The PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INFANT

Siegfried Bernfeld

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781136312236
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Medicine
• Subtopic: Health Care Delivery

First Published in 1999. This is Volume II of thirty-two in the Developmental Psychology series. Written in 1929, this book is a translation into English from Austrian of Dr. Bernfeld's study that confines itself to an intensive study of the brief period in infancy from birth to weaning.

B. THE FIRST PROGRESS

SEEING

THE structure of the new-born very soon experiences a series of essential changes which are designated as developmental progressions. The word progress is not entirely a happy one. It is not used to express any judgment of values, but as a descriptive term for phenomena which the new-born still lacks and the appearance of which makes the infant more like the adult human being. But one must remember that development does not run its course uniformly, and that, therefore, some phenomenon foreign to the new-born’s structure, or scarcely indicated in it, nevertheless forms itself clearly in the next developmental period, though it is at first very dissimilar to the norm-structures of the adult ; so that it is difficult to decide whether the earlier or later stage is closer to the adult, although they differ from each other so greatly. It would be well if there were a suitable word to designate such changes which, in the circuitous route of development, deviate from the starting-point of development without approaching directly the end-point. There is no such term ; we therefore use “ progress ” more unconcernedly than we should if we knew that such roundabout ways as these were necessary steps.

The first progress of this kind demands our special attention for the same reasons that direct us towards a detailed study of the first weeks of life. Manifold as they will prove to be, they stand in firm relation to one another, and give a precise stamp to a definite developmental span. It is, indeed, approximately the first three months which can be considered collectively as the period of the first progress. Naïve observers have been inclined to assign a unified, unique position to the first quarter of the first year. Sigismund calls it the stupid quarter. This name has not persisted, but the separation which it suggests was widely accepted, and, moreover, it vindicates itself on deeper grounds than the convenience of counting by the calendar year.

This phase can be briefly, easily, and clearly characterized. Child psychologists are scarcely at variance upon the fact that the active use of the sense organs and the appearance of the effects of memory in the emotional life and in the will of the child—as, e.g., Bühler formulates it—are the first important steps of development. Actually both of these do not exist, or are so indifferently indicated in the new-born that the unfolding of both these phenomena must produce a very essential changed structure in the child of three months. In order to perceive this clearly the established facts must first be presented collectively.

A priori it is apparent that the first developments will be phenomena classifiable under the progressive tendency, the tendency to make mental progress. One can therefore expect them to be especially clear in the field of the sense of sight, which from the very beginning—as contrary to anticipation we found—behaves progressively. It is advisable to begin with them.

The eye is from birth very sensitive to light, and moderate light stimuli release manifold reactions of pleasure: opening the eyes wide, turning the head towards objects, the breathing and pulse curves, are all more of the ‘ pleasure ’ than of the ‘ pain ’ type. When the light is agreeable to the new-born, it can still do very little to obtain this pleasure or to ensure its continuance. The movements towards light are at the beginning seldom—though this is not positively established for all cases—of long duration or much consequence, and occur only in response to diffused light from large surfaces. In spite of the manifested attraction to light, there can be no talk of the infant seeing in the sense that the adult sees. Though it is in general debatable whether in the first days small lighted objects (candle-flame) as well as a large bright surface (window) are noticed, it nevertheless is certain that the direction of the glance towards the object and the accommodation to its distance do not exist at the beginning. On the contrary, the capacity for both is gradually acquired in the course of the first three months. The older child-psychology, with Preyer at its head, has devoted conscientious study to this question, with the result that we are well informed on some important questions in this connection.

Focussing the gaze perfects itself in four stages (Preyer,. Bühler) : (i) The glance wanders aimlessly about ; if it accidentally falls on a distinct object sufficiently near, the pleasure reactions already named may appear—or the infant gazes straight ahead and depends upon an object being or coming by chance into its line of vision. (2) About the second week bright surfaces are actively held within the line of vision; turning from one bright surface to others has been observed (eleventh day, Preyer). At this point a kind of real seeing of stationary objects is attained, a stage which provides the infant with considerable pleasure. The next important step—the decisive step, if you will—is (3), which is made in the third week. Then the eyes can follow slowly-moving objects, and they take on a “ new, contented, intelligent expression ” (Preyer). The pleasure, or at least its expression, increases up to loud “ joyful exclamations ” (Preyer). Thus the child has attained a certain degree of independence from the accidental appearance and disappearance of light stimuli, in addition to achieving the preliminary condition for actual defined seeing, which is the fixation of stimuli within the retina. With the acquisition of capacity (4), “ seeking,” the infant has attained that degree of activity and independence which can generally be acquired only with the aid of the head muscles. This seeking usually begins at the end of the third month, and regularly in the following way: the child seeks for the cause of the sound and turns its eyes or its head in different directions, apparently carefully and intelligently planned, often quickly in the correct direction.

Simultaneously with the acquisition of these capacities the convergence of the axes of both pupils develops. At the beginning divergent atypical movements of both eye-balls or movements of one by itself are very frequent. They are by no means exclusive; at the beginning, although rarely, convergent movements occur. These very soon predominate. More exact data cannot be cited, but, in any case, this stage is already reached before the expiration of the first month. After the third month these atypical movements do not normally recur.

Accommodation behaves similarly. It, too, is noticed in the first days, but it is scarcely regulated with regard to accuracy, certainty, and speed. More exact reports are not at hand, but there is nevertheless much to support the belief that at the time of “ following ” accommodation already functions with some exactness and regularity (Bühler) : that before the end of the third month, the development of accommodation is not complete (Preyer), and reaches completion perhaps only at the end of the twelfth.

These facts have become the starting-point of two ardent discussions: first, the question was raised as to whether they cover the nativistic or empirical conception; and, secondly, an attempt was made to formulate from them a suitable conception concerning the nature of the infant’s perceptions and of primitive perception in general. The first question could hardly be more in dispute at present. The mechanisms of convergence and accommodation are undoubtedly inherent, This means that the system of muscular movements, which is necessary to perform an act of seeing in the true sense, is prepared by birth. It need not be discovered by the child, and is not “ taught “ as piano-playing is. On the other hand, it is not completely developed from the beginning, and the coordination of muscles which constitutes seeing is not the only kind of movement of which these muscles are capable. Not so in the case of sucking, which is not merely learned, but is at the new-born’s disposal from the first day as completely formed co-ordinations of various muscular movements. The motor system of “ sucking “ is, of course, just as little as “ seeing,” not the only one which is possible with the respective muscles, but it forms automatically and from the beginning in response to definite stimuli, while in the case of seeing, not only is a more precise co-ordination of the parts generally necessary and gradually develops, but, above all, the condensation as a regular reaction to one stimulus must first be “ learned “ little by little. This difference appears greater than it actually is, because normally the eye muscles only make more “ seeing movements ” ; because, in part, they are only able to make more such movements; because the lips, tongue, and palatine muscles co-ordinate for various functions for the rest of life. The problem cannot be one of heredity or of acquisition, but, according to Stern’s general formulation, it is, “ What is inherent, what is acquired ?” And this seems to be the answer : The eye muscle movements are in part inherent (co-ordination, accommodation), in part learned; precision and subordination to the stimulus are acquired; if one can express it so, the combination as sole reaction. It does not have to be expressly mentioned that we are dealing with a reaction of R.T. II type, for the seeing movements serve to admit light, to permit it to act to the greatest degree; it is thoroughly intelligible from this function.

But what does the word “ acquired ” mean ? How is a thing acquired ? is the question which immediately follows from the answer to this. The second question is important for the clarification of the idea of mental gain: revealing the mechanisms of acquiring is a principal task of developmental psychology. Before approaching the question a few distinctions must be made. Looking consists of a series of unequal psychic movements. The statement that the eye movements of adults are not of a psychic nature at all is hardly too sweeping. They are physiological movements, similar to the movements of heart, lungs, stomach, and inner secretions. There is little reason for separating those movements from these on principle. The physiological movements can very often for a certain period of time become conscious, can be perceived, in the same way as the outer surfaces of our body; they often have psychic results—at times very considerable ones : they can be psychically influenced, sometimes very energetically and lastingly. We have, however, no reason for classifying the peristaltic movements in the field of psychology. And what is valid for this could be equally valid for the eye movements, if the eye movements of adults were identical with those of the new-born. The facts of their development give them a certain place in psychology. Eating is certainly a psychic affair, but the movements of the chewing muscles and tongue are not in themselves psychic but physiological processes. Undoubtedly movements become psychological when they are “ discharge phenomena ” or “ activities.” Since the eye movements in the first quarter of the first year are precisely of those categories, they must necessarily be given a somewhat different position in psychology, regardless of the extent to which these genetic facts offer them a kind of midposition between physiological and psychological phenomena.

Koffka alone, as far as I see, remarks that it is to be assumed that by no means all the eye movements of the first days are connected with seeing, but that many are to be conceived simply as impulsive movements, and, therefore, according to our nomenclature, discharge phenomena.

This interpretation seems plausible and justifiable throughout. One cannot sufficiently emphasize that every single undifferentiated state of the early psychic phenomena can have various meanings. If many of the eye movements are discharge processes, it is not surprising that they run their course atypically because the co-ordination of the pupils is not a fixed reflex, but becomes capable of almost every possible kind of movement only later during the course of life.

Above we have classified the psychically relevant movements into two groups: defence-phenomena and activities. If this division is to be maintained, the co-ordinated movements and, in general, all those which are not merely discharge phenomena, but have something to do with seeing, must be regarded as activities. This somewhat contradicts the customary usage of language, but it seems to me it contradicts usage alone. For this classification is in essence justified. We need only make it clear to ourselves that the various eye movements are significant in order that the light stimuli make clear pictures on the retina, and we must be content with the proposition of a “ need for seeing.” This can easily be done if we consider those facts which have been ascertained concerning the pleasure during seeing and concerning the intensity of this accomplishment.

No observer has neglected to mention the “ high pleasure tone “ (Bühler), the “ great joy “ and “ loud cooing “ (Preyer) of the child, which occur not only at the first seeing or during the first successful stage of the act of seeing, but which accompany seeing in general, and which are especially gleeful and continuous during the first three months. A striking visual object arouses every expression of pleasure, of which the child is capable at the time, even to laughing, kicking, and “ screeching.” At the beginning the expressions of pleasure are, in general, only slightly in evidence (in contrast to those of displeasure, of which more will be said later), but even the one fact that the child in the first weeks gives his attention to seeing demonstrates a certain degree of pleasure in seeing or compulsion to see, even where the light stimulus can be easily avoided: it needs only to close its eyes, a reaction which the new-born already controls. The following is remarkable, and, in this connection, proof of what Preyer refers to : Wide open eyes, thus admitting the light, is a common never-failing symptom of pleasure; closing the eyes, “ not-wanting-to-see,” is a symptom of displeasure. It is as if the expression of the pleasure of seeing were typical for every pleasure, which would speak well for the intensity of this delight in seeing. But being able to see something may also be a compensation for some pain; often, and very early in fact (e.g., the second week in the case of Scupin’s boy), the infant stops crying when it is given something luminous and multi-coloured which it can see. It is diverted, not merely for the moment of surprise, but for a longer or shorter period. This behaviour can hardfy be interpreted otherwise than as a probable indication that the pleasure of seeing is stronger than the ‘ pain ’ which was the cause of crying.

Seeing is an active process, and is bound up with effort. All signs of attention are connected with seeing. If there is still doubt that the attention of the child in the first few weeks is not passive and extorted, there can be no possible doubt at a latter stage of development. Scupin thus graphically describes the fourth week : “ The wakeful child was placed near a many-coloured silk cushion. He gazed at it in sustained attention, dilated his nostrils, and pouted his lips; so that his little mouth was quite pointed… . The activity was so apparent that one can only describe the child’s behaviour with the words, he wants to see something. Thus, Queck-Wilker writes : ‘ (Forty-second day) glued his eyes at a point on the ceiling and the head and eyes move backward as the child is turned away from the point. … In the seventieth day he follows the lamp light, turns his head after it, and becomes restless when he is shaded.’ “

Of course, these developed visual processes are activities. Why should not the attempt to follow a moving candle flame with the eyes four weeks earlier be interpreted in the same way ? But this cannot yet be done, because the latter necessitates head movements, while the former requires only eye movements; the eye movements, moreover, are still unconscious, while the head movements were already conscious. We know that one is exactly as uncertain as the other, and we are not concerned as to whether a process is conscious or not when we wish to classify it as an activity. The decisive reason for opposing this position can only be that the activity is accomplished by an organized psychic factor in the sense of its needs, and it is not easy to assume this need of seeing for the earliest suckling period. But just to prove the assumption of the necessity of such a factor I shall devote some space to the apparently purely terminological question.

If we could assume a conscious ego, which wants to see we should naturally say that its seeing is an activity. But¹ since we cannot, we must substitute a need, which impulsively or instinctively produces complex movements: activities, or more exactly expressed, instinctual activities. And, in my opinion, that view recommends itself. There exists from the beginning a need to see; instinctively the child performs movements to gratify this need. The term activity expresses the relation of the movement to the need.

Nevertheless, the desire to understand more clearly the “need to see” is conceivable. The first possibility which presents itself is to give this necessity the name of seeing instinct. But we shall not yield to this temptation. In this case the new name adds nothing, and we must avoid the designation, convenient though it may be, of need by instinct, for it is one of the tasks of this book to treat instincts and instinctual life seriously.

Claparède (2) says that the perceptive interest is dominant in early childhood, and that a considerable amount of this interest is devoted to the seeing instinct, for it is more than mere nomenclature. It classifies the need-to-see in a larger relationship, in the established perceptive interest generally. It can, indeed, go yet a step further and explain this interest biologically: interest appertains to that which is biologically important. The consideration of mental development from this angle of interest is related to the one here presented. And one could be satisfied with it, if this interest were not a very puzzling one, and, in the hands of Claparède at least, not a sharply expressed idea. Besides this, the need for seeing is so closely related to pleasure, that one very unwillingly accepts the reversal of the relationship that results from the theory of interest. On this theory the biologically adequate interest, when exercised, produces pleasure. The need to see ” comes from the common perceptive interest; this interest is of biological advantage; it is therefore combined with pleasure. It seems to me simpler to think of the reverse : the need to see is an instance of the general desire for pleasure. Because seeing brings pleasure it is exercised, and so intensely used, that it appears as if a need to see existed. And we have named such ways of behaving, interest. Thus, seeing is simply an activity, whose purpose is pleasure-gain. The fact that seeing brings pleasure and that in any case pleasure is enjoyed is immediately conceivable. Everyone is free to be satisfied with this way out—that seeing, is connected with pleasure, and thereby the perceptive interest, the need to see, is aroused, and thus the biological purpose is positively assured.

From the beginning pleasure exists in response to certain light stimuli; there are very early exertions which lead to the formulation of a compulsion for repeated, insured, light experiences, but only after a few weeks (at the end of the first three months) can the act of seeing be more or less completely carried out. A number of movements, important up to this point, are from the start performed as discharge or reflex movements; very soon the rest are also. The substance of the process of completion is as follows: the pleasure instinct gradually gains more control over the movements, they become more and more extensive, are placed more exactly and wholly in its service, and the discharge and reflex processes lose their autonomy; pleasure becomes the exclusive aim, and is more effectively attained. The movements are “ innate,” the pleasurable tone of light stimuli likewise, and the general instinct to gain pleasure certainly not the least. Control of the motor apparatus by the instinct is acquired in phases. Of course, this happens in such a relatively short time, that one has no choice but to suppose that the process of acquisition itself is to a certain degree innate, which Koffka (in accord with Stern) has happily termed “ maturation ” in contrast to learning. This course of behaviour we shall recognize in various phenomena as a typical one. Of course the question as to whether, instead of a growth in the capacity for control, there is not a growth of the pleasure in seeing, or (perhaps dependent upon it, too) a growth of motor power, cannot be rejected offhand. The latter is not valid without qualifications; for if one hopes to obtain any clarity in the problem of psychic energy, one must, as long as it is possible to do so without straining a point, work on the assumption that the quantity of energy is constant. Nevertheless, it is striking that the energy utilized in seeing increases, and one is tempted to say an ever greater quantity of energy (instinctual force) is gradually allotted to seeing. At the same time one obtains a viewpoint for understanding the increasing dominance, the maturation of the act of seeing. It is, figuratively speaking, the result of the flowing of motor power into an inherited apparatus. But where does this plus of energy come from ? We do not see a reduction of intensity at this period in any field of the child’s life manifestations. If we maintain the principle of constancy, hardly anything remains but the view which Freud (9) represents, that the energy in the organism at the b...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Translators Note
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• A. The New-Born
• B. First Progress
• C. The Instinct of Mastery
• D. Trauma and Frustrations
• E. The Infant and its World
• Bibliography
• Index