Memory Distortions and Their Prevention

Deborah L. Best, Margaret J. Intons-Peterson

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2013
• Topic: Psychology
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134809691
• Subtopic: Cognitive Psychology & Cognition
• Index: Psychology

This volume explores the well-documented phenomena of memory distortion in a variety of settings, as well as how it can be ameliorated or prevented altogether. The editors have recruited some of the very best researchers in the applied cognitive field to address these issues. These authors examine distortion from several angles: fuzzy trace theory, face identification, memory deficits with age, collaborative influences on distortion, sociocultural influences on memory, retention of procedural and declarative information, and ignorance of medical and other information. The final chapter addresses the issue of cognitive technology, in general. Because of the surge of interest in applied cognitive psychology and in the memory distortion issue in particular, this book will be valuable to many applied and basic researchers.

1

Introduction and a Brief History of Memory Distortions and Their Prevention

Margaret Jean Intons-Peterson

Indiana University,

Deborah L. Best

Wake Forest University,

Memory is the scaffolding upon which all mental life is constructed.

— Fischbach & Coyle (1995, p. ix).

I don't think I will ever trust my memory again.

—Undergraduate Courtney Scott after serving as an experimenter in a study of false memory.

The output of human memory often differs—sometimes rather substantially—from the input.

—Schacter (1995, p. 1).

Suppose we ask you to remember the following list: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, nap, peace, yawn, drowsy. After a short time, we ask you to recall the words. Chances are that you will report the word “sleep” in addition to some of the other words even though “sleep” did not appear in the list. In Intons-Peterson's laboratory, both younger (mean age = 19) and older (mean age = 70) adults recalled proportionately as many nonpresented words as presented words. Moreover, when the nonpresented words were scattered among presented ones in a recognition test, the participants were more likely to say they had heard the nonpresented words than the presented ones! Our results (Intons-Peterson, Rocchi, West, McLellan, & Hackney, 1998) parallel those of others using the same approach (e.g., Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). These false memories occur after a single hearing of the lists, indicating that it is easy to instill such memories. False memories are a form of distorted memories.

What are memory distortions? They may be false memories, memory errors, perceptual illusions, false beliefs, hallucinations, and confabulations. They may be mediated by perceptual processes, memorial processes, or external processes. Obviously, a definition must encompass a wide range. Probably the simplest definition is the one given at the start of the chapter by Schacter, “the output of human memory often differs… from the input.” (1995, p. 1). This definition does not mean that memory is invariably inaccurate. Fortunately, most of the time memory operates accurately and effectively, allowing us to pursue our daily lives with confidence and adaptability. Nevertheless, the impact of memory distortions can be staggering, as in inaccurate eyewitness testimony, hallucinations, and confabulations. Moreover, memory can be fallible, fragile, and inaccurate—discouraging and potentially dangerous attributes for one of our most important abilities. Hence, we want to know when distortions occur and how to prevent them. These issues are the topics of this book. Specifically, the chapters address the processes that produce memory distortions and their prevention.

Furthermore, the emphasis in the book is on memory distortion in daily activities of normal adults and not on drug-induced, psychotic, or hypnotic distortions. The book also does not include some areas of memory distortions that already have received substantial attention, such as eyewitness testimony (e.g., Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Doyle, 1987; Wells, 1988), jury manipulation (e.g., Pennington & Hastie, 1990), or repressed memories (e.g., Freyd, 1996; Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; Pope, 1996). Instead, we explore memory distortions in such everyday situations as memories for events (chapters 2and 4), faces (chapter 3), collaboration and false beliefs (chapter 5), space (chapter 6), motor or procedural information (chapter 7), and in normal aging (chapters 4 and 5). Each of these chapters also addresses possible preventive measures. The last two chapters describe specific approaches for aiding memory. Chapter 8 introduces an exciting and novel method for making material memorable, the method of ignorance! In this method, people are challenged to think of what they do not know about a particular topic. This requires them to think of what they do know in an active and engaging way. The net result is likely to be memory enhancement. Chapter 9 details various techniques that have been developed by using principles of cognitive psychology in a new area called cognitive technology. The central focus of cognitive technology is to harness technology in the service of cognitive performance.

FIG. 1.1. The tops of the two tables are identical in size and shape in the plane of the picture. From Mind Sights by Shepard É1990 by Roger N. Shepard. Used with permission of W.H. Freeman and Company.)

Let us return to the issue of memory distortions. In the example given at the beginning of this chapter, we described a method for eliciting false memories. Strictly speaking, the learners are remembering something that did not happen rather than distorting a memory representation of an actual event. Perhaps false memories should be called memory errors, which they are in the sense that the participants are requested to recall or recognize only the words they had heard. From another perspective, the list was constructed to represent a concept such as sleep. The words were all words that are frequently given as free associates to the stimulus word “sleep.” The underlying rationale is that hearing the words activates a network of associations. This network contains the concept word, “sleep,” so that when the person subsequently tries to retrieve items from a memory search, “sleep” will likely be encountered along with other presented words. In this sense, then, the retrieval of “sleep” tells us about the structure of memory and about the ability of the people to distinguish between the presented and nonpresented items. In our everyday

FIG. 1.2. The two monsters are identical in size. As Shepard noted, we may interpret their identical faces as expressing different emotions—such as rage on the part of the pursuer and fear on the part of the pursued. (From Mind Sights by Shepard É1990 by Roger N. Shepard. Used with permission of W.H. Freeman and Company.)

lives, we face similar distinctions when we forget whether we did something or simply thought about doing it.

If memory distortions are deviations from the input, we need to consider the input. Typically, the input is mediated by the senses, making perception a major building block of memories. How veridical are perceptions? Again, most of the time they serve us well. We are able to see, hear, smell, and taste in biologically adaptive ways. But some perceptual illusions are so powerful that we cannot escape them even if we know about them. Consider Fig. 1.1. Do the two tables have the same top surfaces? Yes, but about the only way for most of us to convince ourselves is to place a drawing or template of one table top on the other table.

Figure 1.2 shows another other powerfully persuasive visual illusion. Are the two figures the same size? Again, they are, but they certainly look different, even when we know they are the same size. Are our eyes playing tricks on us? As cognitive psychologists we know that it is our brain, not our eyes, that is responsible. As the brain integrates information across optical input and previous experiences, the output leads us to draw the wrong conclusions. Thus, even seemingly straightforward physical events may induce memory distortions. Similar outcomes occur with verbal and other sensory input and with imagined events or objects. Given their pervasiveness, it is not surprising that memory distortions have interested scholars and others for a long time.

A BRIEF HISTORY

Curiosity about memory distortions and attempts to understand their origins has an extensive and prescient history. Philosophers of history might well consider Aristotle's laws of association as establishing the argument that items experienced in close temporal or spatial contiguity will tend to be remembered together. This idea, however, had little experimental support until Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) introduced a method to determine whether a memory was true or false, accurate or inaccurate. In effect, he established the foundation of the experimental method in psychology. His approach was to learn a series of nonword trigram letters (the famous nonsense syllables). Because the trigrams were not standard words, any intrusion of a word or of nonstudied combinations of letters could be detected when he tested himself for retention at a later time. By using unfamiliar learning materials, Ebbinghaus could ascertain whether a response was right or wrong.

At about the same time, other European scientists were finding that the use of misleading or vague information could affect the accuracy of memories. In France, Binet (1900) noted that asking misleading questions about objects children had seen led them to produce systematically distorted recollections whereas in Germany, Munsterberg (1908) demonstrated the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. It is amazing to contemplate the faith still placed in eyewitness testimony given Munsterberg's well-known treatise on the subject and the extensive, confirmatory research that has been done since then (e.g., Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Doyle, 1987; Wells, 1988). Freud's (1896) early work also addressed memory distortions. He posited that the distortions were produced as a way to defensively exclude painful memories from consciousness (repression), a theory he derived from his clinical experience. Such painful memories were thought to come from sexual abuse or trauma, a view Freud subsequently abandoned, saying that the reports of such memories were actually confabulations or fantasies. Memory distortions also were reported about this time in brain-damaged alcoholic patients by Korsakoff (1889a, 1889b). These distortions are known today as Korsakoff's syndrome. Korsakoff's sufferers have severely impaired memory for recent and remote events and often produce substantial confabulations.

As we move further into the 20th century, the research comes closer to the sorts of memory distortions considered in this book. In 1932, Bartlett published his classic monograph, Remembering. In the book, Bartlett reported that memories of a story changed with successive retellings. Although Bartlett's original work is not always replicable (Gauld & Stephenson, 1967; Roediger, Wheeler, & Rajaram, 1993), contemporary researchers are still influenced by his view that memories are reconstructions of past events guided by the rememberer's knowledge of the world. At the time, another view, a behavioristic-associationistic one, flourished in the United States.

The behavioristic-associationistic models assumed that forgetting of an association occurred when another association interfered with it. Interference could occur in both a forward—prospective—direction or in a backward—retrospective—direction. Associations or memories do not exist in a vacuum. Instead they exist in a universe of other potentially competing memories. Memories are particularly vulnerable to interference from subsequent events, the retroactive interference previously identified. For some 50 years, research investigated the conditions under which proactive and retroactive interference occurred. This massive attack led to the realization that memories are fragile. The probability that a particular association will be retained declines precipitously unless the association is rehearsed, preferably in an active, elaborative manner, and related to existing knowledge. It became apparent that networks of associations are constructed, and this latter knowledge led Deese (1959), who constructed the example given at the beginning of this chapter, to offer a novel, associationistic explanation of Bartlett's work. His argument was that when parts of the associational network are activated, other parts also are activated. At the time of retrieval, the rememberer may retrieve a nonpresented, but nevertheless activated item. Also see Estes (1997) for a recently published, sophisticated version of this general approach.

The extensive attention to associationism also suggested that misleading information may be incorporated in memory representations, which leads to changes in recollection (e.g., Loftus, Feldman, & Dashiell, 1995). As Loftus et al. related, participants first view a simulated crime or accident. Later, half of the people receive misleading information about the situation; the other half do not receive the information. Then the participants attempt to recall the original event. Typically, the misled participants induce systematic errors in recall. In fact, as Loftus et al. (1995) noted:

subjects have recalled seeing stop signs when they were actually yield signs, hammers when they were actually screwdrivers, and curly-haired culprits when they actually had straight hair. Subjects have also recalled nonexistent items such as broken glass, tape recorders, and even something as large and conspicuous as a barn in a scene that contained no buildings at all. (p. 48)

Today, controversy still rages about whether memories are ever lost or simply have not been retrieved (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), about whether memory distorti...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• CHALLENGES AND CONTROVERSIES IN APPLIED COGNITION
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword
• 1 Introduction and a Brief History of Memory Distortions and Their Prevention
• 2 Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory
• 3 A Study of Face Identification: Are People Looking Beyond Disguises?
• 4 Assessing Memory Deficits in Elderly Adults: Repetition Errors, Misattributions, and Memory Slips
• 5 Collaborative Memory Accuracy and Distortion: Performance and Beliefs
• 6 Sociocultural and Practical Influences on Spatial Memory
• 7 Retention of Procedural and Declarative Information from the Colorado Drivers' Manual
• 8 Curriculum on Medical and Other Ignorance: Shifting Paradigms on Learning and Discovery
• 9 Cognitive Technology
• Author Index
• Subject Index