The Psychology of Reasoning

Eugenio Rignano

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9780415209724
• eBook ISBN:
  9781136309410
• Topic: Medicine
• Subtopic: Health Care Delivery

First Published in 1999. This is Volume XVII of twenty-one of a series on Cognitive Psychology. Written in 1923, this book looks at the treatises on Logic and seeks to discover the nature of reasoning which the author argues is tied up with an instinctive tendency to resolve complex psychical phenomena into more elementary processes.

CHAPTER II

ATTENTION

Part I : Affective Conflict and Unity of Consciousness

ALTHOUGH attention rejoices in a more abundant literature than perhaps any other psychical phenomenon, yet it is still far from being fully “explained” ; that is to say, it has not been brought in any way into relation with other psychical phenomena, especially with those with which it has the greatest affinity. And although attention, as Titchener has well said, forms the pivot of all psychology, yet to-day the question as to its essential nature is, to the great detriment of this branch of the science, still very far from solution.

The cause of this backwardness is the same as is found to be responsible in the case of all other psychical activities, namely, that the investigation of all these phenomena has been begun at the point where they are most complex and intricate instead of with the simplest forms. The question of attention has usually been studied by means of introspection and in the act of philosophical reflection, instead of by observing, for instance, the beast of prey, waiting for an opportunity to fall upon its quarry, or the child who hesitates before putting a white pellet in his mouth, in doubt whether it is a sweet as usual, or may turn out to be a bitter pill as was the case yesterday.

The expediency of beginning the investigation with the simplest forms involves the expediency of pursuing the phylogenetic method and following the course of evolution back as far as possible in order to reveal the phenomenon in the very moment of its first appearance. This is the course we pursued in the preceding chapter, when investigating the nature of another psychical phenomenon no less important and fundamental, namely that of affective tendencies ; and the phylogenetic method, which showed us their mnemonic origin and nature, at once threw light upon that hitherto equally obscure class of phenomena.

This procedure may, it seems to us, be equally successful with attention, which is, as we shall see, only a secondary phenomenon directly derived from affective tendencies.

In the preceding chapter we have seen that the affecture tendencies are originally only expressions of one and the same intrinsic tendency of the organism to preserve or restore the state of its normal physiological equilibrium, or to re-establish a previous physiological state, general or local, which had been determined in the past by certain environmental relations. As soon as these relations are even partially repeated, they set loose and bring about the discharge, in the nascent state, of the mnemonic accumulation which this former physiological system had left behind.

But we must here emphasize the fact that when a physiological system has been disturbed by altered environmental conditions and reduced to a potential state in the form of a mnemonic accumulation, it can become fully re-activated and continue active in a stable physiological state only when its internal and external relations are, not only partially, but entirely and exactly the same as when they induced this physiological state. Thus the physiological system of an infusorian which has previously lived in a certain temperature or in a salt solution of a certain degree will produce an affective tendency towards its former habitat as soon as it is removed to other environmental relations ; and this tendency will be expressed by negative reactions to every other change of its environmental relations which tends to remove it still further from its original habitat, and by positive reactions to every change which brings it nearer thereto (Jennings). But the original physiological state cannot be perfectly re-established and made to persist in normal activity until the animal by its own movements has succeeded in getting again into an environment identical with the old one. Likewise the diminution of histogenetic substance in the blood which prevents the continuance of the normal metabolic state hitherto active and stable, will provoke the affective tendency of hunger and all its derivative acts of seeking and absorbing nourishment. But the normal metabolic state cannot be completely re-established until hunger is “satisfied” ; that is to say, until the acts carried on for the purpose of seeking and absorbing nourishment and the processes of digestion have endowed the blood with the same proportion of histogenetic substance, as formerly.

And yet, as with all mnemonic evocations, here also a small part of a certain former complex environmental state is sufficient, we repeat, if not to “satisfy” the relative affective tendency and to re-activate entirely and lastingly the corresponding physiological state, at least to set it free in the nascent state. That is why the sensations in so far as they represent parts of environmental conditions, become the “starters” par excellence of affective tendencies. But in this respect there is an essential difference between the “non-distance receptors” and the “distance-receptors” which Sherrington rightly emphasizes, so that a very significant phylogenetic advance was made when the latter gradually developed from the former.

The “non-distance receptors” (senses with direct contact) usually permit the immediate or almost immediate satisfaction of the affective tendencies which they “start.” Frequently the sensation evoking a certain affective tendency has in itself the requisites to satisfy this latter. On the other hand, the “distance-receptors” usually produce that particular state in which an affective tendency is evoked and held in suspense, and which we must next analyse with care.

“Between touch and assimilation,” says Spencer, “there exists, in the lowest creatures, an intimate connexion. In many Rhizopods the tactual surface and the absorbing surface are co-extensive. The amoeba, a speck of jelly having no constant form, sends out, in this or that direction, prolongations of its substance. One of these meeting with, and attaching itself to, some relatively fixed object, becomes a temporary limb by which the body of the creature is drawn forward ; but if this prolongation meets with some relatively small portion of organic matter it slowly expands its extremity around this, slowly contracts, and slowly draws the nutritive morsel into the mass of the body, which collapses around it and presently dissolves it. That is to say, the same portion of tissue is at once arm, hand, mouth, and intestine—shows us the tactual and absorbent function united in one.”¹

Sherrington in his turn says: “Animal behaviour shows clearly that in regard to these two groups of receptors the one subserves differentiation of reaction, i.e. swallowing or rejection, of material already found and acquired, e.g. within the mouth. The other, the distance-receptor, smell, initiates and subserves far-reaching complex reactions of the animal anticipatory to swallowing, namely, all that train of reaction which may be comprehensively termed the quest for food. The latter foreruns and leads up to the former. This precurrent relation of the reaction of the distance-receptor to the non-distance receptor (as well as the ‘ conative feeling ’ which the distance-receptor induces) are typical.” ²

Non-distance receptors, then, occasion no “suspended” affective tendencies, no “conative feeling,” but instead they bring about the immediate satisfaction of affective tendencies at the moment they are evoked, or the immediate accomplishment of the acts contributing to their satisfaction (“final or consummatory reactions,” as Sherrington expresses it). Distance-receptors, on the other hand, evoke the relative affective tendency and keep it awake during the entire time of expectation and during the whole series of acts required before the animal can carry out the last consummatory act, which is to satisfy this affective tendency. It follows that in general only the distance-receptors but not the non-distance receptors can bring about a more or less lasting condition of unfulfilled desire: “If all motive impulses could be at once followed up desire would have no place.”³

The question now arises how can we explain the fact that the affective tendencies evoked by the distance-receptors, nevertheless remain “suspended”; in other words, how is that although they persist in this state of excitation, yet for some time they occasion no actual performance of any of those consummatory acts which indeed would not now have any result, but to which they nevertheless impel, as is shown by the incipient performance of these acts? The beast of prey, for instance, whose appetite is aroused from afar by the scent and sight of his victim coming towards him without presentiment of danger, nevertheless does not bound forward at once, but waits motionless with all the muscles tense, until the poor creature has come within springing distance. What then prevents the affective tendency so evoked from being at once completely discharged in the consummatory act of springing upon the prey and tearing it to pieces?

This can only be the counteraction of a conflicting tendency by which the first tendency is prevented from accomplishing its consummatory act. And the conflicting tendency in this case can only be the consequence of all consummatory acts which were actually performed in the past at the first awakening of the affective tendency, but every time without result. So we may say it was the “deception”, occurring at each premature activation of the affective tendency called forth by the distance-receptor, that called into being the opposite tendency by which the first is now held in suspense.

Möbius’ experiment with the pike is well known. By means of a pane of glass he divided a large glass bowl full of water into two parts. In one side he placed the pike and in the other he put tiny whitings which provide the pike’s customary food, with the result that whenever the pike dived after one of the small fishes it fell against the obstructing pane of glass. After making these vain attempts for a week, it gave up entirely the pursuit of its unattainable prey and did not change its behaviour even when the obstructing pane of glass had been taken away.

Now the constantly repeated deceptions which resulted when the affective tendency released by a distance-receptor produced immediately the complete performance of a consummatory act which was necessarily unsuccessful, must have had a very similar effect on all animals provided with these senses. And so it has come to pass that the evocation by the distance-receptors of any affective tendency and the premature beginning of the movement connected with it, now, thanks to the memory of former unsuccessful attempts, provoke the antagonistic tendency, similar in every respect to that which prevented the pike from falling upon its prey. And this conflict produces that state of affective tendency “held in suspense” which constitutes the state of attention.

Accordingly we may say that phylogenetically attention originated with the distance-receptors, and that it consists in the conflict of two affective tendencies, the second of which is released by the first, prevents it for a time from complete activation, and hence keeps it “in suspense/’

The state of attention therefore does not consist of a single affective state_y but of the conflict arising from the coexistence of two affective states. It is because this fact has been overlooked that it has not been possible hitherto to understand in what this state of an affective tendency “in suspense”, characteristic of attention, really consisted, and why all those movements which the first of the two affective tendencies would itself have provoked, are arrested “in the nascent state” whereas had this affectivity alone been active they would have been completed.

But also under countless other circumstances, beside this case of the unsuccessful performance of a premature “consummatory act”, the distance-receptors arouse, in conflict with the first, a second affectivity which for some time prevents the activation of the former, as a consequence of the unexpected, unpleasant results which had some time previously been associated with this activation. And whenever such an affective conflict occurs, a corresponding state of attention arises at the same time ; and vice versa, there is no state of attention without such a conflict of tendencies. For we need only consider carefully a few of the most significant cases, selected so as to be as different as possible from one another, in order at once to see this conflict of tendencies in operation.

“A young chick two days old,” says Lloyd Morgan, “had learned to pick out pieces of yolk from others of white of egg. I cut little bits of orange-peel of the same size as the pieces of yolk, and one of these was soon seized but at once relinquished, the chick shaking its head. Seizing another he held it for a moment in the bill, but then dropped it and scratched at the base of his beak. That was enough. He could not again be induced to seize a piece of orange-peel. The obnoxious material was now removed and pieces of yolk of egg substituted but they were left untouched, being probably taken for orange-peel. Subsequently, he looked at the yolk with hesitation, but presently pecked doubtfully, not seizing but merely touching. Then he pecked again, seized, and swallowed it”.¹

We see here how the first act of attention of the newly hatched chicken was due to the conflict between its first tendency to seize the yolk of the egg and the conflicting tendency aroused by the memory of the unpleasant experience produced by picking up the orange-peel. The “effective guidance and control of consciousness,” which Lloyd Morgan mentions as one of the factors modifying the instinctive pecking of the chicken, was thus only the appearance of a new affectivity, repugnance, inhibiting the first affectivity, hunger, which impelled toward the completion of the instinctive act.²

A little girl is taken out for a walk by a maid, and suddenly catches sight of her mother on the other side of the street and wishes to run over to her at once. But the maid suddenly calls out, “Mind the carriage !” and the infant at once stops. The carriage has hardly passed and she has almost taken a step forward when another approaching vehicle forces her to draw back again. The conflict of the two tendencies of desire and fear, kept alive in the child by the sight of her mother and the repeated passing of vehicles is shown very clearly by the direction of her steps first forward and then backward. It is faithfully reflected in the expression of the small bright eyes which shine with anticipation and joy as soon as they are turned upon her mother and the child takes a step nearer to her, but look distressed and anxious when they observe one of the tiresome wagons of which there seems to be no end. Finally, however, the street is unobstructed. The state of fear and the “state of attention”, have both entirely disappeared, so that the little girl may at last satisfy her wish and throw herself into her mother’s arms.

The conflict of tendencies is likewise exhibited with great distinctness in certain typical states of attention where it is expressed in the ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Preface
• Contents
• I. On The Mnemonic Origin and Nature of Affective Tendencies
• II. Attention Part I: Affective Conflict and Unity of Consciousness
• III. Attention Part II: Vividness and Connection
• IV. What Is Reasoning?
• V. The Evolution Of Reasoning Part I: From Concrete Reasoning to Abstract Reasoning
• VI. The Evolution Of Reasoning Part II: From Intuition to Deduction
• VII. The Higher Forms of Reasoning Part I: Mathematical Reasoning in its Phases of Direct and Indirect Symbolism
• VIII. The Higher Forms of Reasoning Part II: Mathematical Reasoning in its phases of symbolic condensation and symbolic inversion
• IX. The Higher Forms Of Reasoning Part III: Mathematics and Mathematical Logic
• X. “Intentional” Reasoning I: Dialectic Reasoning
• XI. “Intentional” Reasoning II: Metaphysical Reasoning
• XII. The Different Logical Types Of Mind
• XIII. The Pathology Of Reasoning Part I: The Incoherence and Illogicality of Dreams
• XIV. The Pathology Of Reasoning Part II: Coherent but Illogical Insanity due to Mono-affectivism
• XV. The Pathology Of Reasoning Part III: Incoherent Insanity due to Instability, Impotence, or Absence of the Affective Tendencies
• XVI. Conscious and Unconscious Reasoning
• Conclusion Reasoning In Relation To Vital Finalism
• Index