The Politics of Belgium

Institutions and Policy under Bipolar and Centrifugal Federalism

Marleen Brans, Lieven De Winter, Wilfried Swenden

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781317990024
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

For too long Belgium remained an unexplored terrain by comparative political scientists. Belgium's politics were best known through the writings of Arend Lijphart, who considered it a model case of consociationalism. Over the past ten to fifteen years, the analysis of consociationalism has been complemented by a more detailed coverage of Belgium's spectacular transformation process from a unitary into a federal state, moving rapidly now to disintegration. Likewise, several peculiar aspects of Belgian politics, such as the record fragmentation of its party system, have been covered in edited volumes or international journals. However, given the complexity of the Belgian configuration of political institutions and actors, any inclusion of particular aspects of the Belgian case in comparative work calls for an in depth and integrated understanding of the broader political system.

This is the first book which provides such an analysis. It brings together a team of 19 political scientists and sociologists who aim to explain the dynamics and incentives of institutional change and seek to analyze the intricate interplay between the main institutional components of the Belgian body politic. The sociological, political and institutional determinants and the consequences of the "federalisation" process of Belgium is the central theme that links each of the individual chapters. This book will be essential reading for students who want to understand the politics of Belgium and for anyone with a strong interest in West European Politics, comparative politics and comparative federalism.

This book was published as a special issue of West European Politics.

Part I:

Sociological and Institutional Determinants of Policy-Making

‘Will It Stay or Will It Go?’ Federalism and the Sustainability of Belgium

Wilfried Swenden and Maarten Theo Jans

In this article, we situate Belgian federalism in a comparative perspective and analyse its contribution to the sustainability of Belgium. The study is divided into three sections. In the first section, we set out the structure of Belgian federalism and analyse why the federalisation of Belgium did not start until 1970. In the second section, we highlight the specificities of Belgian federalism when put into a comparative perspective and discuss the political dynamics that underpin its further development. In the third section, we list the assets and liabilities of federalism for holding Belgium together, and bring in additional factors that may add to the sustainability of Belgium. On the basis of these assessments we will – cautiously – attempt to predict the political future of Belgium and the contribution of federalism therein.

Why Federalism?

Unlike most of the traditional federations, Belgium did not form as the result of a ‘coming together’ of various states, cantons or colonies into one political unit. As in Spain, in Belgium federalism was perceived as a device to ‘hold together’ (Linz and Stepan 1996) what had become a multinational democratic state. Yet, unlike Spain, Belgium did not devolve powers to newly established regional entities until 1970, that is, more than 50 years after all male Belgian citizens obtained suffrage. Furthermore, by then the centre had long recognised the multi-linguistic nature of the Belgian state. Thus, a first question which concerns us is why federalism is of such recent vintage and why federalism emerged when many of the linguistic grievances which featured so prominently on the agenda of the Flemish Nationalists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were already resolved.

This question can only be answered if we put the federalisation of Belgium into a broader historical perspective and take into account the events which socialised the political agents and influenced their political motives when federalism took off (Witte et al. 2000). First, it took considerable time and effort before Dutch was recognised as one of three official Belgian languages and as the only public language of Flanders. This achievement would not have been possible without the mobilising force of the Flemish Movement, a movement that was closely linked (but not exclusively confined to) Flemish Catholicism. The intransigence of the Belgian centre in recognising Dutch as the only public language of Flanders; in enforcing language laws to this effect; and in offering Dutch-speakers a place in the centre commensurate with their demographic strength (executive and legislative representation, representation in the civil service, military, higher courts and foreign office) contributed to transforming the Flemish Movement from a cultural into a national movement, seeking a form of Flemish self-rule. Several Flemish activists who had been socialised into the more linguistically averse climate of the inter-war period were not willing to reconsider their loyalty vis-à-vis the Belgian state despite the latter’s accommodation of their initially non-territorial grievances. Flemish and Belgian nationalism were increasingly perceived as mutually incompatible goals.

Second, until the late 1950s, Belgian politics was rife with ideological and socio-economic conflict. In the case of the former, such conflicts pitted Catholics against Socialists and Liberals; in the case of the latter they confronted Socialists with Liberals (with the Catholics somehow split between two camps). These ideological and socio-economic cleavages were more salient than the language cleavage, and also cross-cut it (Lijphart 1977; Deschouwer this volume). The widespread secularisation of Belgian society since the 1960s and the accommodation of ideological grievances by granting self-rule to the ideological pillars created a climate in which ideological conflict lost much of its salience (Huyse 1970). Although the consociational mechanisms which contributed to this ideological peace are still in place, the ebbing of the ideological cleavage itself opened up space for political mobilisation along linguistic lines.

Third, in the 1960s, Flemish per capita GDP overtook that of Wallonia for the first time. This strengthened the bargaining position of the Flemish in the centre, for instance, in securing the Flemish character of the Brussels suburbs or in preventing the adoption of socio-economic recovery packages that stood to benefit the suffering Walloon economy. Like many other early industrialised regions of Western Europe, the Walloon coal and steel industries were facing a painful reconversion process. In light thereof, the Walloon Social Democrats and union leaders were hoping to secure funding from the centre. The latter refused it, partly because Flemish union leaders (and Social Democrats) did not support their actions.

Finally, in 1962–63, language laws were adopted which entrenched the character of language zones as Dutch, French, German or bilingual (Dutch and French). Although these laws confirmed legislation that was put in place in the 1930s, they changed the method for determining what language zones a municipality should belong to (Witte and Van Velthoven 2000). This proved to be a particularly contentious issue in and around Brussels. Shortly after it became the capital of the then still officially francophone state, Brussels turned into a predominantly French-speaking urban agglomeration surrounded by Dutch-speaking territory. Improved transport after World War II and immigration from outside Belgium also changed the linguistic composition of the suburbs. Until 1948, language censuses determined whether a city or municipality should remain within its language zone. If the share of adult citizens reporting to speak the language of another zone (i.e. French) was higher than 30 per cent, a municipality could acquire a bilingual character or (for higher percentages even) switch to the other language group. Flemish speakers contested these censuses because they worked against their interests in the Brussels suburbs. The language laws of 1962–63 ‘froze’ the language zones and dispensed with the language census as a method for demarcating the borders. Although some suburbs were forced to offer language facilities in French, they remained a part of the Dutch-speaking language zone (Janssens 2001).

The demarcation and entrenchment of the language zones sparked heated debates in and around Brussels. Ethno-regionalist parties emerged which defended the French-speaking character of Brussels and its suburbs (Front Democratique des Francophones – FDF) or insisted on keeping the suburbs Flemish (Volksunie or People’s Union – VU). Concurrently, the Rassemblement Wallon (RW), a Walloon ethno-regionalist party, campaigned in favour of more socio-economic autonomy for Wallonia, enabling Wallonia to devise the socio-economic policies which it was refused by the centre. These ethno-regionalist forces clearly illustrate two different types of nationalism: cultural-linguistic (Flanders) and socio-economic (Wallonia). At the height of their electoral successes, the FDF received close to 40 per cent of the vote in and around Brussels, the VU close to 20 per cent in Flanders and the RW close to 15 per cent in Wallonia. The rise of these parties put the state-wide Belgian party organisations – Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats – under such pressure that all of them broke up along linguistic lines between 1968 and 1978. Without an organisational linkage with the ideologically related parties across the language border, parties were free to adopt a radical approach vis-à-vis the other language group and take away much of the electoral support for FDF, VU or RW. However, the regionalisation of the party system increased the salience of the ethno-regionalist cleavage and thus created the conditions for federalism. In Belgium, the split of the parties precedes the transformation of the Belgian state from a unitary into a federal one. In this sense, the Belgian experience does not support the thesis that changes in the territorial structure of the state cause shifts in the territorial structure of the party system (Chhibber and Kollman 2004). Rather, political elites have used federalism as a mechanism to recapture lost electoral support and control policies for which consensus was lacking at the national level (Tsebelis 1990; Van Houten 2004).

Belgian Federalism: Institutional Architecture and Dynamics

The transformation of Belgium into a federal state took several decades. Table 1 in the introduction to this volume provides a schematic overview of that process. We have summarised the main features of Belgian federalism in the following points.

A Federation Based on Communities and Regions

The intensity of the language cleavage explains why the first steps towards devolution resulted in granting some autonomy to three language Communities (the Dutch-, French- and German-speaking¹) and not to ten administrative provinces. Provinces existed from 1831 and by 1970 each had had directly elected assemblies and executives for a considerable period of time. Autonomy for the language communities complied much better with the demands of the Flemish nationalists. However, devolving powers to language communities was always going to be difficult in Brussels, where both language groups live side by side. Furthermore, French-speakers were less united in their drive towards regional autonomy. For French-speakers who lived in and around Brussels, linguistic concerns played the upper hand. French-speakers elsewhere were more likely to support regionalism as a means to increase autonomy in socio-economic matters. In addition to being more weakly developed than its Flemish counterpart, Walloon nationalism was driven more strongly by a desire to expand socio-economic rather than cultural autonomy.

The more fragmented aspirations of the French-speaking Belgians and the presence of two distinct drivers of regionalism gave rise to a very complex and asymmetric form of federalism. The creation of three language Communities – Flemish-, French- and German-speaking – complied with the Flemish demands for more cultural autonomy. This was so despite its economic dominance when federalism set in. The territorial boundaries of these Communities are not clear-cut: the Flemish and French Communities stretch into Brussels. This in part non-territorial form of federalism sets Belgium apart from other federations where the territorial nature of the subunits is unambiguous.

In contrast, the creation of three Regions follows a strictly territorial logic. Regions comply better with the aspirations of the leading Walloon politicians, who prioritised regional autonomy in socio-economic matters. The Flemish and Walloon Regions acquired legislative powers in 1980, the Brussels Capital Region not until 1988–89 – at least ten years after a form of Community autonomy was agreed upon. This delay reflected the fears of the Flemish party leaders who believed that a federal structure built on three Regions would turn the state-wide Flemish demographic majority on its head. In Brussels Flemish-speakers represent barely 15 per cent of the population. Therefore, the Flemish only consented to turning Brussels into a third Region after it was agreed that the Dutch-speaking minority in Brussels would be offered consociational protective devices similar to those from which the French-speaking minority benefited at the federal level (Deschouwer this volume; Swenden and Brans 2006). Furthermore, although Brussels was granted regional status in 1989, in legal terms the legislative acts which emanate from the Brussels Capital Region (‘ordinances’) do not stand on equal terms with those deriving from the other regional assemblies (‘decrees’). Ordinances are subject to limited judicial review by the ordinary courts (Alen and Ergec 1993).

Federalism as a Top-Down Process

The federalisation of Belgium has occurred in steps, did not start from a clear blueprint (it took 18 years before all the federal units were fully operational) and has been managed from the centre. Any formal decision to increase the powers of the regions rests with the central parliament alone, albeit often with special majorities (see Deschouwer this volume). The political elites who controlled the central executive (i.e. the ministers in the central executive and the leaders of the parties which they represent) played the lead role in turning Belgium into a federal state. Paradoxically, whereas since 1993 the regional parliaments must endorse international treaties which affect their domestic competencies, their approval is not yet required for proposed changes to the constitution or special majority laws affecting their competencies (see Deschouwer this volume for the meaning of special majorities). The major language communities hold a mutual veto power in the centre. This way, the French-speakers ensured that their demographic (and increasingly also socio-economic) minority position would not lead to their political marginalisation. That said, the input of the Brussels Capital Region, let alone the German-speaking Community at that level is minimal. Since federal MPs represent linguistically split parties which do not campaign across the language border, they are not likely to scale back the current levels of regional autonomy. The requirement that both language groups must approve changes to the federal structure of Belgium largely compensates for the Senate’s failure to represent specific Community or Regional interests.

Federalism without Fragmenting Political Control

Next to ensuring that reforming t...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Series Page
• Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• The Politics of Belgium: Institutions and Policy under Bipolar and Centrifugal Federalism
• Part I Sociological and Institutional Determinants of Policy-Making
• Policy Performance and Policy Reform
• Index