Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology (Routledge Revivals)

Malcolm Budd

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415705516
• eBook ISBN: 9781134515226
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First published in 1989, this book tackles a relatively little-explored area of Wittgenstein's work, his philosophy of psychology, which played an important part in his late philosophy. Writing with clarity and insight, Budd traces the complexities of Wittgenstein's thought, and provides a detailed picture of his views on psychological concepts. A useful guide to the writings of Wittgenstein, the book will be of value to anyone concerned with his work as a whole, as well as those with a more general interest in the philosophy of psychology.

Notes

I Introduction

1RPPI 949–950; Z 458

2RPPI 413; M 323; PI 90–92, 126; RPPI 22; PI 109

3PG 60

4 PI 496

5PG 70

6RPPII 62

7BB 5–6

8PI 122; cf. Rees, R. (ed.) (1987) Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Doncaster: Brynmill Press 8–9; RPPI 895; Z 464. On the translation of ‘übersehen’ and its derivatives see the translator’s note to PR 353 and PG 491–492.

9PR 1, 39

10PI 130; RPPI 633

11RPPI 1054

12RPPII 311; Z 465

13RPPI 548

14PI 109, 132; RPPI 950

15RPPI 556; Z 121

16RPPI 994

17RPPI 257, 723

18RPPI 554; RPPII 218, 220–221

19RPPII 730

20RPPII 20, 194; Z 112–113

21RPPI 554–558

22PI p. 577, 188; RPPI 830; cf. Z 49

23RPPII 734

24PI 577

25PI p. 188; LW 18

26RPPI 45–49, 643; PI p. 230; LW 209

27PI 182

28BB 26–27; AWL 164

29RPPI 212

30PI p. 413, 231, 347; RPPI 299

31PI 314. The mistake in the idea that a concept can be elucidated by means of introspection is not the same as the mistake in the idea that a concept can be given sense by ‘private ostensive definition’. On private ostensive definition, see Chapter I Psychological concepts, privacy and behaviour. and Chapter I Public and private languages and Critique of the private object: II

32RPPI 836; RPPII 64, 148. cf. Z 472, 488–492

33Z 466

34PI 371

35For some elaboration of Wittgenstein’s denial that there is a sensation of position or movement, see Chapter VII Awareness of bodily position and movement and The feeling of motion and position.

36Z 472; RPPII 63

37RPPII 45. Wittgenstein also sometimes operated with a concept of a mental state which requires a mental state to possess genuine duration. See Z 78; PI Insert (a) p. 59.

38RPPI 836; RPPII 66, 144; Z 624. Emotions are not classified as undergoings in the first scheme, but are credited with genuine duration in the second scheme. The explanation seems to be that undergoings are defined as not being ‘characters of thought’, whereas emotions ‘colour thoughts’. For an elucidation of the idea of an emotional colouring of thought, see Chapter VII The emotional colouring of thoughts.

39RPPI 836

40RPPII 63; Z 472

41RPPII 57; Z 72

42RPPII 51; Z 82

43RPPII 45; Z 85

44RPPII 50; Z 81

45PI Insert (a) p. 59; PG 48; Z 71

46RPPI 972–973; Z 75–77

47Z 81. The expression ‘Marginal note’ has disappeared from the square brackets in the second edition of Zettel. The marginal note is an afterthought to RPPII 50.

48(1) – (8) fail to apply to intention in the sense of what someone meant by the words he uttered (RPPII 274); but an intention in that sense is not an enduring state of any kind.

49PI 281

50Z 471; RPPI 286–292; PI pp. 179–180; LW 351; RPPII 35, 133

51RPPII 75

52PI 571

53Z 471

54RFM III...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• I. Introduction
• II. Consciousness and the understanding of language
• III. Sensations and sense-impressions
• IV. Seeing aspects
• V. Images, internal speech, and calculation in the head
• VI. Thought and intention
• VII. Feelings, emotions, and the body
• List of abbreviations
• Notes
• Index