The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys

A Naval Staff History

Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Topic: History
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134730179
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Published here for the first time, this volume presents a superb range of insights into this crucial effort of the Second World War.

This Naval Staff History describes the vital role of the Arctic Convoys, 1941-1945 and was first issued by the Historical Section of the Admiralty as a confidential study for use within the Royal Navy in 1954. It grew out of the earlier Battle Summary No. 22 compiled by Commander J. Owen of the Admiralty's Historical Section and issued in 1943 to cover the convoys run to North Russia in the last half of 1942 and early 1943. That wartime Battle Summary was subsequently revised and expanded by Commander L.J. Pitcairn-Jones to include all the main convoys run from August 1941 until the end of the war using all the historical records which were at hand after the war.

A new preface provides additional context for the convoys, highlighting support provided to Russian forces in their struggle against Germany, for the original Staff History was narrowly focused on the naval aspects of the Arctic Convoys to Russia.

This is an excellent resource for all students with a particular interest in the Arctic Convoys, the Second World War and in maritime and military history.

CHAPTER I

Convoys PQ 1–12, QP 1–8 : August 1941–March 1942

(All times are Zone minus I.)

1

The first¹ of the convoys to Russia sailed for Archangel 2lst August 1941 : seven ships carrying stores and the ground staff for some Hurricane aircraft that were to work with the Russians. From this small beginning developed the regular service of military supplies to North Russia in which 21 convoys outward and 16 homeward bound had sailed with varying fortunes by the end of 1942.

At the outset the Germans seem to have under-estimated² the importance of this traffic; no interference was attempted except by a few submarines and destroyers, and weak air forces based on Bardufoss and Banak in Northern Norway. In these circumstances, the convoys sailed with a cruiser and a couple of destroyers as ocean escort, and in addition some trawlers or minesweepers for one or two days at either end of the voyage; later on, the local escort at the eastern end was reinforced by Russian destroyers.

With the coming of winter, the long nights, rough weather and bitter cold were in themselves a protection in those Arctic regions, where ah craft could not fly and spray froze guns and instruments, so that a ship could seldom steam at high speed without losing efficiency. Up to March 1942 there were lost only one merchant ship (s.s. Waziristan), out ol 158³ that sailed, and one escorting ship—the destroyer Matabele—both sunk by U-boats. One other ship, s.s. Harmalrid, was torpedoed but reached harbour in tow. Arduous though the service was, and calling for a high degree of endurance from both ships and crews, the voyages of these early convoys⁴ presented no features ol special interest so far as enemy action was concerned. For this reason they need not be considered further.

2

Convoys PQ 12 and QP 8 (Plans 1 and 2) were the first convoys to run under the less favourable conditions which came into being after February 1942. Each convoy consisted of 15 merchant ships⁵ and was due to sail from Iceland and Murmansk respectively on 1st March.

On 26th February the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, signalled to the Admiralty his proposals for their passage:—

‘The following factors affect protection of North Russian convoys.

It seems probable that air and U-boat attacks will be concentrated on the eastern part of the route and that surface forces will operate to westward, where there is more sea room, although not further from base than the approximate longitude of Jan Mayen Island.

The protection of these convoys is a major commitment for the Home Fleet; but in it lies a hope of bringing enemy surface ships to action. On the other hand the operation covering northern passage and the time spent in northern waters must be the minimum.

The area in which the danger of surface attack is greatest is between longitude 5° W. and 14° E.⁶

To economise the use of our heavy forces as cover, the passage of the outward and homeward convoys through this danger area should be synchronised; and they should sail on the same date at minimum intervals of 14 days, which would allow the escort of a PQ convoy to take over the next QP convoy.

Such a programme would involve Home Fleet heavy forces being in northern waters during about five days in every 14; and it cannot be managed with the present number of destroyers, if a proper screen is to be provided for capital ships and an escort of two destroyers to each convoy. Another four destroyers will be required.

I intend normally to cover these convoys with two capital ships, and sometimes with carrier also.

With the 14-day cycle, it may prove the time during which the northernmost passages are to a large extent uncovered is too long.’

The Commander-in-Chief proposed sending his second in command, Vice-Admiral A. T. B. Curteis, with the Renown and Duke of York, a cruiser and a screen of destroyers, to cruise in support of the convoys during their passage between 5° W. and 14° E., while he stayed at Scapa himself with the third capital ship. King George V, the aircraft carrier Victorious, and another cruiser. There he would be ready to join Vice-Admiral Curteis or ‘to deal with a possible-break out’ of German ships into the Atlantic, according to the information he received; he should put to sea himself, he considered, only if he learnt that the enemy were on the move or if the air reconnaissance⁷ of Trondheim failed. He thought it unlikely that the Tirpitz would risk fighting Admiral Curteis, whose force ‘was well able to look after itself’; on the other hand his own force might gain an opportunity of getting between the enemy and their base and of forcing an action. Moreover, he wished to husband his strength against the summer, when he expected the Tirpitz to be reinforced by the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which had lately arrived in Germany from Brest. The employment of the whole capital ship strength of the Home Fleet, whenever Russian convoys were at sea, would ‘lead to a steady decline in its efficiency’ by interrupting refits and leave.⁸

But the Admiralty preferred a full concentration of force. This would ensure superiority over the German surface ships, besides ensuring the presence of the fighter protection provided by aircraft in the Victorious, which they considered very important, although the enemy’s air strength in Norway was still small and Admiral Tovey had instructed Vice-Admiral Curteis to keep 250 miles from the coast except to sink or damage enemy ships of war. Their Lordships told the Commander-in-Chief they took ‘full responsibility for any break out of German ships which may occur while you are covering PQ and QP convoys’.

The Commander-in-Chief therefore arranged to rendezvous with Vice-Admiral Curteis, who was then at Hvalfiord (near Reykjavik), in 71° N. 3° E.⁹ on 6th March, when Convoy PQ 12 was expected to be passing to the northward of this position.

To comply with this, the Vice-Admiral sailed from Hvalfiord on 3rd Match, with the Renown (flag), Duke of York, Kenya and six destroyers,¹⁰ and the Commander-in-Chief left Scapa with the King George V, Victorious, Berwick and six destroyers¹¹ the next day. The junction was effected at 1030, 6th March, and the Kenya was then detached to join the convoy and accompanied it to Murmansk.

The strength of the battle fleet was then as follows:—King George V, Duke of York, Renown, Victorious, Berwick and nine destroyers.¹² With this force the Commander-in-Chief cruised some 50 miles to the southward of PQ 12.

3

Convoy PQ 12 (Plan 2) had sailed from Reykjavik on 1st March—15 merchant ships and an oiler under Commodore H. T. Hudson, R.N.R., with a local escort of trawlers. The minesweeper Gossamer and four minesweeping whalers were to have overtaken the convoy on the 4th, but two whalers only joined, the others passing the convoy without sighting it.¹³ Early on the 5th, however, the destroyers Oribi (Commander J. E. H. McBeath, S.O.) and Offa relieved the local escort 100 miles south of Jan Mayen Island, and later in the day the Kenya (Captain M. M. Denny) joined, having been sent by Vice-Admiral Curteis.

Soon afterwards the convoy was located and shadowed for some time by a German aircraft.

Next morning (6th) the Kenya parted company to rejoin Vice-Admiral Curteis, being sent back after his junction with the Commander-in-Chief to provide close cover all the way to Murmansk. That same evening came the news that the Tirpitz or an 8-inch cruiser had sailed from Trondheim and was steering to the northward up the Norwegian coast.¹⁴

This news came from the Seawolf (Lieutenant R. F. Raikes) one of the submarines stationed off the coast. Aircraft of Coastal Command had been maintaining a reconnaissance of Trondheim since the end of February, with special extra patrols to seaward from 4th to 7th March. On the 5th and 6th, however, the reconnaissance had failed, while the day patrol on the 6th was discontinued in the afternoon, apparently for lack of aircraft. But the submarines Trident and Seawolf were patrolling outside the northern approaches to Trondheim The Trident evidently sighted the enemy at about 1700, the 6th, too far off to see what they were or to make a report. Half an hour later, the Seawolf sigh ted flying boats ‘wave-hopping’ towards her and faint smoke to the southward. and then the foretop and funnel of a large ship steaming fast up the coast ten miles inshore. Two hours later, Lieutenant Raikes brought the Seawolf to the surface to make a report, having hoped in vain that the enemy might wait until dark before leaving the approaches, and so enable him to attack. His signal. timed 1801/6, but made at 1940, called the enemy a battleship or an 8-inch gun cruiser; but he says in his written report, ‘I was certain in my own mind that it was the Tirpitz’ and indeed it was.¹⁵

Before the German battleship could endanger its passage. Convoy PQ 12 had to contend with other difficulties. In the evening of 6th March, the convoy encountered ice, and had to turn from a north-easterly to a south-easterly course. It was luckily loose pack ice only, according to Captain Denny of the Kenya, though serious enough to make him remark that ‘after experience with PQ 12, I would never take a convoy anywhere near ice, accepting almost any other risk in preference.’ A merchant ship and one of the whalers parted company that evening; the Oribi, meeting more ice in the night, was considerably damaged. Next morning, the 7th, however, the convoy was able to return to its proper course, and there began a curious game of hide and seek in varying visibility¹⁶ and arctic squalls—the Tirpitz searching for the convoys, particularly PQ 12 but usually to the southward of its track, and the Home Fleet hunting the Tirpitz, but always to the south-west of her area of operations. The four groups were within 100 miles of each other most of the day, and both the Tirpitz and each convoy had narrow escapes from being located;¹⁷ but the only contact that occurred was between a German destroyer and a straggler from the homeward bound convoy, QP8.

1. PASSING THROUGH ‘ARCTIC FOG’

2. FORCING THE WAY THROUGH FROZEN SEAS

3. HEAVY WEATHER

4. TANKEK IN HEAVY SWELL

QP 8, consisting of 15 ships, escorted by two minesweepers and two corvettes,¹⁸ had sailed from Murmansk on 1st March, the same day PQ 12 left Iceland. The cruiser Nigeria (flag Rear-Admiral ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword by Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, KCB, ADC, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff
• Preface by Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones
• Appendix to the Preface
• Amendments to the original edition
• Foreword
• Introduction
• Chapter I: Convoys PQ 1–12. QP 1–8: August 1941–March 1942
• Chapter II: Convoys PQ 13, QP 9: March 1942
• Chapter III: Convoys PQ 14–16, QP 10–12: April–May 1942
• Chapter IV: Convoys PQ 17, QP 13: June–July 1942
• Chapter V: Convoys PQ 18, QP 14, 15: September–November 1942
• Chapter VI: Convoys JW 51A, JW 51B–53, RA 51–53: December 1942–February 1943
• Chapter VII: Convoys JW 54–66, RA 54–67: November 1943–May 1945
• Chapter VIII: Comment and Reflections
• Appendices
• Sources
• Index