma and anÄtma theories. An analogous position in the West is that of Kant in modern philosophy. His Critique is primarily a criticism of Empiricism, which itself was a rejection of the ...
