The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle

Mirrors of Virtue

Jiyuan Yu

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136748554
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

As a comparative study of the virtue ethics of Aristotle and Confucius, this book explores how they each reflect upon human good and virtue out of their respective cultural assumptions, conceptual frameworks, and philosophical perspectives. It does not simply take one side as a framework to understand the other; rather, it takes them as mirrors for each other and seeks to develop new readings and perspectives of both ethics that would be unattainable if each were studied on its own.

1 Eudaimonia, dao, and virtue

Happiness [eudaimonia] is an activity of soul in accordance with complete virtue.

(Nicomachean Ethics, 1102a5–6)

I set my heart on way [dao], base myself on virtue [de], lean upon human excellence [ren] for support and take my recreation in the arts.

(Analects, 7:6)

For both ethics of Confucius and Aristotle, the central question is about what good life is or what kind of person one should be. More strikingly, both ethics answer this central question by focusing on virtue, that is, the quality that makes a person a good person. However, they formulate the question in different ways. In Aristotle, it is “what is eudaimonia [happiness]?” and in Confucius, it is “Where is the dao [way] to be a good person?” They also have different names for virtue: aretē in Aristotle and de or ren in Confucius.

In this chapter, I set out to show how this central question and this general approach are developed in these two ethics by putting them respectively into ancient Chinese and Greek ethical traditions. Both ethics are shaped by their traditions, and they in turn influence the subsequent course of their traditions. The first section is an inquiry into the notions of eudaimonia (happiness) and dao (way); the second section studies two concepts of virtue (aretē and de); and the third section discusses the relation between de and ren in Confucius.

While Confucius is the founder of Chinese ethics, Aristotle works in the eudaimonistic framework that Socrates has established. I am therefore led to compare how Confucius and Socrates initiate their respective ethical traditions (the fourth and fifth sections). Since a comparison with Socrates is useful not only for better understanding the Confucian approach (especially the relation between religion and philosophy in his ethics), but also for appreciating Aristotle’s originality, I develop it in great detail. Aristotle’s ethics follows Socrates’ orientation, yet it becomes the most important representative of virtue ethics and the dominant paradigm for contemporary virtue ethics. It is therefore significant to know how he differs from Socrates. The final section shows that the differences between Aristotle and Socrates run parallel in many ways to the differences between Confucius and Socrates.

Human good: eudaimonia and dao

Aristotle starts his ethics by saying that there is a supreme end for a human life as a whole, and that this end is the human good. The end or good is supreme in the sense that it is not pursued for any further end, while everything else is desired for the sake of it. An understanding of this supreme end or good is of central importance for us if we are to conduct our lives well, and it is the task of ethics to help us grasp it. Aristotle claims that, just as an archer must know the mark at which to aim at, “we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is.”¹

The Greek term eudaimonia has traditionally been translated as “happiness.” Strictly speaking, the translation is somewhat misleading. The English word “happiness” means mainly a feeling of pleasure or contentment, and is only in a secondary sense associated with the objective sense of fortune, attainment of good, or well-being. Yet eudaimonia has the etymological meaning of “favored by the gods,” and was originally associated with “prosperity” or “good fortune” (in the Greek mind, fortune is distributed by the gods).² In Greek ethics from Socrates on, eudaimonia has been taken to be synonymous with “doing well” or “living well,”³ and signifies “well-being,” “achievement” or “flourishing.” To give an account of eudaimonia means to specify what kind of life is flourishing.

For Confucius, the task is to find human dao, the right way which a human life should take. The knowledge of dao is of central significance for human life. “He has not lived in vain who dies the day he is told about the dao” (A, 4:8). In Confucius’ time, however, dao has been lost, and Confucius takes finding it to be his task: “I set my heart on the way [dao]” (A, 7:6). In the Analects, this pursuit is conceived as a mission from Heaven. As one of his visitors remarks to Confucius’ disciples: “The world has long been without the dao. Heaven is about to use your Master as the wooden tongue for a bell” (A, 3:24).

Hence, Aristotle’s eudaimonism is about what is a good human life, and Confucius’ theory of dao is about which way a human life should take. Confucius’ dao corresponds to Aristotle’s eudaimonia in the sense that each refers to the highest human good.

These two concepts are deeply embedded, respectively, in Greek and Chinese cultural traditions. That life has an overall end or goal is what the Greeks generally believe. Aristotle himself tells us how popular this belief is: “It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid.”⁴ Greeks also generally agree about what this end is called: “Both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is eudaimonia, and identify living well and faring well with being eudaimon” (NE, 1095a16–17). When Socrates examines the moral beliefs of his fellow Athenians, the goal of his cross-examination (elenchus) is to make people happy: “The Olympian victor makes you think yourself happy; I make you be happy” (Apology, 36e1).⁵ Yet he also claims that his examination is to make people “live in the right way” (Apology, 39d4). There is no tension between these two statements insofar as the goal of the examination is concerned, because being happy is synonymous with “living well.” “How one ought to live”is repeatedly claimed as the central question of the philosophy of Socrates and Plato.⁶

Almost all major Greek ethical theories start from the premise that happiness is the ultimate answer to explain the end of one’s life, and that it determines the rationality of any action. This constitutes the axiom of Greek eudaimonism. Every action and every thing has an end, but happiness is the only end that we do not pursue for the sake of a further end. Why is happiness such an end? It is the final reason for one’s action. With regard to every action, we can always ask what an end is for, yet happiness is an exception. “There is no need to ask further, ‘What’s the point of wanting happiness?’” (Symposium, 205a2–3). Plato’s Socrates even says that whoever raises such a question is said to be stupid (Euthydemus, 278e–279c). It would not make sense to ask why one wants happiness. When Aristotle starts the NE with the thesis that there is a supreme end for the human life and that end is happiness, he apparently follows the same line of thinking.⁷

To call happiness the final end, however, gives it only a formal sense. One needs to specify in a substantial way what constitutes happiness. In Aristotle’s words, “To say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clear account of what it is is still desired” (NE, 1097b22–24). A history of Greek ethics is a history of disputes about what happiness is and how to achieve it. Different eudaimonistic theories define and rank the goods in life in different ways, and provide answers about what we should aim at finally.

Just as happiness is the common concern of ancient Greek ethics, way (dao) is the common object of ancient Chinese ethics. Since it is Heaven that is said to have commanded Confucius to find the way, to understand how the way becomes a central concern of Confucius, we begin with the concept of Heaven (tian, meaning literally “sky”).⁸ Heaven was an object of religious reverence in the early Zhou (traditionally 1122–256 BCE). It means heavenly bodies (or sky) and the impersonal ordering force of the universe. As an impersonal ordering force, Heaven was conceived mainly in two ways: one was as an incomprehensible and unpredictable force, similar to fate. In this sense, Heaven is morally indifferent and is the cause of all the events that are beyond human control and comprehension, such as natural disasters, fortunes, diseases, etc. The other sense is as the ultimate guarantor of moral value and world order. These two ideas exist side by side for many ancient Chinese philosophers (including Confucius in the Analects) who, however, never try to reconcile these two aspects.⁹ The concept of the benevolent Heaven is used as the theoretical justification by the Duke of Zhou, one of the founders of the Zhou dynasty, for the Zhou’s overthrow of the Shang dynasty (traditionally 1766–1122 BCE), the earliest dynasty of Chinese civilization that has written records. According to the record of the pre-Confucian classic TheBook of Documents, the Duke of Zhou claims that the revolution is justified because the Shang dynasty, due to its misrule, has forfeited the Mandate of Heaven (tian-ming).

The early Zhou is thought to be a golden era and a model society. Its social and moral system is that to which Confucius aspired to return. The Zhou dynasty governed with a form of feudalism and parceled out authority over different areas to kinsmen and other nobles. Yet, over time, these feudal lords turned the regions under their immediate control into more and more independent states. The Zhou ruler’s power declined gradually and this resulted in the breakdown of the original moral and political order. In 771 BCE, a coalition of feudal lords and barbarians invaded the Zhou’s capital, and forced the Zhou eastward. The event marked the end of the Western Zhou and the beginning of the Eastern Zhou. The Eastern Zhou, during which period the Zhou ruler is more of a figurehead than an actual ruler, is subdivided into the Spring and Autumn period (named after the title of the pre-Confucian classic Spring and Autumn Annals, a court chronicle of Confucius’ home state Lu, 722–481 BCE), and the Warring States period (403–222 BCE). Confucius (551–479 BCE) lived during the late Spring and Autumn period, an era marked by endless warfare, brutal violence, and frightening suffering, as the classic Commentary of Zuo on the Spring and Autumn Annals testifies. Apparently, the “Mandate of Heaven”that Zhou once claimed to possess was thought to be lost.

The “Mandate of Heaven”theory presupposes that Heaven has its own will and issues commands. In the Spring and Autumn period, this is said to be the dao of Heaven. Heaven was thought to have its own norm, and humankind has its way as well.¹⁰ When Analects 3:24 claims that Heaven commands Confucius to restore the dao, it shows that Confucius introduces the concepts of Heaven and dao (way) into the center of ethics. He explains the turmoil of his time on the grounds that the dao of Heaven does not prevail and human dao has also been lost. “The Master said, ‘who can go out without using the door? Why, then, does no one follow the way?’” (A, 6:17) He takes seriously the divine nature of his task: “There is no one who understands me,” he says, “It is only Heaven that understands me.”¹¹ The divine mission indicates that the correct way of being a human is that which is in accordance with the way of Heaven.¹²

Confucius’ question, then, is “where is the human dao?” To answer this question means to wake people up and bring them back to the correct path. This question sets the agenda for subsequent Chinese philosophy. Shortly after Confucius, in the Warring States period, a number of philosophical schools (called the “hundred schools”) emerge and develop.¹³ Their common goal is to find and establish the Heaven-based human dao, the dao that can best guide how one should live and how a society should be organized.¹⁴

Although the way (dao) is the common goal, ancient Chinese philosophers differ about what it is. Philosophical schools in the classical period of Chinese philosophy offer competing accounts of what the way should be. The way in Chinese philosophy goes in all different directions.¹⁵ A. Graham felicitously calls ancient Chinese philosophers “the Disputers of Dao.” To appropriate this term and apply it to Greek philosophy, we can also call ancient Greek ethicists “disputers of eudaimonia.”¹⁶

Virtue: aretē and de

Although Confucius starts from dao and Aristotle from eudaimonia, the next step on each side is strikingly similar: that is, to focus on virtue.

Having laid it down that eudaimonia is the object of his ethics, Aristotle proposes that a satisfactory theory of happiness can be provided “if we could first ascertain the function of man” (NE, 1097b25). Human function (ergon) means the characteristic human activity or work, that is, rational activity (we will examine the function argument in detail in the next chapter). The function argument concludes that happiness or human good “turns out to be activity of soul in conformity with virtue” (NE, 1098a16–17). From this conclusion, Aristotle proceeds to discuss virtue: “Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of happiness” (NE, 1102a5–7). The bulk of the NE, then, is dedicated to the examination of the virtues of various parts of the soul. In this way, Aristotle’s eudaimonism becomes an ethics that focuses on virtue.

Confucius’ goal is to seek dao (way), but it is also to cultivate de (virtue): “I set my heart on dao, and base myself on de” (A, 7:6). “How can a man be said either to have anything or not to have anything who fails to hold on to virtue [de] with all his might or to believe in the way [dao] with all his heart?” (A, 19:2). He emphasizes that the cultivation of de is his major concern (A, 7:3), although to obtain it is difficult (A, 9:18; 15:13). He also claims that the supreme de (virtue) is the me...