The United States, Israel, and the Search for International Order

Socializing States

Cameron G. Thies

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415818476
• eBook ISBN: 9781136675478
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

How do emerging states become full, functioning members of the international system? In this book, Cameron G. Thies argues that new and emerging states are subject to socialization efforts by current member states, which guide them in locating their position in the international system.

Thies develops a theoretical approach to understanding how states socialize each other into and out of different roles in the international system, such as regional power, ally, and peacekeeper. The concept of state socialization is developed using role theory, a middle-range theory developed in the interdisciplinary field of social psychology. This middle-range theory helps to flesh out the theoretical mechanisms often missing in grand theories like neorealism and constructivism. The result is a structural theory of international politics that also allows for the explanation of actual foreign policy behavior by states. The foreign policy histories of the U.S. and Israel are analyzed using this theoretical approach to show how international social pressure has affected the kinds of roles they have adopted throughout their histories, as well as the kinds of roles that they have not been allowed to adopt. By considering the effects of international socialization attempts on their foreign policy behavior, Thies shows the well-known cases of the U.S. and Israel in a new light.

The United States, Israel, and the Search for International Order argues that the process by which states learn their appropriate roles and behaviors in the international social order is crucial to understanding international conflict and cooperation, which will be significant for those studying both theory and method in international relations, foreign policy, and diplomatic history.

1 Improving Structural Theories of International Politics

In the real world of events, we know that new states often emerge during very tumultuous times, such as at the close of world wars and the collapse of empires. States that form under these circumstances may be unstable at best. We need only recall the collapse of the Soviet Union and the new states that were formed in its wake. The Baltic Republics were welcomed back into the “family” of nations and even sought a role in the evolving European Union. Ukraine and Belarus, which started their international lives as nuclear powers, were gently stripped of that role by the international community due to the gap between their general capabilities and the possession of nuclear weapons. The specter of a continent-sized, nuclear power falling into chaos induced the international community to give Russia “complimentary” great power status by inviting her to meetings of the G-7, while at the same time the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and individual states like Germany tried to bail her out economically. Or consider the US response to the September 11, 2001, attacks, which ultimately led to war with the “rogue” states of Afghanistan and Iraq. These targets of the War on Terror demonstrate that the socialization of states is an ongoing process that great powers use to alter the behavior and very identity of states of lesser status in the international system. The crux of the matter is that the way members of the international system, and particularly great powers, socialize new states into the system affects the possibilities for both cooperation and conflict among states.

I argue in this book that all states undergo a process of socialization, which largely determines their success or failure as members of the international system. The socialization process begins as states emerge as independent actors, and it continues throughout their tenure in the system. A focus on socialization requires an examination of agents, their interactions, and the enduring structure of the international system. States (agents) are the initiators and subjects of socialization efforts. These activities occur through interstate interaction within the confines of an international system. An enduring structure of the system demands conformity from the agents to ensure its reproduction— hence the need for socialization efforts to maintain that conformity.

Previous attempts to incorporate socialization into the study of international relations have pushed our knowledge of this phenomenon forward, but it still remains incomplete. Waltz's (1979) Theory of International Politics, one of the most influential pieces of scholarship in modern international relations theory, assigns a special role for socialization. Along with competition, socialization is thought to be one of the two methods through which the international structure affects state behavior. Despite the centrality of socialization to his argument, Waltz provides only anecdotal evidence about the operation of socialization. Indeed, although socialization is often referenced in the literature as the means by which structure works its effects, few have delved beyond a superficial exploration of this concept for the anarchic international system as a whole. Constructivists such as Wendt (1999) discuss socialization, but their lack of application to specific cases results in abstract and incomplete models of the process. Scholars of the European Union and NATO explore socialization of member states but within the context of already highly institutionalized environments (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2000; Checkel 2005). This literature has generally failed to produce a generalizable model of the socialization process. In this book, I build upon Waltz's (1979) Theory of International Politics and offer several mechanisms that may theoretically account for the operation of the competition and socialization processes identified in Waltz's theory.

Since the study of socialization is relatively new—not only to Waltz, but also to international relations generally—this book embodies an interdisciplinary approach to the subject, drawing upon concepts and theories developed in economics, political science, psychology, social psychology, and sociology. In particular, this research fleshes out Waltz's spare structural theory by incorporating concepts from role theory. The focus on foreign policy roles as the subject of international socialization bridges the study of foreign policy and international relations. Unfortunately, these areas of study often proceed as if domestic-level factors and system-level factors were only distantly related. Waltz has advocated and repeatedly defended his position that neorealism cannot serve as a theory of foreign policy, despite strong counterarguments from Fearon (1998) and Elman (1996). The book concurs with the latter scholars by demonstrating how the structure of the international system and the domestic choices that lead to the adoption of state identity are linked through foreign policy roles. This theme fits quite nicely with the resurgence in the use of foreign policy role theory as a way to bridge agency and structure (e.g., Harnisch et al. 2011; Thies and Breuning 2012).

Roles in this book become the contents of socialization in the international system. Roles have the advantage of incorporating other possible contents of socialization, including norms, principles, beliefs, and rules. Role theory also provides us with an understanding of how roles are enacted; the kinds of normative expectations that are attached to roles; and, most importantly, the role location process. The role location process occurs when an actor attempts to achieve a role for itself in the system. Every role requires a partner to properly complete its enactment. For example, a regional protector role requires a regional protectee, a bloc leader requires allies to follow it, and so on. This role location process is essentially a role bargaining process, in which ego and alter ego interact to determine an appropriate role. The role bargaining process is the heart of socialization. Socialization is analyzed in this book as a role bargaining process between socializer and socializee.

The empirical research in this book is guided by a socialization “game”— really more of a visual metaphor that models the interaction between a state attempting to pursue a role in the system and its primary socializer. The socialization game incorporates insights from both role theory and dissonance theory. This game imposes a theoretical structure on the socialization process that is absent from previous discussions of socialization in the international relations literature. The socialization game models the role location process for the foreign policy roles that states may pursue in the system.

States pursue these foreign policy roles while occupying one of four master statuses in the international system: novice states, small member states, major member states, and great powers. These master statuses are produced by the interaction of the competition and socialization mechanisms. Hence, Waltz's (1979) insistence on the functional undifferentiation of states is replaced by the differentiation of states into four major categories. This is due to the fact that the incorporation of socialization logically demands that states perform different functions in the system. At the least, some states socialize on behalf of structure, while others are socialized.

I argue that structure exerts its effects on the agents through the constraints imposed by the master statuses on the types of auxiliary foreign policy roles they might adopt. If an auxiliary foreign policy role is consistent with the master status, then it is likely to be accepted by the audience of interested states and the primary socializer. However, if a state chooses a foreign policy role that is inconsistent with its structurally derived master status, then it can expect to have that role rejected by its socializer and the audience of states. This process of socialization at the level of master statuses and auxiliary foreign policy roles works on behalf of structure to maintain conformity and continuity in the international system.

However, the role location process also opens up the possibility for the transformation of structure. The role location process for seeking change in a state's master status typically occurs in the critical juncture brought on by an international crisis. These crises usually produce a war that often leaves the system in flux. In systemic wars, the distribution of capabilities may change, thus altering the structure of the system. Further, socializers may fail in their attempts to ensure conformity on behalf of structure. Rogue states that refuse to conform during the role location process may indeed challenge the very structure of the system. While the notion of revisionist or challenger states is not unknown to classical or postclassical realists, it has not previously been theoretically incorporated into Waltzian neorealism.

The analytic narrative methodology employed in this research to examine these concepts and theories is also interdisciplinary by nature, with roots in economics, history, political science, and sociology. I employ the socialization game as a theoretical searchlight to examine the diplomatic history of the United States and Israel. The history of these states is selectively examined in light of the model. I examine numerous auxiliary foreign policy role location processes within the four master statuses occupied by the United States and the three occupied by Israel during their tenure in the international system.

The analysis uncovers a number of similarities between the two states. As emerging states, both had to force the role of the sovereign state on their primary socializers. As novice states, both sought variations of the neutral role in their international relations. These neutral roles were ultimately rejected by their socializers. Great powers and major members attempted to cast both the United States and Israel in regional roles when they were still relatively new members of the system. The United States was allowed to offer a regional role at a young age, despite its inability to enact the role until it achieved its major member status. Israel was socialized out of its regional role during the Suez Crisis by the United States, and the United States attempted to prevent a regional role for Israel even when it reached the appropriate major member status.

The analysis of the United States as it attains great power status also reveals some interesting findings regarding socialization. As a great power in a multipolar system, the United States was still subject to socialization attempts from other great powers, such as Britain and Germany. The United States twice attempted to enact a neutral role before each of the World Wars, which was inappropriate given its master status. Britain and Germany successfully socialized the United States out of that role on both occasions. At the conclusion of World War II, the United States became one of only two great powers in the bipolar international system. After that point, the United States adopted a number of roles, issued in the form of presidential doctrines, that did not subject it to socialization attempts by the other great power.

The findings from this research make a significant contribution to our understanding of the operation of socialization in the international system. They also begin to bridge the gap between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy. By transforming Waltz's structural model into a genuine systemic theory, I am able to show the extent to which structure constrains foreign policy choices by agents. The most telling case for this claim is the United States, whose range of roles is shaped by different systemic constraints over time. It offered mostly regional roles as a great power in a multipolar system, yet as it entered the bipolar system, it began to offer a truly global role. The US case also demonstrates the constraints of bipolarity, as the same set of roles (what I term “the roles of bipolarity”) is offered by US presidents almost without exception. As the United States emerges into a unipolar system, the main role offered is that of a global leader, with some variations on how to enact that role. The United States has greater freedom of action in enacting its global leader role, as long as it is able to prevent other states from perceiving a threat from its leadership.

In addition to US experience as a great power, we see conformity in the auxiliary foreign policy roles offered by the United States and Israel within their respective master statuses. For example, as major members, both states attempt regional protector and leader roles. As novice states, both attempt to remove themselves from balance of power politics by adopting neutral roles. In both the US and Israeli cases, we see a general match between power status and social status in their role location processes. This reflects the fact that both states have been successfully socialized to the international system—or the “club of nations” (Maoz 1989).

Finally, in this book I examine the interplay of identity and interest in interstate relations. I demonstrate that the socialization process allows us to bridge the gap between constructivists, who emphasize that identity drives state behavior, and rationalists, who argue that interests are the prime motivators for states. The master statuses for states, produced by the interaction of competition and socialization, are identities that shape their subsequent interests in the system. In fact, socializers perform their tasks on behalf of structure to maintain or alter those master identities. The master identities also shape the identities implied in the adoption of auxiliary foreign policy roles.

However, rational interests will often drive the initial adoption of these foreign policy roles, and only later do these roles become enduring parts of a state's social identity. Those roles may then subsequently shape interests as well. For example, the United States adopted the role of regional protector with the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine. One could argue that the adoption of this role was largely shaped by US security and economic interests in the Western Hemisphere; however, over time the regional protector role became an ingrained part of American state social identity. In part, it may explain the affective impact of the crisis triggered by the discovery of missiles in Cuba and later action by Johnson and Reagan to prevent “another Cuba” in the region when the threats to US security were far less serious.

To sum up, I shall try in the following pages to show that an understanding of the socialization process is critical to a more complete understanding of international relations for several reasons. The socialization process lies at the heart of the agent-structure debate. It also sheds light on the current constructivist-rationalist debate. Further, it incorporates a notion of process in a discipline that has long been focused on structure and outcomes. Finally, socialization provides a theoretical link between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy, which have too often proceeded as separate academic enterprises.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

The concept of socialization is a relative newcomer to international relations theory, despite its central importance to social theory and most other social science disciplines. Waltz (1979) was one of the first scholars to recognize the importance of socialization in his structural Theory of International Politics. This is not surprising, since a focus on socialization demands an emphasis on structure, and Waltz was the first international relations scholar to devise a structural theory of international politics.

Waltz's familiar definition of structure has three components: an ordering principle, the functional differentiation of units, and the distribution of capabilities across the units. In a system characterized by an anarchic order, the units of the system will not be differentiated by the functions they perform. This “sameness” effect is due to the formal equality that all states share in a competitive system. Finally, the distribution of capabilities across the units gives us a positional picture of the international system. From this definition of structure, Waltz argues that balances of power will form in the system as a result of the self-interested actions of states attempting to ensure their survival by preventing any one state's drive for universal domination.

Waltz (1979: 74) views the international political structure as a set of constraining conditions. The structure acts as a selector by rewarding some behaviors and punishing others. In this manner, structure limits the kind and quality of outcomes produced by agents in the system despite the varying goals and efforts of those agents. However, structures do not directly produce effects in the system. Structures affect behavior only indirectly through two activities: competition and socialization.

Waltz (1979: 127–128) gives anecdotal evidence for both the competition and socialization propositions. As an example of the effects of competition, Waltz points to the Prussian victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870 that then led the great powers to imitate the Prussian military staff system.¹ As an example of socialization, Waltz indicates that the Bolsheviks had no intentions of conforming to the conventions of diplomacy once they gained power in Russia. Trotsky evidently felt that there would be no need for an ongoing, active foreign ministry. However, as we know, the Bolsheviks did indeed begin to conform to traditional diplomatic practice.

Despite the evident centrality of socialization to Waltz's theory, neither he, nor other neorealists that followed in this research tradition paid much attention to its operation. Neorealists have generally focused on competition as the structural feature that encourages conformity.² Undoubtedly this is because neorealism's primary interest is in structure and not process, and because a focus on unit-level interaction would be seen as reductionist. Competition can be described without examining unit-level interaction based on analogic reasoning from microeconomics. Competition can be described as a situation in which the units find themselves, such as monopolistic, oligopolistic, or perfect competition. The situation of perfect competition generated by the anarchical structure is the standard explanation of why all the units appear and behave similarly in th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Preface
• 1 Improving Structural Theories of International Politics
• 2 Socializing States in the International System
• 3 Socializing the United States: Emergence to Major Member
• 4 Socializing the United States: Structural Imperatives and Great Power Status
• 5 Socializing Israel: Emergence to Major Member
• 6 Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index