Israel's Strategic Agenda

Efraim Inbar

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415413602
• eBook ISBN: 9781317997344
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Divided into two clear parts, the first part of this book examines political and economic factors in the global strategic environment including, the approach of US and EU foreign policies towards Israel, global trends in the field of defence industries and the energy sector and their implications for the Middle East and Israel.

The second part focuses on Israel's strategic agenda as reflected in its military force design and doctrine, the dilemmas the country has faced in the course of fighting its wars of attrition, the relations between military and civil sectors in Israel, the struggle against Israel on the part of non-governmental organizations, Israel's main security challenges and national grand strategy.

This book was previously published as a special issue of Israel Affairs.

American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East: A Necessary Change?

STEVEN R. DAVID

It is difficult to think of a time when the direction of American foreign policy has been more uncertain than in the post-Cold War era. The Soviet Union, that for so long determined American diplomacy, is no more. The importance of Europe is increasingly being questioned by a multicultural United States (US) whose investments and trade flow to Asia, Africa and Latin America are all but ignored by Washington while China is seen by some as a strategic rival and by others as a partner for peace and prosperity. In this changing and confusing world, the only remaining certainty is that no region is as important to the US as the Middle East. The key threats to vital American interests—terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, access to oil—are all rooted in the Middle East. America's current predicament in Iraq and its continuing concern for the security of Israel reinforces this region's paramount importance. With the relative simplicity of the Cold War now gone, few would hazard a guess as to the course of American diplomacy in the years to come, except to recognize that the Middle East is, and will remain, central to American interests. Because of its central importance, it is critical to assess how the US is responding to the dangers and opportunities posed by the Middle East.

Beginning with the end of the Cold War and continuing through the present Bush Administration, American foreign policy towards the Middle East has undergone a subtle but fundamental change. Since the end of World War II, American foreign policy had been dominated by the ‘realist’ concerns of ensuring stability among the Middle Eastern countries by preserving a balance of power. Transforming regimes was less important than influencing their foreign policies, especially when it came to discouraging them from going to war.

This approach made sense during the Cold War when the best way to ensure US interests was to convince countries not to launch attacks on their neighbours. The key threats to American interests from the Middle East in the world now, however, do not stem from the foreign policies of countries. Instead, they originate from internal developments, many of which are beyond the control of their governments. The Bush Administration has responded to these changes by adopting a foreign policy that is more concerned with what happens within countries than what happens between them. It is especially committed to promoting the spread of democracy, even if doing so brings instability in its wake. This is a marked departure from the way the US acted in the past, not only in the Middle East but in terms of its overall foreign policy. Whether this change will benefit America—or Israel—remains to be seen.

This essay begins with an overview of American foreign policy in the Middle East, with particular emphasis on the changes undertaken by the Bush administration. The importance of the neoconservative view in shaping Bush's foreign policy is given special attention. America's vital interests in the Middle East are then considered along with an explanation of why they are threatened more by domestic developments than by the actions states take towards each other. The essay concludes with a brief assessment of the Bush foreign policy both for the US and Israel.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST

Prior to the second Bush Administration, American foreign policy towards the Middle East followed the basic precepts of realism. Realism is a view of the way the world works. For realists, the world is a dangerous place characterized by international anarchy, the conflicting interests of states, and flawed human nature. The realist world is one in which countries must constantly fear for their security since their neighbours possess the ability to harm them, there is no way to divine their intentions, and no international authority (or institution) that will come to their aid if attacked. Realists do not see any opportunity of fundamentally transforming the world, hence realism's pessimistic reputation. Realists, however, do believe that while international war can never be eliminated, its frequency and impact can be lessened.

The best way to do this is through achieving a balance of power among states, both regionally and internationally. Leaders will not go to war against individual states, or groups of states, if they recognize there is a good chance they will lose. By confronting would-be aggressors with overwhelming power, gained either through alliances or individual effort, war is discouraged. For many realists, and especially their contemporary adherents, the neo-realists, the type of regime does not matter. The balancing necessary for stability can occur whether one is dealing with democracies or dictatorships. By balancing power against power, stability is achieved, a goal especially welcome to status quo countries such as the US.¹

American foreign policy towards the Middle East during the Cold War followed realist logic closely, especially through its efforts to influence the foreign policy of Middle Eastern states. The key interests of the US at the time—containing the Soviet Union, preserving access to Middle Eastern oil and protecting Israel—were all threatened by the prospect of interstate war. The fear of war provided the Soviet Union with its best opportunity to extend its influence in the Middle East, since aside from military assistance Moscow had little else to offer the Arab states. The possibility of being attacked from Iran or Iraq, perhaps with Soviet backing, haunted the Saudi regime and its American protectors. Israel had already experienced five wars during the Cold War and understandably feared more for the future.

To safeguard these interests, Washington played by realism's rules and sought to influence the foreign policies of the Middle Eastern states, while protecting its friends from outside aggression. To counter the Soviet threat, the US tried to organize Arab countries into an anti-Soviet alliance. The US also provided military and economic aid to friendly countries (like Jordan and Saudi Arabia) to ensure they remained anti-Soviet. In order to protect the oil fields, the US (under the Carter Administration) made it explicit that Washington viewed the Persian Gulf as a vital American interest, and even threatened the first use of nuclear weapons several times to counter a possible Soviet conventional invasion of the Gulf states.

Protecting Israel from outside attack was a core American concern, especially after 1970 when Jerusalem showed its strategic value by deterring a Syrian invasion of Jordan. American diplomacy, arms sales and technology transfers were undertaken with a view to preventing the creation of a balance of forces in the Middle East that would threaten Israel's core security. The nature of the Middle Eastern regimes, and how they behaved domestically, was of secondary importance to American foreign policy. During the Cold War, the US did not seek, in any meaningful way, to change the character of the Middle Eastern governments. Lip service was paid to promoting democracy, but it was not taken seriously either by the US or the Middle Eastern regimes.²

The end of the Cold War ended America's fixation with the Soviet Union. No longer were Middle Eastern developments seen primarily through the lens of how they affected America's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Instead, the US became more concerned with regional developments, especially the Arab-Israeli peace process and threats to Middle Eastern peace, particularly from Iraq. Both the first Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration pursued these efforts in a manner consistent with realism. The first President Bush intervened against Iraq only after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. The American war against Iraq was halted prior to the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime, in part because it was believed that he could be contained. Saddam may well have been an evil, aggressive leader, but the prospect of overwhelming force used against him would be enough to deter any future expansion. President Clinton pursued the Arab-Israeli peace process with unusual vigour, but his courting of Yasser Arafat did not extend to pressuring the Palestinian leader to adopt democracy. Instead, it was believed that Arafat would recognize that his interests lay in making peace with Israel, despite his autocratic rule. Both efforts collapsed in failure as Saddam Hussein remained a menace and Arafat continued to support terrorism. Realism, at least as practised by the US in the Middle East, was not working.³

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GEORGE W. BUSH

Both in rhetoric and actions, the present Bush administration has largely abandoned the realist approach (at least its neorealist variant) towards the Middle East. Concerns for balance of power and stability, while paying scant attention to the nature of Middle Eastern regimes, have been cast off. In their stead is an aggressive effort to expand democracy, even if the immediate effect is an increase in instability. Much of this new effort has been expressed in the speeches of President George W. Bush and they offer a public blueprint for American foreign policy. One of the first hints of the new Bush approach came in a June 2002 speech that sought to move the Arab-Israeli conflict towards a settlement. In this speech, Bush laid out his vision on how to achieve an Arab-Israeli peace and there was scarcely a realist concept in it. Bush did not talk of balancing power nor did he recite a laundry list of concessions for both sides to make. Rather the heart of the speech called upon the Palestinians to adopt democracy and went so far as to tell them that to do so they would need to remove their present leadership. As Bush argued, ‘Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born. I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror… I call upon them to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty’. Bush went on to discuss, in some detail, what the Palestinians had to do to create a democracy, such as having separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and an effective legislative body.⁴

More than a year later, in one of his most important speeches ever, Bush laid out his strategy for the expansion of democracy, dealing extensively with the Middle East. In a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, Bush argued that a lack of democracy was at the centre of Middle East problems, that the US would no longer support dictatorships, and that neither Islam nor Arab culture was antithetical to democracy. Bush went on to announce a new policy approach, ‘a forward strategy for freedom’, which would extend democracy to the Middle East. In effect, Bush told the Arabs that they no longer faced the choice of backing governments that were corrupt dictatorships or feudal monarchies or Islamic extremist. They now could choose democracy, and if they did, they could count on American support.⁵

Bush crystallized his doctrine in his second inaugural address in January 2005. Again departing from realist notions that it does not matter what kind of government exists in a country so long as it supports American interests and does not threaten its neighbours, Bush proposed a very different vision, a vision in which non-realist concepts such as liberty and freedom take precedence over power. No longer would America have to choose between its ideals and its interests. For Bush, unlike the realists, they have become one. As he said:

We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one… So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.⁶

THE ACTIONS OF GEORGE W. BUSH

Bush's rhetoric in opposition to contemporary realism and in support of spreading democracy has been backed by his actions in the Middle East. Following the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the US, Bush ordered the invasion of Afghanistan and successfully toppled the Taliban regime that had provided refuge to Al Qaeda. The message was clear: regimes that cooperate with terrorists will be destroyed and replaced by democratic governments as part of a plan to create a new Middle East. Following Afghanistan, Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to stop Saddam from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and to spread democracy. Both goals marked a departure from realism. Realists argued that Iraq's apparent possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons did not pose much of a threat because, like all countries, it could be deterred and contained. That Saddam was a murderous dictator who had used chemical weapons on his own people and started two needless wars was beside the point. Saddam, like all leaders, was rational in the sense that he was sensitive to costs. Transforming Iraq into a democracy could not be done, according to the realists, and even if it could, it would not dramatically change the nature of the Iraqi threat.

The Bush administration disagreed, viewing Iraq as a menace so long as Saddam held power. Containment and deterrence would not work because of the nature of the Iraqi regime.⁷ Only by changing the regime would America be safe. Moreover, by transforming Iraq into a democracy—a feat well within America's capabilities—the transformation of other Middle East states would follow, thus lessening or eliminating the threats stemming from them. Throwing realist assumptions to the wind, and faithful to his promise to spread democracy, Bush forcibly removed Saddam and began the process of democratization in Iraq.

Bush's treatment of Yasser Arafat also demonstrated his commitment to democratization over ‘stability’. Under President Clinton, Arafat visited the White House more than any other leader. He was cultivated and flattered, with little effort made to move him towards democratic rule. The assumption was that since Arafat was expected to remain the leader of the Palestinian people, it would be better to work with an imperfect dictator than risk the uncertainties of an unknown successor. Hopes that Arafat would accept a reasonable settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, however, were dashed in the debacle of Camp David, Taba, and the intifada that followed. Once Bush took office, he pursued a markedly different path with Arafat than did Clinton. In the wake of the 9/11 at...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• 1 American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East: A Necessary Change?
• 2 Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel
• 3 China's Upsurge: Implications for the Middle East
• 4 Trends in Middle East Politics and their Implications for Israel
• 5 Global Oil Trends and their Effect on the Middle East
• 6 Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel's Foreign Policy
• 7 Soft Powers Play Hardball: NGOs Wage War against Israel
• 8 Changing Civil-Military Relations in Israel: Towards an Over-subordinate IDF?
• 9 Flexible Force Structure: A Flexibility Oriented Force Design and Development Process for Israel
• 10 Israel's Wars of Attrition: Operational and Moral Dilemmas
• 11 Israel's Palestinian Challenge
• 12 A Breakout Political-Security Grand-Strategy for Israel
• Index