The Theory of Social Change

John McLeish

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9780415175203
• eBook ISBN:
  9781136226717
• Topic: Scienze sociali
• Subtopic: Sociologia

This is Volume XIX of twenty-two in the Social Theory and Methodology series. First published in 1969, this study looks at four views of the theory of social change and is intended for students in social studies, education and social psychology at university level.

I

MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

The basic concern of Marxism is with social change: its primary interest lies in discovering ways of effectively transforming human relations. At the outset of his career as a thinker, when he was still a student, Marx wrote in one of his notebooks a particularly pregnant sentence (freely translated):

‘Philosophers have so far only changed their interpretation of the world; the point however is to change the world.’¹

The massive body of Marxist writing since then can be regarded as being nothing more than a gigantic attempt to understand the implications of this statement.

The problem of evaluating Marxism as a theory of social change crystallizes around the fact that crucial tests, in the form of attempts to apply the basic theory to definitive cases, are lacking. The main concern of Marxist thinkers seems to be to establish, in the most general way, the leading role of economic ‘forces’ in the dynamic of social change. They seem to be concerned with ‘History’ and ‘Society’, rather than with local changes and particular human groups which could provide a scientifically-based test of the theory. Hegel’s World Spirit and Absolute Idea are reduced in status, certainly, to the extent that they lose their initial capital letters. But the vagueness and the generality of the Hegelian dialectic persists in Marxist writings, tending to obscure the explanation of the actual dynamics of particular social and historical changes. This is admitted by Engels, who writes:

‘The development of the materialist conception in regard to a single historical example was a scientific work which would have demanded years of tranquil study….’²

The conditional mood concedes that the task was never completed. Indeed it was never seriously taken in hand by the founders of historical materialism. Marx’s polemical writings on French history (the Revolution of 1848; the Paris Commune) represent the nearest the founders of Marxism came to approaching this task.

In Marxism we are dealing with a sociological theory which has many of the characteristics of an a priori judgement. The theory seems to be confirmed by certain empirical indications, but it has never been established in detail by a rigid application of the inductive method which is characteristic of sociological investigations. It is deductive rather than inductive in its essential features.

The history of Marx’s theory of social innovation makes this a priori character clear. The starting point was Hegel. Religious thinkers before him (for example, Augustine) had attempted to establish a pattern in history and the classical Greek writers had developed a cyclical theory to explain historical events. But Hegel was the first thinker to attempt to produce a detailed and general theory of the evolution and inner coherence of history. Marx’s contribution consisted in completing the translation into secular terms of the Christian explanation of history which remains implicit in Hegel’s picture of the development of the cosmos. The universe as a system of interconnected and ever-changing parts (‘matter in motion’) was seen by Marx to be the real existential basis of all human history and the precondition of social development. Instead of the stage-by-stage, progression of Hegel’s Absolute Idea (a Teutonic circumlocution for ‘God’) we have the idea of progress which operates through a dialectical conflict to be found as a universal principle at the roots of being, the basis of which is material existence. It is a conception of development from the most simple to the most complex. According to Marx’s view, there is an impulse within matter itself which drives everything towards change. He speaks of ‘a tension’, ‘a vital spirit’, and he even feels driven in spite of his scientific approach to use the language of mysticism (Bohme’s ‘qual’)¹ to convey the essence of the question. Matter is, as it were, in torture; to escape it must jump from one level of development to another. He quotes the theologian Duns Scotus with approval for asking, as early as the thirteenth century, whether it was possible for matter to think.² According to Marxism, it is this inner dialectic, this apparant contradiction, which is the motive force, at the very roots of reality, which leads to change. Change is of the essence of all things, and of the relations between things.

The general laws of cosmic development which Marx took over from Hegel need not detain us at this point: we have in mind the ‘laws’ of quantity into quality; contradiction as the basis of change; the negation of the negation; and so on. These laws certainly function in Marx’s social theories because he regards social development as merely one special level of cosmic change. But they take on a specific form in the particular context of human society. At this level, individual human beings and human groups appear on the historical stage as unconscious agents of the historical process. The impulse towards change arises objectively—outside of human awareness and intention (‘matter in motion’). But these impulses towards change, and the conditions of change, are ‘reflected’ in human consciousness as thoughts, feelings, instincts and volitions. This is the human sensuous activity of which Marx speaks in his first ‘thesis’ or declaration on Feuerbach’s philosophy.¹ This human activity too is a form of ‘matter in motion’. But the objective factors of change, reflected in consciousness, have a subjective bias imposed on them which can be described in such terms as ‘ideology’, ‘ideal tendencies’, a ‘false consciousness’—some sort of gap between human perceptions and existent social reality. Marx recognizes the existence of two sets of laws which are identical in substance but which differ markedly in their mode of expression. The first set of laws relate to the development of the external world; the second have to do with the laws of human thought. This means that while social changes are produced by men these changes, to be effective, must conform to hidden laws which operate outside of the will, intention and even consciousness of human beings. Social innovations of all kinds, while they often appear to be the consequences of human intention are, in reality, the outcome of innumerable human wills which are to a considerable extent in conflict with each other. Thus the end-result of innovation has a quality of capriciousness or of historical accident. As it appears in its final expression, the particular innovation was intended by no one, and is not fully acceptable to any of the social agents. Thus, social changes of whatever kind they may be have always something of the appearance of happy, or unhappy, accidents. In reality, however, they come into being as a result of historical necessity, in consequence of the operation of inviolable laws. ‘What is real is rational and what is rational is real,’ says Hegel. Marx re-words this rather ambiguous statement in the sense that that which is necessary comes into being; that which has exhausted any possibility of further development must pass away.¹

The real driving force of change for the Marxist is located in the economic foundations of society. The level of the productive forces of a given society is said to determine the general level of culture, of knowledge and of ideology.² Changes which take place in the economic basis are primary. They depend on scientific laws of a causal, determined character. Economic changes are first in order of time and of importance, they are succeeded by changes in the ‘superstructure’. These super-structural changes have to do with ideas, such as religion, law, literature, theory. These are mere reflections of changes in the basis. The economic order is decisive as regards both the rate and the nature of change in our ideas.

In modern industrial society the main vehicle of social innovation is the class struggle, that is, the struggle of those who live by selling their labour power against those who live by exploiting the labour of the ‘have-nots’. Force, as the midwife of social change, is the arbiter between social classes.³ Reason and human intention play but a small part in determining the outcome of historical confrontations: of more import are the objective, historically developed conditions. In particular, the relationship between the ‘productive forces’ of society and the ‘productive relations’ are decisive. In this formulation, Marx asserts that the final outcome of historical struggle, which is the crucial factor in social change, is decided by causal laws and relationships which stand outside of human consciousness and will. These laws and relationships assert themselves in the form of external necessity to which all wills must bow.¹

It is a general rule or social law that the new is inevitably in conflict with the old. In practice, this means that the social innovator is brought up short, face to face with social traditions, with irrational ideologies, with vested interests which operate together as a great conservative force opposing change.² The innovator who is fortunate enough to have the ‘forces of history’ on his side can overcome resistances to change—but in a fashion which is neither anticipated, nor intended by him. There must inevitably be differences in the degree to which individual innovators are conscious of the objective situation (this includes the productive forces, productive relations, the political struggle, the ideological situation, the next dialectical step forward, etc.). There will also be differences in the degree to which individuals can assimilate their purposes to the general dialectical movement of history. This is what Marx means by ‘class consciousness’. Class consciousness implies that a partisan approach is essential before we can understand the nature of reality and how desirable changes can be brought about. In direct opposition to liberal thinking, Marxists maintain that the individual must be involved in the process of changing reality before he can begin to understand its essential qualities. He who seeks to understand must begin by assuming a position which involves a value-judgement. The social innovator can succeed best if he consciously adopts a class position and a committed standpoint. It is only on this basis that he can begin to understand the relation of class forces, and to be able to predict the immanent movement of productive forces and productive relations in the given historical epoch.³

With reference to the particular problem we are concerned with, that is, how social change comes about, one of the central questions is that of the relationship of the intelligentsia or educated classes to the social process. The same must be said about this question, as it has been dealt with by Marxists, as has been already said about the general theory of social change. The detailed relation between the individual and the specific innovation for which he may be held ‘responsible’ (not to say given credit) is left in the obscurity of an abstract and general formulation by Marxist writers. However certain indications are given as to how this question should be answered.

The distinction between basis and superstructure has been indicated. This distinction was first declared in a classic statement by Marx:

‘The totality of production relations constitutes the economic structure of society, the real ba^is upon which a legal and political superstructure arises and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of the material means of life determines, in general, the social, political, and intellectual processes of life.’¹

This is the doctrine of historical materialism. It asserts that all the ideas, the institutions and the apparent characteristics of a given social system are determined by the way in which people gain their livelihood, i.e. by the reigning mode of production. As a direct corollary, it is declared that the very essence of man in any historical period derives from his relationship to the productive process. ‘The human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.’² This can be interpreted to mean that the intellectual who is never, by definition, involved directly in the actual process of production, must remain involved in purely superstructural activities. As a productive social agent he is concerned solely with the manufacture and transmission of ideology. But this fact does not necessarily exclude him from consideration as a social innovator: it is also a principle that the superstructure is not merely a passive reflection of the economic basis. It is an active force, it is used by all as an instrument in the class-struggle. On the one side, it is active in defence of the existing relations, on the other it is a pacemaker in the drive to change existing productive relationships.³ Lenin assigns to ideas the honourable status of material forces. He says: ‘theory becomes a material force when it has gripped the masses’. When Marx says that economic relations are primary, and thoughts, feelings and volitions are derivative and secondary he does not mean that the latter are unimportant. Nor does he exclude the possibility of a two-way interaction between economy (the productive basis) and ideas (the ideological superstr...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• The International Library of Sociology
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Biographical Notes
• 1 Marxism and the Dialectics of Social Change
• 2 Social Equilibrium and Social Change: Malinowski’s Functionalism
• 3 Psychoanalysis: Personality Structure, Politics, Social Change
• 4 Social Action and Social Change
• 5 Theories of Social Change: A Comparative Analysis
• Bibliography
• Index